Rutherford v. United States

P R E L I M I N A R Y P R I N T
Volume 608 U. S. Part 2
Pages 454–492
OFFICIAL REPORTS
OF
THE SUPREME COURT
May 28, 2026
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
reporter of decisions
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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
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pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

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454 OCTOBER TERM, 2025
Syllabus
RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 24–820. Argued November 12, 2025—Decided May 28, 2026*
Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and
carrying a frearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c). Petitioner Johnnie Carter was convicted of three § 924(c) viola-
tions. At the time each was sentenced, a defendant convicted of two
§ 924(c) counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year sentence for the sec-
ond offense that would be “stacked” upon (i. e., run consecutively to) the
frst offense's mandatory penalty. That sentencing scheme resulted in
a 32-year minimum sentence for Rutherford's § 924(c) violations and a
57-year minimum sentence for Carter's violations. Years later, Con-
gress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated the 25-year
stacking requirement for frst-time offenders. Rutherford and Carter
do not qualify for the Act's reduced penalties because the amendment
to § 924(c) does not apply to defendants sentenced before the Act. In
separate proceedings below, however, Rutherford and Carter each in-
voked the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) as a basis for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (commonly
referred to as the “compassionate release” provision) allows a court to
reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment if the court fnds, after consid-
ering the § 3553(a) factors, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
The courts below held that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot
serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduced sen-
tence. The Third Circuit explained in Rutherford's case that the Com-
mission's 2023 amended policy statement—which adds “Unusually Long
Sentence” to the list of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons that
might warrant compassionate release under certain circumstances, see
USSG App. C, Amdt. 814—“conficts with the will of Congress” ex-
pressed in the statute and thus “cannot be considered in determining a
prisoner's eligibility for compassionate release.” 120 F. 4th 360, 376.
The Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to resolve the
split of Circuit authority over whether the disparity created by a nonret-
*Together with No. 24–860, Johnnie Markel Carter v. United States, on
certiorari to the same court.

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Cite as: 608 U. S. 454 (2026) 455
Syllabus
roactive change to sentencing law is an “extraordinary and compelling
reaso[n]” that warrants compassionate release.
Held: When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroac-
tive—as with the change to § 924(c)—the resulting sentencing disparity
cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason that warrants
a sentence reduction under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Pp. 465–473.
(a) The plain text of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) empowers a district court to
“reduce the term of imprisonment” if it fnds, among other things, that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Under the ordinary meaning of the terms, “extraor-
dinary and compelling” reasons are those that are especially unusual
and convincing.
The disparity created by Congress's amendment to § 924(c) does not
satisfy this definition. Far from “extraordinary,” nonretroactive
amendments to criminal penalties are the norm. Changes to statutory
penalties usually beneft only future offenders. When Congress devi-
ates from the default by extending the revised penalties to defendants
not yet sentenced, the “ordinary practice” is to “withhol[d] that change
from defendants already sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U. S.
260, 280. Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in
which nonretroactivity is the default.
As for “compelling”: It is hard to see how Congress's deliberate deci-
sion not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced
could be a convincing reason that warrants a sentence reduction. Con-
gress decided to apply the lower prison sentences to some violators of
§ 924(c) but not others, “reinforc[ing] its interest in fnality and avoid-
[ing] burdening district courts with additional litigation.” Hewitt v.
United States, 606 U. S. 419, 437–438 (plurality opinion). Treating the
disparity resulting from § 924(c)'s amendment as a compelling reason for
reducing a sentence would undermine Congress's choice to leave the
sentence intact. It would also fall well outside the heartland of compas-
sionate release, which has long been defned by a prisoner's personal
circumstances, such as medical condition, age, and family circumstances.
Pp. 465–467.
(b) Petitioners' arguments to the contrary lack merit. While the
terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” leave room for judgment, they
are not so fexible as to encompass any consideration. Their meaning
depends on context: A reason is “extraordinary” and “compelling” only
if it is suffciently unusual and convincing to “warrant” compassionate
release. The disparity resulting from Congress's amendment to § 924(c)
is neither “extraordinary” nor “compelling”—rather it tracks ordinary
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456 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
sentencing practice and refects Congress's deliberate choice to extend
relief to some prisoners and not others.
Petitioners argue that because Congress empowered the Sentencing
Commission to describe the grounds for compassionate release with only
one express limitation—“[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not
be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason,” 28 U. S. C.
§ 994(t)—Congress impliedly authorized the district court to consider all
other relevant information. That argument fails because “ `[t]he force
of any negative implication . . . depends on context.' ” NLRB v. SW
General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 302 (quoting Marx v. General Revenue
Corp., 568 U. S. 371, 381). By addressing rehabilitation, Congress did
not impliedly bless all other considerations; instead, it singled out reha-
bilitation to break from the old sentencing and parole system.
Petitioners also note that courts ordinarily enjoy broad discretion to
consider all relevant information when imposing or modifying a sen-
tence. But petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of
a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, a court must frst ensure that
a movant is part of the “limited class of prisoners” who are “eligibl[e]”
for such a reduction. Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. 817, 825, 827.
Eligibility depends on whether the prisoner can offer “extraordinary
and compelling” reasons that “warrant” compassionate release, not on
the § 3553(a) factors. This gatekeeping requirement imposes independ-
ent and ascertainable limits on access to compassionate release.
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, is not to the contrary.
That case involved sentence-modifcation proceedings under a different
provision of the Act, where eligibility for a sentencing reduction was
conceded and the only question was what information the court could
consider in modifying a sentence. Because the provision of the Act at
issue in Concepcion lacks any limiting language, we held that a court
could consider changes to the Guidelines, as well as intervening facts,
when calculating a new sentence under it. Id., at 500. Today's cases
differ from Concepcion because they concern whether a prisoner is eligi-
ble for compassionate release in the frst place. And on that score, Con-
gress has “expressly cabined district courts' discretion,” id., at 495, by
prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court fnds that “extraordi-
nary and compelling” reasons warrant it.
Finally, petitioners downplay the confict between the Act and their
interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Act refects Congress's choice
not to extend relief on a categorical basis, but on their approach, a dis-
trict court could treat the disparity between a pre- and post-Act sen-
tence as one of at least two considerations that, taken together, war-
rant compassionate release. The implications of petitioners' argument
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Cite as: 608 U. S. 454 (2026) 457
Syllabus
are sweeping. Under the same logic, could a judge who believes that
a mandatory minimum is unduly harsh treat the severity of the sen-
tence as an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for compassion-
ate release? Petitioners declined to rule out this possibility. Yet
“[i]t is the legislature, not the Court, which is to defne a crime, and
ordain its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95.
Treating the severity of a mandatory penalty as a reason for compas-
sionate release rejects Congress's judgment that the punishment fts the
crime. Petitioners' proposal—injecting other factors into the mix of
extraordinary and compelling reasons—does not solve the problem.
Pp. 468–472.
(c) Petitioners' contention that the Court's interpretation of
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) must yield to the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy
statement misunderstands the Commission's role. Congress empow-
ered the Commission to “give meaning” to the compassionate release
provision by identifying the circumstances that constitute “extraordi-
nary and compelling” reasons for release. Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394. But the Commission's policy statements
must be “consistent with” the governing statute, 28 U. S. C. § 994(a), and
courts have a duty to “independently interpret the statute and effectu-
ate the will of Congress,” 603 U. S., at 395. The statutory text and
structure make clear that Congress's nonretroactive change to § 924(c)—
considered by itself or in combination with other factors—cannot make
a prisoner eligible for compassionate release. To the extent that
the Commission's policy statement counsels otherwise, it is invalid.
Pp. 472–473.
No. 24–820, and 120 F. 4th 360, No. 24–860, affrmed.
Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts,
C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Soto-
mayor, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 473.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioner in No.
24–820. With him on the briefs were Justin B. Berg, Alex
P. Treiger, and Derek C. Reinbold.
David A. O'Neil argued the cause for petitioner in No. 24–
860. With him on the briefs were Anna Moody, Suzanne
Zakaria, and Steven Tegrar.
Deputy Solicitor General Feigin argued the cause for re-
spondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Solici-

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458 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
tor General Sauer, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Galeotti, Frederick Liu, Tyler Anne Lee, and Andrew C.
