CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. DAVID

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Syllabus
CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. DAVID
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 02–1212. Decided May 19, 2003
Respondent David paid petitioner Los Angeles $134.50 to recover his car,
which had been towed from a spot where parking was prohibited, and
requested a hearing to recover the money. The hearing was held 27
days after the car was towed and his claim was denied. He then filed
a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit, claiming that the city violated his due process
rights by failing to provide a sufficiently prompt hearing. The District
Court granted the city summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the Constitution required the city to provide an
earlier hearing, perhaps within 48 hours of towing and at least within
5 days.
Held: The Due Process Clause does not prohibit an agency from imposing
the kind of procedural delay experienced here when holding hearings
to consider claims such as David’s. The three factors that normally
determine whether an individual has received the “process” that the
Constitution finds “due”—which were set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U. S. 319, 335, and applied in FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U. S. 230, 242—
require reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The first factor—the
“private interest” affected by the official action—is a monetary interest
that does not work the far more serious harm caused by the temporary
deprivation of a job that was at issue in Mallen. The second factor—
concern for accuracy—also does not support the Ninth Circuit’s conclu-
sion. A 30-day delay in presenting evidence is unlikely to spawn sig-
nificant factual errors, and the nature of the issue—whether a car is
illegally parked—indicates that initial towing errors are unlikely. The
third factor—the government’s interest—argues strongly in the city’s
favor. Only five percent of the 1,000 impound hearings the city holds
annually are conducted within 48 hours, and those involve persons who
cannot afford the impoundment fees. The delay is substantially re-
quired by administrative needs related to organizing the hearing, e. g.,
arranging for the towing officer to appear. Requiring the city to hold
1,000 hearings, rather than 50, within a short time period would prove
burdensome.
Certiorari granted; 307 F. 3d 1143, reversed.

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716 LOS ANGELES v. DAVID
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
On August 13, 1998, an officer of the city of Los Angeles
Department of Transportation ordered respondent Edwin
David’s automobile towed from a spot where parking was
forbidden. After paying $134.50, David recovered his car.
David, believing that the trees obstructed his view of the
“no parking” sign, requested a hearing to recover the money.
On September 9, 1998—27 days after the vehicle was
towed—the city held the hearing and denied David’s claim.
David then brought this lawsuit in Federal District Court
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, arguing that the
city, in failing to provide a sufficiently prompt hearing, had
violated his federal right to “due process of law.” Amdt. 14,
§ 1. The District Court granted summary judgment for the
city. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a vote
of 2 to 1, reversed, holding that the Constitution required the
city to provide an earlier payment-recovery hearing, perhaps
within 48 hours of the towing and at least within 5 days.
307 F. 3d 1143, 1147 (2002). The city, seeking certiorari
here, argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding runs contrary
to well-settled principles of constitutional law. We agree.
We grant the writ and summarily reverse the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s judgment.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), the
Court set forth three factors that normally determine
whether an individual has received the “process” that the
Constitution finds “due”:
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”

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Per Curiam
By weighing these concerns, courts can determine whether
a State has met the “fundamental requirement of due proc-
ess”—“the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.’ ” Id., at 333.
In FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U. S. 230, 242 (1988), the Court
considered circumstances in which “impairment of an indi-
vidual’s property is not preceded by any opportunity for a
pre-deprivation hearing.” A Government agency had sus-
pended an indicted bank employee from his job. A statute
required the agency to provide a postdeprivation hearing
within 30 days and to issue a decision within 60 days of that
hearing. The bank employee claimed that the 30- or 90-day
delay between (a) the suspension and (b) the postsuspension
hearing and decision violated the Due Process Clause. The
Court recognized that there “is a point at which an un-
justified delay in completing a post-deprivation proceeding
‘would become a constitutional violation.’ ” Ibid. It ap-
plied Eldridge-type factors to determine whether that point
had been reached. 486 U. S., at 242 (assessing the impor-
tance of, and harm to, the private interest, the likelihood of
interim error, and the governmental interest in a delay).
And it concluded that a 30-day delay of the hearing, and a
potential 90-day delay of a decision, did not violate the Con-
stitution. Id., at 243.
Eldridge, as applied in Mallen, requires reversal of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. The first Eldridge factor, the
“private interest,” is a monetary interest here. It consists
of the private individual’s interest in maintaining the use of
money between (a) the time of paying the impoundment and
towing fees and (b) the time of the hearing. The temporary
deprivation of a job, the “private interest” at issue in Mallen,
typically works a far more serious harm. Cf. Eldridge,
supra, at 340 (distinguishing in this respect between bene-
fits “not based upon financial need” and welfare assistance
“given to persons on the very margin of subsistence”). So
does a temporary deprivation of the use of the automobile

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718 LOS ANGELES v. DAVID
Per Curiam
itself—the relevant deprivation at issue in the lower court
cases to which the Ninth Circuit looked for support. See
Stypmann v. San Francisco, 557 F. 2d 1338, 1342–1344 (CA9
1977). Cf. Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc., 682 F. 2d
1320, 1324 (CA9 1982). Indeed, the city indicates that any
loss in the time value of the money can be compensated by
an interest payment. Pet. for Cert. 7.
The second Eldridge factor—concern for accuracy—does
not support the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion. A 30-day delay
in presenting evidence is unlikely to spawn significant factual
errors. Administrative and judicial proceedings normally
take place after considerably more time has elapsed. And
the straightforward nature of the issue—whether the car
was illegally parked—indicates that initial towing errors,
while they may occur, are unlikely. Cf. Mallen, supra, at
244–245 (finding “little likelihood that the deprivation is
without basis” in light of the grand jury indictment).
The third Eldridge factor—the “Government’s interest”—
argues strongly in the city’s favor. The nature of the city’s
interest in delay is one of administrative necessity. The city
points out that it “conducts more than a thousand vehicle
impound hearings annually.” Pet. for Cert. 8. It holds
about five percent of these hearings—those involving indi-
viduals who are unable to afford the impoundment fees—
within 48 hours. Ibid. It “takes time to organize hearings:
there are only so many courtrooms and presiding officials;
the city has to contact the towing officer and arrange for his
appearance; the city may have to find a substitute to cover
that officer’s responsibilities while he attends the hearing.”
307 F. 3d, at 1149 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). And the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, which presumably would require the city
to schedule annually 1,000 or more hearings, instead of 50
hearings, within a 48-hour (or 5-day) time limit, will prove
burdensome. The administrative resources available to
modern police departments are not limitless. The adminis-
trative necessity supporting the delay here is no less sub-

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stantial than the governmental interest in the 30-day hear-
ing delay in Mallen, namely, the need to protect the integrity
of the banking system and to prepare thoroughly for the
hearing. Mallen, supra, at 244. We also add that the rea-
son for denying a predeprivation hearing here—such a hear-
ing is impossible if the city is to be able to enforce the park-
ing rules—is not any less important than in Mallen.
We conclude that the 27-day delay in holding a hearing
here reflects no more than a routine delay substantially re-
quired by administrative needs. Our cases make clear that
the Due Process Clause does not prohibit an agency from
imposing this kind of procedural delay when holding hear-
ings to consider claims of the kind here at issue. The Ninth
Circuit’s judgment to the contrary is reversed.
It is so ordered.