In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Robert Lee Cogdill

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE
239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

In the Matter
of the Care and Treatment of Robert Lee Cogdill, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenwood County

 Marc H. Westbrook, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2007-UP-553

Submitted December 1, 2007 – Filed
December 14, 2007

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief for Capital Appeals Robert Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, Office
of the Attorney General, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Robert
Lee Cogdill appeals the trial judge’s refusal to grant a directed verdict “on
the charge that [he] was a sexually violent predator since there was no direct
or substantial circumstantial evidence on a personal level, rather than as a
matter of statistics, that [he] was likely to engage in acts of sexual violence
if he was not confined to a secure facility for . . . long term care and
treatment, particularly where the state’s expert did not conduct any testing on
[him] before . . . rendering her general opinion.”  We affirm.[1]

FACTS

In
1986, Cogdill plead guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor and was
sentenced to five years probation.  In 1988, he plead guilty to two counts of
first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and was sentenced to thirty
years incarceration.  Prior to Cogdill’s scheduled release date, the State of
South Carolina filed a petition pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent
Predator Act, South Carolina Code section 44-48-100 (Supp. 2006), seeking to
have Cogdill civilly committed for long term care and treatment as a sexually
violent predator.

The
matter was called for a jury trial on May 17, 2005.  Following the close of the
State’s case, Cogdill’s attorney made a motion for a directed verdict. 
Specifically, Cogdill’s attorney argued that the testimony of the State’s sole
witness was not based on individual testing or observations of Cogdill and
there was no evidence that Cogdill had “serious difficulty” controlling his
behavior as required by Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867
(2002).  The circuit court denied the motion for a directed verdict. At the
conclusion of the trial, the jury found Cogdill was a sexually violent
predator, and the trial judge, by order filed May 18, 2005, committed Cogdill
to the custody of the South Carolina Department of Mental Health for long term
control, care, and treatment.     

STANDARD OF
REVIEW

When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this Court applies
the same standard as the trial court. Elam v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp.,
361 S.C. 9, 27, 602 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004). The Court is required to view the
evidence and inferences that
reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C. 416, 428, 567 S.E.2d 231, 237
(2002). When deciding whether to grant or deny a
directed verdict motion, the court is concerned only with the existence of
evidence. Pond Place Partners v. Poole, Inc., 351 S.C. 1, 15, 567 S.E.2d
881, 888 (Ct. App. 2002).  The motion “should be denied when either the
evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.” McMillan
v. Oconee Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006).  “When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the
appellate court has authority to decide credibility
issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence.”  Harvey v.
Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 308, 566 S.E.2d 529, 532 (2002).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Cogdill’s appeals the trial judge’s denial
of his motion for a directed verdict.  Cogdill specifically argues that the
evidence presented against him was insufficient given that the testimony of the
State’s sole witness was not based on individual testing or observations of him
and there was no evidence that he had “serious difficulty” controlling his
behavior as required by Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867
(2002).  We disagree.

the trial, Dr. Pamela Crawford, a psychiatrist from the South Carolina Department
of Mental Health, testified as an expert witness for the State.  Dr. Crawford
testified that she did not perform any psychological test on Cogdill but that
she met with Cogdill and reviewed information about him contained in his case
file.   Dr. Crawford testified that Cogdill suffers from pedophilia, which
affects his likelihood to re-offend and that it was her opinion, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, Cogdill qualified as a sexually violent
predator.  She also testified that Cogdill has trouble controlling his behavior
and that his lack of control was illustrated by the fact he had re-offended
while on probation.  Dr. Crawford testified that if Cogdill was released
without treatment, he would likely re-offend and prepubescent boys would be at
risk.  During cross examination, Cogdill’s
attorney thoroughly questioned Dr. Crawford on the methods she used and the
fact no psychological testing
was performed on Cogdill.

The testimony of Dr. Crawford provides sufficient evidence to
justify the trial judge’s denial of Cogdill’s motion and satisfies the mandate
of Crane.  See In re
Care & Treatment of Harvey, 355
S.C. 53, 59-61, 584 S.E.2d 893, 896-7 (2003) (stating that the requirements of the Sexually Violent Predator Act are the
functional equivalent of the requirement in Crane and finding
sufficient evidence where a psychiatrist testified she diagnosed the offender
with pedophilia and the offender met the statutory definition of a sexually
violent predator).    

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,
the order of the trial judge is

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON,
SHORT, and WILLIAMS JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.