Glen C. Odom v. Campolong

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Glenn C. Odom, Appellant,

v.

John Campolong and A. C. McLeod, Defendants,

Of whom John Campolong is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001000

Appeal From Chesterfield County
Michael S. Holt, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-262
Heard November 6, 2024 – Filed July 23, 2025

AFFIRMED

John E. Parker and John Elliott Parker, Jr., both of Parker
Law Group, LLP, of Hampton, for Appellant.

Richard A. Harpootlian, of Richard A. Harpootlian, PA,
and Keely McComb McCoy, of Keely M. McCoy,
Attorney At Law, LLC, both of Columbia; and Samuel F.
Arthur, III, of Aiken Bridges Elliott Tyler & Saleeby,
P.A., of Florence, all for Respondent A.C. McLeod.
John Lucius McCants, of Baker Ravenel & Bender, LLP,
of Columbia, for Respondent John Campolong.

PER CURIAM: Glenn C. Odom appeals the circuit court's order granting John
Campolong's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Odom and Campolong reside in the Town of McBee (the Town), and both have
held the position of mayor. During Odom's time as mayor, the Town was awarded
an $850,000 grant that was used to build a water line constructed and maintained
by Odom's water and sewer company. This caused some individuals in the Town
to believe the grant money was misappropriated. In 2012, Campolong, then-acting
mayor, and the town council sent a letter to the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division (the SLED Letter) requesting an investigation into Odom's actions during
his term as mayor. In 2013, SLED determined Odom committed no wrongdoing.
On April 23, 2018, Odom commenced the underlying action, alleging that in 2012,
Campolong entered into a civil conspiracy with a member of the town council to
harm Odom and that Campolong publicly defamed him on multiple occasions.
Additionally, Odom maintains Campolong slandered him in front of former town
council members Beulah Bolton and Marion Stephens, III.
Following discovery, Campolong filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
circuit court granted, finding (1) the alleged statements made by Campolong
during town council meetings were privileged, (2) the alleged statements made by
Campolong to council member Bolton before or after a council meeting were
privileged, (3) Odom failed to present clear and convincing evidence that
Campolong acted with actual malice, and (4) the alleged statement made to Bolton
did not rise to the level of actual malice. Additionally, the circuit court found the
statute of limitations barred Odom's claim for civil conspiracy. Odom filed a
motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. This appeal followed.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the circuit court err in finding no clear and convincing evidence of actual
malice?

II. Did the circuit court err in finding the alleged statement was protected by
legislative privilege?
III. Did the circuit court err in finding the statute of limitations barred Odom's civil
conspiracy claim?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same
standard which governs the trial court." Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 358 S.C.
280, 289, 594 S.E.2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he proper standard is the
'genuine issue of material fact' standard set forth in the text of . . . Rule [56(c),
SCRCP]." Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 463, 892 S.E.2d
297, 301 (2023). "Summary judgment is proper when 'there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.'" Hawkins, 358 S.C. at 289, 594 S.E.2d at 562 (quoting Rule 56(c),
SCRCP). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 288, 594 S.E.2d
at 561 (quoting McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S.C. 332, 342, 499 S.E.2d 488, 493 (Ct.
App. 1998)). "In determining whether any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence
and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361–62, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002). "Summary
judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is
desirable to clarify the application of the law." Id. at 362, 563 S.E.2d at 333.

LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Actual Malice
Odom argues the circuit court erred in finding he did not produce clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice "based solely on the testimony of Odom."
He avers the circuit court ignored evidence that Campolong never meaningfully
investigated the matters on which he premised his allegedly defamatory claims.
Additionally, Odom argues the circuit court ignored evidence that Campolong
harbored ill will towards Odom and had reason to doubt the veracity of his
publications. We disagree.

