AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION et al. v. GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
396 OCTOBER TERM, 2002
Syllabus
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION et al. v.
GARAMENDI, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–722. Argued April 23, 2003—Decided June 23, 2003
The Nazi Government of Germany confiscated the value or proceeds of
many Jewish life insurance policies issued before and during the Second
World War. After the war, even a policy that had escaped confiscation
was likely to be dishonored, whether because insurers denied its exist-
ence or claimed it had lapsed from unpaid premiums, or because the
German Government would not provide heirs with documentation of the
policyholder’s death. Responsibility as between the government and
insurance companies is disputed, but the fact is that the proceeds of
many insurance policies issued to Jews before and during the war were
paid to the Third Reich or never paid at all. These confiscations and
frustrations of claims fell within the subject of reparations, which be-
came a principal object of Allied diplomacy after the war. Ultimately,
the western Allies placed the obligation to provide restitution to victims
of Nazi persecution on the new West German Government, which
enacted restitution laws and signed agreements with other countries for
the compensation of their nationals. Despite a payout of more than 100
billion deutsch marks as of 2000, however, these measures left out many
claimants and certain types of claims. After German reunification,
class actions for restitution poured into United States courts against
companies doing business in Germany during the Nazi era. Protests
by defendant companies and their governments prompted the United
States Government to take action to try to resolve the matter. Negoti-
ations at the national level produced the German Foundation Agree-
ment, in which Germany agreed to establish a foundation funded with
10 billion deutsch marks contributed equally by the German Govern-
ment and German companies to compensate the companies’ victims dur-
ing the Nazi era. The President agreed that whenever a German com-
pany was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in an American court, the
Government would (1) submit a statement that it would be in this coun-
try’s foreign policy interests for the foundation to be the exclusive forum
and remedy for such claims, and (2) try to get state and local govern-
ments to respect the foundation as the exclusive mechanism. As for
insurance claims in particular, both countries agreed that the German

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
397 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Syllabus
Foundation would work with the International Commission on Holocaust
Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), a voluntary organization whose mis-
sion is to negotiate with European insurers to provide information about
and settlement of unpaid insurance policies, and which has set up proce-
dures to that end. The German agreement has served as a model for
similar agreements with Austria and France.
Meanwhile, California began its own enquiry into the issue, prompting
state legislation designed to force payment by defaulting insurers.
Among other laws, California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
of 1999 (HVIRA) requires any insurer doing business in the State to
disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 1920 and
1945 by the company or any one “related” to it upon penalty of loss of
its state business license. After HVIRA was enacted, the State issued
administrative subpoenas against several subsidiaries of European in-
surance companies participating in the ICHEIC. Immediately, the
Federal Government informed California officials that HVIRA would
damage the ICHEIC, the only effective means to process quickly and
completely unpaid Holocaust era insurance claims, and that HVIRA
would possibly derail the German Foundation Agreement. Neverthe-
less, the state insurance commissioner announced that he would enforce
HVIRA to its fullest. Petitioner insurance entities then filed this suit
challenging HVIRA’s constitutionality. The District Court issued a
preliminary injunction against enforcing HVIRA and later granted peti-
tioners summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding, inter
alia, that HVIRA did not violate the federal foreign affairs power.
Held: California’s HVIRA interferes with the President’s conduct of the
Nation’s foreign policy and is therefore preempted. Pp. 413–429.
(a) There is no question that at some point an exercise of state power
that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Govern-
ment’s policy or that generally there is executive authority to decide
what that policy should be. In foreign policymaking, the President, not
Congress, has the “lead role.” First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759, 767. Specifically, the President has authority
to make “executive agreements” with other countries, requiring no
ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress. See, e. g., Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 679, 682–683. Making such agreements
to settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a
particularly longstanding practice. Although the executive agreements
with Germany, Austria, and France at issue differ from past agreements
in that they address claims associated with formerly belligerent states,
but against corporations, not the foreign governments, the distinction
does not matter. Insisting on a sharp line between public and private

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
398 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Syllabus
acts in defining the legitimate scope of the Executive’s international
negotiations would hamstring the President in settling international
controversies. Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to
preempt state law, and if the agreements here had expressly preempted
laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward. But since these
agreements include no preemption clause, petitioners’ preemption claim
rests on the asserted interference with Presidential foreign policy that
the agreements embody. The principal support for this claim of pre-
emption is Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U. S. 429. In invalidating an Ore-
gon statute, the Zschernig majority relied on statements in previous
cases that are open to the reading that state action with more than
incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted, even absent any af-
firmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence
without any showing of conflict. See, e. g., id., at 432. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the result, disagreed on this point, arguing that its impli-
cation of preemption of the entire foreign affairs field was at odds with
other cases suggesting that, absent positive federal action, States may
legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their stat-
utes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations. Id., at 459.
Whether respect for the executive foreign relations power requires a
categorical choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict
preemption evident in Zschernig requires no answer here, for even on
Justice Harlan’s view, shared by the majority, the likelihood that state
legislation will produce something more than incidental effect in conflict
with the National Government’s express foreign policy would require
preemption of the state law. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U. S.
203, 230–231. And since on his view it is legislation within “areas of
. . . traditional competence” that gives a State any claim to prevail, 389
U. S., at 459, it is reasonable to consider the strength of the state inter-
est, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how seri-
ous a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law preempted.
Pp. 413–420.
(b) There is a sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the Pres-
ident’s foreign policy, as expressed both in the executive agreements
with Germany, Austria, and France, and in statements by high-level
Executive Branch officials, to require preemption here even without any
consideration of the State’s interest. The account of negotiations to-
ward those agreements shows that the consistent Presidential foreign
policy has been to encourage European governments and companies to
volunteer settlement funds and disclosure of policy information, in pref-
erence to litigation or coercive sanctions. California has taken a differ-
ent tack: HVIRA’s economic compulsion to make public disclosure, of far
more information about far more policies than ICHEIC rules require,

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
399 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Syllabus
employs “a different, state system of economic pressure,” and in doing
so undercuts the President’s diplomatic discretion and the choice he has
made exercising it. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530
U. S. 363, 376. Whereas the President’s authority to provide for set-
tling claims in winding up international hostilities requires flexibility in
wielding “the coercive power of the national economy” as a tool of diplo-
macy, id., at 377, HVIRA denies this, by making exclusion from a large
sector of the American insurance market the automatic sanction for non-
compliance with the State’s own disclosure policies. HVIRA thus com-
promises the President’s very capacity to speak for the Nation with one
voice in dealing with other governments to resolve claims arising out of
World War II. Although the HVIRA disclosure requirement’s goal of
obtaining compensation for Holocaust victims is also espoused by the
National Government, the fact of a common end hardly neutralizes con-
flicting means. The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised
by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.
Pp. 420–425.
(c) If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict remained, it would
have to be resolved in the National Government’s favor, given the
weakness of the State’s interest, when evaluated in terms of traditional
state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA. Even if Cal-
ifornia’s underlying concern for its several thousand Holocaust survivors
is recognized as a powerful one, the same objective dignifies the Na-
tional Government’s interest in devising its chosen mechanism for volun-
tary settlements, there being approximately 100,000 survivors in the
country, only a small fraction of them in California. As against the
federal responsibility, the humanity underlying the state statute could
not give the State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with
national policy. Pp. 425–427.
(d) California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has con-
sistently chosen kid gloves. The efficacy of the one approach versus
the other is beside the point, since preemption turns not on the wisdom
of the National Government’s policy but on the evidence of conflict.
Here, the evidence is more than sufficient to demonstrate that HVIRA
stands in the way of the President’s diplomatic objectives. P. 427.
(e) The Court rejects the State’s submission that even if HVIRA does
interfere with Executive Branch foreign policy, Congress authorized
state law of this sort in the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the U. S. Holo-
caust Assets Commission Act of 1998. To begin with, the effect of any
congressional authorization on the preemption enquiry is far from clear,
but in any event neither statute does the job the State ascribes to it.
McCarran-Ferguson’s purpose was to limit congressional preemption of

