Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.

No. 24 	December 10, 2019 	543
IN THE OREGON TAX COURT
REGULAR DIVISION
John T. HOGGARD
and Mary T. Burry,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
State of Oregon,
Defendant.
(TC 5336)
Following the court’s order in Hoggard I v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 406 (2019)
(Hoggard I), Plaintiffs submitted a request for attorney fees, costs and disburse-
ments. After reviewing the factors enumerated in ORS 20.075, the court deter-
mined that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees, costs, and disbursements
because the county assessor’s legal position was objectively unreasonable and an
award of fees in this case would deter assessors from asserting similar positions
in the future. The court agreed with Defendant that any award of fees should
be capped at amounts attributable to the timeliness issue in Hoggard I, except
that the court also awarded to Plaintiffs reimbursement for the fees incurred
by Plaintiffs’ counsel in requesting the fee award. The court also awarded costs
and disbursements to Plaintiff for charges related to requesting and obtaining
public records. However, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ request for fees for “post-
judgment proceedings.”
Submitted on Plaintiffs’ Request for Award of Attorney
Fees, Costs, and Disbursements.
Jason 	A. 	Wright 	and 	Melina 	Martinez, 	Richardson
Wright LLP, Portland, filed the request for Plaintiff.
Daniel Paul, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Depart-
ment of Justice, Salem, filed the response for Defendant.
Decision rendered for Plaintiff December 10, 2019.
ROBERT T. MANICKE, Judge.
This opinion should be read in conjunction with
this court’s order dated June 7, 2019 (the June 7 Order); the
facts recited below supplement those in the June 7 Order.
Following judgment entered June 26, 2019, Plaintiffs (tax-
payers) have filed a statement of attorney fees under ORS

544 	Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.
305.490(4)1 and ORS 20.105. Taxpayers seek: (1) $29,956.50
in fees incurred to date; (2) costs and disbursements of
$768.25; and (3) an additional $3,600 in anticipated fees that
taxpayers estimate they will incur in “post-judgment pro-
ceedings.” Defendant Department of Revenue (the depart-
ment) argues that no fees or costs are warranted, and that in
any event the attorney fee statutes “cap” the amount of any
award.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Taxpayers initially appealed to the Magistrate
Division from a “Notice of Omitted Property” that the
Clackamas County Assessor mailed to them on June 29,
2017. That notice informed taxpayers that any appeal
must be filed by October 17, 2017, but taxpayers appealed
on December 19, 2017, which was within 90 days after
they received their annual property tax bill. The assessor
defended the accuracy of the October 17 deadline before the
magistrate and maintained that position in a motion to dis-
miss even after (1) the assessor’s counsel cautioned that the
notice procedure on which the deadline was based was “vul-
nerable to a challenge”; and (2) the department informed
the assessor unambiguously that the assessor’s notice pro-
cedure was inconsistent with the statute and failed to trig-
ger any appeal deadline. Before the magistrate ruled on the
assessor’s motion to dismiss, Taxpayers conceded that their
appeal was untimely and sought relief under an alternative
statute that required them to prove “good and sufficient
cause” for having filed late. Even after taxpayers publicly
revealed substantial personal information about health and
family problems in an effort to prove good and sufficient
cause, the assessor did not concede that the June 29, 2017,
notice was ineffective and that there was no October 17
deadline. The magistrate dismissed taxpayers’ case for
two reasons: because taxpayers had conceded that their
complaint was untimely, and because they failed to show
“good and sufficient cause” for late-filing relief under ORS
305.288(5).
1 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to
2017.

