State v. Demetrick Doctor

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Demetrick Doctor, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000554

Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-027
Submitted January 1, 2025 – Filed January 29, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General William Joseph Maye, all of
Columbia, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Demetrick Doctor appeals his convictions of attempted murder
and two counts of murder, and concurrent sentences of life without parole. Doctor
argues the trial court erred by failing to suppress the recording of his custodial
interrogation because he signed the acknowledgement of rights form, but refused
to sign the waiver of rights form; repeatedly shook his head "no" when asked if he
would speak with police; and said "I don't want to" when the police read the waiver
of rights form. 1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Initially, we hold the trial court did not err by denying Doctor's motion to suppress
his interrogation with police because he did not unequivocally invoke his rights.
See State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023) ("[T]he
question of voluntariness presents a mixed question of law and fact."); id.
("[Appellate courts] review the trial court's factual findings regarding voluntariness
for any evidentiary support."); id. ("However, the ultimate legal conclusion—
whether, based on those facts, a statement was voluntarily made—is a question of
law subject to de novo review."); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240,
252 (2001) ("The trial court's factual conclusions as to the voluntariness of a
statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to
show an abuse of discretion."); State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 31, 538 S.E.2d 248,
253 (2000) ("When a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, law enforcement
officers must scrupulously honor it."); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459,
(1994) (holding an invocation of rights must be clear and unequivocal); Aleksey,
343 S.C. at 31, 538 S.E.2d at 253 ("[B]efore law enforcement officers are required
to discontinue questioning, the suspect must clearly articulate his desire to end the
interrogation.").

We find Doctor's initial "refusal" to speak with police was ambiguous: while
Doctor did nod his head "no," he only stated he "probably" would not speak with
officers while holding his hands with his palms up in an "I don't know" manner.
Further, we hold even if he did invoke his right to remain silent, his subsequent
re-initiation of conversation validly waived that right. See Aleksey, 343 S.C. at 31,
538 S.E.2d at 253 ("[L]aw enforcement officers may certainly speak with a suspect
who reinitiates communication subsequent to an invocation of rights."). Because
the officers asked Doctor to clarify whether he was invoking his rights, and Doctor
invited officers to inform him about the evidence in their possession even after
they reiterated they could not speak with him about the case if he was invoking his
rights, the officers did not violate Doctor's rights by continuing the interview. See
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1979) (holding that a criminal
defendant's course of conduct, coupled with an understanding of his rights, may
constitute a waiver of Miranda).

1
Doctor argues he said "I don't want to," but the recording is unclear. The State
argues he said "I don't know."
In addition, we hold that even if the trial court erred by finding the interrogation
admissible, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) ("Error is harmless when
it 'could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial.'" (quoting State v. Key,
256 S.C. 90, 93-94 180 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1971)). Doctor's statements were not
material, and did not contribute to the verdict because Doctor did not confess to
any of the charged offenses, but merely admitted to being angry and in an
altercation with Victim Glenn the day before the shooting. See State v. Brown, 344
S.C. 70, 75, 543 S.E.2d 552, 554-55 (2001) ("Whether an error in the admission of
evidence is harmless generally depends upon its materiality in relation to the case
as a whole."). Two eyewitnesses, Nathan Telford and Stacey Melton, also testified
Doctor was armed and at the scene at the time of the shooting, and both Telford
and Melton picked Doctor out of a photographic lineup. See State v. King, 424
S.C. 188, 201, 818 S.E.2d 204, 211 (2018) ("[A] trial's result is harmless where
'guilt has been conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other
rational conclusion can be reached.'" (quoting State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377
S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989)). Therefore, we hold Doctor's statements during the
interrogation could not have contributed to the result of the trial.

AFFIRMED. 2

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.