MUHAMMAD, aka MEASE v. CLOSE

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Syllabus
MUHAMMAD, aka MEASE v. CLOSE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 02–9065. Argued December 1, 2003—Decided February 25, 2004
Under federal law, challenges to the validity of confinement or its duration
are the province of habeas corpus, but requests for relief turning on
confinement circumstances may be raised under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Where a prisoner’s § 1983 action would implicitly question the convic-
tion’s validity or sentence’s duration, the litigant must first achieve
favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, oppor-
tunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477. Heck has been applied in a § 1983 challenge
to a prison’s administrative action that could affect a prisoner’s credits
toward release based on good time served, Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U. S. 641, but is not implicated by a challenge that threatens no conse-
quence for a prisoner’s conviction or his sentence’s duration. Here,
prison rules required prehearing detention when petitioner Muhammad,
an inmate, was charged with “threatening behavior” in the aftermath
of a confrontation with respondent Close, a prison official. Muhammad
was acquitted of threatening behavior at a hearing six days later, but
was found guilty of insolence, for which prehearing detention would not
have been mandatory. He then filed this § 1983 action, alleging that
Close had charged him with threatening behavior (subjecting him to
prehearing lockup) in retaliation for prior lawsuits and grievance pro-
ceedings against Close. His amended complaint did not challenge his
insolence conviction, or the hearing, and did not seek to expunge the
misconduct finding, seeking only damages for alleged physical, mental,
and emotional injuries sustained during his prehearing detention. Ac-
cepting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the District Court
granted Close summary judgment on the ground that Muhammad had
failed to present sufficient evidence of retaliation to raise a material fact
as to that element. In affirming, the Sixth Circuit found the action
barred by Heck because Muhammad had sought expungement of the
misconduct charge from the prison record when he could seek such relief
only after satisfying Heck’s favorable termination requirement.
Held: The Sixth Circuit’s decision was flawed as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law. In making the erroneous factual finding that Muhammad
had sought to expunge the misconduct charge from his prison record,
the court simply overlooked his amended complaint that sought no such

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relief. This error was compounded by the court’s mistaken view that
Heck applies categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary
proceedings. The administrative determinations here do not raise any
implication about the conviction’s validity and do not necessarily affect
the duration of time to be served. The effect of disciplinary proceed-
ings on good-time credits is a matter of state law or regulation, and in
this case, the Magistrate Judge expressly found or assumed that no such
credits were eliminated by the challenged prehearing action. Because
Muhammad raised no claim on which habeas relief could have been
granted, Heck’s favorable termination requirement does not apply.
Having previously failed to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s decision
that good-time credits were not affected by the allegedly retaliatory
overcharge of threatening behavior and consequential prehearing deten-
tion, Close has waived the 11th-hour contention that Heck is squarely
on point.
47 Fed. Appx. 738, reversed and remanded.
Corinne Beckwith, by appointment of the Court, 539 U. S.
925, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the brief
were James W. Klein, Samia Fam, and Giovanna Shay.
Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued
the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Mi-
chael A. Cox, Attorney General, and Linda M. Olivieri and
Kevin Himebaugh*
Per Curiam.
I
Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on com-
plaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus,
28 U. S. C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particu-
lars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus,
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 500 (1973); requests for
relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be pre-
sented in a § 1983 action. Some cases are hybrids, with a
*Alphonse A. Gerhardstein filed a brief for the Prison Reform Advocacy
Center as amicus curiae urging reversal.

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prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably dam-
ages, but on allegations that not only support a claim for
recompense, but imply the invalidity either of an underlying
conviction or of a particular ground for denying release short
of serving the maximum term of confinement. In Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), we held that where success
in a prisoner’s § 1983 damages action would implicitly ques-
tion the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the
litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his avail-
able state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the
underlying conviction or sentence. Accordingly, in Edwards
v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), we applied Heck in the cir-
cumstances of a § 1983 action claiming damages and equitable
relief for a procedural defect in a prison’s administrative
process, where the administrative action taken against the
plaintiff could affect credits toward release based on good
time served. In each instance, conditioning the right to
bring a § 1983 action on a favorable result in state litiga-
tion or federal habeas served the practical objective of pre-
serving limitations on the availability of habeas remedies.
Federal petitions for habeas corpus may be granted only
after other avenues of relief have been exhausted. 28
U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509
(1982). Prisoners suing under § 1983, in contrast, generally
face a substantially lower gate, even with the requirement of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that administrative
opportunities be exhausted first. 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a).
Heck’s requirement to resort to state litigation and federal
habeas before § 1983 is not, however, implicated by a prison-
er’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his convic-
tion or the duration of his sentence.1 There is no need to
1 The assumption is that the incarceration that matters under Heck is
the incarceration ordered by the original judgment of conviction, not spe-
cial disciplinary confinement for infraction of prison rules. This Court
has never followed the speculation in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475,
499 (1973), that such a prisoner subject to “additional and unconstitutional

