NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSOCIATION v. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.

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803 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSOCIATION v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit
No. 02–196. Argued March 4, 2003—Decided May 27, 2003
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA) establishes rules governing dis-
putes arising out of certain Government contracts. After Congress
enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, estab-
lishing a comprehensive concession management program for national
parks, the National Park Service (NPS) issued implementing regula-
tions including 36 CFR § 51.3, which purports to render the CDA inap-
plicable to concession contracts. Petitioner concessioners’ association
challenged § 51.3’s validity. The District Court upheld the regulation,
concluding that the CDA is ambiguous on whether it applies to conces-
sion contracts and finding NPS’ interpretation reasonable under Chev-
ron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S.
837. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, placing no reliance on
Chevron, but finding NPS’ reading of the CDA consistent with both the
CDA and the 1998 Act.
Held: The controversy is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. Determin-
ing whether administrative action is ripe requires evaluation of (1) the
issues’ fitness for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U. S. 136, 149. Regarding the hardship inquiry, the federal respondents
concede that, because NPS has no delegated rulemaking authority
under the CDA, § 51.3 is not a legislative regulation with the force of
law. And their assertion that § 51.3 is an interpretative regulation ad-
vising the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules
which it administers is incorrect, as NPS is not empowered to adminis-
ter the CDA. That task rests with agency contracting officers and
boards of contract appeals, as well as the federal courts; and any author-
ity regarding the agency boards’ proper arrangement belongs to the
Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy. Consequently, § 51.3 is
nothing more than a general policy statement designed to inform the
public of NPS’ views on the CDA’s proper application. Thus, § 51.3 does
not create “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind,” which are required
for a hardship showing. Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523
U. S. 726, 733. Moreover, § 51.3 does not affect a concessioner’s primary
conduct, e. g., Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 164,

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804 NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSN. v.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
Opinion of the Court
as it leaves the concessioner free to conduct its business as it sees fit.
Moreover, nothing in the regulation prevents concessioners from follow-
ing the procedures set forth in the CDA once a dispute over a concession
contract actually arises. This Court has previously found that chal-
lenges to regulations similar to § 51.3 were not ripe for lack of a hardship
showing. See, e. g., id., at 161–162. Petitioner’s contention that delay-
ing judicial resolution of the issue will cause real harm because the
CDA’s applicability vel non is a factor taken into account by a conces-
sioner preparing its bids is unpersuasive. Mere uncertainty as to the
validity of a legal rule does not constitute a hardship for purposes of
the ripeness analysis. As to whether the issue here is fit for review,
further factual development would “significantly advance [this Court’s]
ability to deal with the legal issues presented,” Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82, even though
the question is “purely legal” and § 51.3 constitutes “final agency action”
under the Administrative Procedure Act, Abbott Laboratories, supra,
at 149. Judicial resolution of the question presented here should await
a concrete dispute about a particular concession contract. Pp. 807–812.
282 F. 3d 818, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Ste-
vens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 812.
Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined,
post, p. 817.
Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard B. Katskee and David M.
Gossett. Robert R. Gasaway and Ashley C. Parrish filed
briefs for Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, respondent under
this Court’s Rule 12.6, urging reversal.
John P. Elwood argued the cause for the federal respond-
ents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson,
Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor
General Clement, and Barbara C. Biddle.
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, a nonprofit trade association that represents
concessioners doing business in the national parks, chal-
lenges a National Park Service (NPS) regulation that pur-

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ports to render the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 92
Stat. 2383, 41 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., inapplicable to concession
contracts. We conclude that the controversy is not yet ripe
for judicial resolution.
I
The CDA establishes rules governing disputes arising out
of certain Government contracts.1 The statute provides
that these disputes first be submitted to an agency’s con-
tracting officer. § 605. A Government contractor dissatis-
fied with the contracting officer’s decision may seek review
either from the United States Court of Federal Claims or
from an administrative board in the agency. See §§ 606,
607(d), 609(a). Either decision may then be appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.2
See 28 U. S. C. § 1295; 41 U. S. C. § 607(g).
Since 1916 Congress has charged NPS to “promote and
regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national
parks,” “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and the wild life therein,” and “provide for [their]
enjoyment [in a way that] will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.” An Act To establish a
National Park Service, 39 Stat. 535, 16 U. S. C. § 1. To make
visits to national parks more enjoyable for the public, Con-
gress authorized NPS to “grant privileges, leases, and per-
mits for the use of land for the accommodation of visitors.”
1 Title 41 U. S. C. § 602(a) provides:
“Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this chapter applies to
any express or implied contract (including those of the nonappropriated
fund activities described in sections 1346 and 1491 of title 28) entered into
by an executive agency for—
“(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being;
“(2) the procurement of services;
“(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance
of real property; or,
“(4) the disposal of personal property.”
2 The CDA also provides that a prevailing contractor is entitled to pre-
judgment interest. § 611.

