SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC., et al. v. HENSON

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28 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC., et al. v.
HENSON
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 01–757. Argued October 15, 2002—Decided November 5, 2002
Respondent Henson’s Louisiana state-court tort suit against petitioners
was stayed when respondent intervened in the similar Price suit, under-
way in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.
Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that the Henson
action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed
Henson to proceed. Petitioners removed Henson to the Middle Dis-
trict of Louisiana, relying upon the general removal statute, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1441(a), and asserting federal jurisdiction under the All Writs Act,
§ 1651, and the supplemental jurisdiction statute, § 1367. The case was
transferred to the Southern District of Alabama, which, inter alia, dis-
missed Henson as barred by the Price settlement. As relevant here,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that § 1441 by its terms author-
izes removal only of actions over which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, and that, because the All Writs Act authorizes writs in
aid of the courts’ respective jurisdictions without providing any federal
subject-matter jurisdiction in its own right, that Act could not support
Henson’s removal from state to federal court.
Held: The All Writs Act does not furnish removal jurisdiction. That Act,
alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction, is not a substitute for § 1441’s requirement that a federal
court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be re-
moved from a state court. Pp. 31–34.
(a) The All Writs Act—which provides, in § 1651(a), that “courts es-
tablished by . . . Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions”—does not authorize removal of
the Henson action. In arguing that the Act supports removal, respond-
ent relies upon United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159,
172, and Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Service, 474 U. S. 34, 41. The latter case, however, made clear that
“[w]here a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it
is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.” Id.,
at 43. Removal is entirely a creature of statute and “a suit commenced
in a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer
under some act of Congress.” Great Northern R. Co. v. Alexander, 246

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29 Cite as: 537 U. S. 28 (2002)
Syllabus
U. S. 276, 280. Petitioners may not, by resorting to the All Writs Act,
avoid complying with statutory requirements for removal. See Penn-
sylvania Bureau, supra, at 43. Section 1441(a) provides that “any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed.” Under those plain
terms, in order properly to remove the Henson action, petitioners must
demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in federal
courts. Because the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts, however, it cannot confer the original jurisdiction re-
quired to support removal under § 1441. Pp. 31–33.
(b) Nor does the All Writs Act authorize the removal of Henson when
considered in conjunction with the doctrine of ancillary enforcement ju-
risdiction. Such jurisdiction “may extend to claims having a factual
and logical dependence on ‘the primary lawsuit.’ ” Peacock v. Thomas,
516 U. S. 349, 355. Because a court must have jurisdiction over a case
or controversy before it may assert jurisdiction over ancillary claims,
ibid., however, ancillary jurisdiction cannot provide the original ju-
risdiction that petitioners must show to qualify for § 1441 removal. In-
voking ancillary jurisdiction, like invoking the All Writs Act, does
not dispense with the need to comply with statutory requirements.
Pp. 33–34.
261 F. 3d 1065, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 35.
Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Mark C. Surprenant, Robert N.
Markle, and Alan B. Nadel.
David J. Bederman argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent.*
*Robert N. Weiner and Jonathan Harrison filed a brief for the Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
Texas by John Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas, Lonny S. Hoffman,
and Gregory S. Coleman; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
by Jeffrey Robert White; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by
Adam Samaha, Roberta B. Walburn, Martha K. Wivell, and Arthur H.
Bryant.

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30 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC. v. HENSON
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondent Hurley Henson filed suit in state court in Iber-
ville Parish, Louisiana, against petitioner Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. (then known as Ciba-Geigy Corp.) asserting
various tort claims related to petitioners’ manufacture and
sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. A similar action,
Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., was already underway in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama. The Louisiana court stayed respondent’s action
when respondent successfully intervened in the Price suit
and participated in the ensuing settlement. That settlement
included a stipulation that the Henson action, “including any
and all claims . . . against [petitioners], shall be dismissed,
with prejudice,” as of the approval date. App. 38a; see also
id., at 36a.
Following the approval of the settlement, the Louisiana
state court conducted a hearing to determine whether the
Henson action should be dismissed. Counsel for respondent
told the court that the Price settlement required dismissal
of only some of the claims raised in Henson. Although this
representation appeared to be contrary to the terms of the
settlement agreement, the Louisiana court relied upon it and
invited respondent to amend the complaint and proceed with
the action.
Counsel for petitioners did not attend the hearing. Upon
learning of the state court’s action, however, petitioners
promptly removed the action to the Middle District of Loui-
siana, relying on 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). The notice of removal
asserted federal jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, § 1651,
and under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, § 1367.
The Middle District of Louisiana granted a transfer to the
Southern District of Alabama pursuant to § 1404(a), and the
Alabama court then dismissed Henson as barred by the
Price settlement and sanctioned respondent’s counsel for his
misrepresentation to the Louisiana state court.