Noll.†
Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court.
A prison sentence, once imposed, usually cannot be modi-
fed by the district court. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(b). But Con-
gress has established several narrow exceptions to this rule.
One exception—commonly referred to as “compassionate re-
lease”—permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment
if it fnds, among other things, that “extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)
(A)(i). We consider whether the sentencing disparity cre-
ated by Congress's nonretroactive change to § 924(c)'s man-
datory penalties can serve as an “extraordinary and compel-
ling reaso[n]” that “warrant[s]” a reduction. § 3582(c)(1)
(A)(i). We hold that it cannot.
†Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were fled for
Clinical Law Professors by Erica Zunkel and David H. Korn; for the
Constitutional Accountability Center by Elizabeth B. Wydra and Brianne
J. Gorod; for FAMM et al. by Jarrod L. Schaeffer and Joshua L. Dratel;
for Former Corrections Offcials by Scott P. Lewis; for the NAACP et al.
by Raymond P. Tolentino, Carlton Forbes, Kristen Johnson, and Christo-
pher Kemmitt; for the National Association of Federal Defenders by Shel-
ley Fite, Tracy Dreispul, Daniel Habib, Jennifer Niles Coffn, and Marisa
Taney; for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (NYCDL) by Harry
Sandick and Celeste L. M. Koeleveld; for Douglas Berman by Vincent
Levy; and for Sen. Cory Booker et al. by Amy Mason Saharia.
Andrew T. Tutt, Dana Kagan McGinley, and Nicole L. Masiello fled a
brief for Former Federal Judges as amici curiae urging reversal in No.
24–820.
Amelia T. R. Starr fled a brief for The Fortune Society as amicus
curiae urging reversal in No. 24–860.
Briefs of amici curiae were fled in both cases for the Cato Institute
et al. by Matthew P. Cavedon, Brett Tolman, and John W. Whitehead; and
for Former Commissioners of the United States Sentencing Commission
by Joshua Matz and Trisha Anderson.
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Opinion of the Court
I
A
Daniel Rutherford, petitioner in one of these consolidated
cases, committed two separate robberies at gunpoint in 2003.
A jury convicted him of several crimes, including two counts
of using and carrying a frearm during a crime of violence,
in violation of § 924(c). At the time, a defendant convicted
of two § 924(c) counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year
sentence of imprisonment for the second offense that would
be “stacked” upon—that is, run consecutively to—the frst
offense's mandatory penalty (which, for Rutherford, was 7
years). See Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132–137
(1993). Rutherford's two § 924(c) counts thus earned him a
32-year minimum sentence, resulting in a total sentence of
over 42 years of imprisonment.
Johnnie Carter, petitioner in the other case, received an
even longer mandatory minimum under § 924(c). In 2007,
Carter participated in a string of armed bank robberies.
Among other offenses, he was convicted of three § 924(c)
counts. Carter was sentenced to 70 years of imprison-
ment—57 of which came from his stacked § 924(c)
convictions.
Years after Rutherford and Carter were each sentenced,
Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194,
“a landmark piece of legislation that changed the federal
criminal-sentencing system in numerous respects,” Hewitt v.
United States, 606 U. S. 419, 424 (2025). Among the changes
was the elimination of § 924(c)'s 25-year stacking require-
ment for frst-time offenders: A 25-year consecutive sentence
is now required only for a “ `violation . . . that occurs after
a prior conviction under this subsection has become fnal.' ”
§ 403(a), 132 Stat. 5222. This change would have made a sig-
nifcant difference for both Rutherford and Carter. Had
either been sentenced today, his mandatory minimum under
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460 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
§ 924(c) would have been much shorter: 14 years for Ruther-
ford and 21 years for Carter.
Obviously, Rutherford and Carter—not to mention the
many other similarly situated prisoners—would like the ben-
eft of the Act's amendment to § 924(c). As a rule, however,
changes to sentencing statutes apply only to offenses com-
mitted after the statute's effective date. See Hewitt, 606
U. S., at 424. The Act departs from this rule in a very lim-
ited respect: Its more lenient penalties apply to offenses com-
mitted before the statute's enactment “if a sentence for the
offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.”
§ 403(b), 132 Stat. 5222. But for defendants sentenced be-
fore the Act, the general rule of nonretroactivity remains in
place. See Hewitt, 606 U. S., at 427.
Rutherford and Carter acknowledge that they do not
qualify for the reduced penalties. Nonetheless, each has in-
voked the Act as a ground for compassionate release under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
B
At this point, some background on the compassionate re-
lease provision is helpful. This provision, which was part of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, allows a district court to
reduce a prison term “after considering the factors set forth
in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” if
the court fnds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction” and that “such a reduction is con-
sistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sen-
tencing Commission.” 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress
did not specify what “extraordinary and compelling” reasons
might warrant compassionate release. It did, however, au-
thorize the Commission to promulgate policy statements that
“describe what should be considered extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria
to be applied and a list of specifc examples.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 994(t). The Commission frst issued an applicable policy
statement in 2006 and amended it the following year to iden-
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Opinion of the Court
tify several “ `extraordinary and compelling' ” reasons for
compassionate release: “ `terminal illness' ”; “ `permanent
physical or medical condition' ”; “ `deteriorating physical or
mental health because of the aging process' ”; “ `death or in-
capacitation of the defendant's only family member capable
of caring for the defendant's minor child or minor children' ”;
and a catchall category for “ `other' ” reasons not specifcally
enumerated, “ `[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons.' ” United States Sentencing Commission, Guide-
lines Manual Supp. to App. C, Amdt. 698 (Nov. 2011) (USSG).
In 2016, the Commission streamlined the statement to recog-
nize four categories of reasons: “ `Medical Condition of the
Defendant,' ” “ `Age of the Defendant,' ” “ `Family Circum-
stances,' ” and “ `Other Reasons.' ” Id., Amdt. 799.
When Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, it
amended the compassionate release provision. While it left
the “extraordinary and compelling” standard untouched, it
opened a new procedural route for seeking a reduction.
Originally, only the Bureau of Prisons could ask a district
court to reduce a prisoner's sentence. The Act gives the
prisoner greater agency: He may request that the Bureau
fle a motion on his behalf, and, if it declines or fails to do so
within 30 days, he may fle a motion himself. 18 U. S. C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). The Act also obligates the Bureau to take
certain steps when a prisoner is diagnosed with a terminal
illness or is mentally or physically unable to fle his own mo-
tion. §§ 3582(d)(2)(A)–(B). For example, the Bureau must
inform “the defendant's attorney, partner, and family mem-
bers” about the defendant's condition and that they can fle
a sentence-reduction request on his behalf. Ibid.
The Commission lost a quorum shortly after the Act went
into effect and did not update its policy statement to address
these changes. Most Circuits held that the existing state-
ment—which mentioned only motions fled by the Bureau—
did not apply to motions fled by prisoners. See United
States v. Andrews, 12 F. 4th 255, 259 (CA3 2021) (collecting
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462 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
cases); but see United States v. Bryant, 996 F. 3d 1243, 1247–
1248 (CA11 2021) (applying the policy statement). So for
this new class of motions, most courts interpreted the stat-
ute without input from the Commission.
They were soon forced into uncharted territory. Relevant
here, courts faced a surge of motions from prisoners who
invoked the Act's nonretroactive sentencing amendments as
grounds for compassionate release. Most Courts of Appeals
held that a nonretroactive amendment to a mandatory mini-
mum cannot serve as an “extraordinary and compelling” rea-
son for a reduced sentence.1 A minority, however, con-
cluded that the disparity produced by such an amendment
can justify a reduced sentence—at least when considered in
combination with other factors.2
The Commission eventually regained a quorum, entered
the fray, and sided with the minority. In 2023, it amended
its policy statement to add a new category to the list of
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons: “Unusually Long
Sentence.” 3 See USSG App. C, Amdt. 814. Under this
category:
“ `If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and
has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment,
a change in the law (other than an amendment to the
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive)
1 See Andrews, 12 F. 4th, at 260–262; United States v. McMaryion, 2023
WL 4118015, *2 (CA5, June 22, 2023); United States v. Jarvis, 999 F. 3d
442, 443–444 (CA6 2021); United States v. Thacker, 4 F. 4th 569, 573–575
(CA7 2021); United States v. Crandall, 25 F. 4th 582, 583 (CA8 2022);
United States v. Jenkins, 50 F. 4th 1185, 1197–1200 (CADC 2022).