Cite as 23 OTR 543 (2019) 	545
Taxpayers represented themselves in the Magis-
trate Division but hired counsel to appeal to the Regular
Division. In this division, taxpayers alleged that their com-
plaint in the Magistrate Division was timely, and they also
challenged the addition of omitted property on the merits.
The department’s answer in this division admitted that
taxpayers had filed their Magistrate Division complaint
timely. The parties undertook factual investigations and
negotiations over the underlying omitted property dispute
but failed to resolve it. The assessor then withdrew the
omitted property assessment, subject to the possibility of
issuing a new notice at some future date. Taxpayers filed
a motion that the court treated as a motion for summary
judgment, and the department resisted on the grounds that
the case was moot because (1) the department had admit-
ted that the Magistrate Division complaint was timely, and
(2) the assessor had withdrawn the assessment. The court’s
June 7 Order expressly “found in favor” of taxpayers that
their Magistrate Division complaint had been timely, but
the order did not reach the merits of the omitted property
dispute.
II. 	ISSUES
(1) 	Is any fee award limited to the amount related to
the timeliness of taxpayers’ appeal to the Magistrate
Division?
(2) 	Should the court award fees attributable to timeliness?
(3) 	What amount of fees is appropriate?
(4) 	May costs and expenses include the public records
charge that Clackamas County imposed on taxpayers
to obtain internal emails?
(5) 	May a fee award include taxpayers’ claim for “post-
judgment proceedings”?
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Fees are “capped” at amounts attributable to timeliness
issue.
The department asserts that, because it admit-
ted in its answer in the Regular Division that taxpayers’

546 	Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.
complaint in the Magistrate Division was timely, any fee
award is “capped” at $5,877.50, which is the amount tax-
payers claim to have incurred through the date on which
taxpayers’ counsel reviewed the department’s answer. The
department thus asserts that fees attributable to the under-
lying dispute over potential omitted property are not eligi-
ble for an award because the court has not “found in favor”
of taxpayers, nor are they “prevailing” parties with respect
to that issue. (Citing Comcast Corp. V v. Dept. of Rev., 23
OTR 8 (2018).)
The court agrees in principle with the department’s
analysis that a cap applies. Taxpayers’ fee statement shows
extensive services related to obtaining facts about whether
any omitted property exists and the value of any work on the
property, hosting a site inspection, and settlement negotia-
tions. The court’s June 7 Order expressly left a ruling on the
underlying omitted property issue for another day, should
the county assessor issue a new notice that taxpayers choose
to contest.
B. 	Whether to Award Fees Attributable to Timeliness?
The court now applies the standards governing ORS
305.490(4)(a)2 to determine whether to award fees through
October 3, 2018, when taxpayers’ counsel reviewed the
department’s answer. ORS 305.490(4)(a) provides:
“If, in any proceeding before the tax court judge involv-
ing ad valorem property taxation, exemptions, special
assessments or omitted property, the court finds in favor of
the taxpayer, the court may allow the taxpayer, in addition
to costs and disbursements, the following:
“(A) 	Reasonable attorney fees for the proceeding under
this subsection and for the prior proceeding in the matter,
if any, before the magistrate; and
2 The court’s authority under ORS 305.490(4) is discretionary, while ORS
20.105 requires a fee award in favor of a “prevailing party” if the court finds that
there was “no objectively reasonable basis” for a party’s position. As applied to
this case, however, ORS 20.105 appears to provide no greater prospect of relief to
taxpayers than would be available under ORS 305.490(4), as the court must apply
the factors in ORS 20.075 regardless. See McKee v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR 58, 65
(2004) (“The rights under ORS 20.105 do not appear to exceed those under ORS
305.490.”).