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
400 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Syllabus
state insurance laws under the commerce power, whether dormant or
exercised, see, e. g., Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U. S. 491, 499–
500, and it cannot plausibly be read to address preemption by executive
conduct in foreign affairs. Nor is HVIRA authorized by the Holocaust
Commission Act, which set up a Presidential Commission to study
Holocaust-era assets that came into the Government’s control, § 3(a)(1),
and directed the Commission to encourage state insurance commission-
ers to prepare a report on the Holocaust-related claims practices of all
insurance companies doing business in this country after January 30,
1933, § 3(a)(4)(A). The Commission’s focus was limited to assets held
by the Government, and the Act’s reference to the state insurance com-
missioners’ report was expressly limited “to the degree the information
is available,” § 3(a)(4)(B), which can hardly be read to condone state
sanctions interfering with federal efforts to resolve claims. Finally,
Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of the President’s
policy. Given the President’s considerable independent authority in
this area, Congress’s silence cannot be equated with disapproval.
Pp. 427–429.
296 F. 3d 832, reversed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 430.
Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were John J. Sullivan, Stephen M. Shapiro,
Neil M. Soltman, Peter Simshauser, William H. Webster,
Linda Dakin-Grimm, and Sally Agel. Frederick W. Reif
filed briefs for respondents Gerling Companies urging re-
versal. With him on the briefs were Dina G. Daskalakis,
Keith D. Barrack, George L. O’Connell, and Timothy P.
Grieve.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Clement,
Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Barbara McDowell,
Mark B. Stern, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, and William
H. Taft IV.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
401 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Frank Kaplan argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Jesse J. Contreras, Larry G. Simon,
Andrew W. Stroud, Michael D. Ramsey, and Leslie Tick.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999
(HVIRA or Act), Cal. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 13800–13807 (West
Cum. Supp. 2003), requires any insurer doing business in that
State to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe
between 1920 and 1945 by the company itself or any one “re-
lated” to it. The issue here is whether HVIRA interferes
with the National Government’s conduct of foreign relations.
We hold that it does, with the consequence that the state
statute is preempted.
I
A
The Nazi Government of Germany engaged not only in
genocide and enslavement but theft of Jewish assets, includ-
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States et al. by Kim Heebner Price and Robin
S. Conrad; for the Federal Republic of Germany by Roger M. Witten; for
the Government of Switzerland by Stephan E. Becker; and for Mitsubishi
Materials Corp. et al. by Walter Dellinger, John H. Beisner, David M.
Balabanian, Margaret K. Pfeiffer, Arne D. Wagner, and Paul J. Hall.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel
Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant At-
torney General, J. Matthew Rodriquez, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, and Daniel L. Siegel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and by
the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Wil-
liam H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, G. Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Cur-
ran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of
Minnesota, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Peter C. Harvey of New Jersey,
Eliot Spitzer of New York, Jim Petro of Ohio, Anabelle Rodrı´guez of
Puerto Rico, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washing-
ton; for Bet Tzedek Legal Services et al. by Gregory R. Smith, Elizabeth
K. Penfil, David A. Lash, and Martin Mendelsohn; for the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners by Ross S. Myers; and for Representa-
tive Henry A. Waxman et al. by Kenneth Chesebro.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
402 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
ing the value of insurance policies, and in particular policies
of life insurance, a form of savings held by many Jews in
Europe before the Second World War. Early on in the Nazi
era, loss of livelihood forced Jews to cash in life insurance
policies prematurely, only to have the government seize the
proceeds of the repurchase, and many who tried to emigrate
from Germany were forced to liquidate insurance policies to
pay the steep “flight taxes” and other levies imposed by the
Third Reich to keep Jewish assets from leaving the country.
See G. Feldman, Allianz and the German Insurance Business,
1933–1945, pp. 249–262 (2001). Before long, the Reich began
simply seizing the remaining policies outright.1 In 1941, the
11th Decree of the Reich Citizenship Law declared the con-
fiscation of assets (including insurance policies) of Jews de-
ported to the concentration camps, and two years later the
13th Decree did the same with respect to property of the
dead, each decree requiring banks and insurance companies
to identify Jewish accounts and transmit the funds to the
Reich treasury. Id., at 264–274. After the war, even a pol-
icy that had escaped confiscation was likely to be dishonored,
whether because insurers denied its existence or claimed it
had lapsed from unpaid premiums during the persecution, or
because the government would not provide heirs with docu-
mentation of the policyholder’s death. See M. Bazyler, Ho-
locaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s
Courts 117–122 (2003). Responsibility as between the gov-
ernment and insurance companies is disputed, but at the end
1 A vivid precursor of the kind of direct confiscation that would become
widespread by 1941 was the Reich’s seizure of property and casualty insur-
ance proceeds in the aftermath of the November 1938 Kristallnacht, in
which Nazi looting and vandalism inflicted damage to Jewish businesses,
homes, and synagogues worth nearly 50 million deutsch marks. Days af-
terward, a Reich decree mandated that all proceeds of all insurance claims
arising from the damage be paid directly to the state treasury, an obliga-
tion ultimately settled by German insurance companies with the Reich at
a mere pittance relative to full value. See Feldman, Allianz and the Ger-
man Insurance Business, at 190–235.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
403 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
of the day, the fact is that the value or proceeds of many
insurance policies issued to Jews before and during the war
were paid to the Reich or never paid at all.
These confiscations and frustrations of claims fell within
the subject of reparations, which became a principal object
of Allied diplomacy soon after the war. At the Potsdam
Conference, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union
took reparations for wartime losses by seizing industrial
assets from their respective occupation zones, putting into
effect the plan originally envisioned at the Yalta Conference
months before. Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin (Pots-
dam) Conference, 1945, in 3 Dept. of State, Treaties and
Other International Agreements of the United States of
America 1776–1949, pp. 1207, 1213–1214 (C. Bevans comp.
1969) (hereinafter Bevans); Report of the Crimea (Yalta)
Conference, 1945, in 3 Bevans 1005; Protocol of the Crimea
(Yalta) Conference on the Question of the German Repara-
tion in Kind, 1945, in 3 Bevans 1020. A year later, the
United States was among the parties to an agreement to
share seized assets with other western allies as settlement,
as to each signatory nation, of “all its claims and those of
its nationals against the former German Government and its
Agencies, of a governmental or private nature, arising out of
the war.” Agreement on Reparation from Germany, on the
Establishment of Inter-Allied Reparation Agency and Resti-
tution of Monetary Gold, 61 Stat. 3163, Art. 2(A), T. I. A. S.
No. 1655 (hereinafter Paris Agreement).
The effect of the Paris Agreement was curtailed, however,
and attention to reparations intentionally deferred, when the
western Allies moved to end their occupation and reestablish
a sovereign Germany as a buffer against Soviet expansion.
They worried that continued reparations would cripple the
new Federal Republic of Germany economically, and so de-
cided in the London Debt Agreement to put off “[c]onsider-
ation of claims arising out of the second World War by coun-
tries which were at war with or were occupied by Germany

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
404 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
during that war, and by nationals of such countries, against
the Reich and agencies of the Reich . . . until the final settle-
ment of the problem of reparation.” Agreement on German
External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953, 4 U. S. T. 443, 449, T. I. A. S.
No. 2792. These terms were construed by German courts
as postponing resolution of foreign claims against both the
German Government and German industry, to await the
terms of an ultimate postwar treaty. See Neuborne, Pre-
liminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation
in American Courts, 80 Wash. U. L. Q. 795, 813–814, and
n. 62 (2002).
In the meantime, the western Allies placed the obligation
to provide restitution to victims of Nazi persecution on the
new West German Government. See Convention on the
Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occu-
pation, May 26, 1952, 6 U. S. T. 4411, 4452–4484, as amended
by Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, [1955] 6 U. S. T.
4117, T. I. A. S. No. 3425. This had previously been a re-
sponsibility of the western military governments, which had
issued several decrees for the return of property confiscated
by the Nazis. See N. Robinson, Restitution Legislation in
Germany: A Survey of Enactments (1949); U. S. Military
Law Nos. 52 and 59 (reprinted in U. S. Military Government
Gazette, Germany, Issue A, p. 24 (June 1, 1946) and Issue G,
p. 1 (Nov. 10, 1947)). West Germany enacted its own restitu-
tion laws in 1953 and 1956, see Institute of Jewish Affairs,
The (West German) Federal Compensation Law (BEG) and
its Implementary Regulations (1957), and signed agreements
with 16 countries for the compensation of their nationals,
including the Luxembourg Agreement with Israel, Sept. 10,
1952, 162 U. N. T. S. 205; see Supplemental Excerpts of Rec-
ord in No. 01–17023 (CA9) (SER), p. 1244. Despite a payout
of more than 100 billion deutsch marks as of 2000, see ibid.,
these measures left out many claimants and certain types of
claims, and when the agreement reunifying East and West

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
405 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Germany, see Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect
to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 1696 U. N. T. S. 124, was read by
the German courts as lifting the London Debt Agreement’s
moratorium on Holocaust claims by foreign nationals, class-
action lawsuits for restitution poured into United States
courts against companies doing business in Germany during
the Nazi era. See Neuborne, supra, at 796, n. 2, 813–814;
see generally Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the
Holocaust in United States Courts, 34 Rich. L. Rev. 1 (2000)
(describing the flood of lawsuits after 1996).
These suits generated much protest by the defendant com-
panies and their governments, to the point that the Govern-
ment of the United States took action to try to resolve “the
last great compensation related negotiation arising out of
World War II.” SER 940 (press briefing by Deputy Secre-
tary of Treasury Eizenstat); see S. Eizenstat, Imperfect Jus-
tice 208–212 (2003). From the beginning, the Government’s
position, represented principally by Under Secretary of
State (later Deputy Treasury Secretary) Stuart Eizenstat,
stressed mediated settlement “as an alternative to endless
litigation” promising little relief to aging Holocaust survi-
vors. SER 953 (press conference by Secretary of State Al-
bright). Ensuing negotiations at the national level produced
the German Foundation Agreement, signed by President
Clinton and German Chancellor Schro¨ der in July 2000, in
which Germany agreed to enact legislation establishing a
foundation funded with 10 billion deutsch marks contributed
equally by the German Government and German compa-
nies, to be used to compensate all those “who suffered at
the hands of German companies during the National So-
cialist era.” Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Re-
membrance, Responsibility and the Future,” 39 Int’l Legal
Materials 1298 (2000).
The willingness of the Germans to create a voluntary
compensation fund was conditioned on some expectation of
security from lawsuits in United States courts, and after

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
406 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
extended dickering President Clinton put his weight behind
two specific measures toward that end. SER 937 (letter
from President Clinton to Chancellor Schro¨ der committing
to a “mechanism to provide the legal peace desired by the
German government and German companies”); see also Eiz-
enstat, supra, at 253–258. First, the Government agreed
that whenever a German company was sued on a Holocaust-
era claim in an American court, the Government of the
United States would submit a statement that “it would be
in the foreign policy interests of the United States for the
Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for the
resolution of all asserted claims against German companies
arising from their involvement in the National Socialist era
and World War II.” 39 Int’l Legal Materials, at 1303.
Though unwilling to guarantee that its foreign policy inter-
ests would “in themselves provide an independent legal basis
for dismissal,” that being an issue for the courts, the Govern-
ment agreed to tell courts “that U. S. policy interests favor
dismissal on any valid legal ground.” Id., at 1304. On top
of that undertaking, the Government promised to use its
“best efforts, in a manner it considers appropriate,” to get
state and local governments to respect the foundation as the
exclusive mechanism. Id., at 1300.2
As for insurance claims specifically, both countries agreed
that the German Foundation would work with the Inter-
national Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC), a voluntary organization formed in 1998 by sev-
eral European insurance companies, the State of Israel, Jew-
ish and Holocaust survivor associations, and the National
2 The executive agreement was accompanied by a joint statement signed
by the American and German Governments, the Governments of Israel
and five Eastern European countries, and the Conference on Jewish Mate-
rial Claims Against Germany, Inc., “[r]ecognizing that it would be in the
participants’ interests for the Foundation to be the exclusive remedy and
forum” for all Holocaust-era claims against German companies. Excerpt
of Record in No. 01–17023 (CA9) (ER), pp. 812–816.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
407 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Association of Insurance Commissioners, the organization of
American state insurance commissioners. The job of the
ICHEIC, chaired by former Secretary of State Eagleburger,
includes negotiation with European insurers to provide in-
formation about unpaid insurance policies issued to Holo-
caust victims and settlement of claims brought under them.
It has thus set up procedures for handling demands against
participating insurers, including “a reasonable review . . . of
the participating companies’ files” for production of unpaid
policies, “an investigatory process to determine the current
status” of insurance policies for which claims are filed, and
a “claims and valuation process to settle and pay individ-
ual claims,” employing “relaxed standards of proof.” SER
1236–1237.
In the pact with the United States, Germany stipulated
that “insurance claims that come within the scope of the cur-
rent claims handling procedures adopted by the [ICHEIC]
and are made against German insurance companies shall be
processed by the companies and the German Insurance Asso-
ciation on the basis of such procedures and on the basis of
additional claims handling procedures that may be agreed
among the Foundation, ICHEIC, and the German Insurance
Association.” 39 Int’l Legal Materials, at 1299. And in a
supplemental agreement formalized in October 2002, the
German Foundation agreed to set aside 200 million deutsch
marks, to be used for insurance claims approved by the
ICHEIC and a portion of the ICHEIC’s operating expenses,
with another 100 million in reserve if the initial fund should
run out. Agreement Concerning Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims, in Lodging of Petitioners in Gerling Global Reinsur-
ance Corp. v. Garamendi, No. 02–733, pp. L–70 to L–71, L–78
to L–79, cert. pending. [Reporter’s Note: See post,
p. 955.] The foundation also bound itself to contribute 350
million deutsch marks to a “humanitarian fund” administered
by the ICHEIC, id., at L–80, and it agreed to work with the
German Insurance Association and the German insurers who

