FELLERS v. UNITED STATES

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
519 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
No. 02–6320. Argued December 10, 2003—Decided January 26, 2004
Police officers went to petitioner’s home and advised him that they had
come to discuss his involvement in drug distribution. They told him
that they had a federal warrant for his arrest and that a grand jury had
indicted him for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. During
the course of a brief discussion, petitioner made several inculpatory
statements. Once at the county jail, petitioner was advised of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and Patterson v. Illi-
nois, 487 U. S. 285, signed a waiver of those rights, and reiterated his
earlier statements. Before trial, he moved to suppress the inculpatory
statements he made at his home and at the jail. A Magistrate Judge
recommended that the home statements be suppressed because the offi-
cers had not informed petitioner of his Miranda rights, and that por-
tions of his jailhouse statements be suppressed as fruits of the prior
failure to provide Miranda warnings. The District Court suppressed
the unwarned home statements but admitted the jailhouse statements
pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, concluding that petitioner
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before mak-
ing the statements. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, hold-
ing that petitioner’s jailhouse statements were properly admitted under
Elstad, and that the officers had not violated his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel under Patterson because they did not interrogate him at his
home.
Held: The Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the absence of an “interro-
gation” foreclosed petitioner’s claim that his jailhouse statements should
have been suppressed as fruits of the statements taken from him at his
home. Pp. 523–525.
(a) An accused is denied the protections of the Sixth Amendment
“when there [is] used against him at his trial . . . his own incriminating
words, which federal agents . . . deliberately elicited from him after
he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” Massiah v.
United States, 377 U. S. 201, 206. This Court has consistently applied
the deliberate-elicitation standard in subsequent Sixth Amendment
cases, see, e. g., United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, and has expressly
distinguished it from the Fifth Amendment custodial-interrogation
standard, see, e. g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625. There is no

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
520 FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
question here that the officers “deliberately elicited” information from
petitioner at his home. Because their discussion took place after peti-
tioner had been indicted, outside the presence of counsel, and in the
absence of any waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights, the officers’ ac-
tions violated the Sixth Amendment standards established in Massiah,
supra, and its progeny. Pp. 523–525.
(b) Because of its erroneous determination that petitioner was not
questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment standards, the Eighth Cir-
cuit improperly conducted its “fruits” analysis under the Fifth Amend-
ment. In applying Elstad, supra, to hold that the admissibility of the
jailhouse statements turned solely on whether they were knowing
and voluntary, the court did not reach the question whether the Sixth
Amendment requires suppression of those statements on the ground
that they were the fruits of previous questioning that violated the Sixth
Amendment deliberate-elicitation standard. As this Court has not had
occasion to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a sus-
pect makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police questioning
in violation of Sixth Amendment standards, the case is remanded to the
Eighth Circuit to address this issue in the first instance. P. 525.
285 F. 3d 721, reversed and remanded.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Seth P. Waxman, by appointment of the Court, 538 U. S.
997, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
was Paul R. Q. Wolfson.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Wray, John P.
Elwood, and Joel M. Gershowitz.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
After a grand jury indicted petitioner John J. Fellers, po-
lice officers arrested him at his home. During the course of
the arrest, petitioner made several inculpatory statements.
*Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Crimi-
nal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Alfred P. Carlton and Thomas C. Goldstein filed a brief for the Ameri-
can Bar Association as amicus curiae.

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
521 Cite as: 540 U. S. 519 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
He argued that the officers deliberately elicited these state-
ments from him outside the presence of counsel, and that the
admission at trial of the fruits of those statements therefore
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Petitioner
contends that in rejecting this argument, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit improperly held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was “not applicable” because
“the officers did not interrogate [petitioner] at his home.”
285 F. 3d 721, 724 (2002). We granted the petition for a writ
of certiorari, 538 U. S. 905 (2003), and now reverse.
I
On February 24, 2000, after a grand jury indicted peti-
tioner for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, Lin-
coln Police Sergeant Michael Garnett and Lancaster County
Deputy Sheriff Jeff Bliemeister went to petitioner’s home
in Lincoln, Nebraska, to arrest him. App. 111. The officers
knocked on petitioner’s door and, when petitioner answered,
identified themselves and asked if they could come in. Ibid.
Petitioner invited the officers into his living room. Ibid.
The officers advised petitioner they had come to discuss
his involvement in methamphetamine distribution. Id., at
112. They informed petitioner that they had a federal war-
rant for his arrest and that a grand jury had indicted him
for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Ibid. The
officers told petitioner that the indictment referred to his
involvement with certain individuals, four of whom they
named. Ibid. Petitioner then told the officers that he
knew the four people and had used methamphetamine during
his association with them. Ibid.
After spending about 15 minutes in petitioner’s home, the
officers transported petitioner to the Lancaster County jail.
Ibid. There, the officers advised petitioner for the first time
of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U. S. 285 (1988). App. 112.
Petitioner and the two officers signed a Miranda waiver