Cite as 23 OTR 543 (2019) 	547
“(B) 	Reasonable expenses as determined by the court.
Expenses include fees of experts incurred by the individual
taxpayer in preparing for and conducting the proceeding
before the tax court judge and the prior proceeding in the
matter, if any, before the magistrate.”
The court notes that, although the conduct that caused the
court to find in favor of taxpayers regarding dismissal of
their complaint in the Magistrate Division involved the
Clackamas County Assessor, the legislature has decided that
it is the department that must pay any fees, consistent with
the department’s supervisory authority. See ORS 305.490
(4)(b) (“Payment of attorney fees or reasonable expenses under
this subsection shall be made by the Department of Revenue
* * *.”); ORS 306.115(1) (department to exercise “supervision
and control” over property tax system of the state).
The court considers the factors in ORS 20.075(1)
when deciding whether to award fees, and, if so, the fac-
tors in ORS 20.075(2) to determine the amount. See Seneca
Sustainable Energy, LLC III v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 22,
28 (2018). The assessor’s persistence in asserting that tax-
payers’ complaint in the Magistrate Division was untimely
raises questions primarily under the factors in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of ORS 20.075(1) (parties’ conduct and objective
reasonableness of their positions). No later than the initial
case management conference on February 1, 2018, the cur-
rent assessor’s predecessor first had reason to doubt his posi-
tion, based on a written report from the employee who par-
ticipated in that hearing, which concluded: “The Magistrate
seemed fairly certain that 2 separate notices are required.”
Within a few days, on February 6, 2018, the assessor’s attor-
ney described the assessor’s position as “vulnerable” 3 and
recommended changing the notice procedure prospectively
in a manner consistent with the department’s longstanding
rule. Some three months later, the assessor’s office asked
the department about the notice procedure by email dated
3 The attorney’s advice states that the assessor is “vulnerable to a challenge
to the sufficiency of our process in a timely-filed complaint,” apparently in the
belief that taxpayers’ complaint was untimely despite any error in the assessor’s
procedures. (Emphasis added.) The advice does not, however, indicate how the
complaint could have been untimely if, as the department’s later communications
indicated, the assessor’s flawed notice procedure failed to trigger any deadline for
appeal.

548 	Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.
April 9, 2018. The department responded five weeks after
that, by email dated May 17, 2018, plainly stating that a
correction of the tax roll due to the discovery of omitted
property “is not considered complete until the taxpayer is
given the 2nd notice (OAR 150-311-0220).” At this point, the
assessor had effectively been told by her supervising state
agency that the October 17, 2017, appeal deadline stated in
the notice her predecessor had sent to taxpayers was wrong;
because the assessor’s predecessor had failed to send two
notices, no appeal deadline had ever arisen.4 Nearly two
months remained before the magistrate issued his final
decision of dismissal on July 12, 2018. The assessor had the
opportunity to withdraw her motion to dismiss and to issue
new notices in compliance with ORS 311.223(2) and the
department’s instructions, but she did not do so. Instead,
the assessor observed taxpayers seeking to prove reason-
able cause for what they thought was a failure to file timely,
a failure that the department had told her was not real. As
part of their effort, taxpayers put detailed personal infor-
mation about their health conditions and those of family
members into the public record. However, the assessor did
not come forward to acknowledge her error. At this point,
there was a chance that the assessor’s error would become
moot, either because taxpayers might succeed in proving
reasonable cause and move on to the merits of the omitted
property/value dispute, or because taxpayers might fail to
prove reasonable cause and simply give up. Taxpayers did
fail to prove reasonable cause, but they did not give up. They
appealed instead to this division, and only after that appeal
commenced did any of the facts about the assessor’s knowl-
edge of her erroneous deadline come to light. With respect
to the first factor in ORS 20.075(1), the court stops short of
determining that the assessor’s conduct was “reckless, will-
ful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal,” mindful of the rel-
atively spare record in this case. However, the court finds
the assessor’s conduct disturbing and likely to erode the
public confidence that all taxing authorities need in order
to do their job effectively. With respect to the second factor,
4 As explained in the June 7 Order, the department does not contest that
a 90-day window for appeal began to run on October 10, 2017, when the asses-
sor mailed the annual tax statement to taxpayers; taxpayers filed within that
window.

