SPRIETSMA, administrator of the ESTATE OF SPRIETSMA, DECEASED v. MERCURY MARINE, A DIVISION OF BRUNSWICK CORP.

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51 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
SPRIETSMA, administrator of the ESTATE OF
SPRIETSMA, DECEASED v. MERCURY
MARINE, A DIVISION OF
BRUNSWICK CORP.
certiorari to the supreme court of illinois
No. 01–706. Argued October 15, 2002—Decided December 3, 2002
Petitioner’s wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by
the propeller of an outboard motor manufactured by respondent, Mer-
cury Marine, a division of Brunswick Corporation (Brunswick). In his
subsequent common-law tort action in Illinois state court, petitioner
claimed that Brunswick’s motor was unreasonably dangerous because,
among other things, it was not protected by a propeller guard. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, and the intermediate court affirmed,
finding the action expressly pre-empted by the Federal Boat Safety Act
of 1971 (FBSA or Act). The Illinois Supreme Court rejected that ra-
tionale, but affirmed on implied pre-emption grounds.
Held: The FBSA does not pre-empt state common-law claims such as peti-
tioner’s. Pp. 56–70.
(a) The FBSA was enacted to improve boating safety, to authorize
the establishment of national construction and performance standards
for boats and associated equipment, and to encourage greater uniformity
of boating laws and regulations as among the States and the Federal
Government. The Secretary of Transportation has delegated the au-
thority to promulgate regulations establishing minimum safety stand-
ards for recreational vessels and associated equipment to the Coast
Guard, which must, inter alia, consult with a special National Boating
Safety Advisory Council before exercising that authority. The Coast
Guard may issue exemptions from its regulations if boating safety will
not be adversely affected. Section 10 of the Act sets forth an express
pre-emption clause, and § 40’s saving clause provides that compliance
with the Act or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under the
Act does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under
state law. When the Coast Guard issued its first regulations in 1972,
the Secretary exempted from pre-emption state laws that regulate mat-
ters not covered by the federal regulations. The Coast Guard has since
promulgated a host of detailed regulations, but it determined in 1990,
after an 18-month inquiry by an Advisory Council subcommittee, that
available data did not support adoption of a regulation requiring propel-

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52 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
Syllabus
ler guards. In 2001, the Advisory Council recommended specific pro-
peller guard regulations, but no regulations regarding their use on rec-
reational boats such as the one in this case are currently pending.
Pp. 56–62.
(b) The FBSA does not expressly pre-empt petitioner’s common-law
tort claims. Section 10’s express pre-emption clause—which applies to
“a [state or local] law or regulation”—is most naturally read as not en-
compassing common-law claims for two reasons. First, the article “a”
implies a discreteness that is not present in common law. Second, be-
cause “a word is known by the company it keeps,” Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575, the terms “law” and “regulation” used together
indicate that Congress only pre-empted positive enactments. The Act’s
saving clause buttresses this conclusion. It assumes that there are
some significant number of common-law liability cases to save, and § 10’s
language permits a narrow reading excluding common-law actions. See
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 868. And the con-
trast between its general reference to “liability at common law” and
§ 10’s more specific and detailed description of what is pre-empted—
including an exception for state regulations addressing “uniquely haz-
ardous conditions”—indicates that § 10 was drafted to pre-empt per-
formance standards and equipment requirements imposed by statute or
regulation. This interpretation does not produce anomalous results.
It would have been perfectly rational for Congress not to pre-empt
common-law claims, which necessarily perform an important remedial
role in compensating accident victims. Pp. 62–64.
(c) The Coast Guard’s 1990 decision not to regulate propeller guards
also does not pre-empt petitioner’s claims. That decision left applicable
propeller guard law exactly the same as it had been before the subcom-
mittee began its investigation. A Coast Guard decision not to regulate
a particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent with an intent to
preserve state regulatory authority pending adoption of specific federal
standards. The Coast Guard’s explanation for its propeller guard deci-
sion reveals only that the available data did not meet the FBSA’s strin-
gent criteria for federal regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the
further step of deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their
political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller guard
regulation, and it did not reject propeller guards as unsafe. Although
undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, the 1990 decision does
not convey an authoritative message of a federal policy against propeller
guards, and nothing in the Coast Guard’s recent regulatory activities
alters this conclusion. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S.
861, distinguished. Pp. 64–68.

