YARBOROUGH, WARDEN v. ALVARADO

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
652 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
YARBOROUGH, WARDEN v. ALVARADO
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–1684. Argued March 1, 2004—Decided June 1, 2004
Respondent Alvarado helped Paul Soto try to steal a truck, leading to the
death of the truck’s owner. Alvarado was called in for an interview
with Los Angeles detective Comstock. Alvarado was 17 years old at
the time, and his parents brought him to the station and waited in the
lobby during the interview. Comstock took Alvarado to a small room
where only the two of them were present. The interview lasted about
two hours, and Alvarado was not given a warning under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. Although he at first denied being present at
the shooting, Alvarado slowly began to change his story, finally admit-
ting that he had helped Soto try to steal the victim’s truck and to hide
the gun after the murder. Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he needed
a break and, when the interview was over, returned him to his parents,
who drove him home. After California charged Alvarado with murder
and attempted robbery, the trial court denied his motion to suppress
his interview statements on Miranda grounds. In affirming Alvarado’s
conviction, the District Court of Appeal (hereinafter state court) ruled
that a Miranda warning was not required because Alvarado had not
been in custody during the interview under the test articulated in
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 112, which requires a court to con-
sider the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and then deter-
mine whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to leave.
The Federal District Court agreed with the state court on habeas re-
view, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state court erred
in failing to account for Alvarado’s youth and inexperience when evalu-
ating whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to
leave the interview. Noting that this Court has considered a suspect’s
juvenile status in other criminal law contexts, see, e. g., Haley v. Ohio,
332 U. S. 596, 599, the Court of Appeals held that the state court’s error
warranted habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) because it “resulted in a decision that . . .
involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal
law, as determined by [this] Court,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
Held: The state court considered the proper factors and reached a reason-
able conclusion that Alvarado was not in custody for Miranda purposes
during his police interview. Pp. 660–669.

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
653 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Syllabus
(a) AEDPA requires federal courts to consider whether the state-
court decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished law. Clearly established law “refers to the holdings, as opposed
to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412. The Miranda
custody test is an objective test. Two discrete inquiries are essential:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and (2) given those
circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ter-
minate the interrogation and leave. “Once the . . . players’ lines and
actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to re-
solve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
Thompson, supra, at 112. Pp. 660–663.
(b) The state-court adjudication did not involve an unreasonable ap-
plication of clearly established law when it concluded that Alvarado was
not in custody. The meaning of “unreasonable” can depend in part on
the specificity of the relevant legal rule. If a rule is specific, the range
of reasonable judgment may be narrow. Applications of the rule may
be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their
meaning must emerge in application over time. The more general the
rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case by case
determinations. Cf. Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 308–309. Fair-
minded jurists could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.
The custody test is general, and the state court’s application of this
Court’s law fits within the matrix of the Court’s prior decisions. Cer-
tain facts weigh against a finding that Alvarado was in custody. The
police did not transport him to the station or require him to appear at
a particular time, cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495; they did
not threaten him or suggest he would be placed under arrest, ibid.; his
parents remained in the lobby during the interview, suggesting that the
interview would be brief, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 441–
442; Comstock appealed to Alvarado’s interest in telling the truth and
being helpful to a police officer, cf. Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 495; Com-
stock twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take a break; and, at the
end of the interview, Alvarado went home, ibid. Other facts point in
the opposite direction. Comstock interviewed Alvarado at the police
station; the interview lasted four times longer than the 30-minute inter-
view in Mathiason; Comstock did not tell Alvarado that he was free to
leave; he was brought to the station by his legal guardians rather than
arriving on his own accord; and his parents allegedly asked to be present
at the interview but were rebuffed. Given these differing indications,
the state court’s application of this Court’s custody standard was reason-
able. Indeed, a number of the facts echo those in Mathiason, a per

