DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP. et al.

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23 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORP. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–428. Argued April 2, 2003—Decided June 2, 2003
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s World War II book, Crusade in Europe,
was published by Doubleday, which registered the work’s copyright and
granted exclusive television rights to an affiliate of respondent Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corporation (Fox). Fox, in turn, arranged for
Time, Inc., to produce a Crusade in Europe television series based on
the book, and Time assigned its copyright in the series to Fox. The
series was first broadcast in 1949. In 1975, Doubleday renewed the
book’s copyright, but Fox never renewed the copyright on the television
series, which expired in 1977, leaving the series in the public domain.
In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in the book, including the
exclusive right to distribute the Crusade television series on video and
to sublicense others to do so. Respondents SFM Entertainment and
New Line Home Video, Inc., acquired from Fox the exclusive rights
to manufacture and distribute Crusade on video. In 1995, petitioner
Dastar released a video set, World War II Campaigns in Europe, which
it made from tapes of the original version of the Crusade television
series and sold as its own product for substantially less than New Line’s
video set. Fox, SFM, and New Line brought this action alleging, inter
alia, that Dastar’s sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Cru-
sade television series constitutes “reverse passing off ” in violation of
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The District Court granted respondents
summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, hold-
ing, among other things, that because Dastar copied substantially the
entire Crusade series, labeled the resulting product with a different
name, and marketed it without attribution to Fox, Dastar had com-
mitted a “bodily appropriation” of Fox’s series, which was sufficient to
establish the reverse passing off.
Held: Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent the unaccredited
copying of an uncopyrighted work. Pp. 28–38.
(a) Respondents’ claim that Dastar has made a “false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading rep-
resentation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the
origin . . . of [its] goods” in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1125(a), would undoubtedly be sustained if Dastar had bought

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24 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORP.
Syllabus
some of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged them
as its own. However, Dastar has instead taken a creative work in the
public domain, copied it, made modifications (arguably minor), and
produced its very own series of videotapes. If “origin” refers only to
the manufacturer or producer of the physical “good” that is made avail-
able to the public (here, the videotapes), Dastar was the origin. If,
however, “origin” includes the creator of the underlying work that
Dastar copied, then someone else (perhaps Fox) was the origin of
Dastar’s product. At bottom, the Court must decide what § 43(a) means
by the “origin” of “goods.” Pp. 28–31.
(b) Because Dastar was the “origin” of the physical products it sold
as its own, respondents cannot prevail on their Lanham Act claim. As
dictionary definitions affirm, the most natural understanding of the “ori-
gin” of “goods”—the source of wares—is the producer of the tangible
product sold in the marketplace, here Dastar’s Campaigns videotape.
The phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act is incapable of connot-
ing the person or entity that originated the ideas that “goods” embody
or contain. The consumer typically does not care about such origina-
tion, and § 43(a) should not be stretched to cover matters that are of no
consequence to purchasers. Although purchasers do care about ideas
or communications contained or embodied in a communicative product
such as a video, giving the Lanham Act special application to such prod-
ucts would cause it to conflict with copyright law, which is precisely
directed to that subject, and which grants the public the right to copy
without attribution once a copyright has expired, e. g., Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230. Recognizing a § 43(a) cause of ac-
tion here would render superfluous the provisions of the Visual Artists
Rights Act that grant an artistic work’s author “the right . . . to claim
authorship,” 17 U. S. C. § 106A(a)(1)(A), but carefully limit and focus
that right, §§ 101, 106A(b), (d)(1), and (e). It would also pose seri-
ous practical problems. Finally, reading § 43(a) as creating a cause
of action for, in effect, plagiarism would be hard to reconcile with, e. g.,
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 211.
Pp. 31–38.
34 Fed. Appx. 312, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except Breyer, J., who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
David A. Gerber argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Stewart A. Baker, Bennett Evan
Cooper, and David Nimmer.