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Syllabus
(d) Nor does the FBSA’s statutory scheme implicitly pre-empt peti-
tioner’s claims. The Act does not require the Coast Guard to promul-
gate comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of recreational
boat safety and design; nor must the Coast Guard certify the acceptabil-
ity of every recreational boat subject to its jurisdiction. Ray v. Atlan-
tic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, and United States v. Locke, 529 U. S.
89, distinguished. Even if the FBSA could be interpreted as expressly
occupying the field of safety regulation of recreational boats with re-
spect to state positive laws and regulations, it does not convey a clear
and manifest intent to completely occupy the field so as to foreclose state
common-law remedies. This Court’s conclusion that the Act’s express
pre-emption clause does not cover common-law claims suggests the op-
posite intent. An unembellished statement in a House Report on the
Act does not establish an intent to pre-empt common-law remedies.
And the FBSA’s goal of fostering uniformity in manufacturing regula-
tions, on which respondent ultimately relies for its pre-emption argu-
ment, is an important but not unyielding interest, as is demonstrated
by the Coast Guard’s early grants of broad exemptions for state regula-
tions and by its position in this litigation. Pp. 68–70.
197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N. E. 2d 75, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Leslie A. Brueckner argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs were Arthur H. Bryant, Joseph A.
Power, Jr., and Todd A. Smith.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler,
Douglas N. Letter, Michael E. Robinson, Kirk K. Van Tine,
Paul M. Geier, Dale C. Andrews, Peter J. Plocki, Robert F.
Duncan, and G. Alex Weller.
Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Steffen N. Johnson, Michael W.
McConnell, Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, and Dan-
iel J. Connolly.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Mis-
souri et al. by Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri,
James R. Layton, State Solicitor, and Charles W. Hatfield, and by the

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54 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
Opinion of the Court
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a state common-law
tort action seeking damages from the manufacturer of an
outboard motor is pre-empted either by the enactment of
the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U. S. C. §§ 4301–4311
(FBSA, 1971 Act, or Act), or by the decision of the Coast
Guard in 1990 not to promulgate a regulation requiring pro-
peller guards on motorboats.
I
On July 10, 1995, petitioner’s wife, Jeanne Sprietsma, died
as a result of a boating accident on an inland lake that spans
the Kentucky-Tennessee border. She was riding in an 18-
foot ski boat equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard
motor manufactured by respondent, Mercury Marine, which
is a division of the Brunswick Corporation (Brunswick).
Apparently when the boat turned, she fell overboard and was
struck by the propeller, suffering fatal injuries.
Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mark Pryor of
Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut,
Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii, Steve Carter
of Indiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike McGrath of Montana,
Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hamp-
shire, Patricia Madrid of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina,
Hardy Myers of Oregon, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Christine O. Gregoire
of Washington, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Ross Diamond III and Jeffrey
Robert White.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America by John G. Roberts, Jr., Cath-
erine E. Stetson, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Maritime Law Association
of the United States by Joshua S. Force, Raymond P. Hayden, William
R. Dorsey III, and James Patrick Cooney; for the National Association of
Manufacturers et al. by Kenneth W. Starr, Robert R. Gasaway, Richard
A. Cordray, Ashley C. Parrish, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel;
and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Alan Untereiner.