2 See United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F. 4th 14, 24–28 (CA1 2022); United
States v. McCoy, 981 F. 3d 271, 284–288 (CA4 2020); United States v. Chen,
48 F. 4th 1092, 1094–1101 (CA9 2022); United States v. McGee, 992 F. 3d
1035, 1045–1048 (CA10 2021).
3 In addition, the Commission added the fact that a prisoner was a victim
of abuse while in custody as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason.
See USSG App. C, Amdt. 814 (Nov. 2023). This change is not at issue in
today's cases.
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Opinion of the Court
may be considered in determining whether the defend-
ant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason,
but only where such change would produce a gross dis-
parity between the sentence being served and the sen-
tence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is fled,
and after full consideration of the defendant's individual-
ized circumstances.' ” Ibid.
Three Commissioners voted against the amendment and
accused the Commission of making “a seismic structural
change to our criminal justice system without congressional
authorization or directive.” United States Sentencing Com-
mission, Public Meeting Tr. 60 (Apr. 5, 2023).
C
Back to the cases at hand. After the First Step Act be-
came effective, Rutherford moved for compassionate release.
He argued that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons war-
rant a reduction because he had received an “unusually long
sentence under a statutory provision that Congress has since
found too punitive but has not made retroactively applica-
ble.” 2 App. in No. 23–1904 (CA3), p. 58. In addition, he
noted that he suffered from obesity and hypertension, which
rendered him more vulnerable to the COVID–19 virus.
While Rutherford's motion was pending, the Third Circuit
held that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot serve
as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for compassion-
ate release. See Andrews, 12 F. 4th, at 260–262. The Dis-
trict Court then denied Rutherford's motion, and Rutherford
appealed that ruling to the Third Circuit. While his appeal
was pending, the Commission amended its policy statement,
and Rutherford asked the Court of Appeals to consider the
effect of this statement in the frst instance.
The Third Circuit affrmed the District Court's denial of
Rutherford's motion. See 120 F. 4th 360, 363 (2024). The
court acknowledged that Congress had authorized the Com-
mission to issue a policy statement feshing out the meaning
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464 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
of “ `extraordinary and compelling ' ” reasons under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Id., at 375. But that statement, the court
said, cannot “go beyond what Congress intended.” Id., at
376. And as the Third Circuit had already explained in An-
drews, it makes no sense to “ `construe Congress's nonretro-
activity directive as simultaneously creating an extraordi-
nary and compelling reason for early release.' ” 120 F. 4th,
at 376 (quoting Andrews, 12 F. 4th, at 261). Because the
Commission's amended policy statement “conficts with the
will of Congress,” the court held, it “cannot be considered in
determining a prisoner's eligibility for compassionate re-
lease.” 120 F. 4th, at 376.
Carter's case is similar. After the Commission amended
its policy statement, he moved for a reduction under § 3582(c)
(1)(A)(i), arguing that his sentence is “unusually long” and
that the Act created a “ `gross disparity' ” between his origi-
nal sentence and the one he would receive under the
amended § 924(c). 2 App. in No. 24–1115 (CA3), pp. 206–207.
He also pointed to his strong family ties, rehabilitation, and
good conduct while incarcerated as additional reasons for a
reduction. Bound by Andrews, the District Court denied
Carter's motion, and Carter appealed. While the appeal
was pending, the Third Circuit decided Rutherford's case.
Shortly thereafter, it summarily affrmed the denial of Car-
ter's motion. See 2024 WL 5339852, *1 (Dec. 2, 2024).
The Circuits remain divided over whether the disparity
created by a nonretroactive change to sentencing law, like
the Act, can constitute an “extraordinary and compelling rea-
so[n]” that “warrant[s]” compassionate release.4 18 U. S. C.
4 Most Courts of Appeals that previously answered this question in the
negative have determined that they are not bound by the Sentencing Com-
mission's contrary amendment to its policy statement. See 120 F. 4th 360,
378–380 (CA3 2024) (case below); United States v. Austin, 125 F. 4th 688,
692 (CA5 2025); United States v. Bricker, 135 F. 4th 427, 435 (CA6 2025);
United States v. Black, 131 F. 4th 542, 545–546 (CA7 2025); United States
v. Johnson, 2025 WL 1949738, *2 (CA8, July 16, 2025). But see United
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Opinion of the Court
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We granted certiorari in these consoli-
dated cases to resolve the split. 605 U. S. 1001 (2025).
II
Petitioners argue that the Third Circuit's decisions depart
from the plain text of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and ignore binding
guidance from the Sentencing Commission. We disagree.
When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment
retroactive, the fact that a preamendment sentence is longer
than it would have been postamendment is not an “extra-
ordinary and compelling reaso[n]” that “warrant[s]” a sen-
tence reduction. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Insofar as
the Commission's amended policy statement maintains other-
wise, it conficts with the statute.
A
The compassionate release provision empowers a district
court to “reduce the term of imprisonment” if it fnds, among
other things, that “extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant such a reduction.” Ibid. The term “extraordi-
nary” means “most unusual,” “far from common,” or “having
little or no precedent.” Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 807 (1976); see 5 Oxford English Dictionary 614
(2d ed. 1989) (“[o]ut of the usual or regular course or order”).
“Compelling,” meanwhile, means “tending to convince or
convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence.” Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, at 463; see 3 Oxford
English Dictionary, at 600 (“irresistible; demanding atten-
tion, respect”). Putting these defnitions together, “extraor-
dinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release
are those that are especially unusual and convincing.
The disparity created by Congress's amendment to § 924(c)
does not satisfy this defnition. Far from “extraordinary,”
States v. Wilson, 77 F. 4th 837, 841–842 (CADC 2023) (reserving this ques-
tion because the amendment had not yet gone into effect).
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466 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
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nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the
norm. “Ordinarily,” we have explained, “statutory changes
to federal penalties only beneft future offenders.” Hewitt,
606 U. S., at 424; see 1 U. S. C. § 109. Congress sometimes
deviates from the default, as it did in the Act, by extending
the revised penalties to defendants not yet sentenced. Even
then, some measure of prospectivity is par for the course:
The “ordinary practice” is to “withhol[d] that change from
defendants already sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States,
567 U. S. 260, 280 (2012). And regardless of whether the
line is drawn at the offense or the sentence, a nonretroactive
penalty change necessarily creates a disparity between those
who receive the beneft and those who do not. See ibid.
(“[D]isparities . . . refec[t] a line-drawing effort” and “will
exist whenever Congress enacts a new law changing sen-
tences”). Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a
system in which nonretroactivity is the default.
As for “compelling”: It is hard to see how Congress's delib-
erate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those
already sentenced could be a convincing reason that “war-
rant[s]” a reduction. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As we
have explained, Congress decided to apply the lower prison
sentences to some violators of § 924(c)—those for whom
a sentence had not yet been imposed—but not others.
§ 403(b), 132 Stat. 5222. In doing so, Congress “reinforced
its interest in fnality and avoided burdening district courts
with additional litigation.” Hewitt, 606 U. S., at 437–438
(plurality opinion). Treating the disparity resulting from
§ 924(c)'s amendment as a compelling reason for reducing a
sentence would undermine Congress's choice to leave the
sentence intact.
It would also fall well outside the heartland of compassion-
ate release, which has long been defned by a prisoner's per-
sonal circumstances. After Congress enacted § 3582(c)(1)
(A)(i), the Bureau of Prisons explained that the standards
for compassionate release mirrored those of a prior sentence-
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Opinion of the Court
reduction statute and that “[r]eleases have been most often
applied in cases where the inmate is terminally ill.” 59 Fed.