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Opinion of the Court
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General
McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Anthony J.
Steinmeyer, and Mark S. Davies.
Dale M. Cendali argued the cause for respondents. With
her on the briefs were Walter E. Dellinger, Pamela A. Har-
ris, Jonathan D. Hacker, Jeremy Maltby, Pammela Quinn,
and Gary D. Roberts.*
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we are asked to decide whether § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), prevents the unaccredited
copying of a work, and if so, whether a court may double a
profit award under § 1117(a), in order to deter future infring-
ing conduct.
I
In 1948, three and a half years after the German surrender
at Reims, General Dwight D. Eisenhower completed Crusade
in Europe, his written account of the allied campaign in Eu-
rope during World War II. Doubleday published the book,
registered it with the Copyright Office in 1948, and granted
exclusive television rights to an affiliate of respondent Twen-
tieth Century Fox Film Corporation (Fox). Fox, in turn, ar-
ranged for Time, Inc., to produce a television series, also
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the International
Trademark Association by Bruce R. Ewing; and for Malla Pollack et al.
by Ms. Pollack, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Association
for Competitive Technology et al. by Paul Bender and Michael R. Klipper;
and for the Directors Guild of America et al. by Richard P. Bress.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property
Law Association by William G. Barber, Louis T. Pirkey, and Ronald E.
Myrick; for the American Library Association et al. by Jonathan Band
and Peter Jaszi; and for Intellectual Property Law Professors by Tyler
T. Ochoa.

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26 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORP.
Opinion of the Court
called Crusade in Europe, based on the book, and Time as-
signed its copyright in the series to Fox. The television se-
ries, consisting of 26 episodes, was first broadcast in 1949.
It combined a soundtrack based on a narration of the book
with film footage from the United States Army, Navy, and
Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War
Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and unidentified
“Newsreel Pool Cameramen.” In 1975, Doubleday renewed
the copyright on the book as the “ ‘proprietor of copyright in
a work made for hire.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a. Fox,
however, did not renew the copyright on the Crusade tele-
vision series, which expired in 1977, leaving the television
series in the public domain.
In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in General
Eisenhower’s book, including the exclusive right to distrib-
ute the Crusade television series on video and to sublicense
others to do so. Respondents SFM Entertainment and New
Line Home Video, Inc., in turn, acquired from Fox the exclu-
sive rights to distribute Crusade on video. SFM obtained
the negatives of the original television series, restored them,
and repackaged the series on videotape; New Line distrib-
uted the videotapes.
Enter petitioner Dastar. In 1995, Dastar decided to ex-
pand its product line from music compact discs to videos.
Anticipating renewed interest in World War II on the 50th
anniversary of the war’s end, Dastar released a video set
entitled World War II Campaigns in Europe. To make Cam-
paigns, Dastar purchased eight beta cam tapes of the origi-
nal version of the Crusade television series, which is in the
public domain, copied them, and then edited the series.
Dastar’s Campaigns series is slightly more than half as long
as the original Crusade television series. Dastar substi-
tuted a new opening sequence, credit page, and final closing
for those of the Crusade television series; inserted new
chapter-title sequences and narrated chapter introductions;
moved the “recap” in the Crusade television series to the

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Opinion of the Court
beginning and retitled it as a “preview”; and removed refer-
ences to and images of the book. Dastar created new pack-
aging for its Campaigns series and (as already noted) a new
title.
Dastar manufactured and sold the Campaigns video set as
its own product. The advertising states: “Produced and
Distributed by: Entertainment D istr ibuting ” (which is
owned by Dastar), and makes no reference to the Cru-
sade television series. Similarly, the screen credits state
“DASTAR CORP presents” and “an ENTERTAINMENT
DISTRIBUTING Production,” and list as executive pro-
ducer, producer, and associate producer employees of
Dastar. Supp. App. 2–3, 30. The Campaigns videos them-
selves also make no reference to the Crusade television se-
ries, New Line’s Crusade videotapes, or the book. Dastar
sells its Campaigns videos to Sam’s Club, Costco, Best Buy,
and other retailers and mail-order companies for $25 per set,
substantially less than New Line’s video set.
In 1998, respondents Fox, SFM, and New Line brought
this action alleging that Dastar’s sale of its Campaigns video
set infringes Doubleday’s copyright in General Eisenhower’s
book and, thus, their exclusive television rights in the book.
Respondents later amended their complaint to add claims
that Dastar’s sale of Campaigns “without proper credit” to
the Crusade television series constitutes “reverse passing
off ” 1 in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat.
441, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a), and in violation of state unfair-
competition law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the District Court found for
respondents on all three counts, id., at 54a–55a, treating its
1 Passing off (or palming off, as it is sometimes called) occurs when
a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s.
See, e. g., O. & W. Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245 F. 609, 621 (CA6 1917).
“Reverse passing off,” as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer
misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his own. See, e. g., Wil-
liams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F. 2d 168, 172 (CA3 1982).