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Opinion of the Court
Petitioner filed a nine-count complaint in an Illinois court 1
seeking damages from Brunswick on state-law theories.
Each count alleged that Brunswick had manufactured an un-
reasonably dangerous product because, among other things,
the motor was not protected by a propeller guard.2 The
trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed on the ground that the
action was expressly pre-empted by the FBSA. 312 Ill.
App. 3d 1040, 729 N. E. 2d 45 (2000). Relying on our inter-
vening decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529
U. S. 861 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the ap-
pellate court’s express pre-emption rationale, but affirmed
on implied pre-emption grounds. 197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N. E.
2d 75 (2001). The court’s decision added to a split of author-
ity on this precise issue arising from lawsuits against, among
a few others, this particular respondent and its corporate
subsidiaries.3
We granted certiorari, 534 U. S. 1112 (2002), to decide
whether the FBSA pre-empts state common-law claims of
1 The complaint alleges that the Sprietsmas and the owners of the boat
were residents of Illinois and that the boat had been purchased in Illi-
nois. App. 101.
2 Id., at 100–122.
3 Compare Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F. 3d 1494 (CA11) (finding
implied pre-emption under the FBSA), cert. granted, 522 U. S. 978 (1997),
cert. dismissed, 523 U. S. 1113 (1998); Carstensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49
F. 3d 430 (CA8) (finding express pre-emption under the FBSA), cert. de-
nied, 516 U. S. 866 (1995); and Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 454 Mich. 20, 557
N. W. 2d 541 (1997) (finding express pre-emption under the FBSA), with
Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S. W. 2d 246 (Tex.)
(holding that federal law did not pre-empt state law in this context), cert.
denied sub nom. Vivian Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. Moore, 513 U. S. 1057
(1994). See also Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F. 3d 598 (CA5
2000) (holding that common-law claims based on the manufacturer’s failure
to provide a propeller guard were impliedly pre-empted by the FBSA;
Outboard Marine, the successor to Neal Glaser Marine, declared bank-
ruptcy shortly after the petition for certiorari was filed), cert. denied
sub nom. Lady v. Outboard Marine Corp., 532 U. S. 941 (2001).

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56 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
Opinion of the Court
this character.4 Because the pre-emption defense raises a
threshold issue, we have no occasion to consider the merits
of petitioner’s claims, or even whether the claims are viable
as a matter of Illinois law. We must, however, evaluate
three distinct theories that may support the pre-emption de-
fense: (1) that the 1971 Act expressly pre-empts common-law
claims; (2) that the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate
propeller guards pre-empts the claims; and (3) that the po-
tential conflict between diverse state rules and the federal
interest in a uniform system of regulation impliedly pre-
empts such claims. Before considering each of these theo-
ries, we review the history of federal regulation in this area.
II
The 1971 Act is the most recent and most comprehensive
of the several statutes that Congress has enacted to improve
the safe operation of recreational boats. A 1910 enactment
required three classes of motorboats to carry certain lights,
sound signals, life preservers, and fire extinguishers. Act
of June 9, 1910, 36 Stat. 462. In 1918, Congress passed a
law that required the numbering of motorboats over 16 feet
long, Act of June 7, 1918, ch. 93, 40 Stat. 602, and in 1940, it
reenacted the above requirements, provided a system of fed-
eral inspection, and authorized penalties for the reckless op-
eration of motorboats, Act of Apr. 25, 1940, ch. 155, 54 Stat.
163. In 1958, Congress enacted additional numbering re-
quirements to be administered by the States and directed
the States to compile and transmit boating accident statistics
to the Secretary of the Treasury. Federal Boating Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 1754. Section 9 of the 1958 Act expressed
a policy of encouraging uniformity of boating laws insofar
as practicable.
The accident statistics compiled by the States presumably
were instrumental in persuading the 1971 Congress that ad-
4 Brunswick has asserted that federal maritime law governs this case.
Because this argument was not raised below, it is waived.

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Opinion of the Court
ditional federal legislation was necessary.5 In its statement
of purposes, the FBSA recites that it was enacted “to im-
prove boating safety,” to authorize “the establishment of na-
tional construction and performance standards for boats and
associated equipment,” and to encourage greater “uniformity
of boating laws and regulations as among the several States
and the Federal Government.” Pub. L. 92–75, § 2, 85 Stat.
213–214. Three of the provisions implementing these goals
are particularly relevant to this case.
Section 5 of the FBSA, as amended and codified in 46
U. S. C. § 4302, authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
issue regulations establishing “minimum safety standards
for recreational vessels and associated equipment,” and re-
quiring the installation or use of such equipment.6 The Sec-
retary has delegated this authority to the Coast Guard. See
49 CFR § 1.46(n)(1) (1997). Before exercising that authority,
5 The Senate Report on the 1971 Act observed that approximately 40
million Americans engaged in recreational boating activities every year,
and that nearly 7,000 persons had died in boating accidents during the
preceding 5-year period. S. Rep. No. 92–248, pp. 6–7 (1971) (hereinafter
S. Rep.). The Report added: “It seems apparent that the annual loss of
life is of sufficiently alarming proportion that the Federal Government
should require products involved to be built to standards of safety com-
mensurate with the risks associated with their use. Similar federal legis-
lation exists with regard to other products, including aircraft and motor
vehicles. Also, safety standards and requirements for certain categories
of larger commercial vessels have existed for many years.” Id., at 13.
6 Title 46 U. S. C. § 4302 provides:
“(a) The Secretary may prescribe regulations—
“(1) establishing minimum safety standards for recreational vessels and
associated equipment, and establishing procedures and tests required to
measure conformance with those standards, with each standard—
“(A) meeting the need for recreational vessel safety; and
“(B) being stated, insofar as practicable, in terms of performance;
“(2) requiring the installation, carrying, or use of associated equipment
. . . on recreational vessels and classes of recreational vessels subject to
this chapter, and prohibiting the installation, carrying, or use of associated
equipment that does not conform with safety standards established under
this section . . . .”