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Opinion of the Court
§ 3, 39 Stat. 535. Such “privileges, leases, and permits” have
become embodied in national parks concession contracts.
The specific rules governing national parks concession con-
tracts have changed over time. In 1998, however, Congress
enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of
1998 (1998 Act or Act), Pub. L. 105–391, 112 Stat. 3497 (codi-
fied with certain exceptions in 16 U. S. C. §§ 5951–5966), es-
tablishing a new and comprehensive concession management
program for national parks. The 1998 Act authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to enact regulations implementing
the Act’s provisions, § 5965.
NPS, to which the Secretary has delegated her authority
under the 1998 Act, promptly began a rulemaking proceeding
to implement the Act. After notice and comment, final reg-
ulations were issued in April 2000. 65 Fed. Reg. 20630
(2000) (codified in 36 CFR pt. 51). The regulations define
the term “concession contract” as follows:
“A concession contract (or contract) means a binding
written agreement between the Director and a conces-
sioner . . . . Concession contracts are not contracts
within the meaning of 41 U. S. C. 601 et seq. (the Con-
tract Disputes Act) and are not service or procurement
contracts within the meaning of statutes, regulations or
policies that apply only to federal service contracts or
other types of federal procurement actions.” 3 36 CFR
§ 51.3 (2002).
Through this provision NPS took a position with respect
to a longstanding controversy with the Department of Interi-
or’s Board of Contract Appeals (IBCA). Beginning in 1989,
the IBCA ruled that NPS concession contracts were subject
to the CDA, see R & R Enterprises, 89–2 B. C. A., ¶ 21708,
pp. 109145–109147 (1989), and subsequent attempts by NPS
to convince the IBCA otherwise proved unavailing, National
3 For ease of reference, throughout this opinion we will refer to the sec-
ond sentence quoted in the text as § 51.3.

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Park Concessions, Inc., 94–3 B. C. A., ¶ 27104, pp. 135096–
135098 (1994).
II
Petitioner challenged the validity of § 51.3 in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Amfac Resorts, L. L. C.
v. United States Dept. of Interior, 142 F. Supp. 2d 54, 80–82
(2001). The District Court upheld the regulation, applying
the deference principle of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). The
court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous on whether it
applies to concession contracts and found NPS’ interpreta-
tion of the CDA reasonable. 142 F. Supp. 2d, at 80–82.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed, albeit on different grounds. Amfac Resorts,
L. L. C. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 282 F. 3d 818,
834–835 (2002). Recognizing that NPS “does not administer
the [CDA], and thus may not have interpretative authority
over its provisions,” the court placed no reliance on Chevron
but simply “agree[d]” with NPS’ reading of the CDA, finding
that reading consistent with both the CDA and the 1998 Act.
282 F. 3d, at 835. We granted certiorari to consider whether
the CDA applies to contracts between NPS and concession-
ers in the national parks. 537 U. S. 1018 (2002). Because
petitioner has brought a facial challenge to the regula-
tion and is not litigating any concrete dispute with NPS,
we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on
whether the case is ripe for judicial action. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 62.
III
Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed “to prevent
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

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challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U. S. 136, 148–149 (1967); accord, Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc.
v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 732–733 (1998). The ripeness
doctrine is “drawn both from Article III limitations on judi-
cial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exer-
cise jurisdiction,” Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509
U. S. 43, 57, n. 18 (1993) (citations omitted), but, even in a
case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripe-
ness may be considered on a court’s own motion. Ibid. (cit-
ing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102,
138 (1974)).
Determining whether administrative action is ripe for ju-
dicial review requires us to evaluate (1) the fitness of the
issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories,
supra, at 149. “Absent [a statutory provision providing for
immediate judicial review], a regulation is not ordinarily con-
sidered the type of agency action ‘ripe’ for judicial review
under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] until the
scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manage-
able proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by
some concrete action applying the regulation to the claim-
ant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm
him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule
which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust
his conduct immediately. . . .)” Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990). Under the facts now
before us, we conclude this case is not ripe.
We turn first to the hardship inquiry. The federal re-
spondents concede that, because NPS has no delegated rule-
making authority under the CDA, the challenged portion of
§ 51.3 cannot be a legislative regulation with the force of law.
See Brief for Federal Respondents 15, n. 6; Supplemental
Brief for Federal Respondents 6. They note, though, that
“agencies may issue interpretive rules ‘to advise the public
of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which