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
654 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Syllabus
curiam summary reversal in which we found it clear that the suspect
was not in custody. Pp. 663–666.
(c) The state court’s failure to consider Alvarado’s age and inexperi-
ence does not provide a proper basis for finding that the state court’s
decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
The Court’s opinions applying the Miranda custody test have not men-
tioned the suspect’s age, much less mandated its consideration. The
only indications in those opinions relevant to a suspect’s experience with
law enforcement have rejected reliance on such factors. See, e. g., Ber-
kemer, supra, at 442, n. 35, 430–432. It was therefore improper for the
Court of Appeals to grant relief on the basis of the state court’s failure
to consider them. There is an important conceptual difference between
the Miranda test and the line of cases from other contexts considering
age and experience. The Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test,
see Thompson, supra, at 112, that furthers “the clarity of [Miranda’s]
rule,” Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 430, ensuring that the police need not
“gues[s] as to [the circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may
interrogate the suspect,” id., at 431. This objective inquiry could rea-
sonably be viewed as different from doctrinal tests that depend on the
actual mindset of a particular suspect, where the Court does consider a
suspect’s age and experience. In concluding that such factors should
also apply to the Miranda custody inquiry, the Ninth Circuit ignored
the argument that that inquiry states an objective rule designed to give
clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s individual
characteristics—including his age—could be viewed as creating a sub-
jective inquiry, cf. Mathiason, supra, at 495–496. Reliance on Alvara-
do’s prior history with law enforcement was improper not only under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s deferential standard, but also as a de novo matter. In
most cases, the police will not know a suspect’s interrogation history.
See Berkemer, supra, at 430–431. Even if they do, the relationship
between a suspect’s experiences and the likelihood a reasonable person
with that experience would feel free to leave often will be speculative.
Officers should not be asked to consider these contingent psychological
factors when deciding when suspects should be advised of Miranda
rights. See Berkemer, supra, at 431–432. Pp. 666–669.
316 F. 3d 841, reversed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed
a concurring opinion, post, p. 669. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 669.
Deborah Jane Chuang, Deputy Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
655 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
briefs were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M.
Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy
Attorney General, and Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising Dep-
uty Attorney General.
John P. Elwood argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Wray,
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson.
Tara K. Allen, by appointment of the Court, 540 U. S. 1043,
argued the cause for respondent. With her on the briefs
were Thomas J. Phalen and John H. Blume.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court can grant
an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a per-
son held pursuant to a state-court judgment if the state-
court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a state court unreasonably applied clearly established law
when it held that the respondent was not in custody for
Miranda purposes. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841
(2002). We disagree and reverse.
I
Paul Soto and respondent Michael Alvarado attempted to
steal a truck in the parking lot of a shopping mall in Santa
*Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Crimi-
nal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Juvenile Law
Center et al. by Marsha L. Levick and Lourdes M. Rosado; and for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey T. Green
and David M. Porter.

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
656 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
Fe Springs, California. Soto and Alvarado were part of a
larger group of teenagers at the mall that night. Soto de-
cided to steal the truck, and Alvarado agreed to help. Soto
pulled out a .357 Magnum and approached the driver, Fran-
cisco Castaneda, who was standing near the truck emptying
trash into a dumpster. Soto demanded money and the igni-
tion keys from Castaneda. Alvarado, then five months short
of his 18th birthday, approached the passenger side door of
the truck and crouched down. When Castaneda refused to
comply with Soto’s demands, Soto shot Castaneda, killing
him. Alvarado then helped hide Soto’s gun.
Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s detective Cheryl Comstock
led the investigation into the circumstances of Castaneda’s
death. About a month after the shooting, Comstock left
word at Alvarado’s house and also contacted Alvarado’s
mother at work with the message that she wished to speak
with Alvarado. Alvarado’s parents brought him to the Pico
Rivera Sheriff ’s Station to be interviewed around lunchtime.
They waited in the lobby while Alvarado went with Com-
stock to be interviewed. Alvarado contends that his parents
asked to be present during the interview but were rebuffed.
Comstock brought Alvarado to a small interview room and
began interviewing him at about 12:30 p.m. The interview
lasted about two hours, and was recorded by Comstock with
Alvarado’s knowledge. Only Comstock and Alvarado were
present. Alvarado was not given a warning under Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Comstock began the inter-
view by asking Alvarado to recount the events on the night
of the shooting. On that night, Alvarado explained, he had
been drinking alcohol at a friend’s house with some other
friends and acquaintances. After a few hours, part of the
group went home and the rest walked to a nearby mall to
use its public telephones. In Alvarado’s initial telling, that
was the end of it. The group went back to the friend’s home
and “just went to bed.” App. 101.
Unpersuaded, Comstock pressed on:

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
657 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
“Q. Okay. We did real good up until this point and ev-
erything you’ve said it’s pretty accurate till this point,
except for you left out the shooting.
“A. The shooting?
“Q. Uh huh, the shooting.
“A. Well I had never seen no shooting.
“Q. Well I’m afraid you did.
“A. I had never seen no shooting.
“Q. Well I beg to differ with you. I’ve been told quite
the opposite and we have witnesses that are saying
quite the opposite.
“A. That I had seen the shooting?
“Q. So why don’t you take a deep breath, like I told you
before, the very best thing is to be honest. . . . You can’t
have that many people get involved in a murder and
expect that some of them aren’t going to tell the truth,
okay? Now granted if it was maybe one person, you
might be able to keep your fingers crossed and say, god
I hope he doesn’t tell the truth, but the problem is is
that they have to tell the truth, okay? Now all I’m sim-
ply doing is giving you the opportunity to tell the truth
and when we got that many people telling a story and
all of a sudden you tell something way far fetched differ-
ent.” Id., at 101–102 (punctuation added).
At this point, Alvarado slowly began to change his story.
First he acknowledged being present when the carjacking
occurred but claimed that he did not know what happened or
who had a gun. When he hesitated to say more, Comstock
tried to encourage Alvarado to discuss what happened by
appealing to his sense of honesty and the need to bring the
man who shot Castaneda to justice. See, e. g., id., at 106
(“[W]hat I’m looking for is to see if you’ll tell the truth”); id.,
at 105–106 (“I know it’s very difficult when it comes time to
‘drop the dime’ on somebody[,] . . . [but] if that had been

