S055840, Opinion — State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. J. W.

292
Argued and submitted June 25, decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed;
appeal dismissed September 18, 2008
In the Matter of J. W.,
aka J.M., a Minor Child.
STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT
OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
Respondent on Review,
v.
J.W.,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9511834861; CAA136927; SC S055840)
193 P3d 20
CJS, Infants § 86.
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Stuart Spring, Juvenile Rights Project, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.
Jamie K. Contreras, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.
With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General,
and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
* Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Linda Hughes, Referee.
Court of Appeals Order of Dismissal dated November 15, 2007.

Cite as 345 Or 292
WALTERS,J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
appeal is dismissed.

294 	State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. J. W.
WALTERS,J.
In this case we consider the appealability of a deci-
sion of a juvenile court referee in a juvenile dependency
proceeding.
This proceeding began when the Department of
Human Services (DHS) filed a petition alleging that a child
was 	within 	the jurisdiction 	of the 	Multnomah 	County
Juvenile Court. As amended, the petition included allega-
tions that child's mother had emotional problems that nega-
tively had affected child, that mother had failed to provide for
the dental needs of child, and that, on one or more occasions,
the family had been without food. The petition also contained
allegations that child's father had engaged in domestic vio-
lence that put child at risk and criminal conduct that
impaired father's ability to care for child.
Mother appeared at a hearing before Multnomah
County Juvenile Court Judge Wyatt. On September 6, 2007,
Wyatt completed and entered a form document, and, by
checking a box in the heading of that document, indicated
that she was entering "Findings and Orders Regarding One
Parent." In the body of that document, Wyatt stated that the
previously described allegations in the petition regarding
mother were true and that "child & mother have special
needs[,] & mother needs the services of the court & DHS to
meet this child's basic and special needs and care." Those
findings were relevant to a finding that child was within the
jurisdiction of the court pursuant to ORS 419B.100(1)(d);1
however, Wyatt did not check the box on the form document
indicating that she had reached that conclusion. Wyatt
ordered that the case be "reviewed by * * * [t]he [c]ourt" on
1 ORS 4198.100(1) provides, in part:
"Except as otherwise provided in subsection {6) of this section and ORS
107. 726, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in any case
involving a person who is under 18 years of age and:
''* * * * *
"(d) Who is dependent for care and support on a public or private child-
caring agency that needs the services of the court in planning for the best inter-
est of the person[.]"

Cite as 345 Or 292 (2008) 	295
September 18, 2007, before "Ref Hughes" for a joint settle-
ment conference, "disposition as to mom," and review. Wyatt
signed the form document above a 	line titled "Judicial
Officer."
Hughes, who is a juvenile court referee, conducted
the September 18, 2007, proceedings, and set out her decision
on a form identical to that used by Wyatt. However, Hughes
checked a box to give her document the heading "Judgment
Establishing Dependency Jurisdiction and Disposition." In
the body of that document, Hughes found that father had
failed to appear and that the previously described allegations
pertaining to him were true. Like Wyatt, Hughes did not
check the box indicating that she found child to be within the
jurisdiction of the court pursuant to ORS 419B.100, but
Hughes did check boxes indicating that she was making child
a ward of the court and appointing DHS the guardian of
child. Hughes stated that child was doing fine in mother's
care, and she required both parents to participate in specified
services. Hughes set the case for further review and signed
the document on September 18, 2007, above the line entitled
"Judicial Officer." A statement at the end of the form pro-
vided that "[a]ny order entered by a Referee shall become
final unless a written request for a rehearing, before a Judge,
is filed within 10 days of the Referee's order."
Mother 	did not file 	a 	request for 	a 	rehearing.
She did file two notices of appeal, one appealing the Wyatt
"Findings and Orders Regarding One Parent" and the other
appealing the Hughes "Judgment Establishing Dependency
Jurisdiction and Disposition." Both notices were assigned the
same case number in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause
why the appeal should not be dismissed, for the reason that
the Wyatt decision "does not appear to be an appealable order
under ORS 419A.200(1)." Mother conceded that the Wyatt
decision was not appealable, but she asserted that the
Hughes decision met the statutory criteria. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the Wyatt "order" was not subject to
appeal, and it dismissed the case. Mother filed a motion to
reconsider, directing the court's attention to her appeal of the