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
522 FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
form, and petitioner then reiterated the inculpatory state-
ments he had made earlier, admitted to having associated
with other individuals implicated in the charged conspiracy,
App. 29–39, and admitted to having loaned money to one of
them even though he suspected that she was involved in
drug transactions, id., at 34.
Before trial, petitioner moved to suppress the inculpatory
statements he made at his home and at the county jail. A
Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing and recommended
that the statements petitioner made at his home be sup-
pressed because the officers had not informed petitioner of
his Miranda rights. App. 110–111. The Magistrate Judge
found that petitioner made the statements in response to the
officers’ “implici[t] questions,” noting that the officers had
told petitioner that the purpose of their visit was to dis-
cuss his use and distribution of methamphetamine. Id., at
110. The Magistrate Judge further recommended that por-
tions of petitioner’s jailhouse statement be suppressed as
fruits of the prior failure to provide Miranda warnings.
App. 110–111.
The District Court suppressed the “unwarned” statements
petitioner made at his house but admitted petitioner’s jail-
house statements pursuant to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298
(1985), concluding petitioner had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights before making the statements.
App. 112–115.
Following a jury trial at which petitioner’s jailhouse state-
ments were admitted into evidence, petitioner was convicted
of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute metham-
phetamine. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his jailhouse
statements should have been suppressed as fruits of the
statements obtained at his home in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 285 F. 3d
721 (CA8 2002). With respect to petitioner’s argument that
the officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings at his
home violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
523 Cite as: 540 U. S. 519 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Patterson, supra, the Court of Appeals stated: “Patterson is
not applicable here . . . for the officers did not interrogate
[petitioner] at his home.” 285 F. 3d, at 724. The Court of
Appeals also concluded that the statements from the jail
were properly admitted under the rule of Elstad, supra.
285 F. 3d, at 724 (“ ‘Though Miranda requires that the
unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility
of any subsequent statement should turn in these circum-
stances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily
made’ ” (quoting Elstad, supra, at 309)).
Judge Riley filed a concurring opinion. He concluded that
during their conversation at petitioner’s home, officers “de-
liberately elicited incriminating information” from petitioner.
285 F. 3d, at 726–727. That “post-indictment conduct out-
side the presence of counsel,” Judge Riley reasoned, violated
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. Id., at 727. Judge
Riley nevertheless concurred in the judgment, concluding
that the jailhouse statements were admissible under the ra-
tionale of Elstad in light of petitioner’s knowing and volun-
tary waiver of his right to counsel. 285 F. 3d, at 727.
II
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered “at or
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated
. . . ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.’ ” Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U. S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U. S. 682, 689 (1972)). We have held that an accused is de-
nied “the basic protections” of the Sixth Amendment “when
there [is] used against him at his trial evidence of his own
incriminating words, which federal agents . . . deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the ab-
sence of his counsel.” Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S.
201, 206 (1964); cf. Patterson, supra (holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not bar postindictment questioning in the
absence of counsel if a defendant waives the right to counsel).

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
524 FELLERS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
We have consistently applied the deliberate-elicitation
standard in subsequent Sixth Amendment cases, see United
States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 270 (1980) (“The question here
is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent
‘deliberately elicited’ incriminating statements . . . within the
meaning of Massiah”); Brewer, supra, at 399 (finding a Sixth
Amendment violation where a detective “deliberately and
designedly set out to elicit information from [the suspect]”),
and we have expressly distinguished this standard from
the Fifth Amendment custodial-interrogation standard, see
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625, 632, n. 5 (1986) (“[T]he
Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel . . . even when
there is no interrogation and no Fifth Amendment applicabil-
ity”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 300, n. 4 (1980)
(“The definitions of ‘interrogation’ under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, if indeed the term ‘interrogation’ is even apt
in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily inter-
changeable”); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment provides the right to
counsel at a postindictment lineup even though the Fifth
Amendment is not implicated).
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the absence
of an “interrogation” foreclosed petitioner’s claim that the
jailhouse statements should have been suppressed as fruits
of the statements taken from petitioner at his home. First,
there is no question that the officers in this case “deliberately
elicited” information from petitioner. Indeed, the officers,
upon arriving at petitioner’s house, informed him that their
purpose in coming was to discuss his involvement in the dis-
tribution of methamphetamine and his association with cer-
tain charged co-conspirators. 285 F. 3d, at 723; App. 112.
Because the ensuing discussion took place after petitioner
had been indicted, outside the presence of counsel, and in the
absence of any waiver of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment
rights, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the offi-

540US2 Unit: $U16 [11-01-05 13:36:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN
525 Cite as: 540 U. S. 519 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
cers’ actions did not violate the Sixth Amendment standards
established in Massiah, supra, and its progeny.
Second, because of its erroneous determination that peti-
tioner was not questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment
standards, the Court of Appeals improperly conducted its
“fruits” analysis under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically,
it applied Elstad to hold that the admissibility of the jail-
house statements turns solely on whether the statements
were “ ‘knowingly and voluntarily made.’ ” 285 F. 3d, at 724
(quoting Elstad, 470 U. S., at 309). The Court of Appeals
did not reach the question whether the Sixth Amendment
requires suppression of petitioner’s jailhouse statements on
the ground that they were the fruits of previous questioning
conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-
elicitation standard. We have not had occasion to decide
whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect
makes incriminating statements after a knowing and volun-
tary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier
police questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment stand-
ards. We therefore remand to the Court of Appeals to ad-
dress this issue in the first instance.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.