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
658 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
your parent, your mother, or your brother, or your sister,
you would darn well want [the killer] to go to jail ’cause no
one has the right to take someone’s life like that . . .”). Al-
varado then admitted he had helped the other man try to
steal the truck by standing near the passenger side door.
Next he admitted that the other man was Paul Soto, that he
knew Soto was armed, and that he had helped hide the gun
after the murder. Alvarado explained that he had expected
Soto to scare the driver with the gun, but that he did not
expect Soto to kill anyone. Id., at 127. Toward the end of
the interview, Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he needed
to take a break. Alvarado declined. When the interview
was over, Comstock returned with Alvarado to the lobby of
the sheriff ’s station where his parents were waiting. Alva-
rado’s father drove him home.
A few months later, the State of California charged Soto
and Alvarado with first-degree murder and attempted rob-
bery. Citing Miranda, supra, Alvarado moved to suppress
his statements from the Comstock interview. The trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the interview
was noncustodial. App. 196. Alvarado and Soto were tried
together, and Alvarado testified in his own defense. He of-
fered an innocent explanation for his conduct, testifying that
he happened to be standing in the parking lot of the mall
when a gun went off nearby. The government’s cross-
examination relied on Alvarado’s statement to Comstock.
Alvarado admitted having made some of the statements but
denied others. When Alvarado denied particular state-
ments, the prosecution countered by playing excerpts from
the audio recording of the interview.
During cross-examination, Alvarado agreed that the inter-
view with Comstock “was a pretty friendly conversation,”
id., at 438, that there was “sort of a free flow between
[Alvarado] and Detective Comstock,” id., at 439, and that Al-
varado did not “feel coerced or threatened in any way” dur-
ing the interview, ibid. The jury convicted Soto and Alva-
rado of first-degree murder and attempted robbery. The

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
659 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
trial judge later reduced Alvarado’s conviction to second-
degree murder for his comparatively minor role in the of-
fense. The judge sentenced Soto to life in prison and Alva-
rado to 15-years-to-life.
On direct appeal, the Second Appellate District Court of
Appeal (hereinafter state court) affirmed. People v. Soto,
74 Cal. App. 4th 1099, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688 (1999) (unpub-
lished in relevant part). The state court rejected Alvarado’s
contention that his statements to Comstock should have been
excluded at trial because no Miranda warnings were given.
The court ruled Alvarado had not been in custody during
the interview, so no warning was required. The state court
relied upon the custody test articulated in Thompson v. Keo-
hane, 516 U. S. 99, 112 (1995), which requires a court to con-
sider the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and
then determine whether a reasonable person would have felt
at liberty to leave. The state court reviewed the facts of
the Comstock interview and concluded Alvarado was not in
custody. App. to Pet. for Cert. C–17. The court empha-
sized the absence of any intense or aggressive tactics and
noted that Comstock had not told Alvarado that he could not
leave. The California Supreme Court denied discretionary
review.
Alvarado filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. The District Court agreed with the state court
that Alvarado was not in custody for Miranda purposes dur-
ing the interview. Alvarado v. Hickman, No. ED CV–00–
326–VAP(E) (2000), App. to Pet. for Cert. B–1 to B–10. “At
a minimum,” the District Court added, the deferential stand-
ard of review provided by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) foreclosed re-
lief. App. to Pet. for Cert. B–7.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Al-
varado v. Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841 (2002). First, the Court
of Appeals held that the state court erred in failing to ac-
count for Alvarado’s youth and inexperience when evaluating
whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
660 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
free to leave. It noted that this Court has considered a sus-
pect’s juvenile status when evaluating the voluntariness of
confessions and the waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. See id., at 843 (citing, inter alia, Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 599–601 (1948), and In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1, 45 (1967)). The Court of Appeals held that in light of
these authorities, Alvarado’s age and experience must be a
factor in the Miranda custody inquiry. 316 F. 3d, at 843.
A minor with no criminal record would be more likely to feel
coerced by police tactics and conclude he is under arrest than
would an experienced adult, the Court of Appeals reasoned.
This required extra “safeguards . . . commensurate with the
age and circumstances of a juvenile defendant.” See id., at
850. According to the Court of Appeals, the effect of Alva-
rado’s age and inexperience was so substantial that it turned
the interview into a custodial interrogation.
The Court of Appeals next considered whether Alvarado
could obtain relief in light of the deference a federal court
must give to a state-court determination on habeas review.
The deference required by AEDPA did not bar relief, the
Court of Appeals held, because the relevance of juvenile sta-
tus in Supreme Court case law as a whole compelled the
“extension of the principle that juvenile status is relevant”
to the context of Miranda custody determinations. 316
F. 3d, at 853. In light of the clearly established law consid-
ering juvenile status, it was “simply unreasonable to con-
clude that a reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of
arrest or police interviews, would have felt that he was at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id., at
854–855 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari. 539 U. S. 986 (2003).
II
We begin by determining the relevant clearly established
law. For purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), clearly estab-
lished law as determined by this Court “refers to the hold-
ings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
661 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000). We look for “the govern-
ing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme
Court at the time the state court renders its decision.”
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71–72 (2003).
Miranda itself held that preinterrogation warnings are re-
quired in the context of custodial interrogations given “the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” 384 U. S.,
at 458. The Court explained that “custodial interrogation”
meant “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.,
at 444. The Miranda decision did not provide the Court
with an opportunity to apply that test to a set of facts.
After Miranda, the Court first applied the custody test in
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). In
Mathiason, a police officer contacted the suspect after a bur-
glary victim identified him. The officer arranged to meet
the suspect at a nearby police station. At the outset of the
questioning, the officer stated his belief that the suspect was
involved in the burglary but that he was not under arrest.
During the 30-minute interview, the suspect admitted his
guilt. He was then allowed to leave. The Court held that
the questioning was not custodial because there was “no indi-
cation that the questioning took place in a context where [the
suspect’s] freedom to depart was restricted in any way.”
Id., at 495. The Court noted that the suspect had come vol-
untarily to the police station, that he was informed that he
was not under arrest, and that he was allowed to leave at
the end of the interview. Ibid.
In California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121 (1983) (per cu-
riam), the Court reached the same result in a case with facts
similar to those in Mathiason. In Beheler, the state court
had distinguished Mathiason based on what it described as
differences in the totality of the circumstances. The police
interviewed Beheler shortly after the crime occurred; Be-
heler had been drinking earlier in the day; he was emotion-

