First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 1
Pages 174–199
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
April 29, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
Page Proof Pending Publication
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

-- 1 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
174 OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
FIRST CHOICE WOMEN’S RESOURCE CENTERS,
INC. v. DAVENPORT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
NEW JERSEY
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 24–781. Argued December 2, 2025—Decided April 29, 2026
First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., is a religious nonproft orga-
nization that has provided counseling and resources to pregnant women
in New Jersey since 1985. Believing that life begins at conception, the
group does not provide abortions or refer clients to others for abortions.
In 2022, New Jersey's Attorney General established a “Reproductive
Rights Strike Force” that issued a consumer alert accusing groups like
First Choice of seeking to prevent people from accessing reproductive
health care by providing false or misleading abortion information. The
Attorney General served a subpoena on First Choice, commanding the
group to produce 28 categories of documents, including documents re-
fecting the names, phone numbers, addresses, and places of employment
of all individuals who had made donations to First Choice by any means
other than through one specifc webpage. Effectively, that demand re-
quired First Choice to provide personal information about donors who
gave through two other websites, through the group's various social
media pages, by mail, in person, or by any other means. The subpoena
warned twice that failure to comply may render the group liable for
contempt of court and other penalties.
First Choice fled suit in federal district court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
seeking to prevent the Attorney General from enforcing the document
demands and arguing that the demand for donor information violated
its First Amendment rights. First Choice alleged that its inability to
guarantee its donors' anonymity in the face of the Attorney General's de-
mands injured the group by discouraging donors from associating with it.
The district court denied First Choice's motion for a preliminary in-
junction and dismissed its complaint, holding that the group failed to
state a justiciable claim as a matter of law because, absent any state
court order compelling production, First Choice had yet to suffer an
injury from the subpoena and thus lacked Article III standing. A di-
vided panel of the Third Circuit affrmed.
Held: First Choice has established a present injury to its First Amend-
ment associational rights suffcient to confer Article III standing.
Pp. 183–199.

-- 2 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 175
Syllabus
(a) Article III's “standing” requirement consists of three elements:
“injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Diamond Alternative
Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 110–111. This case centers on the
injury-in-fact element, which requires “an injury that is concrete, partic-
ularized, and actual or imminent.” Id., at 111. Here, the Attorney
General's subpoena has caused First Choice to suffer an ongoing injury
to its First Amendment rights. Pp. 183–190.
(1) The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the rights to
speak, worship, publish, assemble, and petition their government freely.
Each of these rights necessarily carries with it “ `a corresponding right
to associate with others.' ” Americans for Prosperity Foundation v.
Bonta, 594 U. S. 595, 606. Associational rights carry special signif-
cance for political, social, religious, and other minorities, protecting “dis-
sident expression” from marginalization or outright “suppression by the
majority.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622.
This Court has long held that “compelled disclosure of affliation with
groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on
freedom of association” as more direct forms of suppression, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462, and thus has repeatedly
subjected demands for private donor or member information to height-
ened First Amendment scrutiny. Throughout, the Court has recognized
the critical role privacy plays in preserving protected association, and it
has acknowledged that offcial demands for private donor information “in-
evitabl[y]” carry with them a “deterrent effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 65. Pp. 184–188.
(2) Against this backdrop, First Choice has established a present
injury to its First Amendment associational rights and therefore has
standing. An injury in fact arises when a defendant burdens a plain-
tiff's constitutional rights, and government demands for a charity's pri-
vate donor information have just that effect. Such demands inevitably
discourage association with groups engaged in protected First Amend-
ment advocacy and encourage groups to cease or modify protected advo-
cacy the government disfavors. All this occurs not just when a demand
is enforced but when it is made and for as long as it remains outstanding.
Pp. 188–190.
(b) The Attorney General's three reasons why First Choice has not
suffered any injury suffcient to maintain this lawsuit each fails.
Pp. 191–199.
(1) It does not matter that subpoenas issued by the Attorney Gen-
eral are purportedly “non-self-executing” such that any legal duty to
produce records arises only when a state court agrees to enforce the
subpoena. Whether the subpoena's demands and penalties were imme-
diately enforceable or contingent on future court action, donors would

-- 3 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
176 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Syllabus
reasonably fear disclosure and hesitate to associate, and a reasonable
recipient of the Attorney General's subpoena would be induced to trim
its protected advocacy knowing it now stands in the government's cross-
hairs. This Court's precedents do not impose—and in fact foreclose—
a rule that would nonetheless require First Choice to await a state court
order enforcing the subpoena before the group could challenge the At-
torney General's demands in federal court. Pp. 192–196.
(2) It is of no moment that the subpoena allows First Choice to
solicit funds through one specifc website without disclosing the identi-
ties of those who donate through it. By restricting how First Choice
may interact privately with its donors, the Attorney General's subpoena
burdened First Choice's associational rights. Were the rule otherwise,
the government could channel the ability of disfavored groups to associ-
ate through narrow and state-preferred forms and achieve exactly what
the First Amendment forbids. Pp. 196–198.
(3) It makes no difference that a state court may soon, and with
the Attorney General's assent, issue a protective order requiring the
Attorney General to keep confdential any documents First Choice pro-
duces pursuant to the subpoena. Putting aside the uncertainties about
any prospective protective order, demands for private donor informa-
tion burden First Amendment rights “[e]ven if there [is] no disclosure to
the general public.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 486. An offcial
demand for private donor information is enough to discourage reason-
able individuals from associating with a group and to discourage groups
from expressing dissident views. So long as the demand remains out-
standing, “the pressure” to avoid ties and speech that “might displease”
offcials demanding disclosure can “be constant and heavy.” Ibid.
Pp. 198–199.
Reversed and remanded.
Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Erin M. Hawley argued the cause for petitioner. With
her on the briefs were John J. Bursch, Lincoln Davis Wil-
son, Caroline C. Lindsay, Kristen K. Waggoner, James A.
Campbell, Erik C. Baptist, Natalie Thompson, and Dalton
A. Nichols.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for the United States as ami-
cus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were So-
licitor General Sauer, Assistant Attorney General Dhillon,
Deputy Solicitor General Harris, Andrew G. Braniff, and
Christopher C. Wang.