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28 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
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Opinion of the Court
resolution of the Lanham Act claim as controlling on the
state-law unfair-competition claim because “the ultimate test
under both is whether the public is likely to be deceived or
confused,” id., at 54a. The court awarded Dastar’s profits
to respondents and doubled them pursuant to § 35 of the
Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1117(a), to deter future infringing
conduct by petitioner.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
judgment for respondents on the Lanham Act claim, but re-
versed as to the copyright claim and remanded. 34 Fed.
Appx. 312, 316 (2002). (It said nothing with regard to the
state-law claim.) With respect to the Lanham Act claim, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that “Dastar copied substantially
the entire Crusade in Europe series created by Twentieth
Century Fox, labeled the resulting product with a different
name and marketed it without attribution to Fox[, and]
therefore committed a ‘bodily appropriation’ of Fox’s series.”
Id., at 314. It concluded that “Dastar’s ‘bodily appropri-
ation’ of Fox’s original [television] series is sufficient to
establish the reverse passing off.” Ibid.2 The court also
affirmed the District Court’s award under the Lanham Act
of twice Dastar’s profits. We granted certiorari. 537 U. S.
1099 (2003).
II
The Lanham Act was intended to make “actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks,” and “to protect per-
sons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition.”
15 U. S. C. § 1127. While much of the Lanham Act addresses
2 As for the copyright claim, the Ninth Circuit held that the tax treat-
ment General Eisenhower sought for his manuscript of the book created
a triable issue as to whether he intended the book to be a work for hire,
and thus as to whether Doubleday properly renewed the copyright in 1976.
See 34 Fed. Appx., at 314. The copyright issue is still the subject of
litigation, but is not before us. We express no opinion as to whether peti-
tioner’s product would infringe a valid copyright in General Eisenhow-
er’s book.

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Opinion of the Court
the registration, use, and infringement of trademarks and
related marks, § 43(a), 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) is one of the few
provisions that goes beyond trademark protection. As orig-
inally enacted, § 43(a) created a federal remedy against a
person who used in commerce either “a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation” in connec-
tion with “any goods or services.” 60 Stat. 441. As the
Second Circuit accurately observed with regard to the origi-
nal enactment, however—and as remains true after the 1988
revision—§ 43(a) “does not have boundless application as a
remedy for unfair trade practices,” Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v.
Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F. 2d 232, 237 (1974). “[B]ecause
of its inherently limited wording, § 43(a) can never be a fed-
eral ‘codification’ of the overall law of ‘unfair competition,’ ”
4 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 27:7,
p. 27–14 (4th ed. 2002) (McCarthy), but can apply only to
certain unfair trade practices prohibited by its text.
Although a case can be made that a proper reading of
§ 43(a), as originally enacted, would treat the word “origin”
as referring only “to the geographic location in which the
goods originated,” Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
505 U. S. 763, 777 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment),3 the Courts of Appeals considering the issue, begin-
3 In the original provision, the cause of action for false designation of
origin was arguably “available only to a person doing business in the local-
ity falsely indicated as that of origin,” 505 U. S., at 778, n. 3. As adopted
in 1946, § 43(a) provided in full:
“Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any
person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of ori-
gin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be trans-
ported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be trans-
ported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business
in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or the region in which
said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is

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30 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORP.
Opinion of the Court
ning with the Sixth Circuit, unanimously concluded that
it “does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also
to origin of source or manufacture,” Federal-Mogul-Bower
Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F. 2d 405, 408 (1963), thereby
creating a federal cause of action for traditional trademark
infringement of unregistered marks. See 4 McCarthy
§ 27:14; Two Pesos, supra, at 768. Moreover, every Circuit
to consider the issue found § 43(a) broad enough to encom-
pass reverse passing off. See, e. g., Williams v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 691 F. 2d 168, 172 (CA3 1982); Arrow United
Indus., Inc. v. Hugh Richards, Inc., 678 F. 2d 410, 415 (CA2
1982); F. E. L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi-
cago, 214 USPQ 409, 416 (CA7 1982); Smith v. Montoro, 648
F. 2d 602, 603 (CA9 1981); Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v.
Universal Marine Co., 543 F. 2d 1107, 1109 (CA5 1976). The
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 made clear that § 43(a)
covers origin of production as well as geographic origin.4
Its language is amply inclusive, moreover, of reverse passing
off—if indeed it does not implicitly adopt the unanimous
court-of-appeals jurisprudence on that subject. See, e. g.,
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or represen-
tation.” 60 Stat. 441.
4 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act now provides:
“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which—
“(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, serv-
ices, or commercial activities by another person, or
“(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
“shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(1).