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
662 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
ally distraught; he was well known to the police; and he was
a parolee who knew it was necessary for him to cooperate
with the police. 463 U. S., at 1124–1125. The Court agreed
that “the circumstances of each case must certainly influ-
ence” the custody determination, but reemphasized that “the
ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associ-
ated with a formal arrest.” Id., at 1125 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court found the case indistinguishable
from Mathiason. It noted that how much the police knew
about the suspect and how much time had elapsed after the
crime occurred were irrelevant to the custody inquiry. 463
U. S., at 1125.
Our more recent cases instruct that custody must be de-
termined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s
situation would perceive his circumstances. In Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 (1984), a police officer stopped a sus-
pected drunk driver and asked him some questions. Al-
though the officer reached the decision to arrest the driver
at the beginning of the traffic stop, he did not do so until the
driver failed a sobriety test and acknowledged that he had
been drinking beer and smoking marijuana. The Court held
the traffic stop noncustodial despite the officer’s intent to
arrest because he had not communicated that intent to the
driver. “A policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on
the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particu-
lar time,” the Court explained. Id., at 442. “[T]he only rel-
evant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s po-
sition would have understood his situation.” Ibid. In a
footnote, the Court cited a New York state case for the view
that an objective test was preferable to a subjective test in
part because it does not “ ‘place upon the police the burden
of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person
whom they question.’ ” Id., at 442, n. 35 (quoting People v.
P., 21 N. Y. 2d 1, 9–10, 233 N. E. 2d 255, 260 (1967)).

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
663 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318 (1994) (per cu-
riam), confirmed this analytical framework. Stansbury ex-
plained that “the initial determination of custody depends on
the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating offi-
cers or the person being questioned.” Id., at 323. Courts
must examine “all of the circumstances surrounding the in-
terrogation” and determine “how a reasonable person in the
position of the individual being questioned would gauge the
breadth of his or her freedom of action.” Id., at 322, 325
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Finally, in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99 (1995), the
Court offered the following description of the Miranda cus-
tody test:
“Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determina-
tion: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances,
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions
are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test
to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal ar-
rest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” 516 U. S., at 112 (in-
ternal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
We turn now to the case before us and ask if the state-
court adjudication of the claim “involved an unreasonable
application” of clearly established law when it concluded that
Alvarado was not in custody. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). See
Williams, 529 U. S., at 413 (“Under the ‘unreasonable appli-
cation’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing principle
from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case”). The term
“ ‘unreasonable’ ” is “a common term in the legal world and,