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Opinion of the Court
the Coast Guard must consider certain factors, such as the
extent to which the proposed regulation will contribute to
boating safety, and must consult with a special National
Boating Safety Advisory Council appointed pursuant to § 33
of the Act, 46 U. S. C. § 13110.7 The Advisory Council con-
sists of 21 members, 7 representatives from each of three
different groups: (1) “State officials responsible for State
boating safety programs,” (2) boat and equipment manufac-
turers, and (3) “national recreational boating organizations
and . . . the general public.” § 13110(b). The Coast Guard
may also issue exemptions from its regulations if it deter-
mines that boating safety “will not be adversely affected.”
§ 4305.
Section 10 of the Act, as codified in 46 U. S. C. § 4306, sets
forth the Act’s pre-emption clause and thus provides the
basis for respondent’s express pre-emption argument. It
states in full:
“Unless permitted by the Secretary under section
4305 of this title, a State or political subdivision of a
State may not establish, continue in effect, or enforce
7 “In prescribing regulations under this section, the Secretary shall,
among other things—
“(1) consider the need for and the extent to which the regulations will
contribute to recreational vessel safety;
“(2) consider relevant available recreational vessel safety standards, sta-
tistics, and data, including public and private research, development, test-
ing, and evaluation;
“(3) not compel substantial alteration of a recreational vessel or item of
associated equipment that is in existence, or the construction or manufac-
ture of which is begun before the effective date of the regulation, but
subject to that limitation may require compliance or performance, to avoid
a substantial risk of personal injury to the public, that the Secretary con-
siders appropriate in relation to the degree of hazard that the compliance
will correct; and
“(4) consult with the National Boating Safety Advisory Council estab-
lished under section 13110 of this title about the considerations referred
to in clauses (1)–(3) of this subsection.”

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a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel
or associated equipment performance or other safety
standard or imposing a requirement for associated
equipment (except insofar as the State or political subdi-
vision may, in the absence of the Secretary’s disap-
proval, regulate the carrying or use of marine safety
articles to meet uniquely hazardous conditions or cir-
cumstances within the State) that is not identical to a
regulation prescribed under section 4302 of this title.”
Section 40, 46 U. S. C. § 4311, sets forth the penalties that
may be assessed against persons who violate the Act. At
the end of that section, Congress included the following sav-
ing clause:
“Compliance with this chapter or standards, regula-
tions, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not
relieve a person from liability at common law or under
State law.” § 4311(g).
Federal Regulation Under the FBSA
The day after the President signed the FBSA into law, the
Secretary of Transportation took action that was based on
the assumption that § 10 would pre-empt existing state regu-
lation that “is not identical to a regulation prescribed” under
§ 5 of the Act, even if no such federal regulation had been
promulgated. On August 11, 1971, the Secretary issued a
statement exempting all then-existing state laws from pre-
emption under the Act. 36 Fed. Reg. 15764–15765. He ex-
plained that boating safety would “not be adversely affected
by continuing in effect those existing laws and regulations
of the various States and political subdivisions” until new
federal regulations could be issued. Id., at 15765.
One year later, on August 4, 1972, the Coast Guard issued
its first regulations under § 5 of the Act. See 37 Fed. Reg.
15777–15785. Those regulations included boat performance
and safety standards such as requirements for hull identifi-

