HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.

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177 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of nevada
No. 03–5554. Argued March 22, 2004—Decided June 21, 2004
Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refus-
ing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop
involving a reported assault. Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute re-
quires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances
to identify himself. The state intermediate appellate court affirmed,
rejecting Hiibel’s argument that the state law’s application to his case
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed.
Held: Petitioner’s conviction does not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights or the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination.
Pp. 182–191.
(a) State stop and identify statutes often combine elements of tradi-
tional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behav-
ior in the course of investigatory stops. They vary from State to State,
but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his iden-
tity. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 167–171, this Court
invalidated a traditional vagrancy law for vagueness because of its broad
scope and imprecise terms. The Court recognized similar constitu-
tional limitations in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, where it invali-
dated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on
Fourth Amendment grounds, and in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352,
where it invalidated on vagueness grounds California’s modified stop
and identify statute that required a suspect to give an officer “credible
and reliable” identification when asked to identify himself, id., at 360.
This case begins where those cases left off. Here, the initial stop was
based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment re-
quirements noted in Brown. Further, Hiibel has not alleged that the
Nevada statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. This stat-
ute is narrower and more precise. In contrast to the “credible and reli-
able” identification requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme
Court has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect
disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce a
driver’s license or any other document. If he chooses either to state
his name or communicate it to the officer by other means, the statute is
satisfied and no violation occurs. Pp. 182–185.

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178 HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,
HUMBOLDT CTY.
Syllabus
(b) The officer’s conduct did not violate Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Ordinarily, an investigating officer is free to ask a person for
identification without implicating the Amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466
U. S. 210, 216. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, the Court has
recognized that an officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a
brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it
is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself
during a Terry stop, see, e. g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221,
229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested
and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3.
The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to
require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.
Terry, supra, at 34. The Nevada statute is consistent with Fourth
Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures be-
cause it properly balances the intrusion on the individual’s interests
against the promotion of legitimate government interests. See Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654. An identity request has an immedi-
ate relation to the Terry stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical de-
mands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request
does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the statute does
not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing neither its duration nor
its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively that the statute circumvents
the probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person
for being suspicious, thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary
police conduct. These familiar concerns underlay Kolender, Brown,
and Papachristou. They are met by the requirement that a Terry stop
be justified at its inception and be “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified” the initial stop. Terry, supra, at 20.
Under those principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to
identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to
the circumstances justifying the stop. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U. S.
811, 817. The request in this case was a commonsense inquiry, not an
effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded
insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s require-
ment of a response did not contravene the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 185–189.
(c) Hiibel’s contention that his conviction violates the Fifth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on self-incrimination fails because disclosure of his
name and identity presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is in-
criminating, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 598, and protects only

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179 Cite as: 542 U. S. 177 (2004)
Syllabus
against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be
so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445. Hiibel’s refusal
to disclose was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear
that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish
evidence needed to prosecute him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S.
479, 486. It appears he refused to identify himself only because he
thought his name was none of the officer’s business. While the Court
recognizes his strong belief that he should not have to disclose his iden-
tity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s
judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure
would tend to incriminate him. Answering a request to disclose a name
is likely to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances. See, e. g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v.
Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555. If a case arises where there is a substan-
tial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have
given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the
individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the
Fifth Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and
what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved here.
Pp. 189–191.
118 Nev. 868, 59 P. 3d 1201, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, post, p. 191. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 197.
Robert E. Dolan argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were James P. Logan, Jr., and Harriet
E. Cummings.
Conrad Hafen, Senior Deputy Attorney General of Ne-
vada, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
brief were Brian Sandoval, Attorney General, and David
Allison.
Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General

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180 HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,
HUMBOLDT CTY.
Opinion of the Court
Wray, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Joel M.
Gershowitz.*
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to
identify himself during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968). He challenges his conviction under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I
The sheriff ’s department in Humboldt County, Nevada, re-
ceived an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault.
The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red
and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sher-
iff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the offi-
cer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the
side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a
young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed
skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to
believe it had come to a sudden stop.
The officer approached the man and explained that he was
investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and
Mark A. Berman; for the Cato Institute by Timothy Lynch and M. Chris-
tine Klein; for the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty et al.
by Carter G. Phillips, Edward R. McNicholas, and Rebecca K. Troth; and
for John Gilmore by James P. Harrison.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson;
and for the National Association of Police Organizations by Joel D. Bertoc-
chi and Philip Allen Lacovara.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Electronic Frontier Foundation
by Robert Weisberg; for the Electronic Privacy Information Center et al.
by Marc Rotenberg and David L. Sobel; and for PrivacyActivism et al. by
William M. Simpich.