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
408 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
had joined the ICHEIC, “with a view to publishing as com-
prehensive a list as possible of holders of insurance policies
issued by German companies who may have been Holocaust
victims,” id., at L–147. Those efforts, which control release
of information in ways that respect German privacy laws
limiting publication of business records, have resulted in the
recent release of the names of over 360,000 Holocaust victims
owning life insurance policies issued by German insurers.
See Treaster, Holocaust List Is Unsealed by Insurers, N. Y.
Times, Apr. 29, 2003, section A, p. 26, col. 6.
The German Foundation pact has served as a model for
similar agreements with Austria and France,3 and the United
States Government continues to pursue comparable agree-
ments with other countries. Reply Brief for Petitioners 6,
n. 2.
B
While these international efforts were underway, Califor-
nia’s Department of Insurance began its own enquiry into
the issue of unpaid claims under Nazi-era insurance policies,
prompting state legislation designed to force payment by de-
faulting insurers. In 1998, the state legislature made it an
3 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of France Concerning Payments for Certain Losses
Suffered During World War II, Jan. 18, 2001, 2001 WL 416465; Agreement
between the Austrian Federal Government and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconcilia-
tion, Peace and Cooperation,” 40 Int’l Legal Materials 523 (2001); Agree-
ment Relating to the Agreement of October 24, 2000, Concerning the Aus-
trian Fund “Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation,” Jan. 23, 2001, 2001
WL 935261, Annex A, § 2(n). Though the French agreement does not ad-
dress insurance, the agreement with Austria does. Austria agreed to de-
vote a $25 million fund for payment of claims processed according to the
ICHEIC’s procedures. See ibid. Austria also agreed to “make the lists
of Holocaust era policy holders publicly accessible, to the extent available.”
Ibid. The United States Government agreed, in turn, that the settlement
fund should be viewed as “the exclusive . . . forum” for the resolution of
Holocaust-era claims asserted against the Austrian Government or Aus-
trian companies. 40 Int’l Legal Materials, at 524.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
409 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
unfair business practice for any insurer operating in the
State to “fai[l] to pay any valid claim from Holocaust survi-
vors.” Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.15(a) (West Cum. Supp.
2003). The legislature placed “an affirmative duty” on the
Department of Insurance “to play an independent role in
representing the interests of Holocaust survivors,” including
an obligation to “gather, review, and analyze the archives of
insurers . . . to provide for research and investigation” into
unpaid insurance claims. §§ 12967(a)(1), (2).
State legislative efforts culminated the next year with pas-
sage of Assembly Bill No. 600, 1999 Cal. Stats. ch. 827,
the first section of which amended the State’s Code of Civil
Procedure to allow state residents to sue in state court on
insurance claims based on acts perpetrated in the Holocaust
and extended the governing statute of limitations to Decem-
ber 31, 2010. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 354.5 (West Cum.
Supp. 2003). The section of the bill codified as HVIRA, at
issue here,4 requires “[a]ny insurer currently doing business
in the state” to disclose the details of “life, property, liability,
health, annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance
policies” issued “to persons in Europe, which were in effect
between 1920 and 1945.” Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 13804(a)
(West Cum. Supp. 2003). The duty is to make disclosure not
only about policies the particular insurer sold, but also
about those sold by any “related company,” ibid., including
“any parent, subsidiary, reinsurer, successor in interest,
managing general agent, or affiliate company of the insurer,”
§ 13802(b), 5 whether or not the companies were related dur-
4 Challenges to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 354.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2003)
and Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 790.15 (West Cum. Supp. 2003) were dismissed
by the District Court for lack of standing, a ruling that was not appealed.
See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F. 3d 739,
742–743 (CA9 2001).
5 These terms are further defined in the commissioner’s regulations.
Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 10, § 2278.1 (1996). An “affiliate” company is one
that “directly, or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls,

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
410 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
ing the time when the policies subject to disclosure were
sold, § 13804(a). Nor is the obligation restricted to policies
sold to “Holocaust victims” as defined in the Act, § 13802(a);
it covers policies sold to anyone during that time, § 13804(a).
The insurer must report the current status of each policy,
the city of origin, domicile, or address of each policyholder,
and the names of the beneficiaries, § 13804(a), all of which is
to be put in a central registry open to the public, § 13803.
The mandatory penalty for default is suspension of the com-
pany’s license to do business in the State, § 13806, and there
are misdemeanor criminal sanctions for falsehood in certain
required representations about whether and to whom the
proceeds of each policy have been distributed, § 13804(b).
HVIRA was meant to enhance enforcement of both the
unfair business practice provision (§ 790.15) and the provision
for suit on the policies in question (§ 354.5) by “ensur[ing]
that any involvement [that licensed California insurers] or
their related companies may have had with insurance poli-
cies of Holocaust victims are [sic] disclosed to the state.”
§ 13801(e); see ibid. (HVIRA is designed to “ensure the rapid
resolution” of unpaid insurance claims, “eliminating the fur-
ther victimization of these policyholders and their families”);
Excerpt of Record in No. 01–17023 (CA9) (ER), p. 994 (Cali-
fornia Senate Committee on Insurance report) (HVIRA was
proposed to “ensure that Holocaust victims or their heirs can
take direct action on their own behalf with regard to insur-
ance policies and claims”). While the legislature acknowl-
edged that “[t]he international Jewish community is in active
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the [insurer].” Cal.
Ins. Code Ann. § 1215(a) (West 1993) (cross-referenced in § 2278.1(e)). A
“[m]anaging [g]eneral [a]gent” is a company that “negotiates and binds
ceding reinsurance contracts on behalf of an insurer or manages all or part
of the insurance business of an insurer.” § 769.819(c) (cross-referenced in
§ 2278.1(c)). A “reinsurer” is “a parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the in-
surer that provides reinsurance.” Cal. Code Regs., Tit. 10, § 2278.1(i)
(1996).

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
411 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
negotiations with responsible insurance companies through
the [ICHEIC] to resolve all outstanding insurance claims
issues,” it still thought the Act “necessary to protect the
claims and interests of California residents, as well as to en-
courage the development of a resolution to these issues
through the international process or through direct action
by the State of California, as necessary.” § 13801(f).
After HVIRA was enacted, administrative subpoenas
were issued against several subsidiaries of European insur-
ance companies participating in the ICHEIC. See, e. g.,
SER 785, 791. Immediately, in November 1999, Deputy
Secretary Eizenstat wrote to the insurance commissioner of
California that although HVIRA “reflects a genuine com-
mitment to justice for Holocaust victims and their families,
it has the unfortunate effect of damaging the one effective
means now at hand to process quickly and completely unpaid
insurance claims from the Holocaust period, the [ICHEIC].”
Id., at 975. The Deputy Secretary said that “actions by Cal-
ifornia, pursuant to this law, have already threatened to dam-
age the cooperative spirit which the [ICHEIC] requires to
resolve the important issue for Holocaust survivors,” and he
also noted that ICHEIC Chairman Eagleburger had ex-
pressed his opposition to “sanctions and other pressures
brought by California on companies with whom he is obtain-
ing real cooperation.” Id., at 976. The same day, Deputy
Secretary Eizenstat also wrote to California’s Governor
making the same points, and stressing that HVIRA would
possibly derail the German Foundation Agreement: “Clearly,
for this deal to work . . . German industry and the German
government need to be assured that they will get ‘legal
peace,’ not just from class-action lawsuits, but from the kind
of legislation represented by the California Victim Insurance
Relief Act.” Id., at 970. These expressions of the National
Government’s concern proved to be of no consequence, for
the state commissioner announced at an investigatory hear-
ing in December 1999 that he would enforce HVIRA to its

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
412 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
fullest, requiring the affected insurers to make the disclo-
sures, leave the State voluntarily, or lose their licenses.
ER 1097.
II
After this ultimatum, the petitioners here, several Ameri-
can and European insurance companies and the American
Insurance Association (a national trade association), filed suit
for injunctive relief against respondent insurance commis-
sioner of California, challenging the constitutionality of
HVIRA. The District Court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion against enforcing the Act, reflecting its probability judg-
ment that “HVIRA is unconstitutional based on a viola-
tion of the federal foreign affairs power and a violation of
the Commerce Clause.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 110a. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected these grounds for ques-
tioning the Act but left the preliminary injunction in place
until the District Court could consider whether petitioners
were likely to succeed on their due process claim. Gerling
Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Low, 240 F. 3d 739,
754 (2001).
On remand, the District Court addressed two points. Al-
though it held the Act to be within the State’s “legislative
jurisdiction,” as it applied only to insurers licensed to do
business in the State, the District Court granted summary
judgment to the petitioners on the ground of a procedural
due process violation in “mandating license suspension for
non-performance of what may be impossible tasks without
allowing for a meaningful hearing.” Gerling Global Rein-
surance Corp. of America v. Low, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108,
1113 (ED Cal. 2001). In a second appeal, the same panel of
the Ninth Circuit reversed again. While it agreed that the
Act was not beyond the State’s legislative authority, the
Court of Appeals rejected the conclusion that procedural due
process required an opportunity for insurers to raise an im-
possibility excuse for noncompliance with the law, 296 F. 3d
832, 845–848 (2002), and it reaffirmed its prior ruling that

