INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al. v. PAIUTE- SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP COLONY et al.

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701 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
INYO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et al. v. PAIUTE-
SHOSHONE INDIANS OF THE BISHOP
COMMUNITY OF THE BISHOP
COLONY et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–281. Argued March 31, 2003—Decided May 19, 2003
The Bishop Paiute Tribe in California chartered and wholly owns the
Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, which operates and manages the
Paiute Palace Casino (Casino), a tribal gaming operation. When the
Inyo County District Attorney asked the Casino for the employment
records of three Casino employees under investigation for welfare fraud,
the Tribe responded that its privacy policy precluded release of the rec-
ords without the employees’ consent. The District Attorney, on show-
ing probable cause, then obtained and executed a search warrant author-
izing a search of the Casino for payroll records of the three employees.
The District Attorney subsequently asked for the records of six other
Casino employees. The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered
to accept as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of each
employee’s signed welfare application. The District Attorney refused
the offer. To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and its Gam-
ing Corporation filed suit in Federal District Court against the District
Attorney and the Sheriff, in their individual and official capacities, and
Inyo County (County). Asserting federal-question jurisdiction under
28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1343(i)(3)(4), and the federal common law of
Indian affairs, the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vin-
dicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes under fed-
eral law, and to establish that state law was preempted to the extent
that it purported to authorize seizure of tribal records. The Tribe also
sought relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, including compensatory damages,
alleging that the defendants violated the Tribe’s and Gaming Corpora-
tion’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Tribe’s right
to self-government. The District Court, on defendants’ motion, dis-
missed the Tribe’s complaint, holding, inter alia, that tribal sovereign
immunity did not categorically preclude the search and seizure of the
Casino’s personnel records. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
execution of a search warrant against the Tribe interfered with “the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.” Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220. Acknowledging a prior

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Syllabus
decision in which it held that the right to tribal self-government is not
protected by § 1983, the court concluded that, in this case, a § 1983 claim
could be maintained because the Tribe sought protection from an unlaw-
ful search and seizure, a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and
therefore within § 1983’s compass.
Held:
1. The Tribe may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the sovereign
right it here claims. Section 1983 permits “citizen[s]” and “other per-
son[s] within the jurisdiction” of the United States to seek legal and
equitable relief from “person[s]” who, under color of state law, deprive
them of federally protected rights. Although this case does not
squarely present the question, the Court assumes that tribes, like
States, are not subject to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58. The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe
qualifies as a claimant—a “person within the jurisdiction” of the United
States—under § 1983. Qualification of a sovereign as a “person” who
may maintain a particular claim for relief depends not “upon a bare
analysis of the word ‘person,’ ” Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434
U. S. 308, 317, but on the “legislative environment” in which the word
appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161. There is in this case no
allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that the warrant
was otherwise defective. It is only by virtue of the Tribe’s asserted
“sovereign” status that it claims immunity from the County’s processes.
Section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government
encroachment, see Will, 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereign’s
prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.
For example, a tribal member complaining of a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation would be a “person” qualified to sue under § 1983. But, like other
persons, that member would have no immunity from an appropriately
executed search warrant based on probable cause. The Tribe, accord-
ingly, may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here
claims. Pp. 708–712.
2. The Tribe has not explained, and the trial and appellate courts have
not clearly decided, what prescription of federal common law, if any,
enables the Tribe to maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal
processes. This case is therefore remanded for focused consideration
and resolution of that jurisdictional question. P. 712.
291 F. 3d 549, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer,

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Syllabus
JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 713.
John Douglas Kirby argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs was Paul N. Bruce.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae. With her on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti,
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant At-
torney General Clark, Elizabeth Ann Peterson, and Ethan
G. Shenkman.
Reid Peyton Chambers argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Anne D. Noto, Colin Cloud
Hampson, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., and James T. Meggesto.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali-
fornia et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M.
Medeiros, Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Robert L. Mukai, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sara J.
Drake, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Marc A. Le Forestier,
Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-
tive States as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Richard Blu-
menthal of Connecticut, Charlie Crist of Florida, Thomas J. Miller of
Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy
Myers of Oregon, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, and Mark L. Shurt-
leff of Utah; for Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley et al.
by Mr. Cooley, pro se, George M. Palmer, Roberta Schwartz, and Brent
Dail Riggs; for the California State Sheriffs’ Association by Paul R. Coble
and Martin J. Mayer; and for the National Sheriffs’ Association et al. by
John J. Brandt.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the National
Congress of American Indians et al. by Riyaz A. Kanji, Kaighn Smith,
Jr., and Ian Heath Gershengorn; and for United South and Eastern Tribes,
Inc., by William W. Taylor III, Eleanor H. Smith, and David A. Reiser.
A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of New Mexico et al. by
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General of New Mexico, Stuart M. Blue-
stone, Deputy Attorney General, Christopher D. Coppin, Assistant Attor-
ney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as
follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike McGrath of Montana, and Chris-
tine O. Gregoire of Washington.