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60 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
Opinion of the Court
cation numbers, maximum capacity and warnings of such ca-
pacity, and minimum boat flotation. They did not include
any propeller guard requirement. After those federal regu-
lations became effective, the Secretary limited the scope of
his original blanket exemption to pre-empt those “State stat-
utes and regulations” that concerned requirements covered
by the 1972 regulations. See 38 Fed. Reg. 6914–6915 (1973).
Existing state laws that regulated matters not covered by
the federal regulations continued to be exempted from pre-
emption. Ibid.
In the years since, the Coast Guard has promulgated a
host of detailed regulations. Some prescribe the use of
specified equipment, such as personal flotation devices and
visual distress signals, 33 CFR pts. 175(B), (C) (2001), and
certain procedures, such as compliance labeling by manufac-
turers and prompt accident reporting by operators, pts.
181(B), 173(C). See generally pts. 173–181. Other regula-
tions impose precise standards governing the design and
manufacture of boats themselves and of associated equip-
ment, such as electrical and fuel systems, ventilation, and
“start-in-gear protection” devices. Pt. 183; cf. Chao v. Mal-
lard Bay Drilling, Inc., 534 U. S. 235, 242 (2002) (“Congress
has assigned a broad and important mission to the Coast
Guard. . . . [T]he Coast Guard possesses authority to pro-
mulgate and enforce regulations promoting the safety of
vessels . . .”).
Coast Guard Consideration of Propeller Guard Regulation
In May 1988, the Coast Guard decided that the number of
recreational boating accidents in which persons in the water
were struck by propellers merited a special study.8 Acting
8 Between 1976 and 1990, the Coast Guard officially reported about 100
propeller-strike injuries in the United States per year. App. in Lewis v.
Brunswick, O. T. 1997, No. 97–288, p. 170. A 1992 study by members of
the Johns Hopkins University Injury Prevention Center and the Institute
for Injury Reduction concluded that, when adjusted for underreporting,

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Opinion of the Court
at the request of the Coast Guard, the National Boating
Safety Advisory Council appointed a special Propeller Guard
Subcommittee. The subcommittee was directed to review
“the available data on the prevention of propeller-strike acci-
dents” and to study the “various methods of shrouding pro-
pellers to prevent contact with [a] person in the water.”
App. 43.
After 18 months of study, the subcommittee recommended
that the Coast Guard “should take no regulatory action to
require propeller guards.” Id., at 40. Its recommendation
rested upon findings that, given current technology, feasible
propeller guards might prevent penetrating injuries but in-
crease the potential for blunt trauma caused by collision with
the guard, which enlarges the boat’s underwater profile; fea-
sible models would cause power and speed loss at higher
speeds; and it would be “prohibitive[ly]” expensive to retrofit
all existing boats with propeller guards because “[n]o simple
universal design suitable for all boats and motors in exist-
ence” had been proved feasible. Id., at 36–38.
The Advisory Council endorsed the subcommittee’s recom-
mendation, as did the Coast Guard. In a 1990 letter to the
Council, the Chief of the Coast Guard’s Office of Navigation
Safety and Waterway Services agreed that the available acci-
dent data did not support the adoption of a regulation requir-
ing propeller guards on motorboats, but stated that the
Coast Guard would continue to review information “regard-
ing development and testing of new propeller guarding de-
vices or other information on the state of the art.” Id.,
at 81. In 1995, 1996, and 1997, the Coast Guard invited pub-
lic comment on various proposals to reduce the number of
injuries involving propeller strikes.
In April 2001, the Advisory Council recommended that the
Coast Guard develop four specific regulations. See 66 Fed.
“the true number of propeller injuries and fatalities may be closer to . . .
2,000–3,000 per year.” Id., at 199.