-- 4 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 177
Syllabus
Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel, argued the cause for re-
spondent. With him on the brief were Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General of New Jersey, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum,
Solicitor General, David Leit, Assistant Attorney General,
and Liza B. Fleming, Lauren E. Van Driesen, and Elizabeth
R. Walsh, Deputy Attorneys General.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for A Woman's Con-
cern, Inc., et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Jordan A. Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth,
Andrew J. Ekonomou, and Walter M. Weber; for the Americans for Pros-
perity Foundation by Cynthia Fleming Crawford; for Americans United
for Life by Steven H. Aden, Carolyn C. McDonnell, and Danielle Pimen-
tel; for America's Future et al. by William J. Olson, Jeremiah L. Morgan,
Mark Fitzgibbons, and Michael Boos; for Annunciation House, Inc., by
Christine A. Budasoff and Allyson N. Ho; for Anonymous Donors to Preg-
nancy Resource Centers by Aaron M. Streett; for the Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty by William J. Haun, Eric S. Baxter, Rebekah P. Rick-
etts, and Benjamin A. Fleshman; for the Buckeye Institute by David C.
Tryon; for Care Net Pregnancy Center of Paradise et al. by Catherine
Short and Sheila A. Green; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America by Caleb P. Burns, Jeremy J. Broggi, Jonathan D.
Urick, and Audrey Dos Santos; for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints et al. by R. Shawn Gunnarson, Christopher A. Bates, and Gene
C. Schaerr; for Democrats for Life of America et al. by Catherine Glenn
Foster; for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression et al. by
Joshua A. House; for the Hand of Hope Pregnancy Center by Adam Ma-
thews, Tiffany H. Bates, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, David J.
Hacker, and Jeremiah G. Dys; for Heartbeat International, Inc., et al. by
Thomas L. Brejcha and Adam F. Mathews; for the Institute for Free
Speech by Brett R. Nolan; for the Liberty Justice Center by Jeffrey
Schwab; for the Manhattan Institute et al. by Preston N. Carter, Morgan
D. Goodin, Ilya Shapiro, and Justin Marceau; for Members of Congress
by Christopher O. Murray, Julian R. Ellis, Jr., and Michael L. Francisco;
for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation by Tyler Martinez; for Net-
Choice by Scott A. Keller and Steven P. Lehotsky; for the Pacifc Legal
Foundation by Ethan W. Blevins; for the Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press by Bruce D. Brown and Lisa Zycherman; for the Robert-
son Center for Constitutional Law by Laura B. Hernandez and Christian
B. Edmonds; for Samaritan's Purse by Christopher E. Mills; for Save the
Storks et al. by Andrew Nussbaum; for the Second Amendment Founda-
tion by Steven W. Fogg; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops by Gordon D. Todd and David S. Petron; for the Washington Legal

-- 5 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
178 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court.
New Jersey's Attorney General served a subpoena on a
nonproft organization demanding the identities of its fnan-
Foundation by Cory L. Andrews and Zac Morgan; and for O. Carter Snead
et al. by Michael H. McGinley, and Brian A. Kulp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts et al. by Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General
of Massachusetts, Tasha Bahal, Deputy State Solicitor, and Allyson Slater
and Morgan Carmen, Assistant Attorneys General, by Nicholas W.
Brown, Attorney General of Washington, and Robert A. Hyde and Ben J.
Brysacz, Assistant Attorneys General, and Peter B. Gonick, Deputy Solici-
tor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdic-
tions as follows: Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, Rob Bonta of California,
Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jen-
nings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb of the District of Columbia, Kwame
Raoul of Illinois, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Mary-
land, Dana Nessel of Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Aaron D. Ford
of Nevada, Raúl Torrez of New Mexico, Letitia James of New York, Jeff
Jackson of North Carolina, Dan Rayfeld of Oregon, Peter F. Neronha of
Rhode Island, and Charity R. Clark of Vermont; for the Federation of
State Medical Boards by Jack R. Bierig; and for the Local Government
Legal Center et al. by John J. Korzen, Amanda K. Karras, and Erich
R. Eiselt.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the State of Florida et al. by James
Uthmeier, Attorney General of Florida, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Acting So-
licitor General, Jason J. Muehlhoff, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and
Samuel F. Elliott, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg
Taylor of Alaska, Christopher M. Carr of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of
Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Russell Coleman of
Kentucky, Liz Murrill of Louisiana, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Austin
Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, Drew H. Wrigley
of North Dakota, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma,
Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Derek
Brown of Utah, and John B. McCuskey of West Virginia; for Advancing
American Freedom et al. by J. Marc Wheat; for the American Legislative
Exchange Council by Shawn T. Sheehy and John Cycon; for the Christian
Legal Society et al. by Lori Kepner, Steven T. McFarland, and Laura
Nammo; for the Equal Protection Project by Timothy R. Snowball and
William A. Jacobson; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by Wil-
liam E. Trachman and James L. Kerwin; for the New Jersey Family Pol-