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preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment
under Heck in such a case, of which this is an example.2
II
A
This suit grew out of a confrontation between petitioner,
Muhammad, an inmate, and the respondent Michigan prison
official, Close. App. 70. According to his amended com-
plaint, Muhammad was eating breakfast when he saw Close
“staring at him through the hallway window.” Id., at 71.
Eventually Muhammad stared back, provoking Close to as-
sume “a fighting stance” and “com[e] into the dining area at
a fast pace with his face contorted.” Ibid. Muhammad
stood up and faced him, and when the two were within a foot
of one another, Close asked, “whats [sic] up,” all the while
“staring angerly [sic].” In the aftermath of the confron-
tation, Muhammad was handcuffed, taken to a detention
cell, and charged with violating the prison rule prohibiting
“Threatening Behavior.” (Emphasis deleted.) 3 Under the
rules, special detention was required prior to a hearing on
the charge, which occurred six days later. Muhammad was
acquitted of threatening behavior, but found guilty of the
lesser infraction of insolence, for which prehearing detention
would not have been mandatory.4 Ibid. Muhammad was
restraints” might have a habeas claim independent of § 1983, and the con-
tention is not raised by the State here.
2 Members of the Court have expressed the view that unavailability of
habeas for other reasons may also dispense with the Heck requirement.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 491 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring
in judgment); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 21–22 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). This case is no occasion to settle the issue.
3 The Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive,
No. 03.03.105 (June 6, 1994) (Directive), defines “Threatening Behavior”
as “Words, actions or other behavior which expresses a[n] intent to injure
or physically abuse another person.” App. 40 (emphasis deleted).
4 The Directive defines “Insolence” as “Words, actions, or other behavior
which is intended to harass, or cause alarm in an employee.” Id., at 44
(emphasis deleted).

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required to serve an additional 7 days of detention and de-
prived of privileges for 30 days as penalties for insolence.
Ibid.
Muhammad then brought this § 1983 action, alleging that
Close had charged him with threatening behavior (and sub-
jected him to mandatory prehearing lockup) in retaliation for
prior lawsuits and grievance proceedings against Close. Id.,
at 72. He amended his original complaint after obtaining
counsel, and neither in his amended complaint nor at any
subsequent juncture did Muhammad challenge his conviction
for insolence, or the subsequent disciplinary action. See
Brief for Petitioner 42. The amended complaint sought no
expungement of the misconduct finding, and in fact Muham-
mad conceded that the insolence determination was justified.
The only relief sought was $10,000 in compensatory and puni-
tive damages “for the physical, mental and emotional injuries
sustained” during the six days of prehearing detention man-
dated by the charge of threatening behavior attributable to
Close’s retaliatory motive. App. 72.
Following discovery, the Magistrate Judge recommended
summary judgment for Close on the ground that Muhammad
had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence of retalia-
tion to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to that ele-
ment. Id., at 63. The District Court adopted the recom-
mendation. Id., at 70.
B
Muhammad then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which, by an opinion desig-
nated not for publication, affirmed the summary judgment
for Close, though not on the basis recommended by the Mag-
istrate Judge and adopted by the District Court. 47 Fed.
Appx. 738 (2002). Instead of considering the conclusion that
Muhammad had produced inadequate evidence of retaliation,
a ground that would have been dispositive if sustained, the
Court of Appeals held the action barred by Heck because
Muhammad had sought, among other relief, the expunge-

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ment of the misconduct charge from the prison record. Re-
lying upon Circuit precedent, see Huey v. Stine, 230 F. 3d
226 (2000), the Court of Appeals held that an action under
§ 1983 to expunge his misconduct charge and for other relief
occasioned by the misconduct proceedings could be brought
only after satisfying Heck’s favorable termination require-
ment. The Circuit thus maintained a split on the applicabil-
ity of Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings in the absence
of any implication going to the fact or duration of underlying
sentence, four Circuits having taken the contrary view. See
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F. 3d 532, 542–544 (CA3 2002); DeWalt
v. Carter, 224 F. 3d 607, 613 (CA7 2000); Jenkins v. Haubert,
179 F. 3d 19, 27 (CA2 1999); Brown v. Plaut, 131 F. 3d 163,
167–169 (CADC 1997). We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict, 539 U. S. 925 (2003), and now reverse.
III
The decision of the Court of Appeals was flawed as a mat-
ter of fact and as a matter of law. Its factual error was the
assumption that Muhammad sought to expunge the miscon-
duct charge from his prison record. The court simply over-
looked the amended complaint that sought no such relief.
The factual error was compounded by following the mis-
taken view expressed in Circuit precedent that Heck applies
categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings. But these administrative determinations do not
as such raise any implication about the validity of the under-
lying conviction, and although they may affect the duration
of time to be served (by bearing on the award or revocation
of good-time credits) that is not necessarily so. The effect
of disciplinary proceedings on good-time credits is a matter
of state law or regulation, and in this case, the Magistrate
Judge expressly found or assumed that no good-time credits
were eliminated by the prehearing action Muhammad called
in question. His § 1983 suit challenging this action could not
therefore be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with

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his conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be
served in accordance with the underlying sentence. That is,
he raised no claim on which habeas relief could have been
granted on any recognized theory, with the consequence that
Heck’s favorable termination requirement was inapplicable.
IV
Close tries to salvage the appellate court’s judgment by
arguing for the first time here that Heck is squarely on point
because, if the § 1983 suit succeeded, Muhammad would be
entitled to restoration of some good-time credits with the
result of less time to be spent in prison. Brief for Respond-
ent 17–18. But this eleventh-hour contention was waived.
The Magistrate Judge’s report stated that good-time credits
were not affected by the allegedly retaliatory overcharge of
threatening behavior and the consequential prehearing de-
tention Muhammad complained of, and Close had every op-
portunity to challenge the Magistrate Judge’s position in the
District Court and in the Court of Appeals. Having failed
to raise the claim when its legal and factual premises could
have been litigated, Close cannot raise it now. See Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 464 (1997).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for consideration of sum-
mary judgment on the ground adopted by the District Court,
and for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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