State of Rhode Island v. Brian Faria

Supreme Court
No. 2006-278-M.P.
(62-06-2309)
NOTICE: 	This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
State of Rhode Island 	:
v. 	:
Brian Faria. 	:

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Supreme Court
No. 2006-278-M.P.
(62-06-2309)
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Suttell, for the Court. We consider in this case an equal-protection challenge to
statutory provisions that prohibit convicted felons from seeking the destruction and/or sealing of
certain police and court records relating to criminal cases in which they have been acquitted or
otherwise exonerated. We issued a writ of certiorari to review a District Court decision granting
motions to destroy and to seal records of the defendant, Brian Faria, under G.L. 1956 §§ 12-1-12
and 12-1-12.1. 	For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the decision.
I
Facts and Procedural History
In February 2006, Mr. Faria was arrested and charged in the District Court with two
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 	According to defendant, a subsequent
investigation 	revealed 	that 	the 	alleged 	controlled 	substances 	were, 	in 	fact, 	prescription
medications belonging to a disabled friend who accidentally had left them in defendant’s car. As
a result, the Attorney General declined to file a criminal information, concluding that there was
“insufficient evidence to warrant a felony prosecution.” Thereafter, defendant moved to destroy
State of Rhode Island 	:
v. 	:
Brian Faria. 	:

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“all records of his arrest and exoneration” pursuant to § 12-1-12.1 In a separate filing, defendant
also requested that the court records relating to the complaint “be sealed and/or expunged,”
apparently relying upon § 12-1-12.1.2
Sections 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 allow for the destruction of certain police records and the
sealing of court records, but neither section permits relief for persons previously convicted of a
felony offense. 	Because Mr. Faria had been convicted of a felony in the past, the letter of the
statute precludes the destruction or sealing of records relating to the two counts of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. The defendant argued in support of his motions to destroy
1 General Laws 1956 § 12-1-12 states in pertinent part:
“(a) Any fingerprint, photograph, physical measurements, or other
record of identification, heretofore or hereafter taken by or under
the direction of the attorney general, the superintendent of state
police, the member or members of the police department of any
city or town or any other officer authorized by this chapter to take
them, of a person under arrest, prior to the final conviction of the
person for the offense then charged, shall be destroyed by all
offices or departments having the custody or possession within
sixty (60) days after there has been an acquittal, dismissal, no true
bill, no information, or the person has been otherwise exonerated
from the offense with which he or she is charged, and the clerk of
court where the exoneration has taken place shall, consistent with
§ 12-1-12.1, place under seal all records of the person in the case
including all records of the division of criminal identification
established by § 12-1-4; provided, that the person shall not have
been previously convicted of any felony offense.”
2 Section 12-1-12.1 states in pertinent part:
“(a) Any person who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all
counts in a criminal case, including, but not limited to, dismissal or
filing of a no true bill or no information, may file a motion for the
sealing of his or her court records in the case, provided, that no
person who has been convicted of a felony shall have his or her
court records sealed pursuant to this section.
“* * *
“(c) If the court, after the hearing at which all relevant
testimony and information shall be considered, finds that the
person is entitled to the sealing of the records, it shall order the
sealing of the court records of the person in that case.”

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and to seal that §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 deny him “equal protection of the law as guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 	He contended that the
statutes unconstitutionally discriminate against persons with previous felony convictions because
such classification bears no reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare, or safety.
The state objected to Mr. Faria’s motion to destroy in the District Court, arguing that the
legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The state asserted that
defendant has the burden of attacking the constitutionality of the statutes, and that he had failed
to overcome the burden of negating every conceivable basis that might support the legislative
classification. 	The state maintained that a legitimate state interest existed, viz., the interest in
maintaining a comprehensive history of a felon’s contacts with the criminal-justice system. The
state reasoned that a comprehensive list of a felon’s criminal contacts might assist law
enforcement personnel in identifying patterns of criminal activity and apprehending suspects.
The District Court issued a written decision on July 18, 2006, holding that Ҥ 12-1-12 and
12-1-12.1, insofar as it denies to persons convicted of a felony the right to have their records of
acquittal or exoneration expunged, violates the equal protection of the laws.”3 The court noted
3 It is worth noting that § 12-1-12 provides for the destruction and sealing of certain records of
identification taken by or under the direction of the Attorney General, the state police, or any
municipal police department, and § 12-1-12.1 permits the sealing of court records. Both statutes
apply only to persons who have been acquitted or otherwise exonerated of the offenses to which
the records relate. The expungement statute, G.L. 1956 chapter 1.3 of title 12, on the other hand,
applies to all court, police, and probation records of first offenders. In the case at bar, defendant
is not a first offender, thus rendering expungement inapplicable. As a practical matter, however,
placing records under seal and the expungement of records of a conviction are very similar
remedies. Compare § 12-1.3-1(2) (expungement of court records “means the sealing and
retention of all records of a conviction and/or probation and the removal from active files of all
records and information relating to conviction and/or probation”) with § 12-1-12.1(d) (“The
clerk of the court shall * * * place under seal the court records in the case in which the acquittal,
dismissal, no true bill, no information or other exoneration has been entered.”). 	It is also
important to note that the destruction of a record, in contrast to the expungement or placement
under seal of a record, “eliminates all records of that information * * *. The information is not

