Nails v. South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Angel Nails, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, &
Regulation, State Board of Cosmetology, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001435

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Carolyn C. Matthews, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-453
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed November 9, 2016

AFFIRMED

Suzanne L. Hawkins, of Hawkins Law, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Prentiss Counts Shealey, of the South Carolina
Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Dep't of Corr. v. Mitchell, 377 S.C. 256, 258, 659 S.E.2d 233,
234 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating section 1-23-610 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2015) "sets forth the standard of review when the court of appeals is sitting in
review of a decision by the ALC on an appeal from an administrative agency");
Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 28,
766 S.E.2d 707, 715 (2014) ("This [c]ourt confines its analysis of an ALC decision
to whether it is: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in
excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion."); id. ("In determining whether the ALC's decision was
supported by substantial evidence, the [c]ourt need only find, looking at the entire
record on appeal, evidence from which reasonable minds could reach the same
conclusion as the ALC."); id. ("However, the [c]ourt may reverse the decision of
the ALC where it is in violation of a statutory provision or it is affected by an error
of law."); id. at 32, 766 S.E.2d at 717 ("Interpreting and applying statutes and
regulations administered by an agency is a two-step process."); id. ("First, a court
must determine whether the language of a statute or regulation directly speaks to
the issue. If so, the court must utilize the clear meaning of the statute or
regulation."); id. at 33, 766 S.E.2d at 717 ("If the statute or regulation 'is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' the court then must give deference to
the agency's interpretation of the statute or regulation, assuming the interpretation
is worthy of deference." (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))); Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs In Optometry, 291
S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987) ("The construction of a statute by the
agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful
consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons."); Kiawah Dev.
Partners, II, 411 S.C. at 35, 766 S.E.2d at 719 ("We defer to an agency
interpretation unless it is 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.'" (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)).

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.