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Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F. 2d 958,
963–964, n. 6 (CADC 1990) (Thomas, J.).
Thus, as it comes to us, the gravamen of respondents’ claim
is that, in marketing and selling Campaigns as its own prod-
uct without acknowledging its nearly wholesale reliance on
the Crusade television series, Dastar has made a “false des-
ignation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely
to cause confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of his or her goods.”
§ 43(a). See, e. g., Brief for Respondents 8, 11. That claim
would undoubtedly be sustained if Dastar had bought some
of New Line’s Crusade videotapes and merely repackaged
them as its own. Dastar’s alleged wrongdoing, however, is
vastly different: It took a creative work in the public do-
main—the Crusade television series—copied it, made modi-
fications (arguably minor), and produced its very own series
of videotapes. If “origin” refers only to the manufacturer
or producer of the physical “goods” that are made available
to the public (in this case the videotapes), Dastar was the
origin. If, however, “origin” includes the creator of the un-
derlying work that Dastar copied, then someone else (per-
haps Fox) was the origin of Dastar’s product. At bottom,
we must decide what § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act means
by the “origin” of “goods.”
III
The dictionary definition of “origin” is “[t]he fact or proc-
ess of coming into being from a source,” and “[t]hat from
which anything primarily proceeds; source.” Webster’s
New International Dictionary 1720–1721 (2d ed. 1949). And
the dictionary definition of “goods” (as relevant here) is
“[w]ares; merchandise.” Id., at 1079. We think the most
natural understanding of the “origin” of “goods”—the source
of wares—is the producer of the tangible product sold in the
marketplace, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape
sold by Dastar. The concept might be stretched (as it was

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32 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
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Opinion of the Court
under the original version of § 43(a)) 5 to include not only the
actual producer, but also the trademark owner who commis-
sioned or assumed responsibility for (“stood behind”) produc-
tion of the physical product. But as used in the Lanham
Act, the phrase “origin of goods” is in our view incapable of
connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or
communications that “goods” embody or contain. Such an
extension would not only stretch the text, but it would be
out of accord with the history and purpose of the Lanham
Act and inconsistent with precedent.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits actions like
trademark infringement that deceive consumers and impair a
producer’s goodwill. It forbids, for example, the Coca-Cola
Company’s passing off its product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse
passing off Pepsi-Cola as its product. But the brand-loyal
consumer who prefers the drink that the Coca-Cola Com-
pany or PepsiCo sells, while he believes that that company
produced (or at least stands behind the production of) that
product, surely does not necessarily believe that that com-
pany was the “origin” of the drink in the sense that it was
the very first to devise the formula. The consumer who
buys a branded product does not automatically assume that
the brand-name company is the same entity that came up
with the idea for the product, or designed the product—and
typically does not care whether it is. The words of the Lan-
5 Under the 1946 version of the Act, § 43(a) was read as providing a cause
of action for trademark infringement even where the trademark owner
had not itself produced the goods sold under its mark, but had licensed
others to sell under its name goods produced by them—the typical fran-
chise arrangement. See, e. g., My Pie Int’l, Inc. v. Debould, Inc., 687 F. 2d
919 (CA7 1982). This stretching of the concept “origin of goods” is seem-
ingly no longer needed: The 1988 amendments to § 43(a) now expressly
prohibit the use of any “word, term, name, symbol, or device,” or “false or
misleading description of fact” that is likely to cause confusion as to “affil-
iation, connection, or association . . . with another person,” or as to “spon-
sorship, or approval” of goods. 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).