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that the statutory scheme in §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 establishes two classes of people—those
acquitted or exonerated of a crime who have no felony conviction on their record, and those
acquitted or exonerated who do have a prior felony conviction on their record. 	The court went
on to say:
“The former category of persons is allowed to have their records of
the acquittal or exoneration sealed and expunged while the latter
category of persons is not allowed a similar remedy. The question
posed 	by 	the 	defendant’s 	motion 	is 	whether 	this 	legislative
classification is permissible under the equal protection clause of
the 	Fifth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments 	to 	the 	United 	States
Constitution.”
The District Court employed a rational-basis analysis, reasoning that the legislative
classification in §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 did not impinge upon a fundamental right or a suspect
class. 	Describing the rational-basis test as a “relaxed standard” that is “easily satisfied,” the
District Court nevertheless found no rational basis for distinguishing between felons and non-
felons in §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1. The court described §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 as remedial
statutes with two purposes: first, to remove the social stigma of criminal charges for people who
are acquitted or otherwise exonerated; and second, to remove economic disabilities such as
employment disadvantages that arise from the mere filing of charges.
The District Court rejected the state’s contention that the maintenance of all criminal
records relating to a felon might help identify patterns of criminal activity and apprehend
criminals. The court found the distinction between felons and non-felons to be wholly unrelated
to the objectives of §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1. 	The court reasoned that the criminal justice
system and law enforcement personnel should not accord any relevance to an arrest record or
charge when it later is judicially determined to have been improperly brought or to be without
flagged, but is permanently erased from the case management system as if it never existed.”
Supreme Court Executive Order No. 2007-09.

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evidentiary support. 	In the District Court’s view, using such records would lead to confusion
and mistakes. 	The court also questioned why a felon could not have his new police and court
records destroyed or sealed under §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1, even though the previous felony
might be unrelated to the new charge, when a person with many similar misdemeanor
convictions could have each record destroyed or sealed notwithstanding the relevance of the
misdemeanor convictions in establishing a pattern of criminal activity.
The District Court concluded that it could not envision any conceivable rational basis for
the legislative classification. The court said that any person who has been wrongfully charged or
later acquitted should not suffer a disability from the mere arrest or filing of charges. Stating that
“[o]ur criminal justice system should demand no less,” the District Court explained that the
“legislative remedy * * * of expunging the records and removing the social stigma and other
economic disabilities that arise in cases in which the person was acquitted or otherwise
exonerated of the charges, should be equally available to all persons regardless of their prior
convictions.”
II
Standard of Review
This Court’s review “on writ of certiorari is limited ‘to examining the record to determine
if an error of law has been committed.’” Crowe Countryside Realty Associates Co., LLC v.
Novare Engineers, Inc., 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2006) (quoting State v. Santiago, 799 A.2d 285,
287 (R.I. 2002)). “Questions of law * * * are not binding upon the court and may be reviewed to
determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts.” Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Rhode
Island Department of Environmental Management, 592 A.2d 841, 843 (R.I. 1991) (quoting
Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (1977)). “We reverse only

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when we find pursuant to the petition that the lower-court judge committed an error of law.”
Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1373 (R.I. 1994) (citing Wellington Hotel Associates v.
Miner, 543 A.2d 656, 660 (R.I. 1988)).
This Court uses the “greatest possible caution” when reviewing a constitutional challenge
to a statute. State v. Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 657 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d
818, 822 (R.I. 2004)). “In assessing [a] challenge to the constitutionality of [a statute], ‘we begin
with the principle that legislative enactments of the General Assembly are presumed to be valid
and constitutional.’” Newport Court Club Associates v. Town Council of Middletown, 800 A.2d
405, 409 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown,
659 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 1995)). 	“To be deemed unconstitutional, a statute must ‘palpably and
unmistakably be characterized as an excess of legislative power.’” Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822
(quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45 (R.I. 1995)). 	“Unless the party
challenging the constitutionality of a statute can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act
violates 	a 	specific 	provision 	of 	the 	[Rhode 	Island] 	[C]onstitution 	or 	the 	United 	States
Constitution, this Court will not hold the act unconstitutional.” Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 822
(citing Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 44-45).
III
Discussion
A. Equal Protection
The issue before this Court is whether the distinction between felons and non-felons in
§§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 violates the Equal Protection Clause. 	The Fourteenth Amendment to