Reg. 1238 (1994); see 28 CFR § 572.40(a) (1984) (providing
that the Bureau would move for a sentence reduction under
18 U. S. C. § 4205(g) (1982 ed.) “in particularly meritorious or
unusual circumstances,” such as “if there is an extraordinary
change in an inmate's personal or family situation or if an
inmate becomes severely ill”). The Act's heightened proce-
dural requirements are similarly tied to personal circum-
stances: The Bureau must provide extra assistance to a mov-
ant diagnosed with a terminal illness or who is physically or
mentally unable to submit a request on his own. § 3582(d)(2)
(2018 ed.). And from 2007 until 2023, the Sentencing Com-
mission highlighted essentially three grounds for compas-
sionate release: (1) medical condition, (2) age, and (3) family
circumstances.5 See USSG § 1B1.13, comment., n. 1 (Nov.
2021).
We need not decide whether there are reasons beyond per-
sonal circumstances that could qualify as “extraordinary and
compelling.” Until very recently, no one thought that non-
retroactive sentencing amendments were among them.6
They are not.
5 The Commission also recognized that “[o]ther [r]easons” could qualify,
“[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” USSG
§ 1B1.13, comment., n. 1. The Bureau is responsible for the housing and
care of prisoners, 18 U. S. C. § 4042(a), so it is well positioned to identify
“other reasons” based on a prisoner's personal circumstances. By con-
trast, it plays no role in the sentencing process and lacks expertise in that
area. See Fernandez v. United States, 608 U. S. 411, 425 (2026).
6 Petitioners argue otherwise, but the cases they cite do not involve non-
retroactive sentencing amendments. See United States v. Diaco, 457 F.
Supp. 371, 372 (NJ 1978) (reducing a prisoner's sentence under 18 U. S. C.
§ 4205(g) (1982 ed.) after his codefendants received signifcantly lower sen-
tences); Setser v. United States, 566 U. S. 231, 242–243 (2012) (suggesting
that a district court could use § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018 ed.) to address the
unfairness resulting from state-court developments that produce an un-
usually long sentence). We need not decide whether compassionate re-
lease is available for these kinds of postjudgment developments.
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468 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
B
Petitioners, echoed by the dissent, insist that our reading
artifcially limits the text. The terms “extraordinary and
compelling,” they say, are “ `comprehensive and fexible,' ” re-
quiring a “ `case-by-case' inquiry into the `totality of the cir-
cumstances.' ” Brief for Petitioner Rutherford 15, 17; see
Brief for Petitioner Carter 41. And under this “ `fexible,
all-things-considered approach,' ” a judge may consider the
disparity resulting from Congress's amendment to § 924(c).
Brief for Petitioner Rutherford 17; see post, at 480 (opinion
of Sotomayor, J.).
While the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling” leave
room for judgment, they are not so fexible as to encompass
any consideration. Their meaning depends on context: A
reason is “extraordinary” and “compelling” only if it is suff-
ciently unusual and convincing to “warrant” compassionate
release. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see Fernandez v.
United States, 608 U. S. 411, 423–424, and n. 4 (2026). As
we have explained, the disparity resulting from Congress's
amendment to § 924(c) tracks ordinary sentencing practice
and refects Congress's deliberate choice to extend relief to
some prisoners and not others. Thus, the disparity is nei-
ther an “extraordinary” nor a “compelling” reason that war-
rants a reduction in sentence.
Both petitioners and the dissent note that when Congress
empowered the Sentencing Commission to describe the
grounds for compassionate release, it included only one ex-
press limitation: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall
not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.”
28 U. S. C. § 994(t). By ruling out just one reason, they
argue, Congress impliedly authorized the district court to
consider all other relevant information. Post, at 483–484.
This argument fares no better. We have repeatedly em-
phasized that “ `[t]he force of any negative implication . . .
depends on context.' ” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S.
288, 302 (2017) (quoting Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568
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U. S. 371, 381 (2013)); see also A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107–111 (2012). A
speaker's choice to rule out one item does not always mean
that the rest of the universe is on the table. Imagine that
a dietitian cautions her patient, “Pasta alone is not an accept-
able dinner.” Though the patient might fervently wish oth-
erwise, this advice does not license any meal besides stand-
alone pasta. (Fried chicken with a side of funnel cakes? A
bowl of Lucky Charms?) Instead, the dietitian surely had
some reason—like the patient's past eating habits—to cau-
tion against this specifc choice.
So too with § 994(t). By addressing rehabilitation, Con-
gress did not impliedly bless all other considerations. In-
stead, it had a particular reason—namely, past sentencing
practice—to single out this factor. Before the Sentencing
Reform Act, “[b]oth indeterminate sentencing and parole
were based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed
probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to at-
tempt to rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the
risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return
to society.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361, 363
(1989). Guided by this aim, the judge and parole offcer each
made decisions based on “their own assessments of the of-
fender's amenability to rehabilitation.” Ibid. When the
Sentencing Reform Act eliminated parole and instituted a
new sentencing regime, it “reject[ed] imprisonment as a
means of promoting rehabilitation.” Id., at 367; see 18
U. S. C. § 3582(a) (“[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate
means of promoting correction and rehabilitation”). Ruling
out “rehabilitation alone” as a basis for compassionate re-
lease therefore underscores the break from the old system.
It suggests nothing about what other reasons might qualify
as “extraordinary and compelling.”
And in petitioners' telling, the list is long. They empha-
size that when imposing or modifying a sentence, a district
court ordinarily enjoys “broad discretion to consider all rele-
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470 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
vant information” unless prohibited by the Constitution or
by Congress. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481,
491 (2022); see 18 U. S. C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, char-
acter, and conduct of a person . . . which a court . . . may
receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appro-
priate sentence”). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) expressly recog-
nizes that discretion, they argue, by providing that a court
may grant relief “after considering the factors set forth in
section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”
Those factors include “the kinds of sentences available,” “the
kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for
. . . the applicable category of offense,” and “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities.” §§ 3553(a)(3)–(4),
(6). A factor like the disparity caused by a nonretroactive
sentencing amendment, petitioners contend, fts right in. See
also post, at 482–483, 488–489.
Petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of
a reduction based on the § 3553(a) factors, a court must frst
ensure that a movant is part of the “limited class of prison-
ers” who are “eligibl[e]” for such a reduction. Dillon v.
United States, 560 U. S. 817, 825, 827 (2010). And whether
a prisoner is eligible depends on whether he can offer “ex-
traordinary and compelling” reasons that “warrant” compas-
sionate release, not on the § 3553(a) factors. § 3582(c)(1)
(A)(i); see id., at 827. This gatekeeping requirement is not,
as petitioners seem to believe, a free-for-all. It is a distinct
analytical step that imposes independent and ascertainable
limits on access to compassionate release.
Concepcion v. United States, 597 U. S. 481, is not to the
contrary. Concepcion involved sentence-modifcation pro-
ceedings under a different provision of the Act. See id., at
486–487. All agreed that the defendant was eligible for a
reduction under that provision; the only question was what
type of information the District Court could consider in mod-
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Opinion of the Court
ifying his sentence. See id., at 488 (explaining that “[t]he
Government conceded [the defendant's] eligibility for re-
lief ”). Because that provision lacks any limiting language,
we concluded that a court could consider changes to the
Guidelines, as well as intervening facts, when calculating a
new sentence under it. Id., at 500. Today's cases differ
from Concepcion because they concern whether a prisoner
is eligible for compassionate release in the frst place. And
on that score, Congress has “expressly cabined district
courts' discretion,” id., at 495, by prohibiting a reduction in
sentence unless a court fnds that “extraordinary and com-
pelling” reasons warrant it.
Finally, petitioners downplay the confict between the Act
and their interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). True, Con-
gress chose not to reduce § 924(c) penalties on a categorical
basis for already sentenced defendants. But petitioners' ap-
proach is not categorical: The disparity between a pre- and
post-Act sentence would serve as just one of at least two
considerations that, taken together, warrant compassionate
release. And reducing a sentence based on an all-things-
considered judgment, petitioners argue, does not contradict
Congress's decision to leave a class of offenders ineligible for
a sentencing reduction. See also post, at 487–488.
The implications of this argument are sweeping. Indeed,
its logic extends well beyond nonretroactive sentencing
amendments to disagreement with the length of any punish-
ment on the books. Take a judge who believes that a man-
datory minimum is unduly harsh. Could she treat the se-
verity of the sentence as an “extraordinary and compelling
reason” for compassionate release? Petitioners refused to
rule out this possibility at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg.