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it administers,’ ” Brief for Federal Respondents 15, n. 6
(quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S.
87, 99 (1995) (emphasis added)), and seek to characterize
§ 51.3 as such an interpretive rule.
We disagree. Unlike in Guernsey Memorial Hospital,
where the agency issuing the interpretative guideline was
responsible for administering the relevant statutes and regu-
lations, NPS is not empowered to administer the CDA.
Rather, the task of applying the CDA rests with agency con-
tracting officers and boards of contract appeals, as well
as the Federal Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, and, ultimately, this Court. Moreover,
under the CDA, any authority regarding the proper arrange-
ment of agency boards belongs to the Administrator for Fed-
eral Procurement Policy. See 41 U. S. C. § 607(h) (“Pursuant
to the authority conferred under the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy Act [41 U. S. C. § 401 et seq.], the Adminis-
trator is authorized and directed, as may be necessary or
desirable to carry out the provisions of this chapter, to issue
guidelines with respect to criteria for the establishment,
functions, and procedures of the agency boards . . .”). Con-
sequently, we consider § 51.3 to be nothing more than a “gen-
eral statemen[t] of policy” designed to inform the public
of NPS’ views on the proper application of the CDA. 5
U. S. C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
Viewed in this light, § 51.3 does not create “adverse effects
of a strictly legal kind,” which we have previously required
for a showing of hardship. Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc., 523
U. S., at 733. Just like the Forest Service plan at issue in
Ohio Forestry, § 51.3 “do[es] not command anyone to do any-
thing or to refrain from doing anything; [it] do[es] not grant,
withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or au-
thority; [it] do[es] not subject anyone to any civil or criminal
liability; [and it] create[s] no legal rights or obligations.”
Ibid.

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Moreover, § 51.3 does not affect a concessioner’s primary
conduct. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158,
164 (1967); Ohio Forestry Assn., supra, at 733–734. Unlike
the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, which re-
quired drug manufacturers to change the labels, adver-
tisements, and promotional materials they used in marketing
prescription drugs on pain of criminal and civil penalties,
see 387 U. S., at 152–153, the regulation here leaves a con-
cessioner free to conduct its business as it sees fit. See also
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167, 171 (1967)
(regulations governing conditions for use of color addi-
tives in foods, drugs, and cosmetics were “self-executing”
and had “an immediate and substantial impact upon the
respondents”).
We have previously found that challenges to regulations
similar to § 51.3 were not ripe for lack of a showing of hard-
ship. In Toilet Goods Assn., for example, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) issued a regulation requiring
producers of color additives to provide FDA employees with
access to all manufacturing facilities, processes, and formu-
lae. 387 U. S., at 161–162. We concluded the case was not
ripe for judicial review because the impact of the regulation
could not “be said to be felt immediately by those subject to
it in conducting their day-to-day affairs” and “no irremedia-
bl[y] adverse consequences flow[ed] from requiring a later
challenge.” Id., at 164. Indeed, the FDA regulation was
more onerous than § 51.3 because failure to comply with it
resulted in the suspension of the producer’s certification and,
consequently, could affect production. See id., at 165, and
n. 2. Here, by contrast, concessioners suffer no practical
harm as a result of § 51.3. All the regulation does is an-
nounce the position NPS will take with respect to disputes
arising out of concession contracts. While it informs the
public of NPS’ view that concessioners are not entitled to
take advantage of the provisions of the CDA, nothing in the