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704 INYO COUNTY v. PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF
BISHOP COMMUNITY OF BISHOP COLONY
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case stems from a California county’s investigation of
Native American tribe members for alleged off-reservation
crimes. Pursuing the investigation, county law enforcement
officers executed a state-court warrant for casino employ-
ment records kept by the Tribe on its reservation. The
Tribe sued Inyo County (County), the District Attorney, and
the Sheriff in federal court, asserting sovereign immunity
from state-court processes and seeking declaratory, injunc-
tive, and monetary relief.
The parties and, as amicus curiae, the United States
agree that a Native American Tribe, like a State of the
United States, is not a “person” subject to suit under 42
U. S. C. § 1983. We hold that, in the situation here pre-
sented, the Tribe does not qualify as a “person” who may
sue under § 1983. Whether the Tribe’s suit qualifies for
federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some fed-
eral law other than § 1983 is an issue the parties have not
precisely addressed, and the trial and appellate courts have
not clearly decided. We therefore remand the case for
close consideration and specific resolution of that threshold
question.
I
The Bishop Paiute Tribe is a federally recognized tribe
located on the Bishop Paiute Reservation in California. The
Bishop Paiute Gaming Corporation, chartered and wholly
owned by the Tribe, operates and manages the Paiute Palace
Casino (Casino), a tribal gaming operation run under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102 Stat. 2467, 25 U. S. C.
§ 2701 et seq.
In March 1999, the Inyo County Department of Health and
Human Services (Department) received information from the
State Department of Social Services indicating that three
Casino employees had failed to report Casino earnings on
their applications for state welfare benefits. Brief for Peti-
tioners 4–5. According to the County, the employees failed

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Opinion of the Court
to respond when the Department requested that they recon-
cile the apparent discrepancies between their Casino earn-
ings and their welfare application forms. Id., at 5. The De-
partment then forwarded the matter to the Inyo County
District Attorney’s Office, which, in turn, asked the employ-
ees to reconcile the apparent discrepancies. Id., at 6. That
request, the County asserts, was also ignored. Ibid.
In February 2000, the District Attorney’s Office asked the
Casino for the three employees’ employment records, ex-
plaining that it was investigating “alleged welfare fraud.”
291 F. 3d 549, 554 (CA9 2002). The Tribe responded that its
privacy policy precluded release of the records without the
employees’ consent.
The District Attorney then sought and, on showing proba-
ble cause, obtained a search warrant from the Inyo County
Superior Court. The warrant authorized a search of the Ca-
sino for payroll records of the three employees. On March
23, 2000, the Inyo County Sheriff and the District Attorney
executed the warrant. They did so over the objection of
tribal officials. Those officials urged that the state court
lacked jurisdiction to authorize a search of premises and sei-
zure of records belonging to a sovereign tribe.1 The Sheriff
and the District Attorney, lacking cooperation from the
Tribe, cut the locks off the storage facility containing the
Casino’s personnel records. The county officials seized time-
card entries, payroll registers, and payroll check registers
relating to the three employees; the seizure also garnered
information contained in quarterly wage and withholding re-
ports the Corporation had submitted to the State. Each
item seized contained at least one reference to an employee
under investigation.
In July 2000, the District Attorney’s Office asked the Tribe
for the personnel records of six other Casino employees.
1 The United States maintains, and the County does not dispute, that
the Corporation is an “arm” of the Tribe for sovereign immunity purposes.
See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11–14.