11–15, 44–49. Yet “[i]t is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to defne a crime, and ordain its punishment.”
United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820). Treat-
ing the severity of a mandatory penalty as a reason for com-
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472 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
passionate release rejects Congress's judgment that the pun-
ishment fts the crime.7 And petitioners' proposal—inject-
ing other factors into the mix of extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons—does not solve the problem. The Sixth Circuit
put it well: “[A]dding a legally impermissible ground to three
insuffcient factual considerations does not entitle a defend-
ant to a sentence reduction.” United States v. Jarvis, 999
F. 3d 442, 444 (2021).
C
This brings us to the Sentencing Commission. Recall that
Congress authorized the Commission to promulgate policy
statements that “describe what should be considered ex-
traordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction,”
28 U. S. C. § 994(t), and provided that any grant of compas-
sionate release must be consistent with the Commission's
policy statements, 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Recall, too,
that the Commission's current policy statement allows con-
sideration of nonretroactive legal changes in certain circum-
stances. Petitioners contend that our interpretation of the
statute must yield to the policy statement.
Petitioners misunderstand the Commission's role. Con-
gress has empowered the Commission to “give meaning” to
the compassionate release provision by identifying the cir-
cumstances that constitute “extraordinary and compelling”
reasons for release. Loper Bright Enterprises v. Rai-
mondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394 (2024). Even so, the Commission's
7 The dissent tries to escape this dilemma by arguing that the severity
of a mandatory minimum is not a “relevant consideration” under § 3553(a).
Post, at 490. But the dissent is conspicuously silent about why, on its
logic, a district court could not credit this fact as an “extraordinary and
compelling” reason why a prisoner is eligible for a reduction. If there is
no restriction on the “kind[s]” of reasons that qualify, post, at 480, then
the severity of a mandatory penalty should be fair game too. And
whether district courts will ever “routinely” rely on this consideration is
beside the point. Post, at 491. A district court is never free—even in
an individual case—to reject a punishment that Congress has required.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
policy statements must be “consistent with” the governing
statute, 28 U. S. C. § 994(a), and courts have a duty to “inde-
pendently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of
Congress,” 603 U. S., at 395. We are not bound to follow
the Commission's guidance when it “exceed[s its] statutory
authority” by adopting a defnition of a term that is inconsist-
ent with the statute. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416,
426 (1977). Put differently, the Commission's interpretation
must land within the statutory goalposts, no matter how
wide they might be. Cf. Koons v. United States, 584 U. S.
700, 707 (2018) (“[P]olicy statements cannot make a defend-
ant eligible when [the statute] makes him ineligible”).
We need not nail down the precise boundaries of the
phrase “extraordinary and compelling” to conclude that
“with regard to the particular dispute in [this] case,” the
statute's language “has a plain and unambiguous meaning.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997). The
statutory text and structure make clear that Congress's non-
retroactive change to § 924(c)—considered by itself or in com-
bination with other factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible
for compassionate release. To the extent that it counsels
otherwise, the Commission's policy statement is invalid.
* * *
Compassionate release is available only when a court fnds
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a sen-
tence reduction. 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The dispar-
ity that results from Congress's decision to leave a sentence
untouched cannot serve as one of those reasons. The judg-
ments of the Third Circuit are affrmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and
Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, not this Court, to defne what constitutes “extraordi-
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474 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
nary and compelling reasons” for incarcerated individuals
to receive a sentence reduction under the compassionate-
release statute. In 2023, the Commission exercised its stat-
utory authority and issued a policy statement that permitted
district courts to consider sentencing disparities created by
changes in law. Such disparities, the Commission specifed,
should be considered rarely and only as part of an inquiry
into whether the totality of the circumstances warrant a re-
duction in a person's sentence.
Properly framed, the question presented by these cases is
whether the Commission acted unreasonably when it issued
that guidance. It did not. The Commission's policy state-
ment is consistent with Congress's commands and centuries
of legal practice in which courts look to the totality of the
circumstances when deciding whether to modify a sentence.
Because the Court concludes that the policy is unlawful, and
that courts may never consider nonretroactive changes in
law when deciding whether someone is eligible for compas-
sionate release, I respectfully dissent.
I
A
In 2003, when he was 25 years old, petitioner Daniel Ruth-
erford committed two armed robberies in which no one was
hurt and during which he took a watch and roughly $1,300
worth of other jewelry and cash. He was convicted of two
violations of 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1). At the time, those viola-
tions together carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 32
years, to run consecutive to his sentence for the robberies.
In total, Rutherford was sentenced to 42.5 years in prison.
As two judges noted in Rutherford's direct appeal of his con-
viction, that sentence “would be unthinkable in many state
systems.” 236 Fed. Appx. 835, 845 (CA3 2007) (Ambro, J.,
joined by McKee, J., concurring).
In 2007, petitioner Johnnie Markel Carter and others
robbed several banks and stole about $250,000. As with
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Rutherford's robberies, no one fred a gun and no one was
hurt. Carter, who opted to go to trial, was convicted of
three violations of § 924(c) and later sentenced to a term of
70 years in prison, 57 of which were from mandatory mini-
mums for the § 924(c) violations. (Carter's co-conspirators,
by contrast, took plea deals and received sentences rang-
ing from 10 to 23 years.) For Carter, who was 29 years
old at the time, the 70-year sentence was a de facto life
sentence.
In the two decades since their convictions, both Ruther-
ford and Carter have turned their lives around. Rutherford
has completed over 50 educational courses and received only
two minor infractions in the past decade. He also secured a
job for after he is released, which would enable him to help
support his deceased sister's fve children.
Carter has, as the District Court put it, “become the kind
of model prisoner that our system tries, but too often fails,
to produce.” 711 F. Supp. 3d 428, 440 (ED Pa. 2024) (case
below). While in prison, Carter obtained a GED, completed
vocational training programs, took parenting classes to im-
prove his relationship with his adult children, maintained a
perfect disciplinary record for the last eight years, and pro-
vided counseling and spiritual guidance to his fellow inmates.
B
In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act and greatly
reduced the mandatory minimum for frst-time § 924(c) of-
fenders like Rutherford and Carter. Had the amendments
been in effect when Rutherford was sentenced, he would
have faced a 14-year mandatory minimum, less than half of
the 32-year mandatory minimum he received. Carter would
have been subject to a 21-year mandatory minimum, 36 years
shorter than the 57-year mandatory minimum he received.
Because Congress did not make its changes retroactive,
Rutherford and Carter were not automatically eligible for
sentence reductions based on those changes.
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476 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
In the wake of the First Step Act, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission in 2023 adopted § 1B1.13(b)(6), a policy
statement allowing courts, in limited circumstances, to
consider sentencing disparities created by nonretroactive
changes in law. Specifcally, courts may grant relief based
on such a change in law only when four requirements are
met: (1) the defendant received an “unusually long sentence”;
(2) the defendant has served at least 10 years of that sen-
tence; (3) the disparity is “gross”; and (4) the district court
has taken “full consideration of the defendant's individ-
ualized circumstances.” USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Nov. 2025).
Outside of those circumstances, “a change in the law . . . shall
not be considered” for purposes of determining whether an
“extraordinary and compelling reason exists” to reduce the
sentence. § 1B1.13(c).
Invoking this policy statement, Rutherford and Carter
moved for compassionate release under 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)
(1)(A), which allows a district court to reduce an individual's
term of imprisonment “if it fnds that” “extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” “after consid-
ering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
they are applicable.” Rutherford and Carter argued that
there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce
their sentences based on a combination of their remarkable
personal circumstances as well as the fact that they would
have received much shorter sentences under today's law.
The District Courts, however, held that the Commission's
policy statement is invalid and denied petitioners relief, and
the Court of Appeals affrmed.
II
The question now before the Court is whether the Com-
mission permissibly exercised its delegated authority to per-
mit courts to consider sentencing disparities created by non-
retroactive changes in law, among other factors, in deciding
compassionate release motions. Answering that question
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
properly begins with Congress's express delegation of au-
thority to “[t]he Commission” to defne, in the frst instance,
“what should be considered extraordinary and compelling
reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be
applied and a list of specifc examples” through the “promul-
gati[on]” of “policy statements.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(t). This
provision could hardly be clearer that the Commission has
primary say over what qualifes as “extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons for sentence reduction.” Ibid.