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regulation prevents concessioners from following the proce-
dures set forth in the CDA once a dispute over a concession
contract actually arises. And it appears that, notwithstand-
ing § 51.3, the IBCA has been quite willing to apply the CDA
to certain concession contracts. Watch Hill Concessions,
Inc., 01–1 B. C. A., ¶ 31298, pp. 154520–154521 (IBCA 2001)
(concluding that concession contract was subject to the CDA
despite the contrary language in § 51.3).
Petitioner contends that delaying judicial resolution of this
issue will result in real harm because the applicability vel
non of the CDA is one of the factors a concessioner takes into
account when preparing its bid for NPS concession contracts.
See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 4–6. Petitioner’s ar-
gument appears to be that mere uncertainty as to the valid-
ity of a legal rule constitutes a hardship for purposes of the
ripeness analysis. We are not persuaded. If we were to
follow petitioner’s logic, courts would soon be overwhelmed
with requests for what essentially would be advisory opin-
ions because most business transactions could be priced
more accurately if even a small portion of existing legal un-
certainties were resolved.4 In short, petitioner has failed
4 Petitioner notes that its complaint challenged not only the regulation
but also two specific prospectuses issued by NPS in late 2000. Thus, peti-
tioner argues, even if the first challenge is not ripe, the latter two are
reviewable under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(b)(1). See Supple-
mental Brief for Petitioner 6–8. Petitioner did not seek certiorari review
on these issues; accordingly, we decline to consider them. See this Court’s
Rule 14.1(a); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535–536 (1992).
Similarly, Justice Breyer’s reliance on the Tucker Act to show that
the hardship requirement of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S.
136 (1967), has been satisfied, see post, at 820–821 (dissenting opinion), is
misplaced. The fact that one “congressional statute” authorizes “immedi-
ate judicial relief from [certain types of] agency determinations,” post, at
820, says nothing about whether “immediate judicial review” is advisable
for challenges brought against other types of agency actions based on a
different statute.

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
to demonstrate that deferring judicial review will result in
real hardship.
We consider next whether the issue in this case is fit for
review. Although the question presented here is “a purely
legal one” and § 51.3 constitutes “final agency action” within
the meaning of § 10 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704, Abbott Labo-
ratories, supra, at 149, we nevertheless believe that further
factual development would “significantly advance our ability
to deal with the legal issues presented,” Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82
(1978); accord, Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc., 523 U. S., at 736–
737; Toilet Goods Assn., supra, at 163. While the federal
respondents generally argue that NPS was correct to con-
clude that the CDA does not cover concession contracts, they
acknowledge that certain types of concession contracts might
come under the broad language of the CDA. Brief for Fed-
eral Respondents 33–34. Similarly, while petitioner and re-
spondent Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, present a facial
challenge to § 51.3, both rely on specific characteristics of cer-
tain types of concession contracts to support their positions.
See Brief for Petitioner 21–23, 36; Brief for Respondent
Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, 20, 22. In light of the fore-
going, we conclude that judicial resolution of the question
presented here should await a concrete dispute about a par-
ticular concession contract.
* * *
For the reasons stated above, we vacate the judgment of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it addressed the validity of
§ 51.3 and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the
case with respect to this issue.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
Petitioner seeks this Court’s resolution of the straightfor-
ward legal question whether the Contract Disputes Act of

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1978 (CDA), 41 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., applies to concession
contracts with the National Park Service. Though this
question is one that would otherwise be appropriate for this
Court to decide, in my view petitioner has not satisfied
the threshold requirement of alleging sufficient injury to in-
voke federal-court jurisdiction. If such allegations of injury
were present, however, this case would not raise any of the
concerns that the ripeness doctrine was designed to avoid.
I
The CDA provides certain significant protections for pri-
vate parties contracting with federal agencies. It author-
izes de novo review of a contractor’s disputed decision, pay-
ment of prejudgment interest if a dispute with the agency is
resolved in the contractor’s favor, and expedited procedures
for resolving minor disputes. §§ 607–612. The value to
contractors of these protections has not been quantified in
this case, but the protections are unquestionably significant.
Ever since the enactment of the CDA in 1978, the National
Park Service has insisted that the statute does not apply
to contracts with concessionaires who operate restaurants,
lodges, and gift shops in the national parks. See, e. g., Lodg-
ing of Federal Respondents 1. In its view, the statute ap-
plies to Government contracts involving the procurement of
goods or services that the Government agrees to pay for, not
to licenses issued by the Government to concessionaires who
sell goods and services to the public. After the enactment
of the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, 16
U. S. C. §§ 5951–5966, the Park Service issued a regulation
restating that position. 36 CFR § 51.3 (2002). There is
nothing tentative or inconclusive about the agency’s position.
The promulgation of the regulation indicated that the agency
had determined that a clear statement of its interpretation
of the CDA would be useful to potential concessionaires bid-
ding for future contracts. Under the Park Service’s view,