-- 6 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 179
Opinion of the Court
cial supporters. We consider whether that organization
may challenge the subpoena's constitutionality in federal
court.
I
A
First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., is a reli-
gious nonproft organization that has provided counseling
and resources to pregnant women in New Jersey since 1985.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 115a–117a (Pet. App.). Believing
that “life begins at conception,” and seeking “to protect and
honor life in all stages of development,” the group does not
provide abortions or refer clients to others for abortions.
Id., at 116a–117a.
In 2022, New Jersey's Attorney General, Matthew Platkin,
established a “Reproductive Rights Strike Force.” Press
Release, N. J. Offce of the Attorney General, AG Platkin
Announces Actions To Protect Reproductive Health Care
Providers and Those Seeking Reproductive Care in New Jer-
sey (Dec. 7, 2022).1 Shortly after its creation, the Strike
Force issued a “consumer alert” in which it accused groups
like First Choice of “seek[ing] to prevent people from access-
ing comprehensive reproductive health care” by “provid[ing]
false or misleading information about abortion.” App. 357–
358. The alert concluded by directing women to abortion
providers and asking members of the public who believed
they were “victim[s] of fraudulent, deceptive, misleading, or
unlawful conduct” to “please fle a complaint with the New
Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs.” App. 361–362.
Neither that division nor the Attorney General's offce re-
ceived any complaints from the public about First Choice.
icy Center et al. by Kevin T. Snider; and for the People United for Privacy
Foundation by Allen J. Dickerson.
1 Jennifer Davenport's name appears in the caption of this case because
she succeeded Mr. Platkin as New Jersey's Attorney General after this
case was argued and submitted for decision.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 7 of 28 --

180 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Tr. of Oral Arg. 81–84. Even so, the Attorney General
served a subpoena on the group in 2023. The subpoena
stated that it had been issued pursuant to several New Jer-
sey laws, including the State's Consumer Fraud Act. Pet.
App. 90a. The subpoena “commanded” First Choice to
produce various documents within 30 days and warned the
group (twice) that “[f]ailure to comply with this Subpoena
may render you liable for contempt of Court and such other
penalties as are provided by law.” Id., at 89a–110a.
In all, the Attorney General demanded production of 28
categories of documents (categories that themselves included
as many as 29 subcategories). Most relevant for our pur-
poses, the subpoena directed First Choice to disclose docu-
ments refecting the names, phone numbers, addresses, and
places of employment of all individuals who had made “dona-
tions . . . to First Choice by any means other than through”
one specifc webpage. Id., at 98a, 110a. Effectively, that
demand required First Choice to provide personal informa-
tion about donors who gave through two other websites,
through the group's various social media pages, by mail, in
person, or by any other means. See id., at 95a–101a, 110a.
The subpoena sought documents about donations received
over the span of multiple years—beginning “from January 1,
2021” and extending “to the date of [First Choice's] re-
sponse.” Id., at 91a.
Though the subpoena did not explain why the Attorney
General sought First Choice's donor records, Mr. Platkin
later represented that his offce hoped to “contact a repre-
sentative sample [of donors to] determine” if they had “been
misled” by First Choice about its “mission and operations.”
App. 345–346. In his view, First Choice's solicitation mate-
rials—including a donation webpage featuring pictures of
parents holding infants and young children, id., at 383—could
mislead donors into thinking First Choice provides abor-
tions, see id., at 43, 308–310.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 8 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 181
Opinion of the Court
B
Two days before the deadline to produce documents, First
Choice fled suit in federal district court seeking to prevent
the Attorney General from enforcing his document demands.
Pet. App. 111a–147a. Shortly after that, the Attorney Gen-
eral responded with his own suit in state court. There, he
accused First Choice of violating state law by failing to com-
ply with his subpoena. App. 50–63. Between the two
suits, much litigation followed.
In the federal case at issue here, matters unfolded this
way. A federal law—42 U. S. C. § 1983—authorizes suits
against any person who, under color of state law, deprives
another of his federal constitutional rights. First Choice
fled a complaint under that statute, arguing, among other
things, that the Attorney General's demand for information
about its donors violated its First Amendment rights. Pet.
App. 114a, 136a–138a. Specifcally, First Choice observed
that the First Amendment “prohibits the government from
discouraging people from associating with others” “in pursuit
of many political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends.” Id., at 136a. And, First Choice alleged, the
Attorney General's subpoena had just that impermissible ef-
fect. Id., at 136a–138a. For its donors, the group repre-
sented, “anonymity is of paramount importance,” and its in-
ability to guarantee that anonymity in the face of the
Attorney General's demands injured the group by discourag-
ing donors from associating with it. Id., at 130a, 136a–137a.
In addition to its complaint, First Choice fled a motion
seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney
General from enforcing his subpoena. In support of its mo-
tion, First Choice tendered two declarations. In one, anony-
mous donors represented that, if they “had known informa-
tion about the[ir] donation[s] might be disclosed to an offcial
hostile to pro-life organizations,” “[e]ach of [them] would
have been less likely to donate to First Choice.” Id., at
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 9 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
182 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
177a. The donors added that they submitted their declara-
tion anonymously because they believed they might face ret-
ribution otherwise “given [the Attorney General's] record of
hostility toward pro-life groups.” Id., at 175a. In the sec-
ond declaration, the group's executive director similarly rep-
resented that the Attorney General's request threatened to
“weaken [First Choice's] ability to recruit new donors . . . as
prospective partners would be hesitant to risk the revelation
of their personal information through government investiga-
tion.” Id., at 183a.
Ultimately, the district court issued an opinion both deny-
ing First Choice's motion for a preliminary injunction and
dismissing its complaint. Without questioning First
Choice's allegations or evidence, the court held that the
group failed to state a justiciable claim as a matter of law.
Id., at 57a. In reaching that conclusion, the court pointed
to the ongoing state court suit. In it, a judge had directed
the Attorney General and First Choice to negotiate their dis-
agreements over the subpoena but had not yet compelled
First Choice “to disclose materials that [the group] believes
are constitutionally protected.” Id., at 31a; see also id., at
23a, 155a–156a.
Given the absence of any state court order compelling pro-
duction, the district court reasoned, First Choice had yet to
suffer any injury from the subpoena and thus lacked Article
III standing to challenge it in federal court. Id., at 23a,
31a–32a, 38a–39a, n. 20. To be sure, the district court recog-
nized, an argument could be made that the subpoena “itself
. . . by virtue of being issued” was causing First Choice an
“ongoing injury” to its First Amendment rights. Id., at
49a–50a. But, the court held, that injury was insuffcient to
confer standing. Indeed, the court worried that allowing
the federal litigation to proceed while state proceedings re-
mained ongoing would “not [be] tolerable to our Nation's fed-
eralism.” Id., at 56a.