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
413 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
the Act violated neither the foreign affairs nor the foreign
commerce powers, id., at 849. Given the importance of the
issue,6 we granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1100 (2003), and now
reverse.7
III
The principal argument for preemption made by petition-
ers and the United States as amicus curiae is that HVIRA
interferes with foreign policy of the Executive Branch, as
expressed principally in the executive agreements with Ger-
many, Austria, and France. The major premises of the ar-
gument, at least, are beyond dispute. There is, of course, no
question that at some point an exercise of state power that
touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Gov-
ernment’s policy, given the “concern for uniformity in this
country’s dealings with foreign nations” that animated the
Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the
National Government in the first place. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 427, n. 25 (1964); see
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363,
6 Several other States have passed laws similar to HVIRA. See Holo-
caust Victims Insurance Act, Fla. Stat. § 626.9543 (Cum. Supp. 2003); Holo-
caust Victims Insurance Act, Md. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 28–101 to 28–110
(2002); Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act of 2000, Minn. Stat.
§ 60A.053 (Cum. Supp. 2003); Holocaust Victims Insurance Act of 1998,
N. Y. Ins. Law §§ 2701–2711 (Consol. 2000); Holocaust Victims Insurance
Relief Act of 1999, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 48.104.010–48.104.903 (2003); see
also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20–490 (West Cum. Supp. 2003); Tex. Ins. Code
Ann., Art. 21.74 (Vernon 2003). And similar bills have been proposed in
other States. See, e. g., Mass. Senate Bill No. 843 (Jan. 1, 2003).
7 Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one by the petitioners in this
case (No. 02–722), and one, raising additional issues, by the Gerling Com-
panies (No. 02–733), which were also appellees below. Our grant of certio-
rari in No. 02–722 encompassed three of the questions addressed by the
Ninth Circuit: whether HVIRA intrudes on the federal foreign affairs
power, violates the self-executing element of the Foreign Commerce
Clause, or exceeds the State’s “legislative jurisdiction.” Pet. for Cert.
I. Because we hold that HVIRA is preempted under the foreign affairs
doctrine, we have no reason to address the other questions.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
414 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
381–382, n. 16 (2000) (“ ‘[T]he peace of the whole ought not
to be left at the disposal of a part’ ” (quoting The Federalist
No. 80, pp. 535–536 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton))); Id.,
No. 44, at 299 (J. Madison) (emphasizing “the advantage of
uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers”); Id.,
No. 42, at 279 (J. Madison) (“If we are to be one nation in any
respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations”);
see also First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 U. S. 759, 769 (1972) (plurality opinion) (act of state doc-
trine was “fashioned because of fear that adjudication would
interfere with the conduct of foreign relations”); Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 449 (1979) (nega-
tive Foreign Commerce Clause protects the National Gov-
ernment’s ability to speak with “one voice” in regulating
commerce with foreign countries (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Nor is there any question generally that there is executive
authority to decide what that policy should be. Although
the source of the President’s power to act in foreign affairs
does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the
“executive Power” vested in Article II of the Constitution
has recognized the President’s “vast share of responsibil-
ity for the conduct of our foreign relations.” Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 610–611 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). While Congress holds express
authority to regulate public and private dealings with other
nations in its war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign
affairs the President has a degree of independent authority
to act. See, e. g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Wa-
terman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948) (“The President
. . . possesses in his own right certain powers conferred by
the Constitution on him as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation’s organ in foreign affairs”); Youngstown, supra, at
635–636, n. 2 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion
of Court) (the President can “act in external affairs without
congressional authority” (citing United States v. Curtiss-

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
415 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936))); First Nat. City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, supra, at 767 (the Presi-
dent has “the lead role . . . in foreign policy” (citing Sabba-
tino, supra)); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S.
155, 188 (1993) (the President has “unique responsibility” for
the conduct of “foreign and military affairs”).
At a more specific level, our cases have recognized that the
President has authority to make “executive agreements”
with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate
or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised
since the early years of the Republic. See Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 679, 682–683 (1981); United States v.
Pink, 315 U. S. 203, 223, 230 (1942); United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U. S. 324, 330–331 (1937); see also L. Henkin, For-
eign Affairs and the United States Constitution 219, 496,
n. 163 (2d ed. 1996) (“Presidents from Washington to Clinton
have made many thousands of agreements . . . on matters
running the gamut of U. S. foreign relations”). Making ex-
ecutive agreements to settle claims of American nationals
against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding
practice, the first example being as early as 1799, when the
Adams administration settled demands against the Dutch
Government by American citizens who lost their cargo when
Dutch privateers overtook the schooner Wilmington Packet.
See Dames & Moore, supra, at 679–680, and n. 8; 5 Dept. of
State, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United
States 1075, 1078–1079 (H. Miller ed. 1937). Given the fact
that the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received
congressional acquiescence throughout its history, the con-
clusion “[t]hat the President’s control of foreign relations
includes the settlement of claims is indisputable.” Pink,
supra, at 240 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see 315 U. S., at
223–225 (opinion of the Court); Belmont, supra, at 330–331;
Dames & Moore, supra, at 682.
The executive agreements at issue here do differ in one
respect from those just mentioned insofar as they address

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
416 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
claims associated with formerly belligerent states, but
against corporations, not the foreign governments. But the
distinction does not matter. Historically, wartime claims
against even nominally private entities have become issues
in international diplomacy, and three of the postwar settle-
ments dealing with reparations implicating private parties
were made by the Executive alone.8 Acceptance of this his-
torical practice is supported by a good pragmatic reason for
depending on executive agreements to settle claims against
foreign corporations associated with wartime experience.
As shown by the history of insurance confiscation mentioned
earlier, untangling government policy from private initiative
during wartime is often so hard that diplomatic action set-
tling claims against private parties may well be just as es-
sential in the aftermath of hostilities as diplomacy to settle
claims against foreign governments. While a sharp line be-
tween public and private acts works for many purposes in
the domestic law, insisting on the same line in defining the
legitimate scope of the Executive’s international negotiations
would hamstring the President in settling international con-
troversies. Cf. Pink, supra, at 234–242 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (noting the unsoundness of transplanting “judi-
cial subtleties” of domestic law into “the solution of analo-
gous problems between friendly nations”).
Generally, then, valid executive agreements are fit to pre-
empt state law, just as treaties are,9 and if the agreements
8 The Yalta and Potsdam Agreements envisioning dismantling of Germa-
ny’s industrial assets, public and private, and the followup Paris Agree-
ment aspiring to settle the claims of western nationals against the German
Government and private agencies were made as executive agreements.
See supra, at 403 (citing agreements); see also L. Margolis, Executive
Agreements and Presidential Power in Foreign Policy 15–16 (1986).
9 Subject, that is, to the Constitution’s guarantees of individual rights.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 15–19 (1957); Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312,
324 (1988). Even Justice Sutherland’s reading of the National Govern-
ment’s “inherent” foreign affairs power in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936), contained the caveat that the power,

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
417 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue
would be straightforward. See Belmont, supra, at 327, 331;
Pink, supra, at 223, 230–231. But petitioners and the
United States as amicus curiae both have to acknowledge
that the agreements include no preemption clause, and so
leave their claim of preemption to rest on asserted interfer-
ence with the foreign policy those agreements embody. Re-
liance is placed on our decision in Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U. S. 429 (1968).
Zschernig dealt with an Oregon probate statute prohibit-
ing inheritance by a nonresident alien, absent showings that
the foreign heir would take the property “without confisca-
tion” by his home country and that American citizens would
enjoy reciprocal rights of inheritance there. Id., at 430–431.
Two decades earlier, Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503 (1947), had
held that a similar California reciprocity law “did not on its
face intrude on the federal domain,” Zschernig, supra, at
432, but by the time Zschernig (an East German resident)
brought his challenge, it was clear that the Oregon law
in practice had invited “minute inquiries concerning the
actual administration of foreign law,” 389 U. S., at 435, and
so was providing occasions for state judges to disparage cer-
tain foreign regimes, employing the language of the anti-
Communism prevalent here at the height of the Cold War,
see id., at 440 (the Oregon law had made “unavoidable judi-
cial criticism of nations established on a more authoritar-
ian basis than our own”). Although the Solicitor General,
speaking for the State Department, denied that the state
statute “unduly interfere[d] with the United States’ conduct
of foreign relations,” id., at 434 (internal quotation marks
omitted), the Court was not deterred from exercising its own
judgment to invalidate the law as an “intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution en-
trusts to the President and the Congress,” id., at 432.
“like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.” Id., at 320.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
418 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
The Zschernig majority relied on statements in a number
of previous cases open to the reading that state action with
more than incidental effect on foreign affairs is preempted,
even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject
area of the state law, and hence without any showing of con-
flict. The Court cited the pronouncement in Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 63 (1941), that “[o]ur system of govern-
ment is such that the interest of the cities, counties and
states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field
affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local
interference.” See 389 U. S., at 432; id., at 442–443 (Stew-
art, J., concurring) (setting out the foregoing quotation).
Likewise, Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion viewed the
Oregon statute as intruding “into a domain of exclusively
federal competence.” Id., at 442; see also Belmont, 301
U. S., at 331 (“[C]omplete power over international affairs is
in the national government and is not and cannot be subject
to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several
states” (citing Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S., at
316 et seq.)).
Justice Harlan, joined substantially by Justice White, dis-
agreed with the Zschernig majority on this point, arguing
that its implication of preemption of the entire field of for-
eign affairs was at odds with some other cases suggesting
that in the absence of positive federal action “the States may
legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though
their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign rela-
tions.” 389 U. S., at 459 (opinion concurring in result) (citing
cases); see id., at 462 (White, J., dissenting). 10 Thus, for Jus-
tice Harlan it was crucial that the challenge to the Oregon
10 Justice Harlan concurred in the majority’s result because he would
have found the Oregon statute preempted by a 1923 treaty with Germany.
389 U. S., at 457. This required overruling the Court’s construction of
that treaty in Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503 (1947), which Justice White, in
dissent, declined to do, 389 U. S., at 462.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
419 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
statute presented no evidence of a “specific interest of the
Federal Government which might be interfered with” by the
law. Id., at 459 (opinion concurring in result); see id., at 461
(finding “no evidence of adverse effect in the record”). He
would, however, have found preemption in a case of “con-
flicting federal policy,” see id., at 458–459, and on this point
the majority and Justices Harlan and White basically agreed:
state laws “must give way if they impair the effective exer-
cise of the Nation’s foreign policy,” id., at 440 (opinion of the
Court). See also Pink, 315 U. S., at 230–231 (“[S]tate law
must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs . . . the
superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or interna-
tional compact or agreement”); id., at 240 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (state law may not be allowed to “interfer[e]
with the conduct of our foreign relations by the Executive”).
It is a fair question whether respect for the executive for-
eign relations power requires a categorical choice between
the contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evi-
dent in the Zschernig opinions,11 but the question requires
11 The two positions can be seen as complementary. If a State were
simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility, field preemption
might be the appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government had
acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree of any conflict, the
principle having been established that the Constitution entrusts foreign
policy exclusively to the National Government. See, e. g., Hines v. David-
owitz, 312 U. S. 52, 63 (1941). Where, however, a State has acted within
what Justice Harlan called its “traditional competence,” 389 U. S., at 459,
but in a way that affects foreign relations, it might make good sense to
require a conflict, of a clarity or substantiality that would vary with the
strength or the traditional importance of the state concern asserted.
Whether the strength of the federal foreign policy interest should itself
be weighed is, of course, a further question. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) (congressional occupation of the field is
not to be presumed “in a field which the States have traditionally occu-
pied”); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500, 507–508 (1988)
(“In an area of uniquely federal interest,” “[t]he conflict with federal policy
need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption”).