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nearly 600 concession contracts in 131 national parks fall out-
side of the CDA. Lodging of Federal Respondents 6.
Petitioner is a trade association whose members are par-
ties to such contracts and periodically enter into negotiations
for future contracts. They are undisputedly interested in
knowing whether disputes that are sure to arise under some
of those contracts will be resolved pursuant to the CDA pro-
cedures or the less favorable procedures that will apply if
the Park Service regulation is valid.
II
In our leading case discussing the “ripeness doctrine” we
explained that the question whether a controversy is “ripe”
for judicial resolution has a “twofold aspect, requiring us to
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision
and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consid-
eration.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136,
148–149 (1967). Both aspects of the inquiry involve the ex-
ercise of judgment, rather than the application of a black-
letter rule.
The first aspect is the more important and it is satisfied in
this case. The CDA applies to any express or implied con-
tract for the procurement of property, services, or construc-
tion. 41 U. S. C. § 602(a). In the view of the Park Service,
a procurement contract is one that obligates the Government
to pay for goods and services that it receives, whereas con-
cession contracts authorize third parties to provide services
to park area visitors. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues
that the contracts provide for the performance of services
that discharge a public duty even though the Government
does not pay the concessionaires. Whichever view may bet-
ter reflect the intent of the Congress that enacted the CDA,
it is perfectly clear that this question of statutory interpreta-
tion is as “fit” for judicial decision today as it will ever be.
Even if there may be a few marginal cases in which the appli-
cability of the CDA may depend on unique facts, the regula-

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tion’s blanket exclusion of concession contracts is either a
correct or an incorrect interpretation of the statute. The
issue has been fully briefed and argued and, in my judgment,
is ripe for decision.
The second aspect of the ripeness inquiry is less clear and
less important. If there were reason to believe that further
development of the facts would clarify the legal question, or
that the agency’s view was tentative or apt to be modified,
only a strong showing of hardship to the parties would jus-
tify a prompt decision. In this case, it is probably correct
that the hardship associated with a delayed decision is mini-
mal. On the other hand, as the Park Service’s decision to
promulgate the regulation demonstrates, eliminating the
present uncertainty about the applicable dispute resolution
procedures will provide a benefit for all interested parties.
If petitioner had alleged sufficient injury arising from the
Park Service’s position, I would favor the exercise of our
discretion to consider the case ripe for decision. Because
such an allegation of injury is absent, however, petitioner
does not have standing to have this claim adjudicated.
III
To establish an Article III case or controversy, a litigant
must establish that he has “standing.” Whitmore v. Arkan-
sas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). To have standing, a “plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defend-
ant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed
by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751
(1984). This requirement specifically applies to parties chal-
lenging the validity of administrative regulations. See Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735 (1972).
In the complaint filed in the District Court, petitioner al-
leged that the resolution of the merits of its dispute over the
validity of the Park Service regulation was important, but it
failed to allege that the existence of the regulation had
caused any injury to it or to its members:

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Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
“The applicability of the CDA to concession contracts
is important to concessioners because NPS concession
contracts are of lengthy duration, often require signifi-
cant upfront financial commitments, and by their terms
provide the agency with broad unilateral discretion to
alter many aspects of those contracts over time. The
unlawful decision by the NPS to exempt itself from the
CDA is thus of great importance to the contract solicita-
tion process.” App. 22.
At oral argument, counsel reiterated that the resolution of
this question was “important” and that concessionaires
“need to know now, in terms of deciding whether to bid on
certain contracts, what their rights are under those con-
tracts.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–8. After argument, when asked
to brief the issue of ripeness, petitioner stated that its mem-
bers “need to know before a dispute arises—and in fact, be-
fore deciding whether to bid on a concessions contract—what
procedural mechanisms will apply to contractual disputes,”
and that “the prices at which concessioners ‘compete for
Government contract business’ would be directly affected.”
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 1, 5 (citations omitted). It
is fair to infer from the record before us, however, that peti-
tioner’s members have bid on, and been awarded, numerous
contracts without having the benefit of a definitive answer
to the important legal question that their complaint has
identified.
Neither in its complaint in the District Court nor in its
briefing or argument before this Court has petitioner identi-
fied a specific incident in which the Park Service’s regulation
caused a concessionaire to refuse to bid on a contract, to mod-
ify its bid, or to suffer any other specific injury. Rather,
petitioner has focused entirely on the importance of knowing
whether the Park Service’s position is valid. While it is no
doubt important for petitioner and its members to know as
much as possible about the future of their business trans-
actions, importance does not necessarily establish injury.