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
664 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning.”
Id., at 410. At the same time, the range of reasonable judg-
ment can depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule.
If a legal rule is specific, the range may be narrow. Applica-
tions of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other
rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in
application over the course of time. Applying a general
standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element
of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule ap-
plication was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s
specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway
courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determina-
tions. Cf. Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 308–309 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
Based on these principles, we conclude that the state
court’s application of our clearly established law was rea-
sonable. Ignoring the deferential standard of § 2254(d)(1)
for the moment, it can be said that fairminded jurists could
disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody. On one
hand, certain facts weigh against a finding that Alvarado was
in custody. The police did not transport Alvarado to the
station or require him to appear at a particular time.
Cf. Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 495. They did not threaten him
or suggest he would be placed under arrest. Ibid. Alvara-
do’s parents remained in the lobby during the interview, sug-
gesting that the interview would be brief. See Berkemer,
supra, at 441–442. In fact, according to trial counsel for Al-
varado, he and his parents were told that the interview was
“ ‘not going to be long.’ ” App. 186. During the interview,
Comstock focused on Soto’s crimes rather than Alvarado’s.
Instead of pressuring Alvarado with the threat of arrest and
prosecution, she appealed to his interest in telling the truth
and being helpful to a police officer. Cf. Mathiason, supra,
at 495. In addition, Comstock twice asked Alvarado if
he wanted to take a break. At the end of the interview,
Alvarado went home. App. 186. All of these objective

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
665 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
facts are consistent with an interrogation environment in
which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate
the interview and leave. Indeed, a number of the facts echo
those of Mathiason, a per curiam summary reversal in
which we found it “clear from these facts” that the suspect
was not in custody. 494 U. S., at 495.
Other facts point in the opposite direction. Comstock in-
terviewed Alvarado at the police station. The interview
lasted two hours, four times longer than the 30-minute
interview in Mathiason. Unlike the officer in Mathiason,
Comstock did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave.
Alvarado was brought to the police station by his legal
guardians rather than arriving on his own accord, making
the extent of his control over his presence unclear. Counsel
for Alvarado alleges that Alvarado’s parents asked to be
present at the interview but were rebuffed, a fact that—if
known to Alvarado—might reasonably have led someone in
Alvarado’s position to feel more restricted than otherwise.
These facts weigh in favor of the view that Alvarado was
in custody.
These differing indications lead us to hold that the state
court’s application of our custody standard was reasonable.
The Court of Appeals was nowhere close to the mark when
it concluded otherwise. Although the question of what an
“unreasonable application” of law might be is difficult in
some cases, it is not difficult here. The custody test is gen-
eral, and the state court’s application of our law fits within
the matrix of our prior decisions. We cannot grant relief
under AEDPA by conducting our own independent inquiry
into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter.
“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply
because that court concludes in its independent judgment
that the state-court decision applied [the law] incorrectly.”
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24–25 (2002) (per cu-
riam). Relief is available under § 2254(d)(1) only if the state
court’s decision is objectively unreasonable. See Williams,

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
666 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
529 U. S., at 410; Andrade, 538 U. S., at 75. Under that
standard, relief cannot be granted.
III
The Court of Appeals reached the opposite result by plac-
ing considerable reliance on Alvarado’s age and inexperience
with law enforcement. Our Court has not stated that a sus-
pect’s age or experience is relevant to the Miranda custody
analysis, and counsel for Alvarado did not press the impor-
tance of either factor on direct appeal or in habeas proceed-
ings. According to the Court of Appeals, however, our
Court’s emphasis on juvenile status in other contexts de-
manded consideration of Alvarado’s age and inexperience
here. The Court of Appeals viewed the state court’s failure
to “ ‘extend a clearly established legal principle [of the rele-
vance of juvenile status] to a new context’ ” as objectively
unreasonable in this case, requiring issuance of the writ.
316 F. 3d, at 853 (quoting Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F. 3d 568,
578 (CA9 2000)).
The petitioner contends that if a habeas court must extend
a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand then the
rationale cannot be clearly established at the time of the
state-court decision. Brief for Petitioner 10–24. See also
Hawkins v. Alabama, 318 F. 3d 1302, 1306, n. 3 (CA11 2003)
(asserting a similar argument). There is force to this argu-
ment. Section 2254(d)(1) would be undermined if habeas
courts introduced rules not clearly established under the
guise of extensions to existing law. Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989). At the same time, the difference between
applying a rule and extending it is not always clear. Cer-
tain principles are fundamental enough that when new fac-
tual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier
rule will be beyond doubt.
This is not such a case, however. Our opinions applying
the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect’s
age, much less mandated its consideration. The only indica-

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
667 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
tions in the Court’s opinions relevant to a suspect’s experi-
ence with law enforcement have rejected reliance on such
factors. See Beheler, 463 U. S., at 1125 (rejecting a lower
court’s view that the defendant’s prior interview with the
police was relevant to the custody inquiry); Berkemer, 468
U. S., at 442, n. 35 (citing People v. P., 21 N. Y. 2d, at 9–10,
233 N. E. 2d, at 260, which noted the difficulties of a subjec-
tive test that would require police to “ ‘anticipat[e] the frail-
ties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question’ ”);
468 U. S., at 430–432 (describing a suspect’s criminal past and
police record as a circumstance “unknowable to the police”).
There is an important conceptual difference between the
Miranda custody test and the line of cases from other con-
texts considering age and experience. The Miranda cus-
tody inquiry is an objective test. As we stated in Keohane,
“[o]nce the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions
are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to
resolve the ultimate inquiry.” 516 U. S., at 112 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The objective test furthers “the
clarity of [Miranda’s] rule,” Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 430, en-
suring that the police do not need “to make guesses as to
[the circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may
interrogate the suspect,” id., at 431. To be sure, the line
between permissible objective facts and impermissible sub-
jective experiences can be indistinct in some cases. It is
possible to subsume a subjective factor into an objective test
by making the latter more specific in its formulation. Thus
the Court of Appeals styled its inquiry as an objective test
by considering what a “reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior
history of arrest or police interviews,” would perceive. 316
F. 3d, at 854–855 (case below).
At the same time, the objective Miranda custody inquiry
could reasonably be viewed as different from doctrinal tests
that depend on the actual mindset of a particular suspect,
where we do consider a suspect’s age and experience. For
example, the voluntariness of a statement is often said to