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31 Cite as: 537 U. S. 28 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the sanctions but vacated the District Court’s order dismiss-
ing the Henson action. Henson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261
F. 3d 1065 (2001). The court reasoned that § 1441 by its
terms authorizes removal only of actions over which the dis-
trict courts have original jurisdiction. But the All Writs
Act authorizes writs “in aid of [the courts’] respective juris-
dictions” without providing any federal subject-matter juris-
diction in its own right, see, e. g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526
U. S. 529, 534–535 (1999). Therefore, the Court of Appeals
concluded, the All Writs Act could not support removal of
the Henson action from state to federal court.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals recognized that several
Circuits have held that the All Writs Act gives a federal
court the authority to remove a state-court case in order
to prevent the frustration of orders the federal court has
previously issued. See, e. g., Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F. 3d
424, 426 (CA8 1999); Bylinski v. Allen Park, 169 F. 3d 1001,
1003 (CA6 1999); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Liti-
gation, 996 F. 2d 1425, 1431 (CA2 1993). It noted, however,
that other Circuits have agreed with its conclusion that the
All Writs Act does not furnish removal jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Hillman v. Webley, 115 F. 3d 1461, 1469 (CA10 1997).
We granted certiorari to resolve this controversy, 534 U. S.
1126 (2001), and now affirm.
The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651(a), provides that “[t]he
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” Petitioners advance two arguments in
support of their claim that removal of the Henson action was
proper under the All Writs Act: (1) The All Writs Act author-
ized removal of the Henson action, and (2) the All Writs Act
in conjunction with the doctrine of ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction authorized the removal. We address these
contentions in turn.

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32 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC. v. HENSON
Opinion of the Court
First, petitioners, like the courts that have endorsed “All
Writs removal,” rely upon our statement in United States v.
New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 172 (1977), that the
Act authorizes a federal court “to issue such commands . . .
as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent
the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exer-
cise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” Petitioners also
cite Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 41 (1985), for the proposition
that the All Writs Act “fill[s] the interstices of federal judicial
power when those gaps threate[n] to thwart the otherwise
proper exercise of federal courts’ jurisdiction.” They argue
that the Act comes into play here because maintenance of
the Henson action in state court in Louisiana frustrated the
express terms of the Price settlement, which required that
“any and all claims” in Henson be dismissed.
But Pennsylvania Bureau made clear that “[w]here a
statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it
is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is control-
ling.” 474 U. S., at 43. The right of removal is entirely a
creature of statute and “a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under
some act of Congress.” Great Northern R. Co. v. Alexan-
der, 246 U. S. 276, 280 (1918) (citing Gold-Washing and Water
Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 201 (1878)). These statutory pro-
cedures for removal are to be strictly construed. See, e. g.,
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U. S. 100, 108–109
(1941) (noting that policy underlying removal statutes “is one
calling for the strict construction of such legislation”); Healy
v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 270 (1934) (“Due regard for the right-
ful independence of state governments . . . requires that [fed-
eral courts] scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the
precise limits which the statute has defined”); Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932); Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U. S. 226, 233–234 (1922). Petitioners may not,
by resorting to the All Writs Act, avoid complying with