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817 Cite as: 538 U. S. 803 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
Though some of petitioner’s members may well have suffered
some sort of injury from the Park Service’s regulation, nei-
ther the allegations of the complaint nor the evidence in the
record identifies any specific injury that would be redressed
by a favorable decision on the merits of the case. Accord-
ingly, petitioner has no standing to pursue its claim.
For this reason, I concur in the Court’s judgment.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,
dissenting.
Like the majority, I believe that petitioner National Park
Hospitality Association has standing here to pursue its legal
claim, namely, that the dispute resolution procedures set
forth in the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U. S. C.
§ 601 et seq., apply to national park concession contracts.
But, unlike the majority, I believe that the question is ripe
for our consideration.
I cannot agree with Justice Stevens that petitioner
lacks Article III standing to bring suit on behalf of its mem-
bers. See ante, at 815–816 and this page (opinion concur-
ring in judgment). In my view, the National Park Service’s
definition of “concession contract” to exclude the CDA’s pro-
tections (a definition embodied in the regulation about which
petitioner complains, see 36 CFR § 51.3 (2002)) causes peti-
tioner and its members “injury in fact.” Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (discussing require-
ments of “injury in fact,” causation, and redressability); see
also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n,
432 U. S. 333, 343 (1977) (association’s standing based on in-
jury to a member).
For one thing, many of petitioner’s members are parties
to, as well as potential bidders for, park concession contracts.
Lodging for Federal Respondents 6 (listing 590 concession
contracts in 131 parks). Those members will likely find that
disputes arise under the contracts. And in resolving such
disputes, the Park Service, following its regulation, will re-

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818 NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSN. v.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
Breyer, J., dissenting
ject the concessioners’ entitlement to the significant protec-
tions or financial advantages that the CDA provides. See
41 U. S. C. §§ 605–612; ante, at 813–814 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in judgment). In the circumstances present here, that
kind of injury, though a future one, is concrete and likely
to occur.
For another thing, the challenged Park Service interpreta-
tion causes a present injury. If the CDA does not apply
to concession contract disagreements, as the Park Service
regulation declares, then some of petitioner’s members must
plan now for higher contract implementation costs. Given
the agency’s regulation, bidders will likely be forced to pay
more to obtain, or to retain, a concession contract than they
believe the contract is worth. That is what petitioner ar-
gues. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 4–6. See also
App. to Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 3a–4a. Certain
general allegations in the underlying complaints support this
claim. See, e. g., App. 20–22, ¶¶ 35, 61–67; Amfac Resorts,
L. L. C. Complaint in No. 1:00CV02838 (DC), pp. 4–5, ¶ 8
(available in Clerk of Court’s case file); id., at 31–33, ¶¶ 102–
111. Cf. Amfac Resorts, L. L. C. v. United States Dept. of
Interior, 282 F. 3d 818, 830 (CADC 2002). And several un-
contested circumstances indicate that such allegations are
likely to prove true.
First, as the record makes clear, petitioner has a wide-
spread membership, and many of its members regularly bid
on contracts that, through cross-references to the Park Serv-
ice regulation, embody the Park Service’s interpretation.
See, e. g., App. 69, 80; Lodging for Federal Respondents 14,
25. See also Standard Concession Contract, 65 Fed. Reg.
26052, 26063, 26065 (2000); Simplified Concession Contracts,
id., at 44898, 44899–44900, 44910, 44912. Second, related
contract solicitations are similarly widespread and recurring,
involving numerous bidders. Third, after investigation, the
relevant congressional committee found that the “way poten-
tial contractors view the disputes-resolving system influ-