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
668 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Opinion of the Court
depend on whether “the defendant’s will was overborne,”
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 534 (1963), a question that
logically can depend on “the characteristics of the accused,”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 226 (1973). The
characteristics of the accused can include the suspect’s age,
education, and intelligence, see ibid., as well as a suspect’s
prior experience with law enforcement, see Lynumn, supra,
at 534. In concluding that there was “no principled reason”
why such factors should not also apply to the Miranda cus-
tody inquiry, 316 F. 3d, at 850, the Court of Appeals ignored
the argument that the custody inquiry states an objective
rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while con-
sideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics—including
his age—could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.
Cf. Mathiason, 429 U. S., at 495–496 (noting that facts argua-
bly relevant to whether an environment is coercive may have
“nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for
purposes of the Miranda rule”). For these reasons, the
state court’s failure to consider Alvarado’s age does not pro-
vide a proper basis for finding that the state court’s decision
was an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
Indeed, reliance on Alvarado’s prior history with law en-
forcement was improper not only under the deferential
standard of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1), but also as a de novo mat-
ter. In most cases, police officers will not know a suspect’s
interrogation history. See Berkemer, supra, at 430–431.
Even if they do, the relationship between a suspect’s past
experiences and the likelihood a reasonable person with that
experience would feel free to leave often will be speculative.
True, suspects with prior law enforcement experience may
understand police procedures and reasonably feel free to
leave unless told otherwise. On the other hand, they may
view past as prologue and expect another in a string of ar-
rests. We do not ask police officers to consider these contin-
gent psychological factors when deciding when suspects
should be advised of their Miranda rights. See Berkemer,

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
669 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Breyer, J., dissenting
supra, at 431–432. The inquiry turns too much on the sus-
pect’s subjective state of mind and not enough on the “objec-
tive circumstances of the interrogation.” Stansbury, 511
U. S., at 323.
The state court considered the proper factors and reached
a reasonable conclusion. The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is
Reversed.
Justice O’Connor, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to
express an additional reason for reversal. There may be
cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the “cus-
tody” inquiry under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436
(1966). In this case, however, Alvarado was almost 18 years
old at the time of his interview. It is difficult to expect po-
lice to recognize that a suspect is a juvenile when he is so
close to the age of majority. Even when police do know a
suspect’s age, it may be difficult for them to ascertain what
bearing it has on the likelihood that the suspect would feel
free to leave. That is especially true here; 171 ⁄ 2-year-olds
vary widely in their reactions to police questioning, and
many can be expected to behave as adults. Given these dif-
ficulties, I agree that the state court’s decision in this case
cannot be called an unreasonable application of federal law
simply because it failed explicitly to mention Alvarado’s age.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
In my view, Michael Alvarado clearly was “in custody”
when the police questioned him (without Miranda warnings)
about the murder of Francisco Castaneda. To put the ques-
tion in terms of federal law’s well-established legal stand-
ards: Would a “reasonable person” in Alvarado’s “position”
have felt he was “at liberty to terminate the interrogation

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
670 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Breyer, J., dissenting
and leave”? Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U. S. 99, 112 (1995);
Stansbury v. California, 511 U. S. 318, 325 (1994) (per cu-
riam). A court must answer this question in light of “all
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Id., at
322. And the obvious answer here is “no.”
I
A
The law in this case asks judges to apply, not arcane
or complex legal directives, but ordinary common sense.
Would a reasonable person in Alvarado’s position have felt
free simply to get up and walk out of the small room in the
station house at will during his 2-hour police interrogation?
I ask the reader to put himself, or herself, in Alvarado’s cir-
cumstances and then answer that question: Alvarado hears
from his parents that he is needed for police questioning.
His parents take him to the station. On arrival, a police
officer separates him from his parents. His parents ask to
come along, but the officer says they may not. App. 185–
186. Another officer says, “ ‘What do we have here; we are
going to question a suspect.’ ” Id., at 189.
The police take Alvarado to a small interrogation room,
away from the station’s public area. A single officer begins
to question him, making clear in the process that the police
have evidence that he participated in an attempted carjack-
ing connected with a murder. When he says that he never
saw any shooting, the officer suggests that he is lying, while
adding that she is “giving [him] the opportunity to tell the
truth” and “tak[e] care of [him]self.” Id., at 102, 105. To-
ward the end of the questioning, the officer gives him per-
mission to take a bathroom or water break. After two
hours, by which time he has admitted he was involved in the
attempted theft, knew about the gun, and helped to hide it,
the questioning ends.
What reasonable person in the circumstances—brought to
a police station by his parents at police request, put in a

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
671 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Breyer, J., dissenting
small interrogation room, questioned for a solid two hours,
and confronted with claims that there is strong evidence that
he participated in a serious crime, could have thought to
himself, “Well, anytime I want to leave I can just get up and
walk out”? If the person harbored any doubts, would he
still think he might be free to leave once he recalls that the
police officer has just refused to let his parents remain with
him during questioning? Would he still think that he,
rather than the officer, controls the situation?
There is only one possible answer to these questions. A
reasonable person would not have thought he was free sim-
ply to pick up and leave in the middle of the interrogation.
I believe the California courts were clearly wrong to hold
the contrary, and the Ninth Circuit was right in concluding
that those state courts unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished federal law. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).
B
What about the Court’s view that “fairminded jurists could
disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody”? Ante,
at 664. Consider each of the facts it says “weigh against a
finding” of custody:
(1) “The police did not transport Alvarado to the station
or require him to appear at a particular time.” Ibid. (em-
phasis added). True. His parents brought him to the sta-
tion at police request. But why does that matter? The rel-
evant question is whether Alvarado came to the station of
his own free will or submitted to questioning voluntarily.
Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 493–495 (1977) (per
curiam); California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1122–1123
(1983) (per curiam); Thompson, supra, at 118 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). And the involvement of Alvarado’s parents
suggests involuntary, not voluntary, behavior on Alvarado’s
part.
(2) “Alvarado’s parents remained in the lobby during the
interview, suggesting that the interview would be brief. In

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
672 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Breyer, J., dissenting
fact, [Alvarado] and his parents were told that the interview
was ‘ “not going to be long.” ’ ” Ante, at 664 (citation omit-
ted and emphasis added). Whatever was communicated to
Alvarado before the questioning began, the fact is that the
interview was not brief, nor, after the first half hour or so,
would Alvarado have expected it to be brief. And those are
the relevant considerations. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U. S. 420, 441 (1984).
(3) “At the end of the interview, Alvarado went home.”
Ante, at 664 (emphasis added). As the majority acknowl-
edges, our recent case law makes clear that the relevant
question is how a reasonable person would have gauged his
freedom to leave during, not after, the interview. See ante,
at 663 (citing Stansbury, supra, at 325).
(4) “During the interview, [Officer] Comstock focused on
Soto’s crimes rather than Alvarado’s.” Ante, at 664 (em-
phasis added). In fact, the police officer characterized Soto
as the ringleader, while making clear that she knew Alva-
rado had participated in the attempted carjacking during
which Castaneda was killed. See App. 102–103, 109. Her
questioning would have reinforced, not diminished, Alvara-
do’s fear that he was not simply a witness, but also suspected
of having been involved in a serious crime. See Stansbury,
supra, at 325.
(5) “[The officer did not] pressur[e] Alvarado with the
threat of arrest and prosecution . . . [but instead] appealed
to his interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a
police officer.” Ante, at 664 (emphasis added). This factor
might be highly significant were the question one of “coer-
cion.” But it is not. The question is whether Alvarado
would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave.
In respect to that question, police politeness, while com-
mendable, does not significantly help the majority.
(6) “Comstock twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take
a break.” Ibid. (emphasis added). This circumstance, em-
phasizing the officer’s control of Alvarado’s movements,

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
673 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Breyer, J., dissenting
makes it less likely, not more likely, that Alvarado would
have thought he was free to leave at will.
The facts to which the majority points make clear what
the police did not do, for example, come to Alvarado’s house,
tell him he was under arrest, handcuff him, place him in a
locked cell, threaten him, or tell him explicitly that he was
not free to leave. But what is important here is what the
police did do—namely, have Alvarado’s parents bring him to
the station, put him with a single officer in a small room,
keep his parents out, let him know that he was a suspect,
and question him for two hours. These latter facts compel
a single conclusion: A reasonable person in Alvarado’s cir-
cumstances would not have felt free to terminate the interro-
gation and leave.
C
What about Alvarado’s youth? The fact that Alvarado
was 17 helps to show that he was unlikely to have felt free
to ignore his parents’ request to come to the station. See
Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253, 265 (1984) ( juveniles assumed
“to be subject to the control of their parents”). And a 17-
year-old is more likely than, say, a 35-year-old, to take a po-
lice officer’s assertion of authority to keep parents outside
the room as an assertion of authority to keep their child in-
side as well.
The majority suggests that the law might prevent a judge
from taking account of the fact that Alvarado was 17. See
ante, at 666–668. I can find nothing in the law that supports
that conclusion. Our cases do instruct lower courts to apply
a “reasonable person” standard. But the “reasonable per-
son” standard does not require a court to pretend that Alva-
rado was a 35-year-old with aging parents whose middle-
aged children do what their parents ask only out of respect.
Nor does it say that a court should pretend that Alvarado
was the statistically determined “average person”—a work-
ing, married, 35-year-old white female with a high school de-