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62 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
Opinion of the Court
Reg. 63645, 63647.9 In response, in December 2001, the
Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking ad-
dressing one of the recommendations. The proposed rule, if
adopted, would require an owner of a nonplaning houseboat
for rent to equip her vessel with either a propeller guard or
“a combination of three propeller injury avoidance meas-
ures.” Ibid. The Advisory Council also recommended that
the Coast Guard require “manufacturers and importers of
new planing vessels 12 feet to 26 feet in length with propel-
lers aft of the transom to select and install one of several
factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods.” Ibid.
Although the Coast Guard has indicated that this recommen-
dation, along with the Advisory Council’s other recommenda-
tions, will be addressed in “subsequent regulatory projects,”
ibid., it has not yet issued any regulation either requiring or
prohibiting propeller guards on recreational planing vessels
such as the boat involved in this case.
III
Because the FBSA contains an express pre-emption
clause, our “task of statutory construction must in the first
instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which nec-
9 “After discussing the alternatives and their cost, the Council recom-
mended that the Coast Guard . . . develop four specific regulations:
“(1) Require owners of all propeller driven vessels 12 feet in length and
longer with propellers aft of the transom to display propeller warning
labels and to employ an emergency cut-off switch, where installed;
“(2) Require manufacturers and importers of new planing vessels 12 feet
to 26 feet in length with propellers aft of the transom to select and install
one of several factory installed propeller injury avoidance methods;
“(3) Require manufacturers and importers of new non-planing vessels
12 feet in length and longer with propellers aft of the transom to select
and install one of several factory installed propeller injury avoidance
methods; and
“(4) Require owners of all non-planing rental boats with propellers aft
of the transom to install either a jet propulsion system or a propeller
guard or all of several propeller injury avoidance measures.” 66 Fed.
Reg., at 63647.

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Opinion of the Court
essarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive
intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658, 664
(1993). Here, the express pre-emption clause in § 10 applies
to “a [state or local] law or regulation.” 46 U. S. C. § 4306.
We think that this language is most naturally read as not
encompassing common-law claims for two reasons. First,
the article “a” before “law or regulation” implies a discrete-
ness—which is embodied in statutes and regulations—that
is not present in the common law. Second, because “a word
is known by the company it keeps,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995), the terms “law” and “regulation”
used together in the pre-emption clause indicate that Con-
gress pre-empted only positive enactments. If “law” were
read broadly so as to include the common law, it might also
be interpreted to include regulations, which would render
the express reference to “regulation” in the pre-emption
clause superfluous.
The Act’s saving clause buttresses this conclusion. See
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S., at 867–868.
It states that “[c]ompliance with this chapter or standards,
regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not
relieve a person from liability at common law or under State
law.” § 4311(g). As we held in Geier, the “saving clause
assumes that there are some significant number of common-
law liability cases to save [and t]he language of the pre-
emption provision permits a narrow reading that excludes
common-law actions.” Id., at 868.
The saving clause is also relevant for an independent rea-
son. The contrast between its general reference to “liability
at common law” and the more specific and detailed descrip-
tion of what is pre-empted by § 10—including the exception
for state regulations addressing “uniquely hazardous condi-
tions”—indicates that § 10 was drafted to pre-empt perform-
ance standards and equipment requirements imposed by
statute or regulation.

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64 SPRIETSMA v. MERCURY MARINE
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Our interpretation of the statute’s language does not
produce anomalous results. It would have been perfectly
rational for Congress not to pre-empt common-law claims,
which—unlike most administrative and legislative reg-
ulations—necessarily perform an important remedial role
in compensating accident victims. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251 (1984). Indeed, compensa-
tion is the manifest object of the saving clause, which focuses
not on state authority to regulate, but on preserving “liabil-
ity at common law or under State law.” In context, this
phrase surely refers to private damages remedies.10 We
thus agree with the Illinois Supreme Court’s conclusion that
petitioner’s common-law tort claims are not expressly pre-
empted by the FBSA.
IV
Even if § 10 of the FBSA does not expressly pre-empt
state common-law claims, respondent contends that such
claims are implicitly pre-empted by the entire statute, and
more specifically by the Coast Guard’s decision not to regu-
late propeller guards. Both are viable pre-emption theories:
“We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly
overrides state law either when the scope of a statute
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy
a field exclusively, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S.
72, 78–79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conflict
with federal law. We have found implied conflict pre-
emption where it is ‘impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements,’ id.,
at 79, or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
10 The FBSA itself imposes civil money penalties payable to the United
States, as well as imprisonment for willful violations, 46 U. S. C. § 4311,
but does not authorize any private damages remedies for persons injured
by noncomplying operators, boats, or equipment.