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Opinion of the Court
intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had “any identifica-
tion on [him],” which we understand as a request to produce
a driver’s license or some other form of written identifica-
tion. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to
see identification. The officer responded that he was con-
ducting an investigation and needed to see some identifica-
tion. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he
had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he
wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing
there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer’s
request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer
by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer
to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for
several minutes: The officer asked for identification 11 times
and was refused each time. After warning the man that he
would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the
officer placed him under arrest.
We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road
is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with “willfully
resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in dis-
charging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his
office” in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) § 199.280 (2003).
The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the of-
ficer in carrying out his duties under § 171.123, a Nevada
statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police
officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section
171.123 provides in relevant part:
“1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the
officer encounters under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the person has committed, is commit-
ting or is about to commit a crime.
. . . . .
“3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this
section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious
circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any
person so detained shall identify himself, but may not

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182 HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,
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Opinion of the Court
be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace
officer.”
Hiibel was tried in the Justice Court of Union Township.
The court agreed that Hiibel’s refusal to identify himself as
required by § 171.123 “obstructed and delayed Dove as a
public officer in attempting to discharge his duty” in viola-
tion of § 199.280. App. 5. Hiibel was convicted and fined
$250. The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed, rejecting
Hiibel’s argument that the application of § 171.123 to his case
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On review the
Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the Fourth Amendment
challenge in a divided opinion. 118 Nev. 868, 59 P. 3d 1201
(2002). Hiibel petitioned for rehearing, seeking explicit res-
olution of his Fifth Amendment challenge. The petition was
denied without opinion. We granted certiorari. 540 U. S.
965 (2003).
II
NRS § 171.123(3) is an enactment sometimes referred to as
a “stop and identify” statute. See Ala. Code § 15–5–30
(West 2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 5–71–213(a)(1) (2004); Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 16–3–103(1) (2003); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,
§§ 1902(a), 1321(6) (2003); Fla. Stat. § 856.021(2) (2003); Ga.
Code Ann. § 16–11–36(b) (2003); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, § 5/
107–14 (2004); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22–2402(1) (2003); La. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 84.710(2) (2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 46–5–401(2)(a) (2003);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29–829 (2003); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 594:2,
644:6 (Lexis 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30–22–3 (2004);
N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (West 2004); N. D. Cent.
Code § 29–29–21 (2003); R. I. Gen. Laws § 12–7–1 (2003); Utah
Code Ann. § 77–7–15 (2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, § 1983
(Supp. 2003); Wis. Stat. § 968.24 (2003). See also Note, Stop
and Identify Statutes: A New Form of an Inadequate Solu-
tion to an Old Problem, 12 Rutgers L. J. 585 (1981); Note,
Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: Ex-

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Opinion of the Court
ploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 Iowa
L. Rev. 1057 (1984).
Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of tradi-
tional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate
police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The
statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer
to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few
States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a
model code that permits an officer to stop a person reason-
ably suspected of committing a crime and “demand of him
his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.”
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344
(1942). Other statutes are based on the text proposed by
the American Law Institute as part of the Institute’s Model
Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code § 250.6, Comment
4, pp. 392–393 (1980). The provision, originally designated
§ 250.12, provides that a person who is loitering “under cir-
cumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged
or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses
the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and
give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his
conduct and purposes.” § 250.12 (Tent. Draft No. 13) (1961).
In some States, a suspect’s refusal to identify himself is a
misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a factor
to be considered in whether the suspect has violated loiter-
ing laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to identify
himself without penalty.
Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English
vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face ar-
rest unless they gave “a good Account of themselves,” 15
Geo. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (1744), a power that itself reflected common-
law rights of private persons to “arrest any suspicious night-
walker, and detain him till he give a good account of
himself . . . .” 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, § 6,
p. 130 (6th ed. 1787). In recent decades, the Court has
found constitutional infirmity in traditional vagrancy laws.

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Opinion of the Court
In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), the
Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for
vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied
proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police of-
ficers to exercise unfettered discretion in the enforcement of
the law. See id., at 167–171.
The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations
on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), the Court invalidated
a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute
on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the
initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts estab-
lishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was in-
volved in criminal activity. See id., at 51–52. Absent that
factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the
risk of “arbitrary and abusive police practices” was too great
and the stop was impermissible. Id., at 52. Four Terms
later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify stat-
ute on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U. S. 352 (1983). The California law in Kolender required a
suspect to give an officer “ ‘credible and reliable’ ” identifica-
tion when asked to identify himself. Id., at 360. The Court
held that the statute was void because it provided no stand-
ard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with
it, resulting in “ ‘virtually unrestrained power to arrest and
charge persons with a violation.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Lewis v.
New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring
in result)).
The present case begins where our prior cases left off.
Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on
reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment re-
quirements noted in Brown. Further, the petitioner has not
alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Ko-
lender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more pre-
cise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to re-
quire a suspect to give the officer “credible and reliable”

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identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has
interpreted NRS § 171.123(3) to require only that a suspect
disclose his name. See 118 Nev., at 875, 59 P. 3d, at 1206
(opinion of Young, C. J.) (“The suspect is not required