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Opinion of the Court
The Tribe reiterated its privacy policy, but offered to accept
as evidence of consent a redacted copy of the last page of
each employee’s signed welfare application. That page con-
tained a statement that employment records of individuals
applying for public assistance were subject to review by
county officials. The District Attorney refused the offer.2
To ward off any additional searches, the Tribe and the Cor-
poration filed suit in Federal District Court naming as de-
fendants the District Attorney and the Sheriff, in their indi-
vidual and official capacities, and the County. Asserting
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331, 1337,
1343(i)(3)(4), and the “federal common law of Indian affairs,”
the Tribe sought injunctive and declaratory relief to vin-
dicate its status as a sovereign immune from state processes
under federal law, and to establish that state law was
preempted to the extent that it purported to authorize
seizure of tribal records. App. 97, ¶ 1, 105–114, ¶¶ 26–53.
The Tribe’s complaint also sought relief under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, including compensatory damages. In this regard, the
Tribe alleged that by acting beyond the scope of their juris-
diction and “without authorization of law” in executing the
warrant,3 the defendants violated the Tribe’s and Corpora-
tion’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the
Tribe’s right to self-government. App. 109, ¶ 38; see id., at
108–110, ¶¶ 33–39.
2 At oral argument, the County defended this refusal by asserting that
federal law prohibited it from releasing the relevant pages of the employ-
ees’ welfare applications. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–5. But the United
States assured the Court that “[t]here is no Federal regulation or other
Federal requirement” that would have prevented the County from sharing
the relevant information with the Tribe. Id., at 21. This entire contro-
versy, it thus appears, might have been avoided had the county officials
understood that federal law allowed the accommodation sought by the
Tribe.
3 The Tribe did not dispute the State’s authority over the crimes under
investigation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29.

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On November 22, 2000, the District Court, on defendants’
motion, dismissed the Tribe’s complaint. Tribal sovereign
immunity, the court held, did not categorically preclude the
search and seizure of the Casino’s personnel records. Tak-
ing into account the competing interests of the State and the
Tribe, the court concluded that, “[i]n the interest of a fair and
uniform application of California’s criminal law, state officials
should be able to execute search warrant[s] against the tribe
and tribal property.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court
also held that the District Attorney and the Sheriff had qual-
ified immunity from suit in their individual capacities. Id.,
at 57a–58a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the
District Court’s judgment dismissing the action. “[E]xecu-
tion of a search warrant against the Tribe,” the Court of
Appeals said, “interferes with ‘the right of reservation Indi-
ans to make their own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” 291
F. 3d, at 558 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220
(1959)). In the appellate court’s view, the District Court
should not have “balanced the interests at stake” to deter-
mine whether the warrant was enforceable. 291 F. 3d, at
559. This Court’s precedent, the Ninth Circuit said, ad-
vanced “a more categorical approach denying state jurisdic-
tion . . . over a tribe absent a waiver by the tribe or a clear
grant of authority by Congress.” Ibid. (citing Oklahoma
Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995)).
“[E]ven if a balancing test is the appropriate legal frame-
work,” the Court of Appeals added, “the balance of interests
favors a ruling for the Tribe.” 291 F. 3d, at 559. The
Tribe’s privacy policies regarding employee records “pro-
mote tribal [self-government] interests,” the Ninth Circuit
reasoned; notably, those policies fostered “a trusting rela-
tionship with tribal members,” and “affect[ed] the Casino,
the Tribe’s predominant source of economic development
revenue.” Ibid. The appeals court recognized the State’s
countervailing “interest in investigating potential welfare

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fraud,” but thought it incumbent upon the State to further
that interest “through far less intrusive means.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the District Attorney
and the Sheriff were not shielded by qualified immunity.
“[A] reasonable county officer,” it held, “would have known
. . . that seizing tribal property held on tribal land violated
the Fourth Amendment because the property and land were
outside the officer’s jurisdiction.” Id., at 568. The appeals
court acknowledged prior Ninth Circuit precedent holding
that the right to tribal self-government is not protected by
§ 1983. Id., at 568, n. 7 (citing Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins,
881 F. 2d 657 (1989)); see Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 29, n. 15. But in this case, the Court of Appeals
concluded, a § 1983 claim could be maintained because the
Tribe sought “protection from an unlawful search and sei-
zure,” a right secured by the Fourth Amendment and there-
fore within § 1983’s compass. 291 F. 3d, at 568, and n. 7.
On December 2, 2002, we granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1043.
II
Central to our review is the question whether the Tribe’s
complaint is actionable under § 1983. That provision per-
mits “citizen[s]” and “other person[s] within the jurisdiction”
of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from
“person[s]” who, under color of state law, deprive them of
federally protected rights.4 In Will v. Michigan Dept. of
State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), this Court held that a State
is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. “[I]n enact-
4 The relevant portion of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 reads: “Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.”