A
Before 1984, federal judges had broad discretion when sen-
tencing defendants. Statutes provided minimums and maxi-
mums for judges to work between, but within those ranges,
judges could determine for themselves what sentence was
appropriate. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,
363–366 (1989). This system allowed judges to consider in-
dividual defendants' circumstances, but it also led to “[s]eri-
ous disparities in sentences.” Id., at 365.
To address those disparities, Congress passed the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984. The Act created the United States
Sentencing Commission, which Congress tasked with study-
ing federal sentencing and promulgating the Sentencing
Guidelines. 28 U. S. C. § 994(a). The Guidelines instruct
judges on how to sentence defendants, including how to ac-
count for different factual circumstances like the defendant's
background, the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, and
more, within the context of the considerations set forth in 18
U. S. C. § 3553(a). See 28 U. S. C. §§ 991(b), 994(f), 994(m).1
Congress gave the Commission an important policymaking
role in the compassionate-release context as well. Under
1 Although this Court later held that the Guidelines are not mandatory,
see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, 245–246 (2005), they remain an
important part of federal sentencing, and district courts must “begin all
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines
range,” Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49 (2007).
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478 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
the statute, district courts can grant compassionate release
and reduce a defendant's sentence if they fnd that there
are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so.
18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Congress neither specifed
what constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
for relief nor told district courts how to determine if such
reasons exist. It entrusted the Commission with those
responsibilities instead, instructing district courts that
any grant of relief must be “consistent with applicable pol-
icy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. ”
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
Congress tasked the Commission with issuing “general
policy statements regarding . . . the appropriate use of ”
compassionate release. 28 U. S. C. § 994(a)(2)(C). Congress
also required the Commission to “describe what should be
considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sen-
tence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a
list of specifc examples.” § 994(t). The only limit Congress
imposed was that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone
shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling rea-
son.” Ibid.
B
Congress's express delegation of authority to the Commis-
sion limits this Court's role in these cases. Congress often
“authorize[s]” agencies “to exercise a degree of discretion.”
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369, 394
(2024). “For example, some statutes `expressly delegat[e]'
to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular
statutory term.” Ibid. (quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432
U. S. 416, 425 (1977); emphasis deleted). “Others empower
an agency to prescribe rules to `fll up the details' of a statu-
tory scheme.” 603 U. S., at 395 (quoting Wayman v. South-
ard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825)). Others still authorize agencies
to “regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or
phrase that `leaves agencies with fexibility,' . . . such as `ap-
propriate' or `reasonable.' ” 603 U. S., at 395.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
The Sentencing Reform Act does all those things. It
instructs the Commission to issue guidance on the “ap-
propriate use of ” compassionate release. § 994(a)(2)(C). It
also directs the Commission to give meaning to statutory
terms and fll up the details of the statutory scheme by “de-
scrib[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons for sentence reduction,” identifying “the
criteria to be applied,” and providing “a list of specifc exam-
ples.” § 994(t).
When a statute expressly delegates authority to an agency
in this way, “[a] reviewing court is not free to set aside” the
agency's actions “simply because it would have interpreted
the statute in a different manner.” Batterton, 432 U. S., at
425 (citing American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United
States, 299 U. S. 232, 235–237 (1936)). Instead, the Court
must determine “ `the boundaries of [the agency's] delegated
authority' ” and “ensur[e] the agency has engaged in `rea-
soned decisionmaking' within those boundaries.” Loper
Bright, 603 U. S., at 395.
In short, under the statutory scheme that Congress cre-
ated, the Commission has the leading role of defning the
words “extraordinary and compelling” and thus setting the
scope of compassionate release. This Court, by contrast,
has the more modest role of ensuring that the Commission
does not act unreasonably.
III
With that division of labor in mind, the Court should have
upheld the Commission's policy statement because the Com-
mission acted reasonably when it construed the terms “ex-
traordinary and compelling” to permit courts to consider
sentencing disparities caused by changes in law only in nar-
row circumstances and only as part of a holistic inquiry.
The Commission's policy statement falls well within the ex-
pansive scope of the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling”
and is consistent with longstanding judicial practices, which
Congress did not alter here.
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480 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
A
Start with the terms “extraordinary” and “compelling.”
Rather than imposing any bright-line limits on courts' discre-
tion to consider or weigh information, these terms invite
open-ended, fact- and context-specifc inquiries into the total-
ity of the circumstances in individual cases to determine
whether they rise to an unusual level. In other words,
whether a given set of reasons is “extraordinary and compel-
ling” as applied to a particular defendant's case is a question
of degree, not of kind.
This Court's cases interpreting similarly broad terms
across different contexts support this understanding. This
Court has opined that it is “impossible to anticipate and de-
fne every situation that might” qualify as involving “ex-
traordinary circumstances” that warrant federal interference
with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. Kugler v. Hel-
fant, 421 U. S. 117, 124–125 (1975). It has also “struggle[d]
in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touch-
stone” for distinguishing between “ordinary” and “extraordi-
nary” business expenses. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111,
114–115 (1933).
Given the diffculty in defning with precision what makes
something “unusual,” this Court has held, in the sentencing
context, that such determinations fall within district courts'
discretion. In Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 (1996),
the Court noted that a district court's fnding that a factor
at sentencing was “unusual or exceptional,” such that a de-
parture from the then-binding Sentencing Guidelines was
warranted, “embodies the traditional exercise of discretion
by a sentencing court.” Id., at 98. That was because such
a judgment refected the district court's “ `special compe-
tence' ” in evaluating “ `the fact-specifc circumstances of the
case' ” that set it apart from others. Id., at 99. Similarly,
when identifying cases that are “ `exceptional,' ” the Court
has explained that the inquiry must be carried out by “[d]is-
trict courts . . . in the case-by-case exercise of their discre-
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tion, considering the totality of the circumstances,” as
“ `[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these de-
terminations.' ” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 572 U. S. 545, 554 (2014).
The Commission's policy statement fts comfortably within
these capacious parameters. To start, the Commission re-
quires courts to take “full consideration of the defendant's
individualized circumstances.” USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6). Indi-
viduals also must meet three other discrete criteria, includ-
ing that they are serving an “unusually long” sentence and
are facing a “gross” (i. e., unusually large) sentencing dispar-
ity. Ibid. Even if all those criteria are met, the Commis-
sion's policy statement does not require courts to grant re-
lief. A court can grant relief only if it concludes that there
are extraordinary and compelling reasons after taking in all
relevant information about a defendant's specifc circum-
stances. Ibid.
The majority's chief re joinder is that nonretroactive
changes in law are “the norm.” Ante, at 466–467. True,
but so too are many of the other developments that the ma-
jority agrees may support compassionate release. Everyone
ages. Everyone falls ill. Everyone loses family members
and loved ones. These realities are, unfortunately, also “the
norm.” Yet all agree that courts may properly consider a
defendant's age, physical health, and family circumstances
when determining whether to grant compassionate release.
See ante, at 10. That concession refects the basic reality
that facts which are ordinary in isolation can nonetheless
combine to form an extraordinary whole. Accordingly, the
key question is not whether any one reason for granting re-
lief is extraordinary or compelling on its own or in the ab-
stract, but whether a defendant's circumstances, taken to-
gether, are so extraordinary and compelling as to warrant
reducing his sentence. Because answering that question
calls for a full assessment of the totality of the circumstances
and all relevant information, the words “extraordinary and
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482 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
compelling” do not themselves bar district courts from ever
considering nonretroactive changes in law.
Statistics also undercut the majority's suggestion that the
Commission's policy statement permits relief in ordinary
cases. Almost no one has received relief under the Commis-
sion's criteria. There are currently over 130,000 individuals
serving sentences for federal convictions. United States
Sentencing Commission, QuickFacts: Individuals in the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons (May 2025), https://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/
BOP_2025.pdf (archived at https://perma.cc/K2QS-JCR5).