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52, 67 (1941).” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S.
280, 287 (1995).
Moreover, Congress’ inclusion of an express pre-emption
clause “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-
emption principles,” Geier, 529 U. S., at 869 (emphasis in
original), that find implied pre-emption “where it is impossi-
ble for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” Freightliner Corp., 514 U. S., at
287 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We
are not persuaded, however, that the FBSA has any such
pre-emptive effect.
We first consider, and reject, respondent’s reliance on the
Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt a regulation requiring
propeller guards on motorboats. It is quite wrong to view
that decision as the functional equivalent of a regulation pro-
hibiting all States and their political subdivisions from adopt-
ing such a regulation. The decision in 1990 to accept the
subcommittee’s recommendation to “take no regulatory ac-
tion,” App. 80, left the law applicable to propeller guards
exactly the same as it had been before the subcommittee
began its investigation. Of course, if a state common-law
claim directly conflicted with a federal regulation promul-
gated under the Act, or if it were impossible to comply with
any such regulation without incurring liability under state
common law, pre-emption would occur. This, however, is
not such a case.
Indeed, history teaches us that a Coast Guard decision not
to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is fully con-
sistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority
pending the adoption of specific federal standards. That
was the course the Coast Guard followed in 1971 immediately
after the Act was passed, and again when it imposed its first
regulations in 1972 and 1973. The Coast Guard has never
taken the position that the litigation of state common-law

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claims relating to an area not yet subject to federal regula-
tion would conflict with “the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded “that the Coast
Guard’s failure to promulgate a propeller guard requirement
here equates to a ruling that no such regulation is appro-
priate pursuant to the policy of the FBSA.” 197 Ill. 2d, at
128, 757 N. E. 2d, at 85. With regard to policies defined by
Congress, we have recognized that “a federal decision to
forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative
federal determination that the area is best left unregulated,
and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as
a decision to regulate.” Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp.
v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 384 (1983);
see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947) (state law is pre-empted
“where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to exercise
their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no
such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the
policy of the statute”). In this instance, however, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court’s conclusion does not accurately reflect
the Coast Guard’s entire explanation for its decision:
“The regulatory process is very structured and strin-
gent regarding justification. Available propeller guard
accident data do not support imposition of a regulation
requiring propeller guards on motorboats. Regulatory
action is also limited by the many questions about
whether a universally acceptable propeller guard is
available or technically feasible in all modes of boat op-
eration. Additionally, the question of retrofitting mil-
lions of boats would certainly be a major economic con-
sideration.” App. 80.
This statement reveals only a judgment that the available
data did not meet the FBSA’s “stringent” criteria for federal

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regulation. The Coast Guard did not take the further step
of deciding that, as a matter of policy, the States and their
political subdivisions should not impose some version of pro-
peller guard regulation, and it most definitely did not reject
propeller guards as unsafe.11 The Coast Guard’s apparent
focus was on the lack of any “universally acceptable” propel-
ler guard for “all modes of boat operation.” But nothing in
its official explanation would be inconsistent with a tort ver-
dict premised on a jury’s finding that some type of propeller
guard should have been installed on this particular kind of
boat equipped with respondent’s particular type of motor.
Thus, although the Coast Guard’s decision not to require pro-
peller guards was undoubtedly intentional and carefully con-
sidered, it does not convey an “authoritative” message of
a federal policy against propeller guards. And nothing in
the Coast Guard’s recent regulatory activities alters this
conclusion.
The Coast Guard’s decision not to impose a propeller guard
requirement presents a sharp contrast to the decision of the
Secretary of Transportation that was given pre-emptive ef-
fect in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861
(2000). As the Solicitor General had argued in that case,
the promulgation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 208 embodied an affirmative “policy judgment that
safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed al-
ternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one
particular system in every car.” Id., at 881. In finding
pre-emption, we expressly placed “weight upon the DOT’s
interpretation of FMVSS 208’s objectives and its conclusion,
as set forth in the Government’s brief, that a tort suit such
as this one would ‘ “ ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplish-
11 Indeed, in response to the Propeller Guard Subcommittee’s recommen-
dation in favor of “educational and awareness campaigns,” the Coast
Guard indicated that it would publish a series of articles “aimed at avoid-
ing boat/propeller strike accidents,” which could include the topic of “avail-
able propeller guards.” App. 82–83.