-- 10 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 183
Opinion of the Court
A divided panel of the Third Circuit affrmed. Much like
the district court, the majority reasoned that First Choice
had not established “enough of an injury” to permit its case
to proceed. Id., at 4a. Judge Bibas dissented. He would
have found the case justiciable because the subpoena's issu-
ance burdened First Choice's present ability to associate
freely with its donors. See id., at 3a, n.
II
This case presents a narrow question. We are not asked
to decide the merits of First Choice's federal lawsuit, only
whether it may proceed. Article III of the Constitution
vests federal courts with the “judicial Power” to decide
“Cases” and “Controversies.” § 2, cl. 1. Inherent in that
assignment is a “standing” requirement consisting of three
elements: “injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Di-
amond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 110–
111 (2025). Together, these elements help us distinguish
cases and controversies ft for judicial resolution from ques-
tions of public policy reserved to the elected branches or ab-
stract disputes better left to the debating hall. See ibid.
As this case comes to us, it centers on the injury-in-fact
element. To satisfy that element, a case must involve “an
injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or immi-
nent.” Id., at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). Be-
cause this standard tolerates suits involving “actual or immi-
nent” injuries, a party need not always wait for the
government to take coercive action against it before fling
suit to challenge the government's conduct. Instead, a liti-
gant may bring a pre-enforcement suit seeking prospective
relief against government offcials so long as it faces “a credi-
ble threat of enforcement.” See Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 161, 164–167 (2014).
Before us, First Choice advances two arguments for why it
can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. First, the group
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 11 of 28 --

184 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
submits that the Attorney General's subpoena itself—and
specifcally its demand for donor information—has caused it
to suffer an actual and ongoing injury to its First Amend-
ment rights by deterring donors from associating with it.
Second, First Choice contends that it faces an imminent fu-
ture injury because with the subpoena came a credible threat
that the Attorney General would seek to enforce it in state
court if the group failed to comply. For our purposes, it suf-
fces to address only the frst theory as it is enough to carry
the day.
A
The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the
rights to speak, worship, publish, assemble, and petition
their government freely. Each of these rights, this Court
has “ `long understood,' ” necessarily carries with it “ `a cor-
responding right to associate with others.' ” Americans for
Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. 595, 606 (2021)
(AFP) (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 622 (1984)). Without such a right, no two men could
safely share the same soapbox, no two women the same
church. The government could reduce any assembly to a
party of one, and the right to petition would amount to noth-
ing more than the power to sign one's own name alone. Ap-
preciating all this, we have held that government actions
tending to “curtai[l] the freedom to associate” warrant “the
closest scrutiny” under the First Amendment. NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460–461 (1958).
We have recognized, too, that associational rights carry
special signifcance for political, social, religious, and other
minorities. See id., at 462; Roberts, 468 U. S., at 622. With
the freedom to associate, minorities can “show their numeri-
cal strength,” infuence policy, and “stimulate competition”
in the marketplace of ideas. 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy
in America 196–197 (H. Reeve transl., rev. ed. 1900). But
take that freedom away and “dissident expression” stands
particularly vulnerable to marginalization or outright “sup-
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 12 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 185
Opinion of the Court
pression by the majority,” leaving all of society poorer for it.
Roberts, 468 U. S., at 622.
Our cases have held that governments can infringe free-
dom of association in varied ways. For example, govern-
ments might require a group to accept members it does not
want, deny benefts to an organization based on its message,
or punish individuals for their affliations. See Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 644 (2000); Healy v. James,
408 U. S. 169, 174, 181–182 (1972); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S.
347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion). We have also held that
“compelled disclosure of affliation with groups engaged in
advocacy” can “constitute a[n] effective . . . restraint on free-
dom of association.” NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 462.
NAACP v. Alabama addressed this last problem “in its
starkest form.” AFP, 594 U. S., at 606. Responding to the
NAACP's efforts to promote integration in Alabama in the
1950s, the State's Attorney General (and future Governor)
John Patterson brought a lawsuit in state court. In it, he
contended that the NAACP was operating illegally in Ala-
bama because it had failed to register with the Secretary of
State as required by state law. NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U. S., at 451–453. As remedy, he sought a judicial decree
effectively banning the organization from the State. Id., at
452. And to prove his allegation that the NAACP was oper-
ating in Alabama, Mr. Patterson demanded the names and
addresses of all NAACP members and agents in the State.
Id., at 453. When the organization refused to disclose its
membership rolls, a state court imposed a sanction of
$100,000 (over $1 million today), and the Alabama Supreme
Court let the sanction stand. Id., at 453–454.
This Court reversed that judgment. In doing so, we
began by observing the “vital relationship” between “pri-
vacy in one's associations” and the “freedom to associate.”
Id., at 462. Strip away the ability of individuals to work
together free from governmental oversight and intrusion,
and the freedom to associate may become no freedom at all—
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 13 of 28 --