In Fiscal Year 2024, defendants moved for compassionate re-
lease 3,015 times nationwide. United States Sentencing
Commission, Compassionate Release Data Report, FY 2024,
Table 2 (Mar. 2025), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/fles/
pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/
compassionate-release/FY24-Compassionate-Release.pdf (ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/FQE2-W57L). District courts
granted relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6) for sentencing disparities
caused by any change in law (not just the changes to 18
U. S. C. § 924(c)) just 98 times. Compassionate Release Data
Report, Table 10. That small number suggests that
§ 1B1.13(b)(6) has not opened the foodgates to sentence re-
ductions in unexceptional cases.
B
Longstanding tradition, which Congress has not disturbed,
also supports the Commission's policy statement.
For centuries, courts have enjoyed “broad discretion to
consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing
hearing, consistent with their responsibility to sentence the
whole person before them.” Concepcion v. United States,
597 U. S. 481, 491 (2022). “That discretion also carries for-
ward to later proceedings that may modify an original sen-
tence.” Ibid. At these proceedings, district courts can
modify initial sentences for a variety of reasons, including
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
following a reversal on appeal or a retroactive change in law.
They may also consider whatever evidence they fnd ger-
mane, including “intervening changes of law (such as changes
to the Sentencing Guidelines)” when deciding whether to re-
duce a sentence. Id., at 486. Indeed, courts may even con-
sider nonretroactive changes to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id., at 499–500.
In light of this centuries-old tradition, if Congress wishes
to restrict what courts may consider at sentence-modifcation
proceedings, it must say so expressly. “The only limitations
on a court's discretion to consider any relevant materials at
an initial sentencing or in modifying that sentence are those
set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.”
Id., at 494. (All agree that the Constitution does not ex-
pressly bar consideration of nonretroactive changes in law.)
When Congress is silent, this Court infers that Congress did
not intend to limit sentencing courts' discretion because
“Congress is not shy about placing such limits where it
deems them appropriate” and has “ `shown that it knows how
to direct sentencing practices in express terms.' ” Id., at
494, 497 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85,
103 (2007)).
A compassionate-release proceeding, in which a court de-
cides whether to reduce a defendant's sentence (and if so, by
how much), is obviously a sentence-modifcation proceeding.
Changes in law are also plainly relevant to a court's determi-
nation: The fact that a defendant would be eligible for a sig-
nifcantly lower sentence for the same conduct today due to
a change in law undoubtedly could inform a court's decision
as to whether it should reduce his sentence. Allowing
courts to consider this information, then, is consistent with
courts' traditional discretion.
Congress's words here do not limit courts' discretion as to
what they may consider. As explained, the words “extraor-
dinary and compelling” do not foreclose the approach the
Commission adopted in § 1B1.13(b)(6). Congress's delega-

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484 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
tion to the Commission, moreover, contained just one
express restriction: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone
shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling
reason.” 28 U. S. C. § 994(t). That restriction, however,
does not bar courts from considering rehabilitation in
conjunction with other facts and evidence. Nor does it bar
the Commission from allowing courts to consider evidence
of rehabilitation alongside other facts, as the Commission
has done. See USSG § 1B1.13(d). That specifc restric-
tion thus poses no limit on what evidence courts may
consider, and in fact confrms that Congress knows how to
limit compassionate-release practices explicitly when it
wants to.
The majority tries to downplay Congress's treatment of
rehabilitation by analogizing to a conversation with a dieti-
tian. Ante, at 468–469. An instruction from a dietitian not
to eat pasta alone, the majority says, is not a “license” to eat
unhealthy food, so Congress's express limit on rehabilitation,
the majority reasons, “did not impliedly bless all other con-
siderations” either. Ante, at 469. This analogy misses the
mark. Unlike a judge who enters a sentence-modifcation
proceeding assuming she may consult all relevant informa-
tion not expressly excluded by law, see Kimbrough, 552 U. S.,
at 103, one does not go into a conversation with a dietitian
under the assumption that all foods not expressly prohibited
are on the table. Those concerned enough about their diets
to seek professional help likely do not need to be expressly
told that they should avoid “[f]ried chicken.” Ibid.
Congress's instructions to the Commission are much the
same. An instruction not to grant compassionate release
based on rehabilitation alone is not a prohibition against con-
sidering any other type of evidence. Instead, courts may
consider all relevant information, as they have always done,
see Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491–492, and the Commission
may authorize them to do so, as it did here.
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
IV
The majority disagrees with the Commission's judgment,
forgetting that this Court “is not free to set aside” the Com-
mission's policy statement “simply because it would have in-
terpreted the statute in a different manner,” Batterton, 432
U. S., at 425. The majority also plumbs history and the
First Step Act, searching for limits it cannot fnd in the
compassionate-release statute itself. The majority comes
up empty handed.
A
First, the majority argues that considering nonretroactive
changes in law was, “[u]ntil very recently,” unprecedented.
Ante, at 467. Far from it. Again, courts have for centuries
considered all relevant evidence at sentence-modifcation
proceedings, and sentencing disparities like those created by
nonretroactive changes in law are relevant information.
See Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 490–492; Part III–B, supra.
The majority offers a counter-tradition, claiming that the
“the heartland of compassionate release” “has long been de-
fned by a prisoner's personal circumstances,” such as his
physical health. Ante, at 466. It is certainly true that per-
sonal circumstances feature prominently in compassionate-
release proceedings. Even so, nothing in the statute's text
confnes courts to considering only personal circumstances,
and “[t]he only limitations on a court's discretion to consider
any relevant materials” in a sentence-modifcation proceed-
ing “are those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the
Constitution.” Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 494. Without an
express limitation, the default remains: Courts may consider
facts beyond personal circumstances when deciding whether
to modify a defendant's sentence.
Nor does historical practice supply a personal-
circumstances limit. The parties have identifed only two
published opinions in which district courts reduced a
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486 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
sentence under the predecessor to the compassionate-release
statute, which was in effect from 1976 to 1984. In one of
those two decisions, the District Court reduced a defendant's
sentence not based on the personal circumstances of the de-
fendant, but rather because of the disparity between the de-
fendant's sentence and those of his codefendants. See
United States v. Diaco, 457 F. Supp. 371, 372, 376 (NJ 1978);
see also United States v. Banks, 428 F. Supp. 1088, 1089–1090
(ED Mich. 1977) (granting relief under predecessor statute
“upon careful review of the prisoner's record,” including evi-
dence of rehabilitation).
Further, this Court has also acknowledged that, apart
from a defendant's personal circumstances, compassionate
release might be appropriate to reduce a sentence to account
for later legal developments. In fact, in Setser v. United
States, 566 U. S. 231 (2012), the Court addressed whether
federal courts have authority to order federal sentences to
run consecutively to anticipated state sentences that have
not yet been imposed. Id., at 233. After holding such sen-
tences to be permissible, Justice Scalia explained that, when
unexpected sentencing developments in state court “pro-
duc[e] unfairness to the defendant,” the Sentencing Reform
Act “provides a mechanism for relief ”: compassionate release
under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id., at 242–243. These examples
confrm that courts have historically considered postsentenc-
ing legal developments beyond a defendant's personal
circumstances.2
B
Without a foothold in the compassionate-release statute or
its history, the majority looks for one in the First Step Act
instead. According to the majority, Congress's decision
2 The majority points out that these examples “do not involve nonretro-
active sentencing amendments.” Ante, at 467, n. 6. True, but the point
is that these past examples undercut any argument that historical practice
confned “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to those involving a de-
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
not to make its changes to § 924(c) retroactive means that it
intended to preclude consideration of those changes in all
cases as part of an individualized compassionate-release de-
termination. That argument badly overreads the First
Step Act.
To start, Congress's decision not to make its changes retro-
active simply means that Congress did not intend for every
person who committed § 924(c) offenses prior to the First
Step Act's passage to be automatically eligible for relief.
See ante, at 471 (“True, Congress chose not to reduce § 924(c)
penalties on a categorical basis”). By making that one
choice, however, Congress did not also decide that sentencing
disparities created by those changes should never be consid-
ered in deciding compassionate-release motions. Indeed,
Congress amended the compassionate-release statute in the
First Step Act as well, so Congress easily could have speci-
fed that its nonretroactive changes should not be considered
in compassionate-release determinations, just as it pre-
viously limited consideration of rehabilitation. See Concep-
cion, 597 U. S., at 494 (“Congress is not shy about” limiting
courts' discretion). Yet Congress did not do so.
