In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Gilbert Gonzalez

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL
VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter of
the Care and Treatment of Gilbert Gonzalez, Appellant.

Appeal from Charleston County

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2012-UP-003

Heard October 31, 2011 – Filed January 4,
2012 

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lanelle C. Durant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John
W. McIntosh, and Assistant Attorney General Deborah R. J. Shupe, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Gilbert
Gonzalez appeals his civil commitment to the South Carolina Department of
Mental Health for long-term control, care, and treatment, pursuant to the
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), South Carolina Code sections 44-48-10 to
-170 (2002 & Supp. 2010).  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1.    As to whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Gonzalez's requested jury charges, the record
demonstrates that the trial court's extensive jury charge accurately and fairly
stated the applicable law: In re Care & Treatment of Canupp, 380
S.C. 611, 616, 671 S.E.2d 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted) ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct
definition and adequately covers the law. To
warrant reversal, a circuit court[']s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and
prejudicial to the defendant."); Davis v. Tripp, 338 S.C. 226, 237,
525 S.E.2d 528, 534 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding the trial court did not err in
refusing to give the requested instruction and stating: "We have examined
the court's charge to the jury and conclude that, when viewed in its entirety,
it fairly and sufficiently sets forth the applicable law in this case.").

2.    As to whether the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the State to contend in its closing argument
that the jury could draw an inference from the absence of Gonzalez's expert at
trial, we find no abuse of discretion: Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C.
598, 609-10, 602 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2004) (citation omitted) ("The [closing]
argument must not be calculated to arouse the jurors' passions or prejudices,
and its content should stay within the record and reasonable inferences
that may be drawn therefrom."); Johnson
v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 227 S.C. 351, 369, 88 S.E.2d 260, 269 (1955) (citations
omitted) ("Control of the arguments of counsel rests in the discretion of
the trial judge, and considerable latitude is generally
allowed in the matter of drawing and arguing inferences and deductions from the
evidence.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.