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ham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are
typically of no consequence to purchasers.
It could be argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser
concern is different for what might be called a communica-
tive product—one that is valued not primarily for its physi-
cal qualities, such as a hammer, but for the intellectual con-
tent that it conveys, such as a book or, as here, a video. The
purchaser of a novel is interested not merely, if at all, in the
identity of the producer of the physical tome (the publisher),
but also, and indeed primarily, in the identity of the creator
of the story it conveys (the author). And the author, of
course, has at least as much interest in avoiding passing off
(or reverse passing off) of his creation as does the publisher.
For such a communicative product (the argument goes) “ori-
gin of goods” in § 43(a) must be deemed to include not merely
the producer of the physical item (the publishing house Far-
rar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer Dastar) but
also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys
(the author Tom Wolfe, or—assertedly—respondents).
The problem with this argument according special treat-
ment to communicative products is that it causes the Lanham
Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which addresses
that subject specifically. The right to copy, and to copy
without attribution, once a copyright has expired, like
“the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried
when patented—passes to the public.” Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964); see also Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 121–122 (1938).
“In general, unless an intellectual property right such as a
patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc., 532 U. S. 23, 29 (2001). The rights of a patentee or
copyright holder are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,”
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S.
141, 150–151 (1989), under which, once the patent or copy-

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34 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
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Opinion of the Court
right monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention
or work at will and without attribution. Thus, in construing
the Lanham Act, we have been “careful to caution against
misuse or over-extension” of trademark and related protec-
tions into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.
TrafFix, 532 U. S., at 29. “The Lanham Act,” we have
said, “does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the pur-
pose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.” Id.,
at 34. Federal trademark law “has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery,” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 94
(1879), but rather, by preventing competitors from copying
“a source-identifying mark,” “reduce[s] the customer’s costs
of shopping and making purchasing decisions,” and “helps
assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor)
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product,” Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., 514 U. S. 159, 163–164 (1995) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Assuming for the sake of argument
that Dastar’s representation of itself as the “Producer” of its
videos amounted to a representation that it originated the
creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of
action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a
species of mutant copyright law that limits the public’s “fed-
eral right to ‘copy and to use’ ” expired copyrights, Bonito
Boats, supra, at 165.
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to
the law of copyright, it has done so with much more specific-
ity than the Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of “origin.” The
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 603(a), 104 Stat. 5128,
provides that the author of an artistic work “shall have the
right . . . to claim authorship of that work.” 17 U. S. C.
§ 106A(a)(1)(A). That express right of attribution is care-
fully limited and focused: It attaches only to specified
“work[s] of visual art,” § 101, is personal to the artist,
§§ 106A(b) and (e), and endures only for “the life of the au-

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thor,” § 106A(d)(1). Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action
for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works
(visual or otherwise) would render these limitations super-
fluous. A statutory interpretation that renders another
statute superfluous is of course to be avoided. E. g., Mackey
v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825,
837, and n. 11 (1988).
Reading “origin” in § 43(a) to require attribution of un-
copyrighted materials would pose serious practical problems.
Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word “ori-
gin” has no discernable limits. A video of the MGM film
Carmen Jones, after its copyright has expired, would pre-
sumably require attribution not just to MGM, but to Oscar
Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the film
was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which
the musical was based), and to Prosper Me´ rime´ e (who wrote
the novel on which the opera was based). In many cases,
figuring out who is in the line of “origin” would be no simple
task. Indeed, in the present case it is far from clear that
respondents have that status. Neither SFM nor New Line
had anything to do with the production of the Crusade televi-
sion series—they merely were licensed to distribute the
video version. While Fox might have a claim to being in
the line of origin, its involvement with the creation of the
television series was limited at best. Time, Inc., was the
principal, if not the exclusive, creator, albeit under arrange-
ment with Fox. And of course it was neither Fox nor Time,
Inc., that shot the film used in the Crusade television series.
Rather, that footage came from the United States Army,
Navy, and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information
and War Office, the National Film Board of Canada, and un-
identified “Newsreel Pool Cameramen.” If anyone has a
claim to being the original creator of the material used in
both the Crusade television series and the Campaigns video-
tapes, it would be those groups, rather than Fox. We do not