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
674 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Breyer, J., dissenting
gree. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States: 2003 (123d ed.).
Rather, the precise legal definition of “reasonable person”
may, depending on legal context, appropriately account for
certain personal characteristics. In negligence suits, for ex-
ample, the question is what would a “reasonable person” do
“ ‘under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” In answering
that question, courts enjoy “latitude” and may make “allow-
ance not only for external facts, but sometimes for certain
characteristics of the actor himself,” including physical dis-
ability, youth, or advanced age. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
§ 32, pp. 174–179 (5th ed. 1984); see id., at 179–181; see also
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 10, Comment b, pp. 128–130
(Tent. Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001) (all American jurisdictions
count a person’s childhood as a “relevant circumstance” in
negligence determinations). This allowance makes sense in
light of the tort standard’s recognized purpose: deterrence.
Given that purpose, why pretend that a child is an adult or
that a blind man can see? See O. Holmes, The Common Law
85–89 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
In the present context, that of Miranda’s “in custody” in-
quiry, the law has introduced the concept of a “reasonable
person” to avoid judicial inquiry into subjective states of
mind, and to focus the inquiry instead upon objective circum-
stances that are known to both the officer and the suspect
and that are likely relevant to the way a person would un-
derstand his situation. See Stansbury, 511 U. S., at 323–
325; Berkemer, supra, at 442, and n. 35. This focus helps
to keep Miranda a workable rule. See Berkemer, supra,
at 430–431.
In this case, Alvarado’s youth is an objective circumstance
that was known to the police. It is not a special quality, but
rather a widely shared characteristic that generates com-
monsense conclusions about behavior and perception. To
focus on the circumstance of age in a case like this does not

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
675 Cite as: 541 U. S. 652 (2004)
Breyer, J., dissenting
complicate the “in custody” inquiry. And to say that courts
should ignore widely shared, objective characteristics, like
age, on the ground that only a (large) minority of the popula-
tion possesses them would produce absurd results, the pres-
ent instance being a case in point. I am not surprised that
the majority points to no case suggesting any such limitation.
Cf. Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841, 848, 850–851, n. 5
(CA9 2002) (case below) (listing 12 cases from 12 different
jurisdictions suggesting the contrary).
Nor am I surprised that the majority makes no real argu-
ment at all explaining why any court would believe that the
objective fact of a suspect’s age could never be relevant.
But see ante, at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There may
be cases in which a suspect’s age will be relevant to the Mi-
randa ‘custody’ inquiry”). The majority does discuss a sus-
pect’s “history with law enforcement,” ante, at 668—a bright
red herring in the present context where Alvarado’s youth
(an objective fact) simply helps to show (with the help of a
legal presumption) that his appearance at the police station
was not voluntary. See supra, at 673.
II
As I have said, the law in this case is clear. This Court’s
cases establish that, even if the police do not tell a suspect
he is under arrest, do not handcuff him, do not lock him in a
cell, and do not threaten him, he may nonetheless reasonably
believe he is not free to leave the place of questioning—and
thus be in custody for Miranda purposes. See Stansbury,
supra, at 325–326; Berkemer, 468 U. S., at 440.
Our cases also make clear that to determine how a suspect
would have “gaug[ed]” his “freedom of movement,” a court
must carefully examine “all of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation,” Stansbury, supra, at 322, 325 (internal
quotation marks omitted), including, for example, how long
the interrogation lasted (brief and routine or protracted?),
see, e. g., Berkemer, supra, at 441; how the suspect came to

541US2 Unit: $U53 [05-20-06 18:30:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN
676 YARBOROUGH v. ALVARADO
Breyer, J., dissenting
be questioned (voluntarily or against his will?), see, e. g., Ma-
thiason, 429 U. S., at 495; where the questioning took place
(at a police station or in public?), see, e. g., Berkemer, supra,
at 438–439; and what the officer communicated to the individ-
ual during the interrogation (that he was a suspect? that he
was under arrest? that he was free to leave at will?), see,
e. g., Stansbury, supra, at 325. In the present case, every
one of these factors argues—and argues strongly—that Al-
varado was in custody for Miranda purposes when the po-
lice questioned him.
Common sense, and an understanding of the law’s basic
purpose in this area, are enough to make clear that Alvara-
do’s age—an objective, widely shared characteristic about
which the police plainly knew—is also relevant to the inquiry.
Cf. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U. S. 626, 629–631 (2003) (per
curiam). Unless one is prepared to pretend that Alvarado
is someone he is not, a middle-aged gentleman, well versed
in police practices, it seems to me clear that the California
courts made a serious mistake. I agree with the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s similar conclusions. Consequently, I dissent.