Davis v. Waggoners Trucking

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Edward Allen
Davis, Respondent,

v.

The Waggoners
Trucking, Employer,

And The
Waggoners Trucking, Self-Insured, Carrier, Appellant.

Appeal From the Appellate Panel

of the Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No.   2010-UP-521

Submitted December 1, 2010 – Filed
December 9, 2010

AFFIRMED

David Hill Keller, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Blake Alexander Hewitt, of Columbia, and Matthew  Jackson, of
North Charleston, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM: Edward Allen Davis filed a claim for injuries
resulting from an unexplained fall while working for The Waggoners Trucking
(Employer), and the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission
(Appellate Panel) awarded him benefits.  Employer appeals, arguing Davis failed
to meet his burden of proof and the Appellate Panel failed to adjudicate this
matter correctly.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As
to whether the Appellate Panel erred in failing to require Davis to demonstrate
his injuries were "made worse by striking the floor of the trailer than
they would have been had he struck the ground":  S.C. Code Ann. §
42-1-160(A) (Supp. 2009) (providing an injury is compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act) if the injury occurs accidentally, "arising out
of and in the course of employment"); Crosby v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc.,
330 S.C. 489, 493, 499 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing injuries
are excluded from compensability under the Act when they come "from a
hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the
employment"); Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 444,
452-53, 88 S.E.2d 611, 614-15 (1955) (holding injuries resulting from
unexplained falls are generally excluded from compensability, but recognizing
an exception to the rule when the employment contributed to either the cause or
the effect of the fall); West v. Alliance Capital, 368 S.C. 246, 252,
628 S.E.2d 279, 282 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Douglas v. Spartan Mills,
Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 269, 140 S.E.2d 173, 175 (1965) ("The
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the
neighborhood.  It must be incidental to the character of the business and not
independent of the relation of master and servant.  It need not have been
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin
in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as
a rational consequence.")). 

2. As
to Employer's remaining arguments concerning the necessity for expert medical
testimony and classification of Davis's claim as a "medically
complex" case:  Rule 210(h), SCACR ("[An] appellate court will not
consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Stone
v. Roadway Express, 367 S.C. 575, 582, 627 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2006) ("Only
issues raised [to] and ruled upon by the [Workers' Compensation C]ommission are
cognizable on appeal."); Bonaparte v. Floyd, 291 S.C. 427, 444, 354
S.E.2d 40, 50 (Ct. App. 1987) (placing upon appellant the burden of providing a
record on appeal sufficient for intelligent review). 

AFFIRMED.

FEW,
C.J., SHORT, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur. 

[1]  We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.