186 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
individuals deterred, groups diminished, and their protected
advocacy suppressed. See ibid. Nor, we added, is it “a
novel perception” that these outcomes are “particularly”
likely to follow when the government seeks to intrude into
the workings of groups that hold “dissident beliefs” disfa-
vored by those holding the reins of power. Ibid.
Applying these observations to the case at hand, we held
that the Attorney General's demand for the NAACP's pri-
vate membership rolls burdened the constitutional right of
the organization's members “to pursue their collective effort
to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to ad-
vocate,” given the demand's tendency to “induce members
to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from
joining it.” Id., at 463. Because the Attorney General had
not identifed any interest “suffcient to justify the deterrent
effect” associated with his disclosure demand, we continued,
it could not be sustained. Id., at 463–466.
Since NAACP v. Alabama, we have faced many cases
along similar lines. In them, one state authority or another
has demanded private donor or member information. And
in one case after another we have subjected those demands
to heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Throughout, we
have emphasized the critical role “ `privacy in . . . associa-
tio[n]' ” plays “ `in preserving political and cultural diversity
and in shielding dissident expression from suppression.' ”
AFP, 594 U. S., at 606–607. We have acknowledged, too,
that demands for private donor information “inevitabl[y]”
carry with them a “deterrent effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 65 (1976)
(per curiam). See, e. g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516,
524 (1960); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U. S. 293, 296–297 (1961); Gibson v. Florida Legislative In-
vestigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 546 (1963); Brown v. So-
cialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87,
91–92 (1982).
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 14 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 187
Opinion of the Court
Our most recent encounter with a demand for donor infor-
mation came fve years ago in AFP. There, California At-
torney General Rob Bonta sent “defciency letters” to the
Americans for Prosperity Foundation and the Thomas More
Law Center—the frst, a charity “ `devoted to education and
training about . . . constitutionally limited government' ”; the
second, “a public interest law frm whose `mission is to pro-
tect religious freedom, . . . family values, and the sanctity of
human life.' ” 594 U. S., at 602–603. In his letters,
Mr. Bonta sought the names and addresses of anyone who
donated more than $5,000 in a single year to either group.
Id., at 602. When the organizations protested that they
kept donor information private “[o]ut of concern for their do-
nors' anonymity,” the Attorney General responded by threat-
ening fnes and the suspension of each organization's status
as a tax-exempt charity. Id., at 602–603.
We held that the State's demand, like others before it, vio-
lated the First Amendment. To be sure, the Attorney Gen-
eral “trie[d] to downplay” the impact his demand had on as-
sociational rights, stressing that he promised to keep the
groups' donor information to himself and prohibit its public
dissemination. Id., at 615. But we found that promise of
no moment. Demands for private donor information, we
held, “chill” protected First Amendment associational rights
even when those demands contemplate disclosure only to
government offcials and not “ `the general public.' ” Id., at
616 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 486 (1960)).
So any demand for donor information, we said, must over-
come heightened First Amendment scrutiny “given the `de-
terrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights'
that arises as an `inevitable result of the government's con-
duct.' ” AFP, 594 U. S., at 607 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 65). Nor, we ruled, could the
Attorney General satisfy heightened First Amendment scru-
tiny, as his document demand was not suffciently tailored to

-- 15 of 28 --

188 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
serve the government interests that he asserted. 594 U. S.,
at 611–619 (majority opinion).
B
Against this backdrop, the question before us all but an-
swers itself. First Choice has established a present injury
to its First Amendment associational rights.
Start with the Attorney General's subpoena. It told First
Choice: “You are hereby commanded to produce” a variety
of documents, including ones “suffcient to Identify donations
made to First Choice by any means other than through” one
webpage. Pet. App. 89a, 110a. The subpoena defned the
term “Identify” as requiring First Choice to provide each
donor's “(a) full name; (b) present or last known address;
(c) phone number; [and] (d) present or last known place of
employment.” Id., at 98a. Twice, the subpoena warned
First Choice that “[f]ailure to comply with this Subpoena
may render you liable for contempt of Court and such other
penalties as are provided by law.” Id., at 90a.
Next, recall First Choice's complaint. Because the dis-
trict court dismissed this suit for lack of subject matter juris-
diction as a matter of law, the parties take as given that we
may treat all the complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true
for purposes of our analysis. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 44, 60–67.
In its complaint, First Choice alleged that it keeps donor
information private. Pet. App. 130a. The group alleged,
too, that the Attorney General had publicly called pro-life
groups “ `extremists' ” and suggested that “ `charges' ” might
be brought against them. Id., at 119a–120a. Given this,
the complaint continued, the Attorney General's demand for
donor records “discourages . . . individuals and entities from
associating with First Choice” out of “fear that they them-
selves will face retaliation.” Id., at 137a. And, First
Choice asserted, the “risk of loss of donors . . . greatly jeopar-
dizes [its] ability to carry out its religious mission.” Id.,
at 131a.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 16 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 189
Opinion of the Court
Finally, consider First Choice's two unrebutted declara-
tions. In the frst, several donors represented that “[e]ach
of us would have been less likely to donate to First Choice
if we had known information about the donation might be
disclosed” to the Attorney General. Id., at 177a. The do-
nors added that they submitted their declaration anony-
mously because they feared what they called the Attorney
General's “record of hostility toward pro-life groups.” Id.,
at 175a. In the second declaration, First Choice's executive
director stated that the Attorney General's demand threat-
ened to “weaken [the group's] ability to recruit new donors
. . . as prospective partners would be hesitant to risk the
revelation of their personal information through government
investigation.” Id., at 183a.
All this is more than enough to establish injury in fact
under our precedents. An injury in fact does not arise only
when a defendant causes a tangible harm to a plaintiff, like
a physical injury or monetary loss. It can also arise when
a defendant burdens a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. 413, 425 (2021). And
our cases have long recognized that demands for a charity's
private member or donor information have just that effect.
They “ `discourag[e]' ” people from associating with groups
engaged in protected First Amendment advocacy. NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 460–463. They also encourage
groups and individuals to cease or modify protected First
Amendment advocacy the government disfavors. See ibid.;
Shelton, 364 U. S., at 485–487. All this occurs not just when
a demand is enforced, but when it is made and for as long as
it remains outstanding. As we have put it, a demand for
private donor information “inevitabl[y]” deters the exercise
of First Amendment rights, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 65, and
can do so “as effective[ly]” as other “forms of governmental
action” might, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S., at 462.
A more general principle, too, confrms the specifc lesson
our cases teach on this score. Across contexts, we have said,
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 17 of 28 --