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
420 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
no answer here. For even on Justice Harlan’s view, the like-
lihood that state legislation will produce something more
than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy
of the National Government would require preemption of the
state law. And since on his view it is legislation within
“areas of . . . traditional competence” that gives a State any
claim to prevail, 389 U. S., at 459, it would be reasonable
to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by
standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious
a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law pre-
empted. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sulli-
van, 325 U. S. 761, 768–769 (1945) (under negative Commerce
Clause, “reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and
accommodation of the competing demands of the state and
national interests involved”); Henkin, Foreign Affairs and
the United States Constitution, at 164 (suggesting a test that
“balance[s] the state’s interest in a regulation against the
impact on U. S. foreign relations”); Maier, Preemption of
State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 832,
834 (1989) (similar). Judged by these standards, we think
petitioners and the Government have demonstrated a suffi-
ciently clear conflict to require finding preemption here.
IV
A
To begin with, resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims
that may be held by residents of this country is a matter
well within the Executive’s responsibility for foreign affairs.
Since claims remaining in the aftermath of hostilities may be
“sources of friction” acting as an “impediment to resumption
of friendly relations” between the countries involved, Pink,
supra, at 225, there is a “longstanding practice” of the
national Executive to settle them in discharging its respon-
sibility to maintain the Nation’s relationships with other
countries, Dames & Moore, 453 U. S., at 679. The issue of

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
421 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
restitution for Nazi crimes has in fact been addressed in Ex-
ecutive Branch diplomacy and formalized in treaties and ex-
ecutive agreements over the last half century, and although
resolution of private claims was postponed by the Cold War,
securing private interests is an express object of diplomacy
today, just as it was addressed in agreements soon after the
Second World War. Vindicating victims injured by acts and
omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within
the traditional subject matter of foreign policy in which na-
tional, not state, interests are overriding, and which the Na-
tional Government has addressed.
The exercise of the federal executive authority means that
state law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of
clear conflict between the policies adopted by the two. The
foregoing account of negotiations toward the three settle-
ment agreements is enough to illustrate that the consistent
Presidential foreign policy has been to encourage European
governments and companies to volunteer settlement funds in
preference to litigation or coercive sanctions. See also, e. g.,
Hearings on H. R. 2693 before the Subcommittee of Govern-
ment Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovern-
mental Relations of the House Committee on Government
Reform, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., 24 (2002) (statement of Am-
bassador Randolph M. Bell that it is the “policy of the U. S.
Government” “to resolve matters of Holocaust-era restitu-
tion and compensation through dialogue, negotiation, and co-
operation”); Hearings on the Status of Insurance Restitution
for Holocaust Victims and the Heirs before the House Com-
mittee on Government Reform, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 77
(2001) (statement of Ambassador J. D. Bindenagel to the
same effect). As for insurance claims in particular, the
national position, expressed unmistakably in the executive
agreements signed by the President with Germany and Aus-
tria, has been to encourage European insurers to work with
the ICHEIC to develop acceptable claim procedures, includ-
ing procedures governing disclosure of policy information.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
422 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
See German Foundation Agreement, 39 Int’l Legal Materi-
als, at 1299, 1303 (declaring the German Foundation to be
the “exclusive forum” for demands against German com-
panies and agreeing to have insurance claims resolved
under procedures developed through negotiation with the
ICHEIC); Agreement Relating to the Agreement of October
24, 2000, Concerning the Austrian Fund “Reconciliation,
Peace and Cooperation,” Jan. 23, 2001, 2001 WL 935261,
Annex A, § 2(n) (same for Austria). This position, of which
the agreements are exemplars, has also been consistently
supported in the high levels of the Executive Branch, as
mentioned already, supra, at 411. See also, e. g., Hearing
before the Committee on House Banking and Financial Serv-
ices, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 173 (2000) (Deputy Secretary
Eizenstat statement that “[t]he U. S. Government has sup-
ported [the ICHEIC] since it began, and we believe it should
be considered the exclusive remedy for resolving insurance
claims from the World War II era”); Hearings on H. R. 2693,
at 24 (statement by Ambassador Bell to the same effect);
Hearing on the Legacies of the Holocaust before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., 23
(2000) (Eizenstat testimony that a company’s participation
in the ICHEIC should give it “ ‘safe haven’ from sanctions,
subpoenas, and hearings relative to the Holocaust period”).12
The approach taken serves to resolve the several competing
matters of national concern apparent in the German Founda-
tion Agreement: the national interest in maintaining amica-
12 In Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U. S. 298,
328–330 (1994), we declined to give policy statements by Executive Branch
officials conclusive weight as against an opposing congressional policy in
determining whether California’s “worldwide combined reporting” tax
method violated the Foreign Commerce Clause. The reason, we said, is
that “[t]he Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the
power to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’ ” Id., at 329 (quoting
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3). As we have discussed, however, in the field of foreign
policy the President has the “lead role.” First Nat. City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U. S. 759, 767 (1972).

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
423 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
ble relationships with current European allies; survivors’ in-
terests in a “fair and prompt” but nonadversarial resolution
of their claims so as to “bring some measure of justice . . . in
their lifetimes”; and the companies’ interest in securing
“legal peace” when they settle claims in this fashion. 39
Int’l Legal Materials, at 1304. As a way for dealing with
insurance claims, moreover, the voluntary scheme protects
the companies’ ability to abide by their own countries’
domestic privacy laws limiting disclosure of policy informa-
tion. See Brief for Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus
Curiae 12–13.13
California has taken a different tack of providing regula-
tory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment, supple-
mented by a new cause of action for Holocaust survivors if
the other sanctions should fail. The situation created by the
California legislation calls to mind the impact of the Massa-
chusetts Burma law on the effective exercise of the Presi-
dent’s power, as recounted in the statutory preemption case,
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363
(2000). HVIRA’s economic compulsion to make public dis-
closure, of far more information about far more policies than
ICHEIC rules require, employs “a different, state system of
economic pressure,” and in doing so undercuts the Presi-
13 The dissent would discount the executive agreements as evidence of
the Government’s foreign policy governing disclosure, saying they “do not
refer to state disclosure laws specifically, or even to information disclosure
generally.” Post, at 441 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). But this assertion
gives short shrift to the agreements’ express endorsement of the
ICHEIC’s voluntary mechanism, which encompasses production of policy
information, not just actual payment of unpaid claims. See supra, at 406–
407. The dissent would also dismiss the other Executive Branch expres-
sions of the Government’s policy, see supra, at 411, 422, insisting on noth-
ing short of a formal statement by the President himself, see post, at
441–443. But there is no suggestion that these high-level executive offi-
cials were not faithfully representing the President’s chosen policy, and
there is no apparent reason for adopting the dissent’s “nondelegation” rule
to apply within the Executive Branch.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
424 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
dent’s diplomatic discretion and the choice he has made exer-
cising it. Id., at 376. Whereas the President’s authority to
provide for settling claims in winding up international hostil-
ities requires flexibility in wielding “the coercive power of
the national economy” as a tool of diplomacy, id., at 377,
HVIRA denies this, by making exclusion from a large sector
of the American insurance market the automatic sanction for
noncompliance with the State’s own policies on disclosure.
“Quite simply, if the [California] law is enforceable the Presi-
dent has less to offer and less economic and diplomatic lever-
age as a consequence.” Ibid. (citing Dames & Moore, 453
U. S., at 673). The law thus “compromise[s] the very capac-
ity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice
in dealing with other governments” to resolve claims against
European companies arising out of World War II. 530 U. S.,
at 381. 14
Crosby’s facts are replicated again in the way HVIRA
threatens to frustrate the operation of the particular mecha-
nism the President has chosen. The letters from Deputy
Secretary Eizenstat to California officials show well enough
how the portent of further litigation and sanctions has in
fact placed the Government at a disadvantage in obtaining
practical results from persuading “foreign governments and
foreign companies to participate voluntarily in organizations
such as ICHEIC.” Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 15; see also SER 1267, 1272 (Joint Statement with Swit-
zerland noting the “potentially disruptive and counterpro-
ductive effects” of laws like HVIRA and promising effort by
14 It is true that the President in this case is acting without express
congressional authority, and thus does not have the “plenitude of Execu-
tive authority” that “controll[ed] the issue of preemption” in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 376 (2000). But in Crosby
we were careful to note that the President possesses considerable inde-
pendent constitutional authority to act on behalf of the United States on
international issues, id., at 381, and conflict with the exercise of that au-
thority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
425 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
the United States to call on state legislatures “to refrain
from taking unwarranted investigative initiatives or from
threatening or actually using sanctions against Swiss insur-
ers”). In addition to thwarting the Government’s policy of
repose for companies that pay through the ICHEIC, Califor-
nia’s indiscriminate disclosure provisions place a handicap on
the ICHEIC’s effectiveness (and raise a further irritant to
the European allies) by undercutting European privacy pro-
tections. See ER 1182, 3131 (opinions of the German Gov-
ernment that public disclosure of all European insurance pol-
icies “is not permissible” under German privacy law); Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 (noting protests from
the German and Swiss Governments). It is true, of course,
as it is probably true of all elements of HVIRA, that the
disclosure requirement’s object of obtaining compensation
for Holocaust victims is a goal espoused by the National Gov-
ernment as well. But “[t]he fact of a common end hardly
neutralizes conflicting means,” Crosby, supra, at 379, and
here HVIRA is an obstacle to the success of the National
Government’s chosen “calibration of force” in dealing with
the Europeans using a voluntary approach, 530 U. S., at 380.
B
The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by
the state statute are alone enough to require state law to
yield. If any doubt about the clarity of the conflict re-
mained, however, it would have to be resolved in the Na-
tional Government’s favor, given the weakness of the State’s
interest, against the backdrop of traditional state legisla-
tive subject matter, in regulating disclosure of European
Holocaust-era insurance policies in the manner of HVIRA.
The commissioner would justify HVIRA’s ambitious dis-
closure requirement as protecting “legitimate consumer pro-
tection interests” in knowing which insurers have failed to
pay insurance claims. Brief for Respondent 1, 42–44. But,
quite unlike a generally applicable “blue sky” law, HVIRA

