Rock Hill Investment Group v. Horton

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Rock Hill
Investment Group, LLC, Appellant,

v.

Brenda
Horton, Respondent.

Appeal From Jasper County

Thomas Kemmerlin, Jr., Special Referee

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-165

Submitted April 1, 2011 – Filed April 14,
2011

AFFIRMED

R. Thayer Rivers, Jr., of Ridgeland, for Appellant.

Terry A. Finger, of Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rock Hill Investment Group, LLC (Rock Hill) appeals
the order of Special Referee Thomas Kemmerlin, Jr. dismissing its action
against Respondent Brenda Horton to collect a deficiency judgment and ordering
that Horton's five percent deposit on the property she initially bid on at a
judicial sale be forfeited.  On appeal, Rock Hill argues that a prior
unappealed order from Special Referee Curtis Coltrane denying Horton's motion
to set aside the judicial sale is controlling on all issues presented in Judge
Kemmerlin's order.  In its second issue, Rock Hill argues that Judge
Kemmerlin's order is not correct.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to the first issue on appeal,
we find that Judge Coltrane's order is not controlling on all issues presented
in Judge Kemmerlin's order.  At the time of the hearing, Horton was not yet a
party to an action between herself and Rock Hill because a deficiency did not
exist at that time, nor would Horton have been aware that an action for
deficiency would be brought against her.  As no action for deficiency would
have been brought against her until the actual deficiency existed, a dispute
concerning the "risk" to the noncomplying bidder would not be ripe
for adjudication at the time of Judge Coltrane's hearing.  Furthermore, Judge
Coltrane's order resulting from Horton's motion to set aside the judicial sale did
not involve the same issues covered in Judge Kemmerlin's order.  See Colleton
Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cnty., 371 S.C. 224,
242, 638 S.E.2d 685, 694 (2006) ("[A] justiciable controversy is a
real and substantial controversy which is ripe and appropriate for judicial
determination, as distinguished from a contingent, hypothetical or abstract
dispute."); Matheson v. McCormac, 187 S.C. 260, ­_, 196 S.E.
883, 884 (1938) ("[A] decree from which no appeal is taken becomes
the law of the case in all subsequent proceedings involving the same parties and the same subject matter. . . .") (emphasis added); Prof'l
Bankers Corp. v. Floyd, 285 S.C. 607, 613, 331 S.E.2d 362,
365 (Ct. App. 1985) ("An appealable order from which no appeal is
taken becomes the law of the case in all subsequent proceedings involving the
same parties and the same subject matter . . . . However, the doctrine operates
only as to matters concluded by the unappealed order."). 

2. As to the second issue
on appeal generally asserting that Judge Kemmerlin's order was not correct, we
decline to address this conclusory argument on its merits.  See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Broad
general statements [of the issues on appeal] may be disregarded by the
appellate court.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, SHORT,
and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.