Newton v. South Carolina Department of Transportation

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT
SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS
PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Mary Frances
Newton and Timothy Robert Newton, Respondents,

v.

South Carolina
Department of Transportation, Appellant.

Appeal From Lexington County

A. Victor Rawl, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-008

Submitted December 1, 2007 – Filed January
4, 2008

DISMISSED

Frank B. McMaster and John Gregg McMaster, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Stephen B. Samuels, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  The South Carolina Department of Transportation
(SCDOT) appeals from the circuit court’s order denying its motion to amend its
previously amended answer.  We dismiss without prejudice to a right to appeal
from a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2) SCACR, and the following
authorities: Toal, Vafai, and Muckenfuss, Appellate Practice in South Carolina
83 (2d ed. 2002) (“[A]
fundamental rule of appellate procedure [is] a judgment or order must be final
before it can be appealed.”); Briggs v. Richardson, 273 S.C. 376, 379, 256
S.E.2d 544, 546 (1979) (noting an order allowing amendment of a pleading is not
final and is not immediately appealable); Baldwin Constr. Co. v. Graham, 357 S.C. 227, 230, 593 S.E.2d 146, 147
(2004) (“We decide, then, whether an order denying a motion to amend an answer
is immediately appealable under S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330. . . .  Petitioners
have not arrived at the end of the road and will be able to appeal the decision
after the trial is finished.”).  Because this appeal arises from an
interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable, the appeal is

DISMISSED. [1]

HEARN,
C.J., and KITTREDGE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR.