JONES et al., on behalf of herself and a class of others similarly situated v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.

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369 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
JONES et al., on behalf of herself and a class of
others similarly situated v. R. R. DONNELLEY
& SONS CO.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 02–1205. Argued February 24, 2004—Decided May 3, 2004
After this Court held that federal courts should apply the most appro-
priate state statute of limitations to claims arising under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981, which contains no statute of limitations, see Goodman v. Lukens
Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 660, Congress enacted a 4-year statute of limita-
tions for causes of action “arising under an Act of Congress enacted
after [December 1, 1990],” 28 U. S. C. § 1658. Petitioners, African-
American former employees of respondent, filed a class action alleging
violations of § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Re-
spondent sought summary judgment, claiming that the applicable state
2-year statute of limitations barred their claims, but the District Court
held that petitioners’ wrongful discharge, refusal to transfer, and hostile
work environment claims arose under the 1991 Act and therefore are
governed by § 1658. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that
§ 1658 does not apply to a cause of action based on a post-1990 amend-
ment to a pre-existing statute.
Held: Petitioners’ causes of action are governed by § 1658. Pp. 375–385.
(a) Because the meaning of “arising under” in § 1658 is ambiguous,
Congress’ intent must be ascertained by looking beyond the section’s
bare text to the context in which it was enacted and the purposes it was
designed to accomplish. Pp. 375–377.
(b) Before § 1658’s enactment, Congress’ failure to pass a uniform lim-
itations statute for federal causes of action had created a void that
spawned a vast amount of litigation. The settled practice of borrowing
state statutes of limitations generated a host of issues, such as which of
the forum State’s statutes was the most appropriate, whether the forum
State’s law or that of the situs of the injury controlled, and when a
statute of limitations could be tolled. Congress was keenly aware of
these problems, and a central purpose of § 1658 was to minimize the
need for borrowing. That purpose would not be served if § 1658 were
interpreted to reach only entirely new sections of the United States
Code. An amendment to an existing statute is no less an “Act of Con-
gress” than a new, stand-alone statute. What matters is the new rights
of action and corresponding liabilities created by the enactment. Thus,

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370 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Syllabus
a cause of action “aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted” after De-
cember 1, 1990—and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of
limitations—if the plaintiff ’s claim against the defendant was made pos-
sible by a post-1990 enactment. This construction best serves Con-
gress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of
borrowing state statutes of limitations, while protecting litigants’ set-
tled expectations by applying only to causes of actions not available
until after December 1, 1990. It also is consistent with the common
usage of “arise” and with this Court’s interpretations of “arising under”
as it is used in statutes governing the scope of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. Pp. 377–383.
(c) Petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and
failure to transfer claims all “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act in the sense
that they were made possible by that Act. The 1991 Act overturned
this Court’s decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S.
164, 171, which held that racial harassment relating to employment con-
ditions was not actionable under § 1981. The Act redefined § 1981’s key
“make and enforce contracts” language to include the “termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and condi-
tions of the contractual relationship,” § 1981(b). In Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, this Court held that the amendment en-
larged the category of conduct subject to § 1981 liability, id., at 303, and
thus did not apply to a case that arose before it was enacted, id., at 300.
Rivers’ reasoning supports the conclusion that the 1991 Act qualifies as
an “Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990].” Petitioners’
causes of action clearly arose under the 1991 Act, and the hypothetical
problems posited by respondent and the Seventh Circuit pale in compar-
ison with the difficulties that federal courts faced for decades in try-
ing to answer questions raised by borrowing state limitations rules.
Pp. 383–385.
305 F. 3d 717, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
H. Candace Gorman argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioners.
Gregory G. Garre argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Wiggins, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Den-
nis J. Dimsey, and Linda F. Thome.

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Opinion of the Court
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Virginia A. Seitz, Jonathan F. Cohn,
Richard H. Schnadig, Thomas G. Abram, and Lawrence L.
Summers.
Kevin Newsom, Solicitor General of Alabama, argued the
cause for the State of Alabama et al. as amici curiae urging
affirmance. On the brief were William H. Pryor, Jr., Attor-
ney General, Nathan A. Forrester, former Solicitor General,
and the Attorneys General for their respective States as fol-
lows: Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Richard P. Ieyoub of Loui-
siana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Greg Abbott of
Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah.*
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Like many federal statutes, 42 U. S. C. § 1981 does not con-
tain a statute of limitations. We held in Goodman v. Lukens
Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 660 (1987), that federal courts should
apply “the most appropriate or analogous state statute of
limitations” to claims based on asserted violations of § 1981.
Three years after our decision in Goodman, Congress en-
acted a catchall 4-year statute of limitations for actions
arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1,
1990. 28 U. S. C. § 1658. The question in this case is
whether petitioners’ causes of action, which allege violations
of § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991
Act), 105 Stat. 1071, are governed by § 1658 or by the per-
sonal injury statute of limitations of the forum State.
I
Petitioners are African-American former employees of re-
spondent’s Chicago manufacturing division. On November
*Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Michael L. Foreman,
Kristin M. Dadey, Dennis Courtland Hayes, and Vincent A. Eng filed a
brief for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal.
Ann Elizabeth Reesman filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advi-
sory Council as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

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372 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Opinion of the Court
25, 1996, petitioners filed this class action alleging violations
of their rights under § 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act.
Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they
were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given
an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or
denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chi-
cago plant. Respondent sought summary judgment on the
ground that petitioners’ claims are barred by the applicable
Illinois statute of limitations because they arose more than
two years before the complaint was filed. Petitioners re-
sponded that their claims are governed by § 1658, which pro-
vides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action
arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of
the enactment of this section may not be commenced later
than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.” 1 Section
1658 was enacted on December 1, 1990. Thus, petitioners’
claims are subject to the 4-year statute of limitations if they
arose under an Act of Congress enacted after that date.
The original version of the statute now codified at Rev.
Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, was enacted as § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. It was amended in minor
respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, see Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 427 U. S. 160, 168–169, n. 8 (1976), but its basic cover-
age did not change prior to 1991. As first enacted, § 1981
provided in relevant part that “all persons [within the juris-
diction of the United States] shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory . . . to make and enforce contracts
. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 14 Stat. 27. We held
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989),
1 In 2002, Congress amended § 1658 to add a separate provision (subsec-
tion (b)) specifying the statute of limitations for certain securities law
claims. Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Pub.
L. 107–204, § 804(a), 116 Stat. 801. The original language of § 1658 (quoted
above) was left unchanged but is now set forth in subsection (a). See 28
U. S. C. § 1658(a) (2000 ed., Supp. III).

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Opinion of the Court
that the statutory right “to make and enforce contracts” did
not protect against harassing conduct that occurred after the
formation of the contract. Under that holding, it is clear
that petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful dis-
charge, and refusal to transfer claims do not state violations
of the original version of § 1981. In 1991, however, Con-
gress responded to Patterson by adding a new subsection to
§ 1981 that defines the term “ ‘make and enforce contracts’ ”
to include the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the con-
tractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b).2 It is undis-
puted that petitioners have alleged violations of the amended
statute. The critical question, then, is whether petitioners’
causes of action “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act or under § 1981
as originally enacted.
The District Court determined that petitioners’ wrongful
termination, refusal to transfer, and hostile work environ-
ment claims arose under the 1991 Act and therefore are gov-
erned by § 1658. Adams v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons, 149
2 The current version of § 1981 reads as follows:
“(a) Statement of equal rights
“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
“(b) ‘Make and enforce contracts’ defined
“For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts’
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of con-
tracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship.
“(c) Protection against impairment
“The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment
by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State
law.”

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374 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Opinion of the Court
F. Supp. 2d 459 (ND Ill. 2001).3 In its view, the plain text
of § 1658 compels the conclusion that, “whenever Congress,
after December 1990, passes legislation that creates a new
cause of action, the catch-all statute of limitations applies to
that cause of action.” Id., at 464. The 1991 amendment to
§ 1981 falls within that category, the court reasoned, because
it opened the door to claims of postcontract discrimination
that, under Patterson, could not have been brought under
§ 1981 as enacted. 149 F. Supp. 2d, at 464.
The District Court certified its ruling for an interlocutory
appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), and the Court of Ap-
peals reversed. 305 F. 3d 717 (CA7 2002). It concluded
that § 1658 “applies only when an act of Congress creates a
wholly new cause of action, one that does not depend on the
continued existence of a statutory cause of action previously
enacted and kept in force by the amendment.” Id., at 726.
The 1991 amendment does not satisfy that test, the court
explained, because the text of § 1981(b) “simply cannot stand
on its own”; instead, it merely redefines a term in the origi-
nal statute without altering the text that “provides the basic
right of recovery for an individual whose constitutional
rights have been violated.” Id., at 727.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that § 1658 does not
apply to a cause of action based on a post-1990 amendment
to a pre-existing statute is consistent with decisions from the
Third and Eighth Circuits. See Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219
F. 3d 220, 224 (CA3 2000); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F. 3d
780, 798 (CA8 2001). Conversely, the Courts of Appeals for
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that § 1658 applies
“whenever Congress, after December 1990, passes legislation
3 The court found matters somewhat less clear with respect to petition-
ers’ claims regarding their employee status (which involved allegations
that respondent has a practice of using its African-American employees as
“ ‘temporary’ ” or “ ‘casual’ ” employees), and directed the parties to “sort
out this question amongst themselves in light of ” its ruling. 149 F. Supp.
2d, at 460, 465.

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Opinion of the Court
that creates a new cause of action,” whether or not the leg-
islation amends a pre-existing statute. Harris v. Allstate
Insurance Co., 300 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (CA10 2002); accord,
Anthony v. BTR Automotive Sealing Systems, Inc., 339 F.
3d 506, 514 (CA6 2003). We granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict in the Circuits, 538 U. S. 1030 (2003), and now
reverse.
II
Petitioners, supported by the United States as amicus cu-
riae, argue that reversal is required by the “plain language”
of § 1658, which prescribes a 4-year statute of limitations for
“civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted
after” December 1, 1990. They point out that the 1991 Act
is, by its own terms, an “Act” of Congress that was “enacted”
after December 1, 1990. See Pub. L. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071.
Moreover, citing our interpretations of the term “arising
under” in other federal statutes and in Article III of the
Constitution, petitioners maintain that their causes of action
arose under the 1991 Act.
Respondent concedes that the 1991 Act qualifies as an
“Act of Congress enacted” after 1991, but argues that the
meaning of the term “arising under” is not so clear. We
agree. Although our expositions of the “arising under” con-
cept in other contexts are helpful in interpreting the term
as it is used in § 1658, they do not point the way to one obvi-
ous answer. For example, Chief Justice Marshall’s state-
ment that a case arises under federal law for purposes of
Article III jurisdiction whenever federal law “forms an in-
gredient of the original cause,” Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823 (1824), supports petitioners’ view
that their causes of action arose under the 1991 amendment
to § 1981, because the 1991 Act clearly “forms an ingredient”
of petitioners’ claims.4 But the same could be said of the
4 Indeed, the same would appear to be true of virtually any substantive
amendment, whether or not the plaintiff could have stated a claim
preamendment.

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376 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Opinion of the Court
original version of § 1981. Thus, reliance on Osborn would
suggest that petitioners’ causes of action arose under the
pre-1991 version of § 1981 as well as under the 1991 Act, just
as a cause of action may arise under both state and federal
law. As the Court of Appeals observed, however, § 1658
does not expressly “address the eventuality when a cause of
action ‘aris[es] under’ two different ‘Acts,’ one enacted before
and one enacted after the effective date of § 1658.” 305
F. 3d, at 724.
Petitioners argue that we should look not at Article III,
but at how Congress has used the term “arising under” in
federal legislation. They point in particular to the statutes
in Title 28 that define the scope of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction.5 We have interpreted those statutes to mean
that a claim arises under federal law if federal law provides
a necessary element of the plaintiff ’s claim for relief.6 Peti-
tioners recognize that we have construed the term more
broadly in other statutes,7 but argue that the placement of
§ 1658 in Title 28 suggests that Congress meant to invoke our
interpretation of the neighboring jurisdictional rules. We
hesitate to place too much significance on the location of a
statute in the United States Code. But even if we accepted
5 See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or trea-
ties of the United States”); § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relat-
ing to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks”).
6 See, e. g., Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U. S.
800, 808 (1988) (a case may “ ‘aris[e] under’ ” federal law if “ ‘federal law is
a necessary element of [a claim]’ ”); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U. S. 826, 830 (2002) (a claim “ ‘arises
under’ ” patent law if either “ ‘federal patent law creates the cause of ac-
tion’ ” or “ ‘the plaintiff ’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution
of a substantial question of federal patent law’ ”).
7 See, e. g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 615 (1984) (a claim arises
under the Medicare Act for purposes of 42 U. S. C. § 405(h) when “ ‘both
the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation’ ” of the claim
is the Medicare Act).

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the proposition that Congress intended the term “arising
under” to have the same meaning in § 1658 as in other sec-
tions of Title 28, it would not follow that the text is unambig-
uous. We have said that “[t]he most familiar definition of
the statutory ‘arising under’ limitation” is the statement by
Justice Holmes that a suit “ ‘arises under the law that creates
the cause of action,’ ” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construc-
tion Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1,
8–9 (1983) (quoting American Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260 (1916)). On one hand, that
statement could support petitioners’ view that their causes
of action arose under the 1991 Act, which created a statutory
right that did not previously exist. On the other hand, it
also could support respondent’s claim that petitioners’ causes
of action arose under the original version of § 1981, which
contains the operative language setting forth the elements
of their claims. Justice Holmes’ formulation even could sup-
port the view that petitioners’ claims arose under both ver-
sions of the statute. Cf. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F. 2d
823, 827 (CA2 1964) (Friendly, J.) (“It has come to be realized
that Mr. Justice Holmes’ formula is more useful for inclusion
than for the exclusion for which it was intended”). In order
to ascertain Congress’ intent, therefore, we must look be-
yond the bare text of § 1658 to the context in which it was
enacted and the purposes it was designed to accomplish.
III
In Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio,
446 U. S. 478, 483 (1980), we observed that Congress’ failure
to enact a uniform statute of limitations applicable to federal
causes of action created a “void which is commonplace in fed-
eral statutory law.” Over the years that void has spawned
a vast amount of litigation. Prior to the enactment of
§ 1658, the “settled practice [was] to adopt a local time limita-
tion as federal law if it [was] not inconsistent with federal
law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261,

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266–267 (1985). Such “[l]imitation borrowing,” Board of
Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U. S., at 484, generated a host of
issues that required resolution on a statute-by-statute basis.
For example, it often was difficult to determine which of the
forum State’s statutes of limitations was the most appro-
priate to apply to the federal claim. We wrestled with that
issue in Wilson v. Garcia, in which we considered which
state statute provided the most appropriate limitations prin-
ciple for claims arising under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 471 U. S.,
at 268, 276–279 (resolving split of authority over whether the
closest state analogue to an action brought under § 1983 was
an action for tortious injury to the rights of another, an ac-
tion on an unwritten contract, or an action for a liability on
a statute). Before reaching that question, however, we first
had to determine whether the characterization of a § 1983
claim for statute of limitations purposes was an issue of state
or federal law and whether all such claims should be charac-
terized in the same way. Ibid. Two years later, in Good-
man v. Lukens Steel Co., we answered the same three ques-
tions for claims arising under § 1981. 482 U. S., at 660,
661–662. Both decisions provoked dissent 8 and further
litigation.9
The practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations also
forced courts to address the “frequently present problem of
a conflict of laws in determining which State statute [was]
controlling, the law of the forum or that of the situs of the
injury.” S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 4–6 (1955)
(discussing problems caused by borrowing state statutes of
8 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 280 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U. S. 656, 669 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 680 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
9 See, e. g., Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 875 F. 2d 1325, 1326–
1328 (CA7 1989) (concluding that the rule established in Goodman did not
apply retroactively).

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limitations for antitrust claims).10 Even when courts were
able to identify the appropriate state statute, limitations bor-
rowing resulted in uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defend-
ants, as a plaintiff alleging a federal claim in State A would
find herself barred by the local statute of limitations while a
plaintiff raising precisely the same claim in State B would
be permitted to proceed. Ibid. Interstate variances of
that sort could be especially confounding in class actions be-
cause they often posed problems for joint resolution. See
Memorandum from R. Marcus, Assoc. Reporter to Workload
Subcommittee (Sept. 1, 1989), reprinted in App. to Vol. 1
Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Sub-
committee Reports (1990), Doc. No. 5, p. 10 (hereinafter Mar-
cus Memorandum). Courts also were forced to grapple with
questions such as whether federal or state law governed
when an action was “commenced,” or when service of process
had to be effectuated. See Sentry Corp. v. Harris, 802 F. 2d
229 (CA7 1986) (addressing those issues in the wake of our
decision in Wilson). And the absence of a uniform federal
limitations period complicated the development of federal
law on the question when, or under what circumstances, a
statute of limitations could be tolled. See 802 F. 2d, at 234–
242 (discussing conflicting authority on whether tolling was
a matter of state or federal law); Board of Regents v. To-
manio, 446 U. S., at 485 (explaining that “ ‘borrowing’ logi-
cally included [state] rules of tolling”).
Those problems led both courts and commentators to
“cal[l] upon Congress to eliminate these complex cases, that
do much to consume the time and energies of judges but that
10 The problems associated with borrowing state statutes of limitations
prompted Congress in 1955 to enact a federal period of limitations govern-
ing treble damages actions under the antitrust laws. 15 U. S. C. § 15b.
See S. Rep. No. 619, at 5 (explaining that “[i]t is one of the primary pur-
poses of this bill to put an end to the confusion and discrimination present
under existing law where local statutes of limitations are made applicable
to rights granted under our Federal laws”).

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380 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
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do little to advance the cause of justice, by enacting federal
limitations periods for all federal causes of action.” Sentry
Corp. v. Harris, 802 F. 2d, at 246.11 Congress answered that
call by creating the Federal Courts Study Committee, which
recommended the enactment of a retroactive, uniform fed-
eral statute of limitations.12 As we have noted, § 1658 ap-
plies only to claims arising under statutes enacted after De-
cember 1, 1990, but it otherwise follows the Committee’s
recommendation. The House Report accompanying the
final bill confirms that Congress was keenly aware of the
problems associated with the practice of borrowing state
statutes of limitations, and that a central purpose of § 1658
was to minimize the occasions for that practice.13
The history that led to the enactment of § 1658 strongly
supports an interpretation that fills more rather than less of
the void that has created so much unnecessary work for fed-
eral judges.14 The interpretation favored by respondent
11 See also, e. g., Lowenthal, Pastuszenski, & Greenwald, Special Project,
Time Bars in Specialized Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action
and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 Cornell L. Rev. 1011, 1105 (1980);
Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 Mich. L. Rev.
937, 992–993 (1951); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provi-
sions, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 68, 77–78 (1953); Note, Disparities in Time Limita-
tions on Federal Causes of Action, 49 Yale L. J. 738, 745 (1940).
12 A report prepared for the Committee concluded that “there is little to
be said in favor of the current situation and there seems to be no identifi-
able support for continuing this situation.” Marcus Memorandum 1.
13 The House Report notes “a number of practical problems” created by
the practice of borrowing statutes of limitations: “ ‘It obligates judges and
lawyers to determine the most analogous state law claim; it imposes uncer-
tainty on litigants; reliance on varying state laws results in undesirable
variance among the federal courts and disrupts the development of fed-
eral doctrine on the suspension of limitation periods.’ ” H. R. Rep.
No. 101–734, p. 24 (1990).
14 A few years after § 1658 was enacted, we described it as supplying
“a general, 4-year limitations period for any federal statute subsequently
enacted without one of its own.” North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515
U. S. 29, 34, n. (1995). In his separate opinion in that case, Justice
Scalia captured the basic purpose of § 1658 when he observed that

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and the Court of Appeals subverts that goal by restricting
§ 1658 to cases in which the plaintiff ’s cause of action is based
solely on a post-1990 statute that “ ‘establishes a new cause
of action without reference to preexisting law.’ ” 305 F. 3d,
at 727 (quoting Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F. 3d, at 225). On
that view, § 1658 would apply only to a small fraction of post-
1990 enactments. Congress routinely creates new rights of
action by amending existing statutes, and “[a]ltering statu-
tory definitions, or adding new definitions of terms pre-
viously undefined, is a common way of amending statutes.”
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 308 (1994).
Nothing in the text or history of § 1658 supports an interpre-
tation that would limit its reach to entirely new sections of
the United States Code. An amendment to an existing stat-
ute is no less an “Act of Congress” than a new, stand-alone
statute. What matters is the substantive effect of an enact-
ment—the creation of new rights of action and correspond-
ing liabilities—not the format in which it appears in the
Code.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that § 1658 must be given
a narrow scope lest it disrupt litigants’ settled expectations.
The court observed that Congress refused to make § 1658
retroactive because, “ ‘with respect to many statutes that
have no explicit limitations provision, the relevant limita-
tions period has long since been resolved by judicial deci-
sion,’ ” and “ ‘retroactively imposing a four year statute of
limitations on legislation that the courts have previously
ruled is subject to a six month limitations period in one
[State], and a ten year period in another, would threaten to
disrupt the settled expectations of . . . many parties.’ ” 305
F. 3d, at 725–726 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 101–734, p. 24
(1990)). Concerns about settled expectations provide a
valid reason to reject an interpretation of § 1658 under which
“a uniform nationwide limitations period for a federal cause of action is
always significantly more appropriate” than a rule that applies in some
States but not in others. Id., at 37 (opinion concurring in judgment).

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382 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Opinion of the Court
any new amendment to federal law would suffice to trigger
the 4-year statute of limitations, regardless of whether the
plaintiff ’s claim would have been available—and subject to
a state statute of limitations—prior to December 1, 1990.
Such concerns do not, however, carry any weight against the
reading of § 1658 adopted by the District Court and urged
by petitioners, under which the catchall limitations period
applies only to causes of action that were not available until
after § 1658 was enacted. If a cause of action did not exist
prior to 1990, potential litigants could not have formed set-
tled expectations as to the relevant statute of limitations
that would then be disrupted by application of § 1658.
We conclude that a cause of action “aris[es] under an Act
of Congress enacted” after December 1, 1990—and therefore
is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations—if the
plaintiff ’s claim against the defendant was made possible by
a post-1990 enactment. That construction best serves Con-
gress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the
practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations while at
the same time protecting settled interests. It spares fed-
eral judges and litigants the need to identify the appropriate
state statute of limitations to apply to new claims but leaves
in place the “borrowed” limitations periods for pre-existing
causes of action, with respect to which the difficult work al-
ready has been done.
Interpreting § 1658 to apply whenever a post-1990 enact-
ment creates a new right to maintain an action also is con-
sistent with the common usage of the word “arise” to mean
“come into being; originate” 15 or “spring up.” 16 Finally,
that construction is consistent with our interpretations of
15 American Heritage Dictionary 96 (4th ed. 2000); Black’s Law Diction-
ary 138 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
16 Oxford English Dictionary 629 (2d ed. 1989); Black’s Law Dictionary,
at 138.