We find Odom failed to demonstrate Campolong made the alleged defamatory
statements with actual malice. The circuit court reviewed the entire record and
afforded proper weight to Odom's concession that he had no evidence of actual
malice. See George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 451, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001) ("The
constitutional guarantee of free speech requires that a public official or public
figure must prove a defamatory statement was made 'with "actual malice"—that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.'" (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964))); id. at
451, 548 S.E.2d at 874 ("At trial, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence."); id. at 453, 548 S.E.2d at 874 ("[T]he clear and
convincing evidenc[e standard must be] considered by the trial court when ruling
on a summary judgment motion involving the issue of actual malice."). Odom's
references to the record are not clear and convincing evidence of actual malice
because Bolton and Stephen's testimony lacked conviction as to what statements
were made and when any such statements were issued. Moreover, their testimony
was, at times, ambiguous. See id. at 456, 548 S.E.2d at 876 ("'[T]he actual malice
standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or 'malice' in the
ordinary sense of the term.'" (quoting Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989))); id. ("Instead, actual malice is governed
by a subjective standard which tests the defendant's good faith belief in the truth of
her statements."); id. ("There must be sufficient evidence to conclude either that
the defendant made the statements with a 'high degree of awareness . . . of probable
falsity' or that the defendant 'in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.'" (citations omitted)). Additionally, Campolong's alleged failure to
investigate the defamatory claims is not demonstrative of actual malice. See id. at
459, 548 S.E.2d at 878 ("The failure to investigate before publishing, even when a
reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish
reckless disregard."); id. ("However, actual malice may be present where the
defendant fails to investigate and there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity
of the statement or informant."). Furthermore, the circuit court did not ignore
evidence that Campolong harbored ill will towards Odom or had reason to doubt
the truth of his publications. Odom relies on Campolong's statement that he had no
personal knowledge of any illegal conduct done by Odom; this appears to be in
reference to the SLED Letter. We find Campolong and the town council were
permitted to investigate issues pertaining to Odom and the town's water supply
without fear of a lawsuit. See Richardson v. McGill, 273 S.C. 142, 147, 255
S.E.2d 341, 343 (1979) ("Under the present facts, public policy mandated that
legislators be permitted to pursue reports of incompetent or illegal behavior
involving appointed county personnel without the necessity of having to justify
their actions in a suit for defamation.").

II. Legislative Privilege
Odom argues the circuit court erred by finding legislative privilege protected the
statements made to Bolton and Stephens because no evidence in the record
indicates they were made in furtherance of a legitimate, ongoing legislative
function. We disagree. In Richardson, the supreme court held defamatory
statements made outside of a regular legislative session were absolutely privileged
because the statements "were uttered (1) at a meeting attended only by the
legislative delegation, the members of the Recreation Commission, and appellant;
(2) by respondent, a member of the legislative delegation; and (3) concerning a
matter related to legislative duties and [in which] all present had an official
interest." Id. at 147, 255 S.E.2d at 343–44. Here, any alleged defamatory
statements made to Bolton and Stephens were privileged because the statements
related to Town's grants, water, budgets, and finances or to the town council's
legislative purposes or duties. Bolton and Stephens's testimony indicated that
whenever the town council discussed water related issues, Odom's time as mayor
and the issuance of the grant to his company were included in the discussion.
Additionally, Bolton testified the statements were made before or after council
meetings in town hall; thus, the close proximity in time to these meetings further
insulates the statements.
III. Statute of Limitations
Odom asserts the continuous accrual theory or the last overt act doctrine permit
him to allege a claim of civil conspiracy for overt acts of defamation that occur in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Odom argues his claim did not accrue until
2016 at the earliest. We disagree. We hold Odom's cause of action for civil
conspiracy is barred by the statute of limitations. Odom's argument regarding
continuous accrual is unpersuasive. South Carolina does not recognize a theory
tolling the time period to bring an action for civil conspiracy. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-3-530 (2005) (setting forth causes of action a party must bring within three
years); Poly-Med, Inc. v. Novus Sci. Pte. Ltd., 437 S.C. 343, 349, 878 S.E.2d 896,
899 (2022) ("South Carolina has not adopted the continuing breach theory in
Janssen, Marshall, or otherwise."). Additionally, we hold the statute of limitation
began to run in 2012 following the creation of the SLED letter, which would be an
overt act in furtherance of the alleged civil conspiracy.

Accordingly, the circuit court's order is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.