UNITED STATES et al. v. BEAN

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71 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
UNITED STATES et al. v. BEAN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 01–704. Argued October 16, 2002—Decided December 10, 2002
Because of respondent’s felony conviction, he was prohibited by 18 U. S. C.
§ 922(g)(1) from possessing, distributing, or receiving firearms or ammu-
nition. Relying on § 925(c), he applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms (ATF) for relief from his firearms disabilities.
ATF returned the application unprocessed, explaining that its annual
appropriations law forbade it from expending any funds to investigate
or act upon such applications. Invoking § 925(c)’s judicial review provi-
sion, he filed suit, asking the District Court to conduct its own inquiry
into his fitness to possess a gun and to issue a judicial order granting
relief. The court granted the requested relief, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.
Held: The absence of an actual denial by ATF of a felon’s petition pre-
cludes judicial review under § 925(c). The Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized to grant relief from a firearms disability if certain precondi-
tions are met, and an applicant may seek federal-court review if the
Secretary denies his application. Ibid. Since 1992, however, the ap-
propriations bar has prevented ATF, to which the Secretary has dele-
gated this authority, from using appropriated funds to investigate or act
upon the applications. Section 925(c)’s text and the procedure it lays
out for seeking relief make clear that an actual decision by ATF on an
application is a prerequisite for judicial review, and that mere inaction
by ATF does not invest a district court with independent jurisdiction.
Grammatically, the phrase “denied by the Secretary” references the Sec-
retary’s decision on whether an applicant “will not be likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety,” and whether “the granting of the
relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” Such determina-
tion can hardly be construed as anything but a decision actually denying
the application. Under § 925(c)’s procedure for those seeking relief, the
Secretary, i. e., ATF, has broad authority to grant or deny relief, even
when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. This procedure shows
that judicial review cannot occur without a dispositive decision by ATF.
First, in the absence of a statutorily defined standard of review for
action under § 925(c), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) supplies
the applicable standard. 5 U. S. C. §§ 701(a), 706(2)(A). The APA’s “ar-
bitrary and capricious” test, by its nature, contemplates review of some

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72 UNITED STATES v. BEAN
Opinion of the Court
action by another entity. Second, both parts of § 925(c)’s standard for
granting relief—whether an applicant is “likely to act in a manner dan-
gerous to public safety” and whether the relief is in the “public inter-
est”—are policy-based determinations and, hence, point to ATF as the
primary decisionmaker. Third, § 925(c) allows the admission of addi-
tional evidence in district court proceedings only in exceptional circum-
stances. Congressional assignment of such a circumscribed role to a
district court shows that the statute contemplates that a court’s deter-
mination will heavily rely on the record and the ATF’s decision. In-
deed, the very use in § 925(c) of the word “review” to describe a court’s
responsibility in this statutory scheme signifies that it cannot grant re-
lief on its own, absent an antecedent actual denial by ATF. Pp. 74–78.
253 F. 3d 234, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Irving L.
Gornstein, Mark B. Stern, and Thomas M. Bondy.
Thomas C. Goldstein argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Larry C. Hunter and Amy
Howe.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider in this case whether, despite appropriation
provisions barring the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire-
arms (ATF) from acting on applications for relief from fire-
arms disabilities of persons convicted of a felony, a federal
district court has authority under 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) to grant
such relief.
I
After attending a gun show in Laredo, Texas, respondent,
Thomas Lamar Bean, a gun dealer, and his associates drove
*Craig Goldblatt and Mathew S. Nosanchuk filed a brief for the Vio-
lence Policy Center as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Law Enforce-
ment Alliance of America, Inc., by Richard E. Gardiner; and for the Sec-
ond Amendment Foundation by William M. Gustavson.

