Magaha v. Greenwood Mills, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Bessie M.
Magaha, Respondent,

v.

Greenwood
Mills, Inc., Appellant.

Appeal From Greenwood County

 J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-244

Submitted April 1, 2008 – Filed April 24,
2008  

AFFIRMED

Roy R. Hemphill, of Greenwood; for Appellant.

Carole Marie Dennison, of Greenville; John S. Nichols, of Columbia; for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
Greenwood Mills, Inc. (the Mill) appeals the circuit court’s order in this
workers’ compensation action.  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

Bessie M. Magaha was employed with the Mill for over thirty years
as a weaver.  In November of 1998, the Mill transferred Magaha to work on a larger
loom.  Magaha alleged she sustained an injury to her right shoulder, arm, and
hand.  She first sought treatment for the pain from her family doctor on
January 11, 1999.  Magaha had two surgeries on her shoulder and sought payment
of medical expenses and temporary total and permanent total disability.  The
Mill denied Magaha sustained an injury by accident and alleges it did not
receive notice of the injury until it received a Form 50 on December 29, 2000,
almost two years after the alleged accident.

At the hearing before the single commissioner, Magaha argued she
suffered repetitive trauma to her right shoulder after moving to the larger
loom.  Magaha is five-feet, one-inch tall, was in her sixties at the time of
the alleged accident, and has a seventh grade education.  Magaha testified she
informed Ronnie Butler, her supervisor at the Mill, of problems with her
shoulder on the first day she used the new loom.  At a prior deposition, Magaha
testified she told Butler the soreness in her shoulder and arm was getting
worse but did not explicitly tell Butler the soreness was related to her work. 
She explained at the hearing that she “figured he probably would [think] . . .
that it’s something . . . from work.”  Butler testified before the single
commissioner that he did not remember whether Magaha told him about her injury. 
Nor did he remember whether Magaha complained about the new loom.  Butler claimed he would have noted any complaints on Magaha’s attendance card, pursuant to
the Mill’s policy.  Butler conceded Magaha was a good worker, retired without
any warnings, and rarely, if ever, complained. 

Magaha began receiving short-term disability benefits in March or
April of 1999.  On her application for short term disability, Magaha
represented that her injuries were not work-related.  On cross-examination on
the issue, Magaha testified that the Mill did not explain the short-term
disability form to her and she did not remember checking a box on the form
denying her injury was work-related.  Magaha has suffered a stroke, has had a
guardian ad litem appointed for her, and could not remember whether the Mill
helped her fill out the disability forms.    

After shoulder surgery in March of 1999, Magaha returned to work. 
Within two weeks, the pain returned.  Magaha retired in July of 2000, had
carpal tunnel surgery in October of 2000, and had a second shoulder surgery in
February of 2002. 

Dr. Michael Bryant, Magaha’s treating physician, wrote the Mill
after Magaha’s first consultation.  By letter dated January 19, 1999, Dr.
Bryant informed the Mill:

Ms. Magaha had been seen in my office on 1/11/99 with impingement
syndrome with continued pain and discomfort.  She had some decreased strength
secondary to the pain as well as pain on internal and external rotation of the
right upper extremity . . . .  She is no longer doing the job that caused
the impingement syndrome but continues to be debilitated at work working in
pain. . . . I would appreciate your consideration in helping her cover this
expense, as I think it will be less costly overall in her treatment. (Emphasis
added.)

The Mill
stipulated it received this letter.   

The single commissioner found Magaha failed to prove a compensable
injury and failed to give sufficient notice of having sustained an injury by
accident.  With one dissent, the full commission adopted the findings of the
single commissioner.

Magaha
appealed the issues of notice and compensability to the circuit court.  In
closing arguments at the circuit court hearing, Magaha’s counsel argued:

I think
notice is everything.  If she gave notice that she started an investigation to
see if it was work related.  Clearly the hearing commissioner was also
concerned because . . . he asked the supervisor whether the [new loom] was
bigger than the one she used to work on and he said it was, he admitted it was
by probably an inch or two.  So, that crucial two inches is very important and
it is going down to whether she had to stretch further.  And I think it is not
appropriate and it is not fair and . . . [it] is not supported by substantial
evidence.  They didn’t even conduct any kind of investigation, it is not legal,
it is not proper for them to take Dr. Bryant’s notes and put [them] in a
personnel file without going out on the floor.  [Magaha’s supervisor] couldn’t
remember anything and that was one of the biggest problems in the case. . . .
And if a proper investigation had been done, looking at the whole record then
they would of (sic) found the case was compensable.

The discussion portion of the
circuit court’s order states: 

In this case, Dr. Bryant provided all the information
that the Employer needed to properly investigate [Magaha’s] injury.  He told
[the Mill] that a job change had caused the impingement syndrome, that Claimant
was experiencing pain and discomfort in her right upper extremity which was her
predominant arm for work, and that he was requesting that the Employer cover
the expense of medical treatment.

This information should have launched an investigation
by the Employer into the specifics of Claimant’s medical problems and whether
or not a work related injury had occurred.  Unfortunately for Claimant, the
record does not contain any evidence that the Employer made any reasonable
effort to determine the cause of the injury or to question the Claimant or
plant personnel when their memories were still fresh.  Under these
circumstances, the Employer would be unable to properly determine whether or
not Claimant’s medical problems were work-related.