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
426 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
effectively singles out only policies issued by European com-
panies, in Europe, to European residents, at least 55 years
ago. Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 13804(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2003);
see also § 790.15(a) (mandating license suspension only for
“fail[ure] to pay any valid claim from Holocaust survivors”).
Limiting the public disclosure requirement to these policies
raises great doubt that the purpose of the California law is
an evaluation of corporate reliability in contemporary insur-
ing in the State.
Indeed, there is no serious doubt that the state interest
actually underlying HVIRA is concern for the several thou-
sand Holocaust survivors said to be living in the State.
§ 13801(d) (legislative finding that roughly 5,600 documented
Holocaust survivors reside in California). But this fact does
not displace general standards for evaluating a State’s claim
to apply its forum law to a particular controversy or trans-
action, under which the State’s claim is not a strong one.
“Even if a plaintiff evidences his desire for forum law by
moving to the forum, we have generally accorded such a
move little or no significance.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 820 (1985); see Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U. S. 302, 311 (1981) (“[A] postoccurrence change
of residence to the forum State—standing alone—[i]s insuf-
ficient to justify application of forum law”).
But should the general standard not be displaced, and the
State’s interest recognized as a powerful one, by virtue of
the fact that California seeks to vindicate the claims of Holo-
caust survivors? The answer lies in recalling that the very
same objective dignifies the interest of the National Govern-
ment in devising its chosen mechanism for voluntary settle-
ments, there being about 100,000 survivors in the country,
only a small fraction of them in California. ER 870 (press
release of insurance commissioner of California); Bazyler, 34
Rich. L. Rev., at 8, n. 11. As against the responsibility of
the United States of America, the humanity underlying the

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
427 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
state statute could not give the State the benefit of any
doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy.
C
The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist
where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves. We
have heard powerful arguments that the iron fist would work
better, and it may be that if the matter of compensation were
considered in isolation from all other issues involving the Eu-
ropean Allies, the iron fist would be the preferable policy.
But our thoughts on the efficacy of the one approach versus
the other are beside the point, since our business is not to
judge the wisdom of the National Government’s policy; dis-
satisfaction should be addressed to the President or, perhaps,
Congress. The question relevant to preemption in this case
is conflict, and the evidence here is “more than sufficient
to demonstrate that the state Act stands in the way of [the
President’s] diplomatic objectives.” Crosby, supra, at 386.
V
The State’s remaining submission is that even if HVIRA
does interfere with Executive Branch foreign policy, Con-
gress authorized state law of this sort in the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, ch. 20, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011–1015,
and the more recent U. S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act
of 1998 (Holocaust Commission Act), 112 Stat. 611, note fol-
lowing 22 U. S. C. § 1621. There is, however, no need to con-
sider the possible significance for preemption doctrine of ten-
sion between an Act of Congress and Presidential foreign
policy, cf. generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U. S., at 637–638 (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and
opinion of Court), for neither statute does the job the com-
missioner ascribes to it.
The provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act said to be
relevant here specify that “[t]he business of insurance” shall
be recognized as a subject of state regulation, 15 U. S. C.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
428 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Opinion of the Court
§ 1012(a), which will be good against preemption by federal
legislation unless that legislation “specifically relates to the
business of insurance,” § 1012(b); see also § 1011 (policy be-
hind § 1012 is that “continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest” and “silence on the part of the Congress shall not
be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxa-
tion of such business by the several States”). As the text
itself makes clear, the point of McCarran-Ferguson’s leg-
islative choice of leaving insurance regulation generally to
the States was to limit congressional preemption under the
commerce power, whether dormant or exercised. Compare
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429–430
(1946), with United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944); see Department of Treasury v.
Fabe, 508 U. S. 491, 499–500 (1993). Quite apart, then, from
any doubt whether HVIRA would qualify as regulating
“the business of insurance” given its tangential relation to
present-day insuring in the State, see FTC v. Travelers
Health Assn., 362 U. S. 293, 300–301 (1960) (McCarran-
Ferguson was not intended to allow a State to “regulate ac-
tivities carried on beyond its own borders”), a federal statute
directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce legis-
lation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption
by executive conduct in foreign affairs.
Nor does the Holocaust Commission Act authorize
HVIRA. That Act set up a Presidential Commission to
“study and develop a historical record of the collection and
disposition” of Holocaust-era assets that “came into the pos-
session or control of the Federal Government.” Pub. L.
105–186, § 3(a)(1), 112 Stat. 612. For this purpose, Con-
gress directed the Commission to “encourage the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners to prepare a report
on the Holocaust-related claims practices of all insurance
companies, both domestic and foreign, doing business in the

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
429 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
United States at any time after January 30, 1933, that issued
any individual life, health, or property-casualty insurance
policy to any individual on any list of Holocaust victims.”
§ 3(a)(4)(A), 112 Stat. 613. These provisions are no help to
HVIRA. The Commission’s focus was limited to assets in
the possession of the Government, and if anything, the fed-
eral Act assumed it was the National Government’s responsi-
bility to deal with returning those assets. See § 3(d), 112
Stat. 614 (President to collect recommendations from the
commission and submit a suggested plan for “legislative, ad-
ministrative, or other action” to Congress). In any event,
the federal Act’s reference to the state insurance com-
missioners as compiling information was expressly limited
“to the degree the information is available,” § 3(a)(4)(B),
112 Stat. 613, a proviso that can hardly be read to condone
state sanctions interfering with federal efforts to resolve
such claims.
Indeed, it is worth noting that Congress has done nothing
to express disapproval of the President’s policy. Legislation
along the lines of HVIRA has been introduced in Congress
repeatedly, but none of the bills has come close to making it
into law. See H. R. 1210, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003);
S. 972, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); H. R. 2693, 107th Cong.,
1st Sess. (2001); H. R. 126, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
In sum, Congress has not acted on the matter addressed
here. Given the President’s independent authority “in the
areas of foreign policy and national security, . . . congres-
sional silence is not to be equated with congressional disap-
proval.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 291 (1981).
VI
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit is reversed.
So ordered.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
430 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Responding to Holocaust victims’ and their descendents’
long-frustrated efforts to collect unpaid insurance proceeds,
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999
(HVIRA), Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 13800 et seq. (West Cum.
Supp. 2003), requires insurance companies operating in the
State to disclose certain information about insurance policies
they or their affiliates wrote in Europe between 1920 and
1945. In recent years, the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government has become more visible in this area, undertak-
ing foreign policy initiatives aimed at resolving Holocaust-
era insurance claims. Although the federal approach differs
from California’s, no executive agreement or other formal
expression of foreign policy disapproves state disclosure laws
like the HVIRA. Absent a clear statement aimed at disclo-
sure requirements by the “one voice” to which courts prop-
erly defer in matters of foreign affairs, I would leave intact
California’s enactment.
I
As the Court observes, ante, at 401–402, and n. 1, the Nazi
regimentation of inhumanity we characterize as the Holo-
caust, marked most horrifically by genocide and enslave-
ment, also entailed widespread destruction, confiscation, and
theft of property belonging to Jews. For insurance policies
issued in Germany and other countries under Nazi control,
historical evidence bears out, the combined forces of the Ger-
man Government and the insurance industry engaged in lar-
cenous takings of gigantic proportions. For example, in-
surance policies covered many of the Jewish homes and
businesses destroyed in the state-sponsored pogrom known
as Kristallnacht. By order of the Nazi regime, claims aris-
ing out of the officially enabled destruction were made pay-
able not to the insured parties, but to the State. M. Bazyler,
Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s
Courts 114 (2003). In what one historian called a “charade

