MARYLAND v. PRINGLE

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366 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
MARYLAND v. PRINGLE
certiorari to the court of appeals of maryland
No. 02–809. Argued November 3, 2003—Decided December 15, 2003
A police officer stopped a car for speeding at 3:16 a.m.; searched the car,
seizing $763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the
back-seat armrest; and arrested the car’s three occupants after they
denied ownership of the drugs and money. Respondent Pringle, the
front-seat passenger, was convicted of possession with intent to distrib-
ute cocaine and possession of cocaine, and was sentenced to 10 years’
incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle’s knowledge and
dominion or control over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the
back armrest when Pringle was a front-seat passenger in a car being
driven by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for an
arrest for possession.
Held: Because the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest
did not contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Maryland
law authorizes police officers to execute warrantless arrests, inter alia,
where the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been
committed or is being committed in the officer’s presence. Here, it is
uncontested that the officer, upon recovering the suspected cocaine, had
probable cause to believe a felony had been committed; the question is
whether he had probable cause to believe Pringle committed that crime.
The “substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt,” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175,
and that belief must be particularized with respect to the person to be
searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91. To determine
whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, a court must
examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether
these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to” probable cause. Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U. S. 690, 696. As it is an entirely reasonable inference from
the facts here that any or all of the car’s occupants had knowledge of,
and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine, a reasonable offi-
cer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle com-
mitted the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly. Prin-
gle’s attempt to characterize this as a guilt-by-association case is

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367 Cite as: 540 U. S. 366 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
unavailing. Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, and United States v. Di Re, 332
U. S. 581, distinguished. Pp. 369–374.
370 Md. 525, 805 A. 2d 1016, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General of Maryland, argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were J. Joseph
Curran, Jr., Attorney General, and Kathryn Grill Graeff
and Shannon E. Avery, Assistant Attorneys General.
Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General
Chertoff, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah
Watson.
Nancy S. Forster argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Stephen E. Harris and Sherrie
Glasser.*
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied by
three men was stopped for speeding by a police officer. The
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio
et al. by Jim Petro, Attorney General of Ohio, Douglas R. Cole, State
Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor, and Diane Richards
Brey, Deputy Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Gregg Renkes
of Alaska, Christopher L. Morano of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Del-
aware, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Richard
P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay)
Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Ne-
vada, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, W. A. Drew Edmondson of
Oklahoma, Anabelle Rodrı´guez of Puerto Rico, Henry Dargan McMaster
of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas,
Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, and Darrell
V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foun-
dation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson.
Steven R. Shapiro and Lisa Kemler filed a brief for the American Civil
Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

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368 MARYLAND v. PRINGLE
Opinion of the Court
officer, upon searching the car, seized $763 of rolled-up cash
from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies of co-
caine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat.
After all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and
money, the officer arrested each of them. We hold that the
officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle—one of the
three men.
At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County Police
officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding. There were
three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow, the driver and
owner, respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, and
Otis Smith, the back-seat passenger. The officer asked
Partlow for his license and registration. When Partlow
opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle regis-
tration, the officer observed a large amount of rolled-up
money in the glove compartment. The officer returned to
his patrol car with Partlow’s license and registration to check
the computer system for outstanding violations. The com-
puter check did not reveal any violations. The officer re-
turned to the stopped car, had Partlow get out, and issued
him an oral warning.
After a second patrol car arrived, the officer asked Partlow
if he had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. Partlow
indicated that he did not. Partlow then consented to a
search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the
glove compartment and five plastic glassine baggies contain-
ing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest. When the
officer began the search the armrest was in the upright posi-
tion flat against the rear seat. The officer pulled down the
armrest and found the drugs, which had been placed between
the armrest and the back seat of the car.
The officer questioned all three men about the ownership
of the drugs and money, and told them that if no one ad-
mitted to ownership of the drugs he was going to arrest them
all. The men offered no information regarding the owner-

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ship of the drugs or money. All three were placed under
arrest and transported to the police station.
Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and gave an oral and
written confession in which he acknowledged that the co-
caine belonged to him, that he and his friends were going to
a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or “[u]se it
for sex.” App. 26. Pringle maintained that the other occu-
pants of the car did not know about the drugs, and they
were released.
The trial court denied Pringle’s motion to suppress his
confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding that the
officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. A jury con-
victed Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years’
incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 141 Md. App. 292,
785 A. 2d 790 (2001).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote, re-
versed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to show
Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs,
“the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Prin-
gle] was a front seat passenger in a car being driven by its
owner is insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest
for possession.” 370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1027
(2002). We granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 921 (2003), and
now reverse.
Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U. S. 643 (1961), the people are “to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . .” U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. Maryland law
authorizes police officers to execute warrantless arrests,
inter alia, for felonies committed in an officer’s presence or
where an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony

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370 MARYLAND v. PRINGLE
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has been committed or is being committed in the officer’s
presence. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 594B (1996) (repealed
2001). A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public
place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the offi-
cer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment
if the arrest is supported by probable cause. United States
v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 424 (1976); see Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 354 (2001) (stating that “[i]f an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has com-
mitted even a very minor criminal offense in his presence,
he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender”).
It is uncontested in the present case that the officer, upon
recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing sus-
pected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had
been committed. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 287 (1996) (re-
pealed 2002) (prohibiting possession of controlled dangerous
substances). The sole question is whether the officer had
probable cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime.1
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects
“citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with pri-
vacy and from unfounded charges of crime,” while giving
“fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protec-
tion.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949).
On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-
cause standard is a “ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ ”
that deals with “ ‘the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231 (1983)
(quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175–176); see, e. g., Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695 (1996); United States v. So-
kolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7–8 (1989). “[P]robable cause is a fluid
1 Maryland law defines “possession” as “the exercise of actual or con-
structive dominion or control over a thing by one or more persons.” Md.
Ann. Code, Art. 27, § 277(s) (1996) (repealed 2002).

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concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in par-
ticular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, re-
duced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 U. S., at 232.
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise defini-
tion or quantification into percentages because it deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circum-
stances. See ibid.; Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 175. We have
stated, however, that “[t]he substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,”
ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and
that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect
to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979). In Illinois v. Gates, we noted:
“As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely re-
lated context: ‘[T]he term “probable cause,” according to
its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which
would justify condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.’
More recently, we said that ‘the quanta . . . of proof ’
appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inappli-
cable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338
U. S., at 173. Finely tuned standards such as proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the
evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the
[probable-cause] decision.” 462 U. S., at 235.
To determine whether an officer had probable cause to ar-
rest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the
arrest, and then decide “whether these historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, amount to” probable cause, Ornelas, supra,
at 696.
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nis-
san Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash

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in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle.2 Five
plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat
armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning,
the three men failed to offer any information with respect to
the ownership of the cocaine or the money.
We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these
facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge
of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
Thus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there was
probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of
possession of cocaine, either solely or jointly.
Pringle’s attempt to characterize this case as a guilt-by-
association case is unavailing. His reliance on Ybarra v. Il-
linois, supra, and United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581
(1948), is misplaced. In Ybarra, police officers obtained a
warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for evidence
of possession of a controlled substance. Upon entering the
tavern, the officers conducted patdown searches of the cus-
tomers present in the tavern, including Ybarra. Inside a
cigarette pack retrieved from Ybarra’s pocket, an officer
found six tinfoil packets containing heroin. We stated:
“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others independently
suspected of criminal activity does not, without more,
2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland dismissed the $763 seized from the
glove compartment as a factor in the probable-cause determination, stat-
ing that “[m]oney, without more, is innocuous.” 370 Md. 524, 546, 805
A. 2d 1016, 1028 (2002). The court’s consideration of the money in isola-
tion, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mis-
taken in light of our precedents. See, e. g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213,
230–231 (1983) (opining that the totality of the circumstances approach is
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the
facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
been or is being committed”). We think it is abundantly clear from the
facts that this case involves more than money alone.

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give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sib-
ron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62–63 (1968). Where the
standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a per-
son must be supported by probable cause particularized
with respect to that person. This requirement cannot
be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact
that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search
or seize another or to search the premises where the
person may happen to be.” 444 U. S., at 91.
We held that the search warrant did not permit body
searches of all of the tavern’s patrons and that the police
could not pat down the patrons for weapons, absent individu-
alized suspicion. Id., at 92.
This case is quite different from Ybarra. Pringle and his
two companions were in a relatively small automobile, not a
public tavern. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295
(1999), we noted that “a car passenger—unlike the unwitting
tavern patron in Ybarra—will often be engaged in a common
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in
concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.”
Id., at 304–305. Here we think it was reasonable for the
officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men.
The quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likeli-
hood of drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would
be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the potential
to furnish evidence against him. In Di Re, a federal investi-
gator had been told by an informant, Reed, that he was to
receive counterfeit gasoline ration coupons from a certain
Buttitta at a particular place. The investigator went to the
appointed place and saw Reed, the sole occupant of the rear
seat of the car, holding gasoline ration coupons. There were
two other occupants in the car: Buttitta in the driver’s seat
and Di Re in the front passenger’s seat. Reed informed the
investigator that Buttitta had given him counterfeit coupons.
Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched.
After noting that the officers had no information implicating

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Di Re and no information pointing to Di Re’s possession of
coupons, unless presence in the car warranted that inference,
we concluded that the officer lacked probable cause to believe
that Di Re was involved in the crime. 332 U. S., at 592–594.
We said “[a]ny inference that everyone on the scene of a
crime is a party to it must disappear if the Government in-
former singles out the guilty person.” Id., at 594. No such
singling out occurred in this case; none of the three men
provided information with respect to the ownership of the
cocaine or money.
We hold that the officer had probable cause to believe that
Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a con-
trolled substance. Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contra-
vene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.