Canzater v. City of Columbia

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Leroy Canzater,       
Appellant,

v.

City of Columbia,       
Respondent.

Appeal From Richland County

James R. Barber, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-054

Submitted January 12, 2004 – Filed January
22, 2004

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

Dwight Christopher Moore, of Sumter, for Appellant.

W. Allen Nickles, III, and Carl L. Solomon, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this action for malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, and bad faith termination, Leroy Canzater asserts
the trial court erred in dismissing the false imprisonment and bad faith termination
causes of action as barred by the statute of limitations and in ruling that
an arrest warrant conclusively barred an action for
malicious prosecution.  We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

FACTS

The City of Columbia (“the City”) employed
Canzater in the Wastewater Maintenance Division.  Believing that Canzater had
for more than a year knowingly received overtime payments from the City in excess
of the hours actually worked, the City terminated his employment and sought
warrants for his arrest.  On December 2, 1998, a grand jury indicted Canzater
for grand larceny.  The court issued a warrant for his arrest.  Canzater was
arrested the following day.  On May 4, 1999, Canzater was again arrested and
indicted, this time on charges of conspiracy to commit embezzlement in connection
with the overtime payments.

The circuit court dismissed all charges against
Canzater on September 22, 2000.  Thereafter, on November 5, 2001, Canzater initiated
the instant action against the City.  He asserted claims for false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and bad faith termination.  In his complaint, Canzater
alleges the City pursued the prosecution against him without probable cause
and without conducting a proper investigation to determine whether he engaged
in the alleged criminal conduct.

The trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss
all three counts pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP.  Specifically, the court
ruled that Canzater’s claims for false imprisonment and bad faith termination
were barred by the statute of limitations and the malicious prosecution claim
failed as a matter of law because the existence of probable cause was established
by the issuance of arrest warrants.  This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I.  False Imprisonment

Canzater contends the trial court erred in holding
his false imprisonment action was barred by the statute of limitations because
the two-year statutory period did not begin to run until the charges against
him were dismissed.  We disagree.

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-550 (Supp. 2002)
 provides
that the statute of limitations for a false imprisonment claim is two years. 

We embrace the rule adopted by other jurisdictions
that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment begins to run when
the plaintiff is released following an arrest.  Campbell v. Hyatt Regency,
388 S.E.2d 341, 342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)  (“An
action for false imprisonment ‘must be brought within two years of its accrual
. . . which is from the release from imprisonment.’ ”); Stafford v. Muster,
582 S.W.2d 670, 680 (Mo. 1979)  (“[F]or false
imprisonment in particular, the authorities overwhelmingly hold that a cause
of action for false imprisonment accrues on the discharge from imprisonment.”);
M.C. Dransfield, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Action
for False Imprisonment or False Arrest, 49 A.L.R.2d 922 (1956)  (stating
the general rule is that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment
“begins to run from the termination of the imprisonment and not from the time
when the proceedings under which the plaintiff’s arrest occurred ended . .
. .”); see Miller v. Dickert, 259 S.C. 1, 3, 190 S.E.2d 459,
460 (1972)  (noting that both parties conceded the
cause of action in a false imprisonment case accrued from the time of the
arrest); 8 S.C. Juris. False Imprisonment § 17 (1991).

Following the return of indictments charging
Canzater with larceny and conspiracy to commit embezzlement, two different
circuit judges issued warrants for his arrest on December 3, 1998, and May
12, 1999, respectively.  According to the complaint, Canzater was released
from custody on his own recognizance after each arrest.  Using these two dates
as the dates of his discharge from imprisonment, it is clear that an action
brought on November 5, 2001 fails to satisfy the two-year statute of limitations.

II. 
Bad Faith Termination

Canzater also asserts the trial
court erred in barring his cause of action for bad faith termination under
the statute of limitations.  Specifically, Canzater argues his claim of bad
faith termination is a contract claim rather than a tort claim and therefore
beyond the scope of the South Carolina Torts Claims Act’s two-year statute
of limitations. 

Canzater did not raise this issue to the trial
court and the trial court did not rule upon it.  We therefore decline to address
it.  See Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20,
24, 531 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2000)  (“In order to preserve
an issue for appellate review, the issue must have been raised to and ruled
upon by the trial court.”) . 

III. 
Malicious Prosecution

Canzater contends the trial court erred in granting
the City’s motion to dismiss and determining the existence of an arrest warrant
conclusively establishes probable cause for prosecution.  We agree.

“A ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be
based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint and
the motion cannot be sustained if facts alleged and inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory
of the case.”  Toussaint v. Ham, 292 S.C. 415, 416, 357 S.E.2d 8, 9
(1987).

Although “South Carolina has long embraced the
rule that a true bill of indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause
in an action for malicious prosecution,” Kinton v. Mobile Home Indus.,
Inc., 274 S.C. 179, 182, 262 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1980) ,
it is only prima facie evidence and not conclusive.  See 54 C.J.S.
Malicious Prosecution § 34 at 555 (1987) (stating that “where the result
of the preliminary examination before a magistrate or other judicial officer
is unfavorable to the accused, and he is held, or committed . . . this is
prima facie evidence of probable cause, but not conclusive.”). 

In Melton v. Williams, 281 S.C. 182,
314 S.E.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1984) , we concluded
that, even though an arrest warrant was issued, “[u]nder the circumstances
it was for the jury to say whether or not there was probable cause for the
swearing out of the warrant by Williams.” Id. at 187 , 314 S.E.2d at
615 ; see also Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 323,
143 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1965) ; Millhouse v. Food
Lion, Inc., 289 S.C. 203, 203, 345 S.E.2d 739, 739 (Ct. App. 1986) ;
cf. Gist v. Berkley County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 336 S.C. 611, 616,
521 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. App. 1999)  (finding
error in a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action for false
imprisonment because the arrest warrant was insufficient and did not establish
probable cause).

The trial court, therefore, erred in dismissing
Canzater’s claim for malicious prosecution because the existence of an arrest
warrant does not conclusively establish probable cause for prosecution. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

GOOLSBY and ANDERSON, JJ., and CURETON, A.J.,
concur.