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ing § 1983,” the Court said, “Congress did not intend to over-
ride well-established immunities or defenses under the com-
mon law,” including “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity.”
Id., at 67. Although this case does not squarely present the
question, the parties agree, and we will assume for purposes
of this opinion, that Native American tribes, like States of
the Union, are not subject to suit under § 1983. See Brief
for Petitioners 35–38; Tr. of Oral Arg. 49; Kiowa Tribe of
Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 754
(1998) (“an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Con-
gress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity”).
The issue pivotal here is whether a tribe qualifies as a
claimant—a “person within the jurisdiction” of the United
States—under § 1983.5 The United States maintains it does
not, invoking the Court’s “longstanding interpretive pre-
sumption that ‘person’ does not include the sovereign,” a pre-
sumption that “may be disregarded only upon some affirma-
tive showing of statutory intent to the contrary.” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 7–8 (quoting Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Ste-
vens, 529 U. S. 765, 780–781 (2000)); see Will, 491 U. S., at 64.
Nothing in the text, purpose, or history of § 1983, the Gov-
ernment contends, overcomes the interpretive presumption
5 Courts of Appeals have expressed divergent views on this question.
See Native Village of Venetie IRA Council v. Alaska, 155 F. 3d 1150,
1152, n. 1 (CA9 1998) (concluding that Tribes are persons entitled to sue
under § 1983); American Vantage Co. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292
F. 3d 1091, 1097, n. 4 (CA9 2002) (“[I]t is doubtful whether [a] Tribe qua
sovereign would qualify as a ‘citizen of the United States or other person’
eligible to bring an action under § 1983.” (quoting White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Williams, 810 F. 2d 844, 865, n. 16 (CA9 1987) (Fletcher, J., dis-
senting))); cf. Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F. 3d 474, 477 (CA7 1998) (stating in
dictum that “a state is not a ‘person’ under [§ 1983]”); Pennsylvania v.
Porter, 659 F. 2d 306, 314–318 (CA3 1981) (en banc) (holding that a State
may bring a § 1983 action in a parens patriae capacity).

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Opinion of the Court
that “ ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 7–8 (some internal quota-
tion marks omitted). Furthermore, the Government urges,
given the Court’s decision that “person” excludes sovereigns
as defendants under § 1983, it would be anomalous for the
Court to give the same word a different meaning when it
appears later in the same sentence. Id., at 8; see Brown v.
Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (the “presumption that a
given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a
statute” is “surely at its most vigorous when a term is re-
peated within a given sentence”); cf. Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 397 (1978) (because munici-
palities are “persons” entitled to sue under the antitrust
laws, they are also, in principle, “persons” capable of being
sued under those laws).
The Tribe responds that Congress intended § 1983 “to pro-
vide a powerful civil remedy ‘against all forms of official vio-
lation of federally protected rights.’ ” Brief for Respond-
ents 45 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700–701 (1978)). To achieve that reme-
dial purpose, the Tribe maintains, § 1983 should be “broadly
construed.” Brief for Respondents 45 (citing Monell, 436
U. S., at 684–685 (internal quotation marks omitted)). In-
dian tribes, the Tribe here asserts, “have been especially vul-
nerable to infringement of their federally protected rights
by states.” Brief for Respondents 42 (citing, inter alia, The
Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867) (state taxation of tribal
lands); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians,
526 U. S. 172 (1999) (state infringement on tribal rights to
hunt, fish, and gather on ceded lands); Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U. S. 30 (1989) (tribal ju-
risdiction over Indian child custody proceedings); California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U. S. 202 (1987)
(state attempt to regulate gambling on tribal land)). To
guard against such infringements, the Tribe contends, the

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Court should read § 1983 to encompass suits brought by In-
dian tribes.
As we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of a
sovereign as a “person” who may maintain a particular claim
for relief depends not “upon a bare analysis of the word ‘per-
son,’ ” Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U. S. 308, 317
(1978), but on the “legislative environment” in which the
word appears, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 161 (1942).
Thus, in Georgia, the Court held that a State, as purchaser
of asphalt shipped in interstate commerce, qualified as a
“person” entitled to seek redress under the Sherman Act for
restraint of trade. Id., at 160–163. Similarly, in Pfizer, the
Court held that a foreign nation, as purchaser of antibiotics,
ranked as a “person” qualified to sue pharmaceuticals manu-
facturers under our antitrust laws. 434 U. S., at 309–320;
cf. Stevens, 529 U. S., at 787, and n. 18 (deciding States are
not “person[s]” subject to qui tam liability under the False
Claims Act, but leaving open the question whether they “can
be ‘persons’ for purposes of commencing an FCA qui tam
action” (emphasis deleted)); United States v. Cleveland Indi-
ans Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001) (“Although we
generally presume that identical words used in different
parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,
the presumption is not rigid, and the meaning of the same
words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law.” (inter-
nal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted)).
There is in this case no allegation that the County lacked
probable cause or that the warrant was otherwise defective.
It is only by virtue of the Tribe’s asserted “sovereign” status
that it claims immunity from the County’s processes. See
App. 97–105, ¶¶ 1–25, 108–110, ¶¶ 33–39; 291 F. 3d, at 554
(Court of Appeals “find[s] that the County and its agents vio-
lated the Tribe’s sovereign immunity when they obtained
and executed a search warrant against the Tribe and tribal