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819 Cite as: 538 U. S. 803 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
ences how, whether, and at what prices they compete for
government contract business.” S. Rep. No. 95–1118, p. 4
(1978). Fourth, the CDA provides a prevailing contractor
with prejudgment interest, and authorizes expedited proce-
dures. 41 U. S. C. §§ 607(f), 608, 611. These are factors
that make the inapplicability of the CDA more costly to suc-
cessful bidders. See S. Rep. No. 95–1118, at 2–4; ante, at
813–814 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
These circumstances make clear that petitioner’s members
will likely suffer a concrete monetary harm, either now or in
the foreseeable future. Such a showing here is sufficient
to satisfy the Constitution’s standing requirements. And
the threatened injuries, present and future—monetary
harm, injuries to a potential or actual contractual relation-
ship, and injuries that arguably fall within the CDA’s protec-
tive scope—are sufficient to satisfy “prudential” standing
requirements as well. Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins,
524 U. S. 11, 19–20 (1998); Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153
(1970). Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United
States, 316 U. S. 407, 421–422 (1942).
Given this threat of immediate concrete harm (primarily
in the form of increased bidding costs), this case is also ripe
for judicial review. As Justice Stevens explains in Parts
I and II of his opinion, the case now presents a legal issue—
the applicability of the CDA to concession contracts—that is
fit for judicial determination. That issue is a purely legal
one, demanding for its resolution only use of ordinary judicial
interpretive techniques. See ante, at 814–815 (opinion con-
curring in judgment). The relevant administrative action,
i. e., the agency’s definition of “concession contract” under
the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998, 16
U. S. C. §§ 5951–5966, has been “formalized,” Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148 (1967). It is embodied
in an interpretive regulation issued after notice and public
comment and pursuant to the Department of the Interior’s

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820 NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSN. v.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
Breyer, J., dissenting
formal delegation to the National Park Service of its own
statutorily granted rulemaking authority, § 5965; ante, at
806–807. (Unlike the majority, I would apply to the regula-
tion the legal label “interpretive rule,” not “general state-
ment of policy,” ante, at 809 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted), though I agree with the majority that,
because the Park Service does not administer the CDA, see
ibid., we owe its conclusion less deference.) The Park Serv-
ice’s interpretation is definite and conclusive, not tentative or
likely to change; as the majority concedes, the Park Service’s
determination constitutes “final agency action” within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. Ante, at 812
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The only open question concerns the nature of the harm
that refusing judicial review at this time will cause petition-
er’s members. See Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 149.
The fact that concessioners can raise the legal question at a
later time, after a specific contractual dispute arises, see
ante, at 812, militates against finding this case ripe. So too
does a precedential concern: Will present review set a prece-
dent that leads to premature challenges in other cases where
agency interpretations may be less formal, less final, or less
well suited to immediate judicial determination? See ante,
at 811–812.
But the fact of immediate and particularized (and not to-
tally reparable) injury during the bidding process offsets the
first of these considerations. And the second is more than
offset by a related congressional statute that specifies that
prospective bidders for Government contracts can obtain
immediate judicial relief from agency determinations that
unlawfully threaten precisely this kind of harm. See 28
U. S. C. § 1491(b)(1) (allowing prospective bidder to object,
for instance, to “solicitation by a Federal agency for bids . . .
for a proposed contract” and permitting review of related
allegation of “any . . . violation of statute or regulation in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement”).

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821 Cite as: 538 U. S. 803 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
See also R. Nash, S. Schooner, & K. O’Brien, The Govern-
ment Contracts Reference Book 308, 423 (2d ed. 1998). This
statute authorizes a potential bidder to complain of a pro-
posed contractual term that, in the bidder’s view, is unlawful,
say, because it formally incorporates a regulation that em-
bodies a specific, allegedly unlawful, remedial requirement.
Cf. App. 25, ¶¶ 114–116 (excerpts from petitioner’s complaint
making just this claim); App. to Supplemental Brief for Peti-
tioner 2a, ¶¶ 121–122 (same). That being so, i. e., the pres-
ent injury in such a case being identical to the present injury
at issue here, I can find no convincing prudential reason to
withhold Administrative Procedure Act review.
In sum, given this congressional policy, the concrete na-
ture of the injury asserted by petitioner, and the final nature
of the agency action at issue, I see no good reason to post-
pone review. I would find the issue ripe for this Court’s
consideration. And I would affirm the decision of the Court
of Appeals on the merits, primarily for the reasons set forth
in its opinion as supplemented here by the Government.