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respondent’s vehicle to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, for dinner.
Bean v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 253 F. 3d
234, 236 (CA5 2001). When Mexican officials stopped the
vehicle at the border, they found in the back, in plain view,
approximately 200 rounds of ammunition. Ibid. According
to respondent, he had instructed his associates to remove
any firearms and ammunition from his vehicle, but inexplica-
bly one box remained. Ibid. Respondent was convicted in
a Mexican court of importing ammunition into Mexico and
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
Because of his felony conviction, respondent was prohib-
ited by 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing, distributing,
or receiving firearms or ammunition. Relying on § 925(c),
respondent applied to ATF for relief from his firearms disa-
bilities. ATF returned the application unprocessed, explain-
ing that its annual appropriations law forbade it from ex-
pending any funds to investigate or act upon applications
such as respondent’s.
Respondent then filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Relying on the ju-
dicial review provision in § 925(c), respondent asked the Dis-
trict Court to conduct its own inquiry into his fitness to pos-
sess a gun, and to issue a judicial order granting relief from
his firearms disabilities. Respondent attached various affi-
davits from persons attesting to his fitness to possess fire-
arms. After conducting a hearing, the court entered judg-
ment granting respondent the requested relief. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
congressional refusal to provide funding to ATF for review-
ing applications such as respondent’s “is not the requisite
direct and definite suspension or repeal of the subject
rights.” 253 F. 3d, at 239. The Fifth Circuit then pro-
ceeded to hold that the District Court had jurisdiction to
review ATF’s (in)action. We granted certiorari. 534 U. S.
1112 (2002).

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II
Under federal law, a person who is convicted of a felony is
prohibited from possessing firearms. See § 922(g)(1). The
Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant relief from
that prohibition if it is established to his satisfaction that
certain preconditions are met. See § 925(c).1 An applicant
may seek judicial review from a “United States district
court” if his application “is denied by the Secretary.” Ibid.
Since 1992, however, the appropriations bar has prevented
ATF, to which the Secretary has delegated authority to act
on § 925(c) applications,2 from using “funds appropriated
1 Title 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) provides:
“A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or
receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Secretary
for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the
acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of
firearms, and the Secretary may grant such relief if it is established to
his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the
applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting
of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. Any person
whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Secretary
may file a petition with the United States district court for the district in
which he resides for a judicial review of such denial. The court may in
its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result
in a miscarriage of justice. A licensed importer, licensed manufacturer,
licensed dealer, or licensed collector conducting operations under this
chapter, who makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred
under this chapter, shall not be barred by such disability from further
operations under his license pending final action on an application for relief
filed pursuant to this section. Whenever the Secretary grants relief to
any person pursuant to this section he shall promptly publish in the Fed-
eral Register notice of such action, together with the reasons therefor.”
2 Respondent contends that congressional denial of funds to ATF did not
eliminate the Secretary’s power to act on his application. In support,
respondent notes that § 925(c) refers to the action by “the Secretary.”
That claim, however, is waived, as respondent raised it for the first time
in his brief on the merits to this Court.
Even if considered on the merits, respondent’s argument faces several
difficulties. First, it appears that the Secretary delegated to ATF the

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herein . . . to investigate or act upon applications for re-
lief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U. S. C.
[§ ]925(c).” Treasury, Postal Service, and General Govern-
ment Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. 102–393, 106 Stat.
1732.3 Accordingly, ATF, upon receipt of respondent’s peti-
tion, returned it, explaining that “[s]ince October 1992, ATF’s
annual appropriation has prohibited the expending of any
funds to investigate or act upon applications for relief from
Federal firearms disabilities.” App. 33–34. Respondent
contends that ATF’s failure to act constitutes a “denial”
within the meaning of § 925(c), and that, therefore, district
courts have jurisdiction to review such inaction.
We disagree. Inaction by ATF does not amount to a “de-
nial” within the meaning of § 925(c). The text of § 925(c) and
exclusive authority to act on petitions brought under § 925(c), see 27 CFR
§§ 178.144(b) and (d) (2002); such delegation is not unreasonable. Second,
even assuming the Secretary has retained the authority to act on such
petitions, it is not clear that respondent would prevail were he to file a
requisite action under 5 U. S. C. § 706(1) (providing for judicial review to
“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”).
Not only does the Secretary, by the explicit terms of the statute, possess
broad discretion as to whether to grant relief, see infra, at 76–78, but
congressional withholding of funds from ATF would likely inform his exer-
cise of discretion.
3 In each subsequent year, Congress has retained the bar on the use of
appropriated funds to process applications filed by individuals. Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107–67, 115
Stat. 519; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106–554, 114
Stat. 2763A–129; Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
2000, Pub. L. 106–58, 113 Stat. 434; Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 105–277, 112 Stat. 2681–485; Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. 105–61, 111
Stat. 1277; Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropria-
tions Act, 1997, Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–319; Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. 104–
52, 109 Stat. 471; Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Ap-
propriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. 103–329, 108 Stat. 2385; Treasury, Postal
Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. 103–
123, 107 Stat. 1228.