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33 Cite as: 537 U. S. 28 (2002)
Opinion of the Court
the statutory requirements for removal. See Pennsyl-
vania Bureau, supra, at 43 (All Writs Act “does not au-
thorize [federal courts] to issue ad hoc writs whenever
compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient
or less appropriate”).
Petitioners’ question presented to this Court suggests a
variation on this first argument, asking whether the All
Writs Act “vests federal district courts with authority to ex-
ercise removal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1441.” Pet.
for Cert. i (emphasis added). The general removal statute,
28 U. S. C. § 1441, provides that “any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant
or the defendants, to the district court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending,” unless Congress specifically provides oth-
erwise. § 1441(a). Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in
order properly to remove the Henson action pursuant to
that provision, petitioners must demonstrate that original
subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts. They
concede that the All Writs Act “does not, by its specific
terms, provide federal courts with an independent grant of
jurisdiction.” Brief for Petitioners 9; see also Clinton,
supra, at 534–535 (express terms of the All Writs Act confine
a court “to issuing process ‘in aid of ’ its existing statutory
jurisdiction; the Act does not enlarge that jurisdiction”).
Because the All Writs Act does not confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts, it cannot confer the original jurisdiction
required to support removal pursuant to § 1441.
Second, petitioners contend that some combination of the
All Writs Act and the doctrine of ancillary enforcement juris-
diction support the removal of the Henson action. As we
explained in Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U. S. 349, 355 (1996),
“[a]ncillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual
and logical dependence on ‘the primary lawsuit.’ ” Petition-
ers emphasize that the Southern District of Alabama re-

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34 SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, INC. v. HENSON
Opinion of the Court
tained jurisdiction over the Price settlement, thus distin-
guishing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
511 U. S. 375 (1994), in which we found ancillary jurisdiction
lacking. They argue that respondent’s maintenance of the
Henson action undermined the Price settlement and that, in
light of the Alabama court’s retained jurisdiction, ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction was necessary and appropriate.*
But they fail to explain how the Alabama District Court’s
retention of jurisdiction over the Price settlement author-
ized removal of the Henson action. Removal is governed
by statute, and invocation of ancillary jurisdiction, like invo-
cation of the All Writs Act, does not dispense with the need
for compliance with statutory requirements.
Read in light of the question presented in the petition for
certiorari, perhaps petitioners’ argument is that ancillary ju-
risdiction authorizes removal under 28 U. S. C. § 1441. As
we explained in Peacock, however, a “court must have juris-
diction over a case or controversy before it may assert juris-
diction over ancillary claims.” 516 U. S., at 355. Ancillary
jurisdiction, therefore, cannot provide the original jurisdic-
tion that petitioners must show in order to qualify for re-
moval under § 1441.
Section 1441 requires that a federal court have original
jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from
a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination
with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court,
is not a substitute for that requirement. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
*Petitioners’ assertion that removal was “necessary” is unpersuasive on
its own bottom. One in petitioners’ position may apply to the court that
approved a settlement for an injunction requiring dismissal of a rival ac-
tion. Petitioners could also have sought a determination from the Louisi-
ana state court that respondent’s action was barred by the judgment of
the Alabama District Court.

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35 Cite as: 537 U. S. 28 (2002)
Stevens, J., concurring
Justice Stevens, concurring.
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 32, the decisions of
the Courts of Appeals that we disapprove today have relied
in large part on our decision in United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159 (1977).* For the reasons stated
in Part II of my dissenting opinion in that case—reasons that
are echoed in the Court’s opinion today—I believe that it
clearly misconstrued the All Writs Act. Id., at 186–190
(opinion dissenting in part). See also id., at 178 (Stewart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the
overly expansive interpretation given to the All Writs Act in
New York Telephone may produce further mischief, I would
expressly overrule that misguided decision.
With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.
*See, e. g., In re VMS Securities Litigation, 103 F. 3d 1317, 1323 (CA7
1996); Sable v. General Motors Corp., 90 F. 3d 171, 175 (CA6 1996); In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 996 F. 2d 1425, 1431 (CA2
1993). See also Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction and the All Writs Act, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 417 (1999) (noting that nearly all courts that have
approved removal pursuant to the All Writs Act have relied on New
York Telephone).
Indeed, the court below observed that the most powerful argument in
favor of petitioners’ position is provided by the “broad view of the All
Writs Act’s purpose” articulated in New York Telephone. Henson v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 261 F. 3d 1065, 1070 (CA11 2001).