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property.” (emphasis added)). Section 1983 was designed to
secure private rights against government encroachment, see
Will, 491 U. S., at 66, not to advance a sovereign’s preroga-
tive to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion. For example, as the County acknowledges, a tribal
member complaining of a Fourth Amendment violation
would be a “person” qualified to sue under § 1983. See Brief
for Petitioners 20, n. 7. But, like other private persons, that
member would have no right to immunity from an appropri-
ately executed search warrant based on probable cause. Ac-
cordingly, we hold that the Tribe may not sue under § 1983
to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.6
III
In addition to § 1983, the Tribe asserted as law under
which its claims arise the “federal common law of Indian
affairs.” Supra, at 706 (quoting App. 97, ¶ 1). But the
Tribe has not explained, and neither the District Court nor
the Court of Appeals appears to have carefully considered,
what prescription of federal common law enables a tribe to
maintain an action for declaratory and injunctive relief es-
tablishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal
processes. In short, absent § 1983 as a foundation for the
Tribe’s action, it is unclear what federal law, if any, the
Tribe’s case “aris[es] under.” 28 U. S. C. § 1331. We there-
fore remand for focused consideration and resolution of that
jurisdictional question.
* * *
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
6 It hardly “demean[s] . . . Native American tribes,” see post, at 713
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in our view, to bracket them with
States of the Union in this regard.

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
In my judgment a Native American tribe is a “person”
who may sue under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The Tribe’s com-
plaint, however, does not state a cause of action under § 1983
because the county’s alleged infringement of the Tribe’s sov-
ereign prerogatives did not deprive the Tribe of “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws” within the meaning of § 1983. At bottom, rather than
relying on an Act of Congress or a provision of the Constitu-
tion, the Tribe’s complaint rests on the judge-made doctrine
of tribal immunity—a doctrine that “developed almost by
accident.” Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technol-
ogies, Inc., 523 U. S. 751, 756 (1998). Because many applica-
tions of that doctrine are both anomalous and unjust, see id.,
at 760, 764–766 (Stevens, J., dissenting), I would not accord
it the same status as the “laws” referenced in § 1983.
It is demeaning to Native American tribes to deny them
the same access to a § 1983 remedy that is available to any
other person whose constitutional rights are violated by per-
sons acting under color of state law. The text of § 1983—
which provides that § 1983 defendants are “person[s] who,
under color of [State law,]” subject any “other person” to a
deprivation of a federal right—adequately explains why a
tribe is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. For tribes
generally do not act under color of state law. But that text
sheds no light on the question whether the tribe is an “other
person” who may bring a § 1983 suit when the tribe is the
victim of a constitutional violation. The ordinary meaning
of the word “person” as used in federal statutes,1 as well as
the specific remedial purpose of § 1983, support the conclu-
1 The Dictionary Act, which was passed just two months before § 1983
and was designed to supply rules of construction for all legislation, pro-
vided that “the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic
and corporate . . . .” Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.

538US2 Unit: $U54 [10-27-04 16:21:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN
714 INYO COUNTY v. PAIUTE-SHOSHONE INDIANS OF
BISHOP COMMUNITY OF BISHOP COLONY
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
sion that a tribe should be able to invoke the protections of
the statute if its constitutional rights are violated.2
In this case, however, the Tribe’s allegations do not state
a cause of action under § 1983. The execution of the warrant
challenged in this case would unquestionably have been law-
ful if the casino had been the property of an ordinary com-
mercial corporation. See ante, at 711 (“There is in this case
no allegation that the County lacked probable cause or that
the warrant was otherwise defective”). Thus, the Tribe
rests its case entirely on its claim that, as a sovereign, it
should be accorded a special immunity that private casinos
do not enjoy. See ibid. That sort of claim to special privi-
leges, which is based entirely on the Tribe’s sovereign status,
is not one for which the § 1983 remedy was enacted.
Accordingly, while I agree with the Court that the judg-
ment should be set aside, I do not join the Court’s opinion.
2 Our holding in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65
(1989), that a State is not a “person” within § 1983 is fully consistent with
this view. Will rested on “the ordinary rule of statutory construction
that if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between
the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do
so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’ Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984).” Ibid.