190 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
courts may make “commonsense inferences” when assessing
Article III standing, including inferences about “third party
behavior.” Diamond Alternative Energy, 606 U. S., at 116.
And “organizations span[ning] the ideological spectrum” con-
frm the reasonableness of the inferences our cases have
drawn about the burdens that demands for private donor in-
formation inevitably impose on protected First Amendment
rights. AFP, 594 U. S., at 617. Groups ranging from the
American Civil Liberties Union to the National Taxpayers
Union Foundation to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints have fled briefs in this case explaining that,
“[e]ven if a subpoena targeting First Amendment activity is
never enforced in court, [it] will give its targets a very good
reason to clam up [and] give the target organization's mem-
bers and supporters a very good reason to abandon the
cause.” Brief for Foundation for Individual Rights and Ex-
pression, American Civil Liberties Union, and American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey as Amici Curiae 6
(FIRE Brief); see also Brief for National Taxpayers Union
Foundation as Amicus Curiae; Brief for The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. as Amici Curiae. Worse,
amici represent, offcials “across the political spectrum”
have sometimes issued subpoenas and other investigatory
demands in order to secure just these results. FIRE Brief
4; see also id., at 12–23 (collecting examples).
Each of these strands tightens the braid into one conclu-
sion. From its allegations and declarations, and given our
many and longstanding precedents in the area and reason-
able inferences about third party behavior, First Choice has
established that the Attorney General's demand for private
donor information injures the group's First Amendment as-
sociational rights.2
2 First Choice contends that our First Amendment charitable solicitation
precedents independently support its assertion of a present Article III
injury. We have held that the First Amendment's speech clause “protects
[the] right to solicit charitable contributions.” Americans for Prosperity
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 18 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 191
Opinion of the Court
III
The Attorney General does not dispute much of this. He
admits that a party suffering an “objectively reasonable
chill” to its First Amendment associational rights has an in-
jury in fact suffcient to give rise to Article III standing.
See Brief for Respondent 1–3. He does not question that an
offcial demand for private donor information can “objec-
tively chill” a charity's protected First Amendment associa-
tional freedoms. See id., at 26–31.
Notably, too, Mr. Platkin declines to defend the district
court's ruling that “our Nation's federalism” does not “toler-
a[te]” First Choice's effort to have a federal court adjudicate
its federal suit while state court litigation over the subpoena
remains ongoing. Pet. App. 56a. Nor does Mr. Platkin de-
fend the Court of Appeals' similar assessment that First
Choice must frst litigate its constitutional objections in state
court in order to “ripe[n]” its constitutional claims. Id.,
at 4a.
He does not defend the lower courts' views for good rea-
son. First Choice brought this suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Congress enacted that provision with the express goal of en-
suring a federal forum to citizens who claim that state actors
have violated their constitutional rights. See Enforcement
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13; U. S. Const., Amdt. 14,
§ 5; Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 185 (2019).
And federal courts have a “virtually unfagging” obligation
to exercise the jurisdiction given them. Sprint Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. 69, 77 (2013) (internal quota-
Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. 595, 618 (2021); see also Schaumburg v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632–633 (1980). That
right limits a government's ability to make demands of charities that
would have the “predictable result” of rendering their “solicitations . . .
unsuccessful.” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487
U. S. 781, 799–800 (1988). Given our conclusion that First Choice has
standing on other grounds, we have no need to resolve whether Mr. Plat-
kin's disclosure demand burdens the group's solicitation rights.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 19 of 28 --

192 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
tion marks omitted); see also Knick, 588 U. S., at 194. Of
course, certain “abstention” doctrines supply narrow excep-
tions to that rule when state proceedings are ongoing. See,
e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). But the lower
courts did not fnd, and Mr. Platkin does not argue, that any
of this Court's abstention doctrines apply to this case.
Despite all this, the Attorney General insists that First
Choice has not suffered any injury and thus cannot maintain
this lawsuit for three reasons. First, he contends that the
subpoenas his offce issues are “non-self-executing” and sub-
poenas of that sort cannot “objectively chill” First Amend-
ment rights as a categorical matter. Second, he claims that,
even if non-self-executing subpoenas can “objectively chill”
First Amendment rights, the subpoena he issued to First
Choice did not. Third, he suggests that, even if his sub-
poena did “objectively chill” First Choice's associational
rights when he issued it, his later promise to refrain from
making First Choice's donor information public effectively
cured that chill.
A
Take each argument in turn, starting with the Attorney
General's most ambitious submission. He says that subpoe-
nas issued by his offce are “non-self-executing.” Brief for
Respondent 7. Translated, that means they “impose no obli-
gations of their own.” Id., at 3. Instead, any legal duty to
produce records arises only when a court agrees to enforce
the subpoena. Categorically, he says, this means a recipient
of a non-self-executing subpoena like the one he issued to
First Choice suffers no injury unless and until a court en-
forces it.
This conclusion does not follow from its premises. “[T]he
value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs—not that it
drops.” Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, 231 (1974) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Much the same holds true for the sub-
poena before us. It “commanded” First Choice to produce
private donor information. Pet. App. 89a. And it warned
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 20 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 193
Opinion of the Court
that failure to comply “may render [the group] liable for con-
tempt of Court” or “other penalties.” Id., at 90a. Whether
that command and those penalties were immediately enforce-
able or depended on subsequent court action, the most First
Choice could say to existing and prospective donors after
receiving Mr. Platkin's subpoena was that their privacy
might be protected—or it might not. Objectively reason-
able people interested both in their privacy and in associat-
ing with First Choice would “not lightly disregard” such a
distinct possibility of disclosure. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sul-
livan, 372 U. S. 58, 68 (1963). An objectively reasonable re-
cipient of a demand like that would be induced, as well, to
trim its protected advocacy knowing it now stands in the
government's crosshairs. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U. S., at 460–463; Shelton, 364 U. S., at 485–487; cf. Virginia
v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 393 (1988)
(self-censorship in response to a “well-founded fear that the
law will be enforced against them” is an injury in fact “that
can be realized even without an actual prosecution”).
Seeking to persuade us otherwise, the Attorney General
tries to analogize this case to Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1
(1972), where we found the plaintiffs' alleged First Amend-
ment injury merely “subjective” and self-imposed, and thus
insuffcient to create a justiciable controversy. Id., at 13–14.
But this case is nothing like that one. There, the plaintiffs
alleged that their First Amendment associational rights
were “chilled” not by any “specifc action . . . against them,”
but “by the mere existence, without more” of a government
program they thought was “inappropriate” or “dangerous.”
Id., at 3, 10, 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
by contrast, the Attorney General targeted First Choice for
investigation. He commanded production of its private
donor information. And his command, even if not immedi-
ately enforceable, is backed by a threat of court-ordered com-
pliance followed by the possibility of sanctions should First
Choice resist.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 21 of 28 --