The majority would have a point if the Commission in-
structed courts to grant relief based solely on a nonretroac-
tive change in law; such an approach would amount to grant-
ing relief on a categorical basis, which would be in tension
with the categorical nonretroactive nature of Congress's
amendments here. The Commission's guidance, however,
permits consideration of changes in law only when the dis-
parity is “gross,” the sentence is “unusually long,” and the
defendant has served at least 10 years of his sentence.
§ 1B1.3(b)(6). It also requires courts to give “full consider-
ation of the defendant's individualized circumstances” while
weighing any change in law. Ibid. That individualized ap-
proach is consistent with Congress's judgment that prior
§ 924(c) offenders are not automatically entitled to relief, and
in no way countermands Congress's more general decision
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488 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
not to make the First Step Act's amendments retroactive for
each and every § 924(c) offender.
Take petitioners as examples. Neither is seeking relief
based solely on Congress's nonretroactive changes to § 924(c).
Instead, they argue that they are entitled to a reduction be-
cause of the change in law in addition to their remarkable
changed personal circumstances. To be clear, it may well be
that neither Rutherford nor Carter would be found by a dis-
trict court to be entitled to compassionate release even after
taking account of sentencing disparities. Nevertheless,
they are at least entitled to full consideration of their cases
in view of all relevant information. Affording them that in-
dividualized analysis is fully consistent with Congress's judg-
ment that a change in law does not automatically entitle
them to relief.
Even the Government agrees that individualized analysis
is consistent with Congress's intent at least at one step of
the compassionate-release analysis. Once a defendant es-
tablishes extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Govern-
ment concedes that courts may consider a sentencing dispar-
ity created by nonretroactive changes in law when weighing
the § 3553(a) factors to decide how much to reduce a defend-
ant's sentence. See Brief for United States 37; see also 18
U. S. C. § 3553(a)(6) (listing “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities” as one factor the court “shall con-
sider”). The majority maintains that considering sentenc-
ing disparities is impermissible at the frst step because it
is a “distinct analytical step that imposes independent and
ascertainable limits on access to compassionate release.”
Ante, at 470.
This attempt at statutory surgery does not cure the prob-
lem. For one thing, § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not clearly man-
date that the two steps be hermetically sealed off from one
another. It specifes only that a court “may reduce [a] term
of imprisonment . . . , after considering the factors set forth
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it
fnds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). This text in no way
dictates the majority's precise, two-step sequencing in which
courts undertake two different inquiries while feigning igno-
rance of the other. That text just as easily means that
courts should decide if there are extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons for relief “after considering” the § 3553(a) fac-
tors. Indeed, it is obvious, and conceded, that at least some
of the § 3553(a) factors are salient at both stages. For in-
stance, one of the § 3553(a) factors is “the history and charac-
teristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), which includes the
defendant's personal circumstances. If courts can consider
personal circumstances at both steps of the analysis, see
ante, at 466 (describing “personal circumstances” as “the
heartland of compassionate release”), it is not clear why they
cannot also consider sentencing disparities at both steps as
well.
In any event, even assuming Congress intended to impose
a rigid, two-step process, it is hard to “see how a court may
be thought to subvert congressional intent by considering
nonretroactive changes to the law at the `extraordinary and
compelling' stage of the analysis but not while weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F. 4th 14,
32 (CA1 2022) (Barron, J., concurring). “[I]f Congress truly
intended to bar district courts from considering [the First
Step Act's] changes to mandatory minimums in the compas-
sionate release context by making the changes non-
retroactive, then it is doubtful those changes should be con-
sidered at all.” United States v. Chen, 48 F. 4th 1092, 1099
(CA9 2022). It also remains that, no matter how the Court
may try to slice it, a compassionate-release proceeding is a
“sentence-modifcation proceeding,” and courts have long en-
joyed broad discretion to consider relevant information in
such proceedings unless Congress expressly says otherwise.
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490 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
Concepcion, 597 U. S., at 491. Nothing in the First Step Act
specifcally addresses what courts may consider when decid-
ing whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction.
In the end, the majority is unable to explain why exactly
the Commission's case-by-case approach is inconsistent with
Congress's categorical nonretroactivity decision. See ante,
at 471–472. After acknowledging that it is “[t]rue” that
Congress merely made a judgment about categorical retroac-
tivity, the majority takes aim at something different alto-
gether: mandatory minimums. See ibid. In the majority's
view, permitting holistic consideration of all relevant evi-
dence, including changes in law, would also permit judges to
grant relief based on their personal view that a mandatory-
minimum sentence is too harsh. Ibid.
Those fears are unfounded. A judge's policy disagree-
ment with a statutory mandatory minimum is not, and has
never been, a relevant consideration at sentencing. Al-
though district courts may disagree with the nonbinding
Sentencing Guidelines “ `based solely on policy considera-
tions,' ” they are “constrained by the mandatory minimums
Congress prescribed” by statute regardless of their policy
views. Kimbrough, 552 U. S., at 101, 108; see United States
v. Fanfan, 558 F. 3d 105, 110, n. 6 (CA1 2009) (“Though dis-
trict courts may sentence based on policy disagreements
with the . . . guidelines, they may not do so on the basis of
disagreements with statutes”); see also § 3553(e) (providing
“[l]imited authority” for a court to “impose a sentence below
a statutory minimum”); § 3553(f) (permitting district courts
to disregard a mandatory minimum for certain offenses only
if fve criteria are met).
Refecting that norm, § 3553(a) does not permit judges to
consider their own personal policy preferences when impos-
ing an initial sentence or reducing a sentence through a
compassionate-release motion. Nor does it allow judges to
weigh whether they think that Congress mandated the right
punishment for a given crime. It does, however, instruct
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Sotomayor, J., dissenting
judges to consider sentencing disparities, § 3553(a)(6), includ-
ing those created by nonretroactive changes in law. That
instruction is perfectly consistent with courts' longstanding
discretion to consider all relevant information, including
changes in law, when resentencing a defendant. See Con-
cepcion, 597 U. S., at 491–492.
In addition, no evidence supports the specter that the ma-
jority invokes. District judges around the country routinely
impose mandatory-minimum sentences in tens of thousands
of cases every year, as it is their oath-bound duty to apply
the laws of the United States. See 28 U. S. C. § 453. There
is no evidence that these same district judges are routinely
granting compassionate release as an end run around manda-
tory minimums. In Fiscal Year 2024, the Commission re-
ceived information regarding 61,678 cases in which a crimi-
nal defendant was sentenced. United States Sentencing
Commission, QuickFacts on Mandatory Minimums 1 (2024),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Mand_Mins_FY24.pdf
(archived at https://perma.cc/5Q4L-9G3Z). Of all individu-
als sentenced that year, 15.9% faced a mandatory minimum
at sentencing. That same year, judges granted compassion-
ate release just 481 times in total on any ground (including
under § 1B1.13(b)(6)) and denied it 2,534 times. Compas-
sionate Release Report, Table 20. Compassionate release is
not the loophole to mandatory minimums that the majority
fears.
Even if a district court were to start using compassionate
release as an opportunity to usurp Congress's role and ele-
vate its own policy preferences, the Government could ap-
peal those outlier grants of compassionate release to the
courts of appeals and, if necessary, to this Court. If a sys-
temic solution were necessary, the Commission could issue
another policy statement or Congress could enact legislation
to prevent misuse of the compassionate-release statute.
The solution is not, however, for this Court to conjure cate-
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492 RUTHERFORD v. UNITED STATES
Sotomayor, J., dissenting
gorical limitations on courts' discretion that neither Con-
gress nor the Commission imposed.
* * *
The majority is right on one point: The extraordinary-and-
compelling analysis is indeed subject to “independent and
ascertainable limits.” Ante, at 470. Yet one need only read
the Commission's policy statement to determine those limits.
The majority nevertheless searches high and low for other
statutory limits on what courts may consider when deciding
compassionate-release motions. Because the Commission's
narrow, limited guidance is consistent with what Congress
has previously said and with what courts have previously
done, I respectfully dissent.
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Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None

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