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
431 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
concocted by insurers and ministerial officials,” insurers sat-
isfied property loss claims by paying the State only a fraction
of their full value. G. Feldman, Allianz and the German
Insurance Business, 1933–1945, p. 227 (2001); see Bazyler,
supra, at 114; App. 27–28 (declaration of Rabbi Abraham
Cooper, Assoc. Dean, Simon Wiesenthal Center) (“There is
documentary evidence that the insurance companies paid
only one-half of the Jewish insurance proceeds to the Reich
and kept the other half for themselves.”).
The Court depicts Allied diplomacy after World War II as
aimed in part at settling confiscated and unpaid insurance
claims. Ante, at 403. But the multilateral negotiations
that produced the Potsdam, Yalta, and like accords failed to
achieve any global resolution of such claims. European in-
surers, encountering no official compulsion, were themselves
scarcely inclined to settle claims; turning claimants away,
they relied on the absence of formal documentation and other
technical infirmities that legions of Holocaust survivors were
in no position to remedy. See, e. g., Hearings on H. R. 2693
before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Finan-
cial Management and Intergovernmental Relations of the
House Committee on Government Reform, 107th Cong., 2d
Sess., 14–15 (2002) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“Some
survivors were rejected because they could not produce
death certificates for loved ones who perished in Nazi con-
centration camps. Other insurance companies took advan-
tage of the fact that claimants had no policy documents to
prove their policy existed.”). For over five decades, untold
Holocaust-era insurance claims went unpaid. Id., at 38
(statement of Leslie Tick, California Dept. of Insurance).
In the late 1990’s, litigation in American courts provided a
spur to action. See Bazyler, supra, at xi; Feldman, supra,
at vii; Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of
Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 Wash.
U. L. Q. 795, 796 (2002). Holocaust survivors and their de-
scendents initiated class-action suits against German and

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
432 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
other European firms seeking compensation for, inter alia,
the confiscation of Jewish bank assets, the use of Jewish
slave labor, and the failure to pay Jewish insurance claims.
See generally Bazyler, supra, at 1–171.
In the insurance industry, the litigation propelled a num-
ber of European companies to agree on a framework for
resolving unpaid claims outside the courts. This concord
prompted the 1998 creation of the International Commission
on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). A voluntary
claims settlement organization, ICHEIC comprises several
European insurers, Jewish and Holocaust survivor organiza-
tions, the State of Israel, and this country’s National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners. See S. Eizenstat, Imper-
fect Justice 266 (2003); Bazyler, supra, at 132.
As the Court observes, ante, at 407, ICHEIC has formu-
lated procedures for the filing, investigation, valuation, and
resolution of Holocaust-era insurance claims. At least until
very recently, however, ICHEIC’s progress has been slow
and insecure. See In re Assicurazioni Generali S. p. A. Ho-
locaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358 (SDNY 2002)
(quoting a 2001 press account describing ICHEIC as having
“repeatedly been at the point of collapse since its inception
in 1998”). Initially, ICHEIC’s insurance company members
represented little more than one-third of the Holocaust-era
insurance market. See App. 32 (declaration of Leslie Tick,
California Dept. of Insurance) (“The five insurance company
members of the ICHEIC represent approximately 35.5% of
the pre-World War II European insurance market.”); Eizen-
stat, supra, at 268 (despite repeated assurances that all Ger-
man insurance companies would join ICHEIC, “[t]hey never
have to this day”). Petitioners note that participation in
ICHEIC has expanded in the past year, see Reply Brief 8–9,
but it remains unclear whether ICHEIC does now or will
ever encompass all relevant insurers.
Moreover, ICHEIC has thus far settled only a tiny propor-
tion of the claims it has received. See Eizenstat, supra, at

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
433 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
267 (“ICHEIC’s administrative failings led to few claims paid
and large costs.”). Evidence submitted in a series of class
actions filed against Italian insurer Generali indicated that
by November 2001, ICHEIC had resolved only 797 of 77,000
claims. See In re Assicurazioni Generali, 228 F. Supp. 2d,
at 357. The latest reports show only modest increases.
See Treaster, Holocaust List Is Unsealed by Insurers, N. Y.
Times, Apr. 29, 2003, section A, p. 26, col. 6 (“In more than
four years of operation [ICHEIC] has offered $38.2 million—
or just short of the $40 million it had spent on expenses as
of 18 months ago—to 3,006 claimants.”).
Finally, although ICHEIC has directed its members to
publish lists of unpaid Holocaust-era policies, that non-
binding directive had not yielded significant compliance at
the time this case reached the Court. See Brief for Re-
spondent 10; Bazyler, Holocaust Justice, at 132 (“Using the
ICHEIC process, the European insurers have been able to
. . . avoid revealing the names of possible claim holders.”).
Shortly after oral argument, ICHEIC-participating German
insurers made more substantial disclosures. See N. Y.
Times, supra, at 26 (list of 363,232 names published in April
2003). But other insurers have been less forthcoming. For
a prime example, Generali—which may have sold more life
insurance and annuity policies in Eastern Europe during the
Holocaust than any other company, see Bazyler, supra, at
113—reportedly maintains a 340,000-name list of persons to
whom it sold insurance between 1918 and 1945, but has re-
fused to disclose the bulk of the information on the list. See
App. 37–38 (declaration of Leslie Tick, California Dept. of
Insurance); Brief for Respondent 5.
II
A
California’s disclosure law, the HVIRA, was enacted a
year after ICHEIC’s formation. Observing that at least
5,600 documented Holocaust survivors reside in California,

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
434 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Cal. Ins. Code Ann. § 13801(d) (West Cum. Supp. 2003), the
HVIRA declares that “[i]nsurance companies doing business
in the State of California have a responsibility to ensure that
any involvement they or their related companies may have
had with insurance policies of Holocaust victims [is] disclosed
to the state,” § 13801(e). The HVIRA accordingly requires
insurance companies doing business in California to disclose
information concerning insurance policies they or their affil-
iates sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945, § 13804(a), and
directs California’s Insurance Commissioner to store the in-
formation in a publicly accessible “Holocaust Era Insurance
Registry,” § 13803. The Commissioner is further directed to
suspend the license of any insurer that fails to comply with
the HVIRA’s reporting requirements. § 13806.
These measures, the HVIRA declares, are “necessary to
protect the claims and interests of California residents, as
well as to encourage the development of a resolution to these
issues through the international process or through direct
action by the State of California, as necessary.” § 13801(f).
Information published in the HVIRA’s registry could, for ex-
ample, reveal to a Holocaust survivor residing in California
the existence of a viable claim, which she could then present
to ICHEIC for resolution.1
The Court refers, ante, at 408–409, 426, to a number of
other California statutory provisions enabling the litigation
1 In addition, California may deem an insurer’s or its affiliate’s continu-
ing failure to resolve Holocaust-era claims relevant marketplace informa-
tion for California consumers. See Brief for Respondent 42–44; Brief for
National Association of Insurance Commissioners as Amicus Curiae 11–
13. The Court discounts the HVIRA’s pursuit of this objective, stressing
that the HVIRA covers only certain policies issued in Europe more than
50 years ago. Ante, at 425–426. But States have broad authority to reg-
ulate the insurance industry, Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U. S. 648, 653–655 (1981), and a State does
not exceed that authority by assigning special significance to an insurer’s
treatment of claims arising out of an era in which government and indus-
try collaborated to rob countless Holocaust victims of their property.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
435 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
of Holocaust-era insurance claims in California courts.
Those provisions, it bears emphasis, are not at issue here.
The HVIRA imposes no duty to pay any claim, nor does it
authorize litigation on any claim. It mandates only informa-
tion disclosure, and our assessment of the HVIRA is prop-
erly confined to that requirement alone.
B
The Federal Government, after prolonged inaction, has re-
sponded to the Holocaust-era insurance issue by diplomatic
means. Executive agreements with Germany, Austria, and
France, the Court observes, are the principal expressions of
the federal approach. Ante, at 413. Signed in July 2000,
the German Foundation Agreement establishes a voluntary
foundation, funded by public and private sources, to address
Holocaust-era claims. Agreement Concerning the Founda-
tion “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” 39 Int’l
Legal Materials 1298 (2000).2 “[I]t would be in the interests
of both parties,” the agreement declares, “for the Foundation
to be the exclusive remedy and forum for addressing . . . all
claims that have been or may be asserted against German
companies arising from the National Socialist era and World
War II.” Id., at 1299. In the case of insurance, the agree-
ment endorses ICHEIC as the appropriate forum for claims
resolution. Ibid.
The German Foundation Agreement commits the Federal
Government to certain conduct. It provides, for example,
that when a German company is sued in a United States
court on a Holocaust-era claim, the Federal Government will
file with the court a statement that “the President of the
United States has concluded that it would be in the foreign
policy interests of the United States for the [German] Foun-
dation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for the resolu-
tion of all asserted claims against German companies arising
2 The executive agreements with Austria and France are comparable.
See ante, at 408, and n. 3.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
436 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
from their involvement in the National Socialist era and
World War II.” Id., at 1303. The agreement also provides
that “[t]he United States will recommend dismissal on any
valid legal ground (which, under the U. S. system of jurispru-
dence, will be for the U. S. courts to determine).” Ibid.
The agreement makes clear, however, that “[t]he United
States does not suggest that its policy interests concerning
the Foundation in themselves provide an independent legal
basis for dismissal.” Id., at 1304.
III
A
The President’s primacy in foreign affairs, I agree with the
Court, empowers him to conclude executive agreements with
other countries. Ante, at 415. Our cases do not catalog the
subject matter meet for executive agreement,3 but we have
repeatedly acknowledged the President’s authority to make
such agreements to settle international claims. Ante, at
415–416. And in settling such claims, we have recognized,
an executive agreement may preempt otherwise permissi-
ble state laws or litigation. Ante, at 416–417. The execu-
tive agreements to which we have accorded preemptive
effect, however, warrant closer inspection than the Court
today endeavors.
In United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937), the
Court addressed the Litvinov Assignment, an executive
agreement incidental to the United States’ recognition of the
Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, the So-
viet Union assigned to the United States all its claims
against American nationals, including claims against New
3 “One is compelled to conclude that there are agreements which the
President can make on his sole authority and others which he can make
only with the consent of the Senate (or of both houses), but neither Justice
Sutherland [in United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937)] nor any one
else has told us which are which.” L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the
United States Constitution 222 (2d ed. 1996).