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the procedure it lays out for seeking relief make clear that
an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite
for judicial review, and that mere inaction by ATF does not
invest a district court with independent jurisdiction to act
on an application.
Grammatically, the phrase “denied by the Secretary” ref-
erences the Secretary’s decision on whether an applicant
“will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety,” and whether “the granting of the relief would not
be contrary to the public interest.” The determination
whether an applicant is “likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety” can hardly be construed as anything but
a decision actually denying the application.4 And, in fact,
respondent does not contend that ATF actually passed on his
application, but rather claims that “refusal to grant relief
constitutes a literal, or at least a constructive, denial of the
application because it has precisely the same impact on [the
applicant] as denial on the merits.” Brief for Respondent 35
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The procedure that § 925(c) lays out for those seeking relief
also leads us to conclude that an actual adverse action on
the application by ATF is a prerequisite for judicial review.
Section 925(c) requires an applicant, as a first step, to peti-
tion the Secretary and establish to the Secretary’s satisfac-
tion that the applicant is eligible for relief. The Secretary,
in his discretion, may grant or deny the request based on
the broad considerations outlined above. Only then, if the
4 Also counseling against construing failure to act as a denial for pur-
poses of § 925(c) is the fact that while the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) draws a distinction between a “denial” and a “failure to act,” see 5
U. S. C. § 551(13), an applicant may obtain judicial review under § 925(c)
only if an application is denied. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes
and Statutory Construction § 46:06, p. 194 (6th ed. 2000) (“The use of dif-
ferent terms within related statutes generally implies that different mean-
ings were intended”).

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Secretary denies relief, may an applicant seek review in a
district court.
This broad authority of the Secretary, i. e., ATF, to grant
or deny relief, even when the statutory prerequisites are sat-
isfied, shows that judicial review under § 925(c) cannot occur
without a dispositive decision by ATF. First, in the absence
of a statutorily defined standard of review for action under
§ 925(c), the APA supplies the applicable standard. 5
U. S. C. § 701(a). Under the APA, judicial review is usually
limited to determining whether agency action is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law.” § 706(2)(A). Application of the APA stand-
ard of review here indicates that judicial review is predicated
upon ATF’s dispositive decision: the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” test in its nature contemplates review of some action
by another entity, rather than initial judgment of the court
itself.
Second, both parts of the standard for granting relief point
to ATF as the primary decisionmaker. Whether an appli-
cant is “likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety”
presupposes an inquiry into that applicant’s background—a
function best performed by the Executive, which, unlike
courts, is institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral,
wide-ranging investigation. Similarly, the “public interest”
standard calls for an inherently policy-based decision best
left in the hands of an agency.
Third, the admission of additional evidence in district
court proceedings is contemplated only in exceptional cir-
cumstances. See 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) (allowing, “in [district
court’s] discretion,” admission of evidence where “failure to
do so would result in a miscarriage of justice”). Congres-
sional assignment of such a circumscribed role to a district
court shows that the statute contemplates that a district
court’s determination will heavily rely on the record and the
decision made by ATF. Indeed, the very use in § 925(c) of

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78 UNITED STATES v. BEAN
Opinion of the Court
the word “review” to describe a district court’s responsibility
in this statutory scheme signifies that a district court cannot
grant relief on its own, absent an antecedent actual denial
by ATF.
Accordingly, we hold that the absence of an actual denial of
respondent’s petition by ATF precludes judicial review under
§ 925(c), and therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
It is so ordered.