Cite as 23 OTR 543 (2019) 	549
the court finds that the assessor’s defense of untimeliness
became objectively unreasonable no later than the date of
the department’s email advice to the assessor.
With respect to the third and fourth factors in ORS
20.075(1) (deterrence), the court concludes that an attorney
fee award would likely reinforce the existing case law by
reminding parties that even a position that initially seems
sound can become objectively unreasonable due to events
that occur after litigation has started. See, e.g., Dimeo v.
Gesik, 197 Or App 560, 562, 106 P3d 697 (2005) (“[A] party
has a continuing duty to evaluate its position throughout the
course of litigation. It is possible that a claim that was objec-
tively reasonable when asserted may become unreasonable
when viewed in light of additional evidence or changes in
the law.”); Patton II v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR 256, 259 (2005).
Conversely, the court finds it unlikely that a fee award would
chill an assessor, or any party, from asserting or maintain-
ing a reasonable claim or defense. Regarding the fifth and
sixth factors (objective reasonableness of the parties during
the litigation and in pursuing settlement), the court is not
aware of any evidence that taxpayers, the assessor, or the
department behaved unreasonably during the period lead-
ing up to the department’s answer in this division, except for
the assessor’s maintenance of an objectively unreasonable
position as discussed above. The seventh factor (a prevailing
party fee under ORS 20.190) is inapplicable here. Overall,
the first four factors weigh strongly in favor of an attorney
fee award, and the last three factors are neutral.
Before moving to the amount of taxpayers’ request
for fees, the court pauses to consider the department’s argu-
ment that “plaintiffs bear some responsibility for the out-
come in the Magistrate Division” because they admitted
their complaint was untimely. The department cites ORS
20.075(1)(h), the “catch-all” factor that the court may exam-
ine in order to decide whether to award fees. This argument
is not well taken. The court finds it significant that taxpayers
did not voluntarily dismiss their appeal in the Magistrate
Division; rather, they ceased to pursue one of two avenues
for that appeal. The normal avenue to appeal requires a tax-
payer to file a complaint in the Magistrate Division within
90 days after the roll has been corrected. ORS 311.223(4).

550 	Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.
The assessor’s June 29, 2017, notice stated on its face that
that deadline was October 17, 2017. The assessor insisted in
the Magistrate Division that that deadline was correct, even
after the magistrate questioned that in a hearing, and even
after obtaining increasingly clear advice and direction that
the deadline was incorrect. To pursue that issue would have
required taxpayers to analyze and present a legal argument
challenging the sufficiency of the notice. Taxpayers instead
conceded that avenue of appeal and tried to make the fac-
tual argument that their untimely filing was due to “good
and sufficient cause,” an effort that failed. The court rec-
ognizes that a party is responsible for managing its own
case, but whatever weight the court might otherwise give
to taxpayers’ concession that their appeal under the nor-
mal avenue was untimely is completely extinguished by
the assessor’s ongoing failure to admit that her own stated
deadline for appeal was wrong. The assessor had time to
make that admission before the magistrate issued a final
decision, but the assessor chose not to do so. The court will
award attorney fees, limited to fees related to the issue of
the timeliness of taxpayers’ complaint in the Magistrate
Division.
C. 	Amount of Fee Award
The court now turns to the amount of fees as spec-
ified in ORS 20.075(2). As an initial matter, the court con-
cludes that more fees may be allowed than the cap amount
that the department describes ($5,877.50), because the
department did not include fees attributable to requesting
reimbursement for fees. See Seneca Sustainable Energy,
LLC III v. Dept. of Rev., 23 OTR 22, 56 (2018) (reiterating
that “fees on fees” are eligible for an award). The court finds
that the time entries for February 14, March 8, June 12,
June 28, and the four time entries on July 9 and 10, 2019,
are substantially related to seeking fee reimbursement and
add up to $3,482.50 in addition to the amount of the cap the
department cites. 5 With this aggregate maximum amount
5 In addition, the court includes one post-answer time entry in the amount
of $135, for October 16, 2018, because that time appears entirely dedicated to
using records obtained from Clackamas County in a public records request, as
discussed below.