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the United States Constitution provides that a state shall not “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, sec. 1.4
The District Court concluded that the classification involved neither a fundamental right
nor a suspect class of persons, a conclusion that neither defendant nor the state contest. When, as
here, “neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated, then the legislation properly
is 	analyzed 	under 	a 	minimal-scrutiny 	test.” 	Riley 	v. 	The 	Rhode 	Island 	Department 	of
Environmental Management, 941 A.2d 198, 206 (R.I. 2008). A statute will survive this minimal
scrutiny if “a rational relationship exists between the provisions of [the statute] and a legitimate
state interest.” Id. (quoting Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 825).
To ascertain whether a rational relationship exists, the proper inquiry is not whether this
Court can find a rational basis for the statute, but whether “the General Assembly rationally
could conclude that the legislation would resolve a legitimate problem.” Mackie v. State, 936
A.2d 588, 596 (R.I. 2007). 	Under rational-basis review, if we “can conceive of any reasonable
basis to justify the classification, we will uphold the statute as constitutional.” Id. (quoting
Cherenzia, 847 A.2d at 825). 	Therefore, even if the General Assembly had a constitutionally
improper motive when it passed legislation, “the legislation would still hold up to rational basis
scrutiny if this [C]ourt could find any legitimate objective.” Id. (quoting Power v. City of
Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 903 (R.I. 1990)). 	Thus, to overcome the presumption of validity, a
party seeking to attack a statutory classification has the burden “to negate every conceivable
4 Although the District Court framed the issue as “whether this legislative classification is
permissible under the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution,” it clearly based its analysis upon the Fourteenth Amendment.
We note that the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection guarantee applies to federal action, not
state action, and therefore is inapplicable in this case.

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basis which might support it.” Id. at 597 (quoting Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir.
2005)).
B. Rational-Basis Analysis
Sections 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1 draw a distinction between those persons acquitted or
exonerated of a crime without a previous felony conviction on their record and those acquitted or
exonerated with a previous felony conviction. 	The statutes allow the former to have certain
records of identification destroyed and court records sealed, whereas convicted felons are denied
similar relief.
As the District Court aptly noted, the rational-basis review is a “relaxed standard” that is
“easily satisfied.” 	Thus, we must find only that a rational reason exists for drawing the
distinction between felons and non-felons or misdemeanants that would justify prohibiting felons
from having such records sealed and destroyed.
Here, the state contends that the District Court erred in finding that no permissible basis
exists to support the classification between felons and non-felons. 	We agree and conclude that
defendant has failed “to negate every conceivable basis” that might justify the statutory
classification. Mackie, 936 A.2d at 597 (quoting Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 32).
The state’s interest in effective law enforcement represents one rational basis justifying
the classification between felons and non-felons that defendant failed to negate. Considering the
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute similar to the one at issue here,5 the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held that retaining records of felony arrests served a valid state interest. State v.
Expunged Record, 881 So.2d 104, 105-06 (La. 2004). 	The court reasoned that arrest records
5 The Louisiana statute La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:9E.(1)(a) (2007) allows for destruction of
misdemeanants’ arrest records but prohibits the destruction of the arrest records for persons
arrested for felony offenses.

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were “useful in uncovering criminal conduct, aid[ed] in setting bond, and facilitate[d] the work
of correctional institutions.” Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Nettles, 375 So.2d 1339, 1342 (La.
1979)).
The Supreme Court of Georgia also recently recognized law enforcement as a state
interest sufficient to satisfy rational-basis review when it upheld a Georgia statute that subjected
all convicted felons, but not convicted misdemeanants, to DNA profiling. Quarterman v. State,
651 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. 2007). The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s interest in “creating for
law enforcement purposes a permanent identification record of convicted felons” was justified
“based on the difference between the types and seriousness of the offenses as well as the severity
of punishment involved” and the fact that “convicted felons are more likely to violate the law
than ordinary citizens.” Id.
Turning to §§ 12-1-12 and 12-1-12.1, we determine that the General Assembly rationally
could conclude that denying convicted felons the privilege of having certain police and court
records relating to subsequent arrests sealed or destroyed serves the state’s legitimate interest in
law enforcement. 	As the Attorney General articulated in his brief to this Court, felons’ arrest
records, even acquittals and exonerations, may help in identifying patterns of criminal activity
and the identification and apprehension of criminals. 	Additionally, this Court previously has
found effective law enforcement an important state interest. State v. Anil, 417 A.2d 1367, 1370
(R.I. 1980) (concluding that the state must be able to withhold the identity of confidential
informants to protect the “public interest in effective law enforcement”).
We are satisfied that maintaining records of felons’ arrests aids the state’s legitimate
interest in law enforcement, and further, the statutory classification between felons and non-

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felons rationally relates to this interest. 	It is our opinion, therefore, that the classification does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
IV
Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons we reverse the decision of the District Court and remand the
papers to it.

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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE:State of Rhode Island v. Brian Faria
DOCKET SHEET NO.:2006-278-MP
COURT:Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED:May 23, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:DistrictCounty: Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: 	Judge Richard A. Gonnella
JUSTICES:Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:Justice Paul A. Suttell, for the Court
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff: Dawson M. Hodgson, Esq.
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant:John F. Cicilline, Esq.