194 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Failing in one analogy, Mr. Platkin attempts another.
This time he points to Pakdel v. City and County of San
Francisco, 594 U. S. 474 (2021) (per curiam). In that case,
we explained that a plaintiff normally cannot sue in federal
court over an alleged regulatory taking until local land use
authorities “commi[t] to a position” regarding how “the regu-
lations at issue apply to the particular land in question.”
Id., at 478–479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Apply-
ing the same logic here, Mr. Platkin insists, means that First
Choice should not be allowed to challenge his subpoena in
federal court until state court proceedings have run their
course. Until then, after all, his non-self-executing sub-
poena is “subject to negotiation” and it remains uncertain
which of its demands will be enforced. Brief for Respond-
ent 25, 27.
But even setting aside the question whether a Takings
Clause rule might be properly transposed into the First
Amendment context, the rule Mr. Platkin invokes has little
purchase here. He “committed to a position” when he is-
sued his subpoena demanding donor records. To be sure, he
remained free to narrow the scope of his demands later, and
he might fail to secure a judicial order compelling production.
But none of this means he failed to commit to a position.
Nor does any of this undo the “inevitable” injury First
Choice experienced to its associational rights when Mr. Plat-
kin issued his subpoena—an injury that it continues to expe-
rience so long as the subpoena remains outstanding. Buck-
ley, 424 U. S., at 65.
Below, the district court offered still another analogy to
the same end. It pointed to lower court decisions applying
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440 (1964). See Pet. App. 77a–
80a, and n. 4. In Reisman, and its cousin, FTC v. Claire
Furnace Co., 274 U. S. 160 (1927), this Court confronted ef-
forts to enjoin non-self-executing federal administrative sub-
poenas before a court directed their enforcement. See Reis-
man, 375 U. S., at 444–446; Claire Furnace, 274 U. S., at 165–
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 22 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 195
Opinion of the Court
166, 173–174. In both cases, we read the governing statutes
in question as preferring federal court review only after the
government sought to compel production. See Reisman,
375 U. S., at 446–450; Claire Furnace, 274 U. S., at 174. And
in both cases, we held that the availability of federal court
review on the back end provided the plaintiffs “an adequate
remedy at law,” which meant that their pre-emptive requests
for injunctive relief were subject to dismissal “for want of
equity.” Reisman, 375 U. S., at 443 (reciting the usual rule
that an equitable remedy is unavailable when an adequate
remedy at law is available); accord, Claire Furnace, 274
U. S., at 174. In much the same way, the district court con-
cluded, First Choice cannot sue preemptively to challenge
the Attorney General's subpoena, but must instead wait for
the state court litigation to play out.
This analogy works no better than its predecessors.
First, the plaintiffs in Reisman and Claire Furnace did not
allege a present injury from the subpoena itself, but com-
plained only of future injuries they might face if a court en-
forced the subpoena. See Reisman, 375 U. S., at 442, 449–
450; Claire Furnace, 274 U. S., at 165–166. Because a per-
son in those plaintiffs' shoes “would suffer no injury while
testing” the subpoena in federal court, we were able to
“[f]in[d] that the remedy specifed by Congress,” i. e., review
upon enforcement, “works no injustice and suffers no consti-
tutional invalidity.” Reisman, 375 U. S., at 449–450. The
same conclusion does not follow in cases like this one, where
a plaintiff suffers ongoing injuries from the subpoena itself.
See Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 138 F. 4th 563, 582–
583 (CADC 2025).
Second, Reisman and Claire Furnace concerned equity
practice, not Article III standing. And the “adequate rem-
edy at law” we found suffcient to divest us of equitable au-
thority in those cases involved litigation in federal court
when the federal government would sue to enforce the sub-
poenas at issue. See Reisman, 375 U. S., at 446–450; Claire