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383 Cite as: 541 U. S. 369 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
the term “arising under” as it is used in statutes governing
the scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. By con-
trast, nothing in our case law supports an interpretation as
narrow as that endorsed by the Court of Appeals, under
which “arising under” means something akin to “based solely
upon.” We should avoid reading § 1658 in such a way as to
give the familiar statutory language a meaning foreign to
every other context in which it is used.
IV
In this case, petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrong-
ful termination, and failure to transfer claims “ar[ose] un-
der” the 1991 Act in the sense that petitioners’ causes of
action were made possible by that Act. Patterson held that
“racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment
is not actionable under § 1981.” 491 U. S., at 171 (emphasis
added). The 1991 Act overturned Patterson by defining the
key “make and enforce contracts” language in § 1981 to in-
clude the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b). In Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., we recognized that the 1991 amendment “en-
larged the category of conduct that is subject to § 1981 liabil-
ity,” 511 U. S., at 303, and we therefore held that the amend-
ment does not apply “to a case that arose before it was
enacted,” id., at 300. Our reasoning in Rivers supports the
conclusion that the 1991 Act fully qualifies as “an Act of Con-
gress enacted after [December 1, 1990]” within the meaning
of § 1658. Because petitioners’ hostile work environment,
wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims did not
allege a violation of the pre-1990 version of § 1981 but did
allege violations of the amended statute, those claims
“ar[ose] under” the amendment to § 1981 contained in the
1991 Act.

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384 JONES v. R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO.
Opinion of the Court
While that conclusion seems eminently clear in this case,17
respondent has posited various hypothetical cases in which
it might be difficult to determine whether a particular claim
arose under the amended or the unamended version of a stat-
ute. Similarly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that applying
§ 1658 to post-1990 amendments could be problematic in
some cases because “ ‘the line between an amendment that
modifies an existing right and one that creates a new right
is often difficult to draw.’ ” 305 F. 3d, at 725 (quoting Zubi
v. AT&T Corp., 219 F. 3d, at 224). We are not persuaded
that any “guess work,” 305 F. 3d, at 725, is required to
determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the
relevant statute as it stood prior to December 1, 1990, or
whether her claims necessarily depend on a subsequent
amendment. Courts routinely make such determinations
when dealing with amendments (such as the 1991 amend-
ment to § 1981) that do not apply retroactively.18 In any
event, such hypothetical problems pale in comparison with
the difficulties that federal courts faced for decades in trying
17 Indeed, respondent concedes that, “[i]n this case, the nature of the
‘new’ claim is clear. It is recognized that liability under § 1981 was ex-
panded, because this Court had spoken on the scope of § 1981 and Congress
reversed the Court’s interpretation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”
Brief for Respondent 26.
18 Respondent argues that the question whether a plaintiff ’s cause of
action would have been viable prior to a post-1991 amendment will be
particularly complicated in cases in which there was a split of authority
regarding the scope of the original statute. In such cases, courts will
have to determine whether the amendment clarified existing law or cre-
ated new rights and liabilities. Such analysis is hardly beyond the judicial
ken: Courts must answer precisely the same question when deciding
whether an amendment may be applied retrospectively. See, e. g., Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 948–950 (1997).
The substantial overlap between the retroactivity and statute-of-
limitations inquiries undermines respondent’s claim that application of
§ 1658 to post-1991 amendments will generate additional work for federal
judges.

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Opinion of the Court
to answer all the questions raised by borrowing appropriate
limitations rules from state statutes.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.