Cite as 23 OTR 543 (2019) 	551
in mind ($9,495), the court now reviews the statutory factors
relevant to the amount of a fee award.
Subsection (2) of ORS 20.075 first directs the court
to consider the same factors just discussed. The foregoing
analysis does not indicate any basis to reduce the fee award
below the amount actually and reasonably incurred through
taxpayers’ review of the answer. Regarding paragraph (a)
(time required, difficulty, and skill needed for the task),
the court finds that reconstructing what happened in the
Magistrate Division, based on an informal process and in
consultation with clients who are not lawyers and were not
represented in the Magistrate Division, would not have been
an easy or routine task. Figuring out the flaw in the asses-
sor’s argument and probing for evidence to show that the
assessor discovered the flaw during the case, required skill
and experience. The court does not consider paragraph (b)
(whether this case precluded taxpayers’ counsel from taking
other cases) particularly relevant, as counsel is part of a law
firm with staff, the matter is not large, and taxpayers are
individuals whom counsel describes as existing clients and
who thus are not likely to create a conflict of interest that
precludes taking other cases. Regarding paragraph (c), the
hourly rates charged are not excessive for the Portland area,
based on taxpayers’ uncontested market data. Regarding
paragraph (d), the amount of fees related to the dismissal
issue is substantially higher than the amount of tax actu-
ally refunded ($3,866.73), but the court must take into
account that an annual additional tax amount attributable
to the purported roll change may continue to be charged for
years—perhaps many years—into the future. Paragraph (e)
refers to the time limitations imposed by the client (of which
there is no evidence) or the circumstances of the case. In this
case, taxpayers’ counsel had to act quickly to file the com-
plaint in this division because of the short, 60-day deadline
to appeal from a Magistrate Division decision. However, the
court sees no evidence that the deadline affected the amount
counsel billed. Paragraph (e) is a neutral factor. Paragraph (f)
(client relationship) also is neutral: the fact that counsel
knows taxpayers well may have made counsel’s work more
efficient, but the court also assumes that that efficiency
is reflected in counsel’s higher hourly rate. Paragraph (g)

552 	Hoggard II v. Dept. of Rev.
(counsel’s experience level) already is reflected in paragraph
(a) above. Regarding paragraph (h) (fixed or contingent fee),
taxpayers describe the arrangement as “a fixed fee matter,
billed at an hourly rate.” The department does not challenge
this arrangement or suggest that an amount less than the
fees billed is appropriate because of this factor. The court
grants taxpayers’ request for attorney fees billed to date in
the amount of $9,495.
D. 	Costs and Expenses
The department objects generally to an award of
costs and also objects specifically to any award to reimburse
taxpayer for public record charges imposed by Clackamas
County as not reasonable and necessary to the prosecution
of this action. The court disagrees, finding on the basis of the
time entries that taxpayers made the public records request
in August 2018, before the department filed its answer. The
internal emails that Clackamas County provided in response
to that request were among several documents that revealed
the assessor’s knowledge about the weakness of the position
that it persisted in maintaining. These facts influenced the
court’s decision to exercise its discretion to find in taxpayers’
favor on the question of timeliness on which this fee award
is based. Accordingly, the court allows as an expense the
$490 charge from Clackamas County to divulge the emails,
as well as a Tax Court filing fee in the amount of $265, and
postage and copy charges amounting to $13.25. 	The total
costs and expenses allowed are $768.25.
E. 	Post-Judgment Proceedings
Finally, taxpayers seek an additional $3,600 in
anticipated fees that taxpayers estimate they would incur
in “post-judgment proceedings.” The court rejects this claim
as nonsense. The narrative accompanying this claim states:
“Post-judgment proceedings in this case include negoti-
ating a payment plan and traditional collection efforts.
* * * [taxpayers] estimate that the primary litigator, Jason
Wright, will spend approximately eight hours negotiating
a payment plan and if necessary, preparing debtor inter-
rogatories, conducting debtor examinations, and preparing
writs of garnishment on behalf of [taxpayers].”

Cite as 23 OTR 543 (2019) 	553
The court sees absolutely no basis for counsel Wright or any-
one else to conduct a judgment debtor examination of the
Oregon Department of Revenue, prepare writs of garnish-
ment against it, or negotiate a payment plan with it. The
court adds nothing for post-judgment proceedings to the
amounts determined above.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The court thus awards attorney fees, costs, dis-
bursements and expenses in favor of taxpayers in the total
amount of $10,263.25. The court directs counsel for tax-
payers to submit an appropriate form of judgment. Now,
therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Request for Award
of Attorney Fees, Costs and Disbursements is granted.