-- 23 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
196 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
Furnace, 274 U. S., at 174. Here, by contrast, the district
court sought to force First Choice to litigate in state court
before coming to federal court. That difference matters be-
cause, even as a matter of equity practice, “[i]t is settled that
no adequate remedy at law exists, so as to deprive federal
courts of equity jurisdiction, unless it is available in the fed-
eral courts.” Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 304 U. S. 209, 217 (1938).
Third, our cases have already rejected the notion that a
litigant must exhaust available state court remedies before
seeking to vindicate its federal constitutional rights in fed-
eral court under § 1983. Knick, 588 U. S., at 185. Section
1983 guarantees a federal forum for plaintiffs who claim un-
constitutional treatment at the hands of state offcials. Re-
quiring plaintiffs to exhaust state court remedies before they
may avail themselves of § 1983's promise, we have said,
would “hollow” out the statute. Ibid. Such a rule, too,
would threaten litigants with a “preclusion trap.” Ibid.
Under it, a plaintiff who goes to state court and loses would
fnd its claim forever barred in federal court under principles
of res judicata. In that way, § 1983's promise of a federal
forum would “di[e] aborning.” Ibid.
B
Moving from the categorical to the case specifc, the Attor-
ney General submits that, even if a non-self-executing sub-
poena seeking donor information can objectively chill First
Amendment freedoms, his subpoena to First Choice did not.
Yes, that subpoena sought information about those who do-
nate to the group by almost any means, whether in person,
over the phone, or online. See Pet. App. 95a–101a, 110a.
But, the Attorney General stresses, the subpoena did not
seek information about individuals who give through one
website. See id., at 110a. The Attorney General says he is
content this specifc website could not mislead a potential
donor into thinking that First Choice provides or refers for

-- 24 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 197
Opinion of the Court
abortions. Brief for Respondent 28. Accordingly, he will
permit First Choice to solicit funds through that avenue
without disclosing the identities of those who donate through
it. That permission, the Attorney General submits, means
First Choice has suffered no First Amendment injury. Id.,
at 27–29.
This argument misapprehends the Article III standing in-
quiry. A government that takes three limbs but spares the
last imposes an injury all the same. So too here. The ques-
tion before us isn't how badly the Attorney General has bur-
dened First Choice's associational rights; the question is
whether he has burdened those rights at all. And by effec-
tively restricting how First Choice may interact privately
with its donors, the subpoena did just that. Were the rule
otherwise, the government could channel the ability of disfa-
vored groups to associate through narrow and state-preferred
forms. In doing so, it could achieve exactly what the First
Amendment forbids, marginalizing dissident voices and res-
haping the marketplace of ideas to its pleasure, all while
evading any legal challenge to its actions. None of that is
consistent with our Constitution, which prohibits “subtle . . .
interference” with protected liberties no less than it does
“heavy-handed frontal attack[s].” Bates, 361 U. S., at 523.
In a separate but similar vein, Mr. Platkin contends that
any injury initially associated with his subpoena dissipated
later. On the day before oral argument in the Third Circuit,
he sent a letter to First Choice indicating that he would be
“willing to narrow” his demands and accept information
about donors who give through just two websites. Supp.
App. to Reply Brief on Pet. for Cert. 2a (Supp. App.). At
least that, Mr. Platkin maintains, was surely enough to end
any injury his subpoena imposed and moot this case. Brief
for Respondent 24–25.
Not so. A defendant seeking to moot a case by abandon-
ing his injurious conduct carries a “heavy burden.” Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449,
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 25 of 28 --

198 FIRST CHOICE WOMEN'S RESOURCE CENTERS, INC. v.
DAVENPORT
Opinion of the Court
457, n. 1 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Among
other things, he “must prove no reasonable expectation re-
mains that [he] will return to [his] old ways.” FBI v. Fikre,
601 U. S. 234, 241 (2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That is a standard Mr. Platkin cannot meet. His letter ex-
pressly “reserve[d] the right to seek identities of other do-
nors . . . through a separate subpoena.” Supp. App. 2a.
Even more than that, he continued to insist on the disclosure
of donor information collected through two websites. As
with his earlier offer to allow anonymous donations through
one website, this later proposal might have mitigated the
scope of First Choice's injury, but it did not extinguish it.
C
In a last push, the Attorney General suggests that his de-
mand cannot injure First Choice because a state court will
soon, and with his assent, issue a protective order requiring
him to keep confdential any documents the group produces.
As a result, First Choice and its donors have no need to
worry about donor information becoming public. Brief for
Respondent 30.
This response fares no better than the rest. Put aside
that no such protective order presently exists. Put aside
the possibility that, even with a protective order in place,
donor information might wind up in the public domain due
to a hack or leak. Cf. AFP, 594 U. S., at 616, n. Put aside
the risk of harassment and reprisals that could invite. See
Pet. App. 182a (declaration discussing hostility sometimes di-
rected against “pro-life organizations”). And put aside that
risks along those lines are “heightened in the 21st century,”
where almost “anyone with . . . a computer” can access infor-
mation once it migrates to the public domain. AFP, 594
U. S., at 617 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even taken on its own terms, this response falls short.
An offcial demand for private donor information is enough
to discourage reasonable individuals from associating with a
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 26 of 28 --

Cite as: 608 U. S. 174 (2026) 199
Opinion of the Court
group. It is enough to discourage groups from expressing
dissident views. A government that chooses to make pri-
vate donor information public may make the damage worse.
But “[e]ven if there [is] no disclosure to the general public,
the pressure” to avoid ties and speech “which might dis-
please” offcials demanding disclosure can “be constant and
heavy.” Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486; see also AFP, 594 U. S.,
at 616 (“assurances of confdentiality . . . do not eliminate”
the First Amendment injury caused by a demand for private
member or donor information). Just ask yourself, would it
have been an answer in NAACP v. Alabama if the State's
Attorney General promised to keep the NAACP's member-
ship rolls to himself?
*
Since the 1950s, this Court has confronted one offcial de-
mand after another like the Attorney General's. Over and
again, we have held those demands burden the exercise of
First Amendment rights. Disputing none of these prece-
dents but seeking ways around them, the Attorney General
has offered a variety of arguments. Some are old, some are
new, but none succeeds. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Page Proof Pending Publication

-- 27 of 28 --

Page Proof Pending Publication
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, cap-
tions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional
edits were made:
None

-- 28 of 28 --