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36 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORP.
Opinion of the Court
think the Lanham Act requires this search for the source of
the Nile and all its tributaries.
Another practical difficulty of adopting a special definition
of “origin” for communicative products is that it places the
manufacturers of those products in a difficult position. On
the one hand, they would face Lanham Act liability for fail-
ing to credit the creator of a work on which their lawful
copies are based; and on the other hand they could face Lan-
ham Act liability for crediting the creator if that should be
regarded as implying the creator’s “sponsorship or approval”
of the copy, 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). In this case, for ex-
ample, if Dastar had simply “copied [the television series] as
Crusade in Europe and sold it as Crusade in Europe,” with-
out changing the title or packaging (including the original
credits to Fox), it is hard to have confidence in respondents’
assurance that they “would not be here on a Lanham Act
cause of action,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 35.
Finally, reading § 43(a) of the Lanham Act as creating a
cause of action for, in effect, plagiarism—the use of other-
wise unprotected works and inventions without attribu-
tion—would be hard to reconcile with our previous decisions.
For example, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc., 529 U. S. 205 (2000), we considered whether product-
design trade dress can ever be inherently distinctive. Wal-
Mart produced “knockoffs” of children’s clothes designed and
manufactured by Samara Brothers, containing only “minor
modifications” of the original designs. Id., at 208. We con-
cluded that the designs could not be protected under § 43(a)
without a showing that they had acquired “secondary mean-
ing,” id., at 214, so that they “ ‘identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself,’ ” id., at 211 (quoting
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456
U. S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982)). This carefully considered limi-
tation would be entirely pointless if the “original” producer
could turn around and pursue a reverse-passing-off claim
under exactly the same provision of the Lanham Act. Sa-

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37 Cite as: 539 U. S. 23 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
mara would merely have had to argue that it was the “ori-
gin” of the designs that Wal-Mart was selling as its own line.
It was not, because “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act re-
ferred to the producer of the clothes, and not the producer
of the (potentially) copyrightable or patentable designs that
the clothes embodied.
Similarly under respondents’ theory, the “origin of goods”
provision of § 43(a) would have supported the suit that we
rejected in Bonito Boats, 489 U. S. 141, where the defend-
ants had used molds to duplicate the plaintiff ’s unpatented
boat hulls (apparently without crediting the plaintiff). And
it would have supported the suit we rejected in TrafFix,
532 U. S. 23: The plaintiff, whose patents on flexible road
signs had expired, and who could not prevail on a trade-dress
claim under § 43(a) because the features of the signs were
functional, would have had a reverse-passing-off claim for
unattributed copying of his design.
In sum, reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lan-
ham Act in accordance with the Act’s common-law founda-
tions (which were not designed to protect originality or cre-
ativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which
were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer
of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to
the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied
in those goods. Cf. 17 U. S. C. § 202 (distinguishing between
a copyrighted work and “any material object in which the
work is embodied”). To hold otherwise would be akin to
finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and
copyright, which Congress may not do. See Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 537 U. S. 186, 208 (2003).
The creative talent of the sort that lay behind the Cam-
paigns videos is not left without protection. The original
film footage used in the Crusade television series could have
been copyrighted, see 17 U. S. C. § 102(a)(6), as was copy-
righted (as a compilation) the Crusade television series, even
though it included material from the public domain, see

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38 DASTAR CORP. v. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
FILM CORP.
Opinion of the Court
§ 103(a). Had Fox renewed the copyright in the Crusade
television series, it would have had an easy claim of
copyright infringement. And respondents’ contention that
Campaigns infringes Doubleday’s copyright in General Ei-
senhower’s book is still a live question on remand. If,
moreover, the producer of a video that substantially copied
the Crusade series were, in advertising or promotion, to give
purchasers the impression that the video was quite different
from that series, then one or more of the respondents might
have a cause of action—not for reverse passing off under the
“confusion . . . as to the origin” provision of § 43(a)(1)(A), but
for misrepresentation under the “misrepresents the nature,
characteristics [or] qualities” provision of § 43(a)(1)(B). For
merely saying it is the producer of the video, however, no
Lanham Act liability attaches to Dastar.
* * *
Because we conclude that Dastar was the “origin” of the
products it sold as its own, respondents cannot prevail on
their Lanham Act claim. We thus have no occasion to con-
sider whether the Lanham Act permitted an award of double
petitioner’s profits. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case.