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
437 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
York banks holding accounts of Russian nationals that the
Soviet Government had earlier nationalized. The Federal
Government sued to recover the accounts thus assigned to
it. Applying New York law, the lower courts refused to en-
force the assignment; those courts held that the account-
nationalization upon which the assignment rested contra-
vened public policy. Id., at 325–327. This Court reversed,
concluding that “no state policy can prevail against the inter-
national compact here involved.” Id., at 327. The Litvinov
Assignment clearly assigned to the United States the claims
in issue; the enforceability of that assignment, the Court
stressed, “is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states.” Id., at 331.
United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), again ad-
dressed state-imposed obstacles to the Litvinov Assignment.
Reiterating its holding in Belmont, the Court confirmed that
no State may “deny enforcement of a claim under the Lit-
vinov Assignment because of an overriding policy of the
State.” 315 U. S., at 222. Pointing both to the assignment
itself and to a later exchange of diplomatic correspondence
clarifying its scope, see id., at 224–225, and n. 7, the Court
saw no “serious doubt that claims of the kind here in ques-
tion were included” in the “broad and inclusive” assignment,
id., at 224.
Four decades later, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S.
654 (1981), the Court gave effect to an executive agreement
arising out of the Iran hostage crisis. One of the agree-
ment’s announced “purpose[s]” was “to terminate all litiga-
tion as between the Government of each party and the na-
tionals of the other, and to bring about the settlement and
termination of all such claims through binding arbitration.”
Id., at 665 (quoting the agreement). The agreement called
for the formation of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
to arbitrate claims not settled within six months. Ibid. In
addition, under the agreement the United States undertook

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
438 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
“to terminate all legal proceedings in United States
courts involving claims of United States persons and in-
stitutions against Iran and its state enterprises, to nul-
lify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to
prohibit all further litigation based on such claims, and
to bring about the termination of such claims through
binding arbitration.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In line with these firm commitments, the Court held that the
agreement and the executive order implementing it validly
“suspended” litigation in United States courts against Ira-
nian interests. See id., at 686–688.
Notably, the Court in Dames & Moore was emphatic about
the “narrowness” of its decision. Id., at 688. “We do not
decide,” the Court cautioned, “that the President possesses
plenary power to settle claims, even as against foreign
governmental entities.” Ibid. Before sustaining the Presi-
dent’s action, the Court determined: (1) Congress “had
implicitly approved” the practice of claim settlement by
executive agreement, id., at 680; (2) the alternative forum
created under the executive agreement was “capable of pro-
viding meaningful relief,” id., at 687; (3) Congress had not in
any way disapproved or resisted the President’s action, id.,
at 687–688; and (4) the settlement of claims was “a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute
between our country and another,” id., at 688.
Together, Belmont, Pink, and Dames & Moore confirm
that executive agreements directed at claims settlement may
sometimes preempt state law. The Court states that if the
executive “agreements here had expressly preempted laws
like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.” Ante,
at 416–417. One can safely demur to that statement, for, as
the Court acknowledges, no executive agreement before us
expressly preempts the HVIRA. Ante, at 417. Indeed, no
agreement so much as mentions the HVIRA’s sole concern:
public disclosure.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
439 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
B
Despite the absence of express preemption, the Court
holds that the HVIRA interferes with foreign policy objec-
tives implicit in the executive agreements. See ibid. I
would not venture down that path.
The Court’s analysis draws substantially on Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U. S. 429 (1968). In that case, the Oregon courts
had applied an Oregon escheat statute to deny an inheritance
to a resident of a Communist bloc country. The Oregon
courts so ruled because the claimant failed to satisfy them
that his country’s laws would allow U. S. nationals to inherit
estates, nor had the claimant shown he would actually re-
ceive payments from the Oregon estate with no confiscation
by his home government. Id., at 432. Applying Oregon’s
statutory conditions, the Court concluded, required Oregon
courts to “launc[h] inquiries into the type of governments
that obtain in particular foreign nations,” id., at 434, render-
ing “unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on
a more authoritarian basis than our own,” id., at 440. Such
criticism had a “direct impact upon foreign relations,” the
Court said, id., at 441, and threatened to “impair the effec-
tive exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy,” id., at 440. The
Court therefore held the statute unconstitutional as applied
in that case. Id., at 433–434. But see id., at 432 (“We do
not accept the invitation to re-examine our ruling in Clark
v. Allen [331 U. S. 503 (1947)],” which held a substantively
similar California statute facially constitutional.).
We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided, and
I would not resurrect that decision here. The notion of
“dormant foreign affairs preemption” with which Zschernig
is associated resonates most audibly when a state action “re-
flect[s] a state policy critical of foreign governments and in-
volve[s] ‘sitting in judgment’ on them.” L. Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the United States Constitution 164 (2d ed. 1996);
see Constitutionality of South African Divestment Statutes
Enacted by State and Local Governments, 10 Op. Off. Legal

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
440 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Counsel 49, 50 (1986) (“[W]e believe that [Zschernig] repre-
sents the Court’s reaction to a particular regulatory statute,
the operation of which intruded extraordinarily deeply into
foreign affairs.”). The HVIRA entails no such state action
or policy. It takes no position on any contemporary foreign
government and requires no assessment of any existing for-
eign regime. It is directed solely at private insurers doing
business in California, and it requires them solely to disclose
information in their or their affiliates’ possession or control.
I would not extend Zschernig into this dissimilar domain.4
Neither would I stretch Belmont, Pink, or Dames &
Moore to support implied preemption by executive agree-
ment. In each of those cases, the Court gave effect to the
express terms of an executive agreement. In Dames &
Moore, for example, the Court addressed an agreement ex-
plicitly extinguishing certain suits in domestic courts. 453
U. S., at 665; see supra, at 437–438. Here, however, none of
the executive agreements extinguish any underlying claim
for relief. See Neuborne, 80 Wash. U. L. Q., at 824, n. 101.
The United States has agreed to file precatory statements
advising courts that dismissing Holocaust-era claims accords
with American foreign policy, but the German Foundation
Agreement confirms that such statements have no legally
binding effect. See 39 Int’l Legal Materials, at 1304; supra,
at 436. It remains uncertain, therefore, whether even liti-
gation on Holocaust-era insurance claims must be abated in
deference to the German Foundation Agreement or the par-
allel agreements with Austria and France. Indeed, ambigu-
4 The Court also places considerable weight on Crosby v. National For-
eign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363 (2000). As the Court acknowledges,
however, ante, at 423, Crosby was a statutory preemption case. The state
law there at issue posed “an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s
full objectives under the [relevant] federal Act.” 530 U. S., at 373. That
statutory decision provides little support for preempting a state law by
inferring preclusive foreign policy objectives from precatory language in
executive agreements.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
441 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
ity on this point appears to have been the studied aim of
the American negotiating team. See Eizenstat, Imperfect
Justice, at 272–273 (describing the “double negative” that
satisfied German negotiators and preserved the flexibility
sought by Justice Department litigators).
If it is uncertain whether insurance litigation may con-
tinue given the executive agreements on which the Court
relies, it should be abundantly clear that those agreements
leave disclosure laws like the HVIRA untouched. The con-
trast with the Litvinov Assignment at issue in Belmont and
Pink is marked. That agreement spoke directly to claim as-
signment in no uncertain terms; Belmont and Pink con-
firmed that state law could not invalidate the very as-
signments accomplished by the agreement. See supra, at
436–437. Here, the Court invalidates a state disclosure law
on grounds of conflict with foreign policy “embod[ied]” in
certain executive agreements, ante, at 417, although those
agreements do not refer to state disclosure laws specifically,
or even to information disclosure generally.5 It therefore is
surely an exaggeration to assert that the “HVIRA threat-
ens to frustrate the operation of the particular mechanism
the President has chosen” to resolve Holocaust-era claims.
Ante, at 424. If that were so, one might expect to find some
reference to laws like the HVIRA in the later-in-time execu-
tive agreements. There is none.
To fill the agreements’ silences, the Court points to state-
ments by individual members of the Executive Branch. See
ante, at 411 (letters from Deputy Secretary of the Treas-
5 The Court apparently finds in the executive agreements’ “express en-
dorsement of ICHEIC’s voluntary mechanism” a federal purpose to pre-
empt any information disclosure mechanism not controlled by ICHEIC
itself. Ante, at 423, n. 13. But nothing in the executive agreements sug-
gests that the Federal Government supports the resolution of Holocaust-
era insurance claims only to the extent they are based upon information
disclosed by ICHEIC. The executive agreements do not, for example,
prohibit recourse to ICHEIC to resolve claims based upon information
disclosed through laws like the HVIRA.

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
442 AMERICAN INS. ASSN. v. GARAMENDI
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
ury Stuart Eizenstat to California Governor Gray Davis and
the Insurance Commissioner of California); ante, at 422 (tes-
timony before Congress by Eizenstat, stating that a com-
pany’s participation in ICHEIC should give it “safe haven
from sanctions, subpoenas, and hearings relative to the Holo-
caust period” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But we
have never premised foreign affairs preemption on state-
ments of that order. Cf. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U. S. 298, 329–330 (1994) (“Execu-
tive Branch actions—press releases, letters, and amicus
briefs”—that “express federal policy but lack the force of
law” cannot render a state law unconstitutional under the
Foreign Commerce Clause.). We should not do so here lest
we place the considerable power of foreign affairs preemp-
tion in the hands of individual sub-Cabinet members of the
Executive Branch. Executive officials of any rank may of
course be expected “faithfully [to] represen[t] the President’s
chosen policy,” ante, at 423, n. 13, but no authoritative text
accords such officials the power to invalidate state law sim-
ply by conveying the Executive’s views on matters of federal
policy. The displacement of state law by preemption prop-
erly requires a considerably more formal and binding fed-
eral instrument.
Sustaining the HVIRA would not compromise the Presi-
dent’s ability to speak with one voice for the Nation. See
ante, at 424. To the contrary, by declining to invalidate
the HVIRA in this case, we would reserve foreign affairs
preemption for circumstances where the President, acting
under statutory or constitutional authority, has spoken
clearly to the issue at hand. “[T]he Framers did not make
the judiciary the overseer of our government.” Dames &
Moore, 453 U. S., at 660 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). And judges should not be the expositors of
the Nation’s foreign policy, which is the role they play by
acting when the President himself has not taken a clear

539US2 Unit: $U78 [07-05-05 18:52:13] PAGES PGT: OPIN
443 Cite as: 539 U. S. 396 (2003)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
stand. As I see it, courts step out of their proper role when
they rely on no legislative or even executive text, but only
on inference and implication, to preempt state laws on for-
eign affairs grounds.
In sum, assuming, arguendo, that an executive agreement
or similarly formal foreign policy statement targeting disclo-
sure could override the HVIRA, there is no such declaration
here. Accordingly, I would leave California’s enactment in
place, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.