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ment and execution’ ” ’ of those objectives . . . . Congress
has delegated to DOT authority to implement the statute;
the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and
background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely
to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and
its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the
likely impact of state requirements.” Id., at 883. In the
case before us today, the Solicitor General, joined by counsel
for the Coast Guard, has informed us that the agency does
not view the 1990 refusal to regulate or any subsequent reg-
ulatory actions by the Coast Guard as having any pre-
emptive effect. Our reasoning in Geier therefore provides
strong support for petitioner’s submission.
V
Even though the refusal to regulate propeller guards in
1990 had no pre-emptive effect, it is possible that the statu-
tory scheme as a whole implicitly pre-empted common-law
claims such as petitioner’s when it was enacted in 1971. If
that were so, the exemption carried forward by the Secre-
tary in 1973 after the first federal regulations were adopted
might have saved existing state common-law rules “in effect
on the effective date” of the 1971 Act, so far as those rules
relate to propeller guards. 38 Fed. Reg., at 6915. But even
if that is not the case, we think it clear that the FBSA did
not so completely occupy the field of safety regulation of rec-
reational boats as to foreclose state common-law remedies.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978), we
considered a federal statute that directed the Secretary of
Transportation to determine “which oil tankers are suffi-
ciently safe to be allowed to proceed in the navigable waters
of the United States,” and after inspection to certify “each
vessel as sufficiently safe to protect the marine environ-
ment.” Id., at 163, 165. We held that this scheme of man-
datory federal regulation implicitly pre-empted the power of
the State of Washington “to exclude from Puget Sound ves-

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sels certified by the Secretary as having acceptable design
characteristics, unless they satisfy the different and higher
design requirements imposed by state law.” Id., at 165.
As we explained in United States v. Locke, 529 U. S. 89
(2000), the analysis in Ray was governed by field-pre-
emption rules because the rules at issue were in a “field re-
served for federal regulation” and “Congress ha[d] left no
room for state regulation of these matters.” 529 U. S., at
111. In particular, Title II of the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) required the Secretary to issue
“such rules and regulations as may be necessary with re-
spect to the design, construction, and operation of the cov-
ered vessels.” 435 U. S., at 161.
The Illinois Supreme Court relied on both Ray and Locke
to find petitioner’s claims impliedly pre-empted. But the
FBSA, unlike Title II of the PWSA, does not require the
Coast Guard to promulgate comprehensive regulations cov-
ering every aspect of recreational boat safety and design;
nor must the Coast Guard certify the acceptability of every
recreational boat subject to its jurisdiction. Moreover, nei-
ther Title II of the PWSA nor the holding in either Ray or
Locke purported to pre-empt possible common-law claims,
whereas the FBSA expressly preserves such claims.
The FBSA might be interpreted as expressly occupying
the field with respect to state positive laws and regulations
but its structure and framework do not convey a “clear and
manifest” intent, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72,
79 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),
to go even further and implicitly pre-empt all state common
law relating to boat manufacture. Rather, our conclusion
that the Act’s express pre-emption clause does not cover
common-law claims suggests the opposite intent. See Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 517 (1992); id.,
at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Nor is a clear and manifest intent to sweep
away state common law established by an unembellished

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statement in a House Report that the 1971 Act “preempts
the field on boating standards or regulations.” H. R. Rep.
No. 92–324, p. 11 (1971). The statement was made prior to
the amendment containing the saving clause, and nothing in
the entire report suggests that it meant the occupied “field”
to include judge-made common law.
Respondent ultimately relies upon one of the FBSA’s main
goals: fostering uniformity in manufacturing regulations.
Uniformity is undoubtedly important to the industry, and the
statute’s pre-emption clause was meant to “assur[e] that
manufacture for the domestic trade will not involve compli-
ance with widely varying local requirements.” S. Rep. 20.
Yet this interest is not unyielding, as is demonstrated both
by the Coast Guard’s early grants of broad exemptions for
state regulations and by the position it has taken in this liti-
gation. Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard, the
concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of
state common-law remedies that compensate accident vic-
tims and their families and that serve the Act’s more promi-
nent objective, emphasized by its title, of promoting boat-
ing safety.
The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.