As a further result, the Claimant was not afforded the
opportunity to be provided medical care and treatment by the Employer.  If
this injury is later conclusively deemed work related on remand, the
Employer has lost the chance to supervise and to direct her medical care and
treatment. (Emphasis added.)

The order concludes:

The only evidence in the record is that Claimant has
met the statutory notice requirements of Section 42-15-20 as a matter of law. 
The decision of the Commission is hereby reversed and the matter is remanded to
the Commission for further findings of fact consistent with this order.

The Mill
appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The Full
Commission is the ultimate fact finder in Workers’ Compensation cases.”  Etheredge
v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 454, 562 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2002). 
“The findings of the Commission are presumed correct and will be set aside only
if unsupported by substantial evidence.”  Id.  However, “[s]ubstantial
evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly
from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a
whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the
administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its
action.”  Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306
(1981).  A court may reverse or modify a decision of the commission if
substantial rights of a party have been prejudiced because the findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are affected by other error of law.  Etheredge,
349 S.C. at 456, 562 S.E.2d at 682.

LAW/ANALYSIS

APPEALABILITY

Our
initial consideration in this case centers on whether the circuit court’s order
is immediately appealable.  The Mill argues the circuit court reversed the
commission’s finding on the issue of timely notice but failed to rule on the
issue of compensability of the injury and therefore the order is final and
immediately appealable.  Magaha argues the circuit court’s order remands the
action for further proceedings and therefore the issue is not immediately
appealable pursuant to Montjoy v. Asten-Hill Dryer Fabrics, 316 S.C. 52,
446 S.E.2d 618 (1994).

The South Carolina appellate courts “have consistently held that an order of the circuit court
remanding a case for additional proceedings before an administrative agency is
not directly appealable.”  Montjoy, 316 S.C. at 52, 446 S.E.2d at 618. 
However, our appellate courts also recognize that remand orders from the
circuit court to an administrative agency may be immediately appealable where
the circuit court’s order constitutes a final decision on the merits and the
remand order has no effect on the finality of the decision.  Foggie v.
General Elec. Co., 376 S.C. 384, 389, 656 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Brown v. Greenwood Mills, Inc., this court found the circuit court’s
order finally determined an issue on the merits and the remand merely directed
the commission to make the necessary findings to effectuate the circuit court’s
order.  366 S.C. 379, 387, 622 S.E.2d 546, 551 (Ct. App. 2005).  Viewing the
order based on the Mills’ interpretation, solely for the issue of appealability,
we find the order immediately appealable.

NOTICE

The
Mill first argues the circuit court erred in reversing the commission’s finding
that Magaha gave timely notice of the accident.  We disagree.

Section
42-15-20 of the Workers’ Compensation Act requires that every injured employee
give the employer notice of a job-related accident within ninety days after its
occurrence.  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-20 (Supp. 2007).  “Section 42-15-20
provides no specific method of giving notice, the object being that the
employer be actually put on notice of the injury so he can investigate it
immediately after its occurrence and can furnish medical care for the employee
in order to minimize the disability and his own liability.”  Bass v. Isochem,
365 S.C. 454, 472-73, 617 S.E.2d 369, 379 (Ct. App. 2005).  The notice
requirement is to be construed liberally in favor of claimants.  Etheredge,
349 S.C. at 458, 562 S.E.2d at 683. 

The
Mill conceded it received Dr. Bryant’s letter, in which he informs the Mill of
Magaha’s injury and its relationship to her work.  In Etheredge, this
court found a letter from the employee’s family physician provided notice to
employer.  Id. at 458, 562 S.E.2d at 683.  In light of the law requiring
the liberal construction of the notice provision of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, we conclude Dr. Bryant’s letter provided notice to the Mill.   

COMPENSABILITY OF INJURY

The
Mill next argues the circuit court’s remand does not affect the commission’s
ruling on the compensability of Magaha’s injury, and thus the issue of
compensability is “law of the case.”  We disagree.

“Law
of the case” is a doctrine dissuading courts from revisiting settled issues. 
John R. Knight, The Law of the Case Doctrine:  What Does it Really Mean?,
43-Oct. Fed.R.Law. 8 (1996).  Where a litigant fails to appeal a ruling on a
particular issue, that ruling becomes law of the case.  See Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Eagle Lake & Golf Condominiums, 310 S.C. 473, 475, 427
S.E.2d 646, 648 (1993) (finding an unappealed ruling is law of the case).

After
a thorough review of Magaha’s notice of appeal to the circuit court, the
transcript of the hearing, and the circuit court’s order, we find the doctrine
of “law of the case” does not apply.  First, Magaha raised the issue of compensability
in her notice of appeal to the circuit court.  Furthermore, reading the circuit
court’s order as a whole, we find the emphasized language in the order
indicates the circuit court expects the commission to revisit the issue of
whether Magaha suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course
and scope of her employment.  We recognize the circuit court did not
specifically rule on the issue in the conclusion portion of the order. 
However, given the circuit court’s clear reversal on the issue of notice, there
was no need for the court to remand with instructions for “further findings of
fact consistent with this order” unless the court expected further proceedings
on the issue of injury by accident. 

CONCLUSION

The
circuit court’s order reversing the commission’s finding on notice and remanding
the action to the commission for further proceedings on the issue of whether
Magaha suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course and
scope of her employment is  

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, SHORT, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.    

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.