296 	State ex rel Juv. 	v.J.W.
'judgment" entered by Hughes. The state filed a response,
agreeing that the Hughes 'judgment" was appealable. The
Court of Appeals nevertheless denied reconsideration, rea-
soning that "[a] judgment signed by a referee is not appeala-
ble" and that "[a]ppellant has not shown that she requested a
rehearing within 10 days of the judgment." Mother sought
review, which we allowed to address the appealability of the
"judgment" entered by Hughes. 2
Juvenile court proceedings are governed by chapter
419 of the Oregon Revised Statutes. ORS 419A.200(1) pro-
vides that "any person or entity * * * whose rights or duties
are adversely affected by a judgment of the juvenile court
may appeal therefrom."3 (Emphasis added.) The document
that Hughes signed adversely affects the rights of appellant,
and therefore it may be appealed under ORS 419A.200 ifit is
a 'judgment" of the juvenile court. ORS 419A.205(1) defines a
'judgment" for purposes of appeal:
"For the purpose of being appealed, the following are
judgments:
"(a) 	Ajudgment finding a child or youth to be within
the jurisdiction of the court;
"(b) 	A judgment disposing of a petition including, but
not limited to, a disposition under ORS 419B.325 or
419C.411;
"(c) 	Any final disposition of a petition; and
"(d) 	A final order adversely affecting the rights or
duties of a party and made in a proceeding after judgment
including, but not limited to, a final order under ORS
419B.449 or 419B.476."
(Emphases added.)
2 Mother did not seek review of the ruling of the Court of Appeals as to Wyatt's
decision, and we do not decide whether that order was appealable.
3 ORS 419A.200(1) provides, in full:
"Except as provided in ORS 419A.190, any person or entity, including, but
not limited to, a party to a juvenile court proceeding under ORS 419B.875(1) or
419C.285(1), whose rights or duties are adversely affected by a judgment of the
juvenile court may appeal therefrom. An appeal from a circuit court must be
taken to the Court of Appeals, and an appeal from a county court must be taken
to the circuit court."

Cite as 345 Or 292 (2008) 	297
The parties begin their arguments from the same
foundation-paragraphs (a) and (b) of ORS 419A.205(1). 4
The parties agree that, as to paragraph (a), the Hughes deci-
sion was a finding that child was "within the jurisdiction of
the court," 5 and the state does not dispute that, as to para-
graph (b), the Hughes decision was a decision disposing of a
petition 	under 	ORS 	419B.325. 	The 	parties' 	arguments
diverge, however, as to whether those decisions were "judg-
ments," as that term is used in those paragraphs.
Mother argues that no statute prohibits a referee
from entering a judgment. The term "judgment" as used in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of ORS 419A.205(1) may be only a
descriptor of the decision referred to in those paragraphs.
Under that construction, as long as the decision that a referee
makes is a decision of the type described, and the decision is
labeled a "judgment," it is arguable that the decision is a
judgment subject to appeal. 	Therefore, because Hughes
found child to be within the jurisdiction of the court and dis-
posed of a petition, the document that she entered, which was
labeled 	a 	judgment, 	arguably 	met 	the 	terms 	of ORS
419A.205(1)(a) and (b). Furthermore, mother contends that,
although there is a statute, ORS 419A.150(7), that permits
rehearing of a decision of a referee, 6 that statute does not
require rehearing or make rehearing a prerequisite to an
appeal.
Acknowledging that it has changed its position since
the matter was heard by the Court of Appeals, the state
responds that ORS 419A.150, the statute authorizing juve-
nile referees to conduct juvenile court proceedings, permits
4 Mother asserted in her petition to this court that the Hughes decision was
also appealable under ORS 419A.205(1)(c). At oral argument, mother abandoned
that argument, and we do not address it.
5 As noted, Hughes did not check the box indicating that she found child to be
within the jurisdiction of the court. However, the parties have assumed that the
factual findings Hughes made were sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
6 ORS 419A.150(7) provides:
"At any time prior to the expiration of 10 days after the entry of the order
and findings of a referee into the court register, a child, ward, youth, youth
offender, the parent, guardian, district attorney, Department of Human
Services, juvenile department or other party affected by the order may request
rehearing. The request for rehearing must be served upon all parties by the
party requesting the rehearing."

298 	State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. J. W.
referees to enter orders, but not judgments; judgments may
be entered only by judges. Further, the state argues, mother's
failure to seek rehearing of the Hughes decision under ORS
419A.150(7) precludes her appeal.
As is apparent, the parties differ over the meaning of
the term "judgment" as that term is used in the statute gov-
erning appeals of juvenile court decisions, ORS 419A.205.
The parties' arguments focus on the text of that statute and
the context in which it is used in chapter 419A, which gov-
erns juvenile court proceedings. However, chapter 419A is
not the only chapter of the Oregon Revised Statutes that
addresses 	the 	appealability 	of juvenile 	court 	decisions.
Chapter 18 governs the appealability ofjudgments generally,
and, as explained below, three of the statutes in that chapter
are determinative here.
The first statute requires the creation of a ''judgment
document." ORS 18.035(2) provides that, in "juvenile pro-
ceedings under ORS chapters 419A, 419B and 419C, the
judge shall ensure that ajudgment document complying with
ORS 18.038 and 18.048 is created and filed." (Emphases
added.)
The second statute requires that, with one exception
not applicable here, ajudgment document must contain the
signature of a judge. ORS 18.038(4)(c) provides that "[a] judg-
ment document must include" "[t]he signature of the judge
rendering the judgment, or the signature of the court admin-
istrator if the court administrator is authorized by law to sign
the judgment document***."
The 	third 	statute, 	ORS 	18.245, 	sets 	forth 	the
requirements of chapter 18 that are ''jurisdictional for the
purposes of appeal of a judgment[.]" ORS 18.245 lists those
requirements:
"( 1) 	The judgment document for the judgment must be
plainly titled as a judgment as required by ORS 18.038(1).
"(2) 	The judgment document for the judgment must
comply with the requirements of ORS 18.038(4).
"(3) 	The court administrator for the circuit court ren-
dering the judgment must note in the register of the court

Cite as 345 Or 292 (2008) 	299
that the judgment document has been filed, as required by
ORS 18.058(1)."
As noted, one of the requirements of ORS 18.038(4) is that
the document be signed by the judge who rendered the
judgment.
The statute upon which the parties premise their
arguments, ORS 419A.205, was enacted in 2001. See Or
Laws 2001, ch 480, § 2 (enacting text of statute). 7 Thereafter,
the legislature adopted the three statutes we have set forth
above. See Or Laws 2003, ch 576, §§ 3, 4 (enacting original
versions of ORS 18.035 and ORS 18.038); Or Laws 2005,
ch 568, § 2 (enacting ORS 18.245). Because the legislature's
most recent enactments control, see Col. R.-L. Bridge Co. v.
Wellington, 140 Or 413, 417, 13 P2d 1075 (1932) (noting that
"the last expression of the legislative will controls"), and
because the legislature in ORS chapter 18 made a judicial
signature a prerequisite to an appeal, we need not decide
whether ORS 419A.205 also imposes a requirement that a
judge enter the decision to be appealed. Under ORS 18.035,
ORS 18.038, and ORS 18.245, a judgment must be signed by
a judge, and the absence of a judge's signature is a jurisdic-
tional defect.
The final issue for our consideration is whether the
Hughes decision satisfies the judicial signature requirement
of ORS 18.038(4). We take judicial notice that, at the time
that she signed the document in this case, Hughes had been
appointed not only as a juvenile court referee, but also as a
circuit court judge pro tern for Multnomah County. However,
Wyatt set the September 18, 2007, hearing before "Ref'
Hughes, and, on this record, we are unable to conclude that
Hughes signed the "judgment" in any capacity other than as
a referee. We therefore hold that the Hughes ')udgment" is
not appealable 8 and that the Court of Appeals correctly dis-
missed mother's appeal.
7 The legislature made minor amendments to ORS 419A.205 in 2003. See Or
Laws 2003, ch 348, § 1 (changing "child" to "child or youth," and adding references
to ORS 419C.411); Or Laws 2003, ch 396, § 29 (also changing "child" to "child or
youth").
8 Our experience with this case suggests that it may be worthwhile for the
bench and bar to review forms used in juvenile dependency proceedings to consider
whether they should be modified in light of current statutory requirements. For
example, the form used in this case does not appear to include a heading that would

300 	State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. J. W.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
appeal is dismissed.
---- --·---····""·-----------
permit a judge to enter a "judgment" finding that a child is within the jurisdiction
of the court without also entering a disposition. Similarly, the form does not appear
to include a heading that would permit a referee to enter an "order" of jurisdiction
or disposition, other than an "Order Regarding One Parent." The form also may not
specifically or correctly indicate the role of the person who signs it. See ORS 1.210
(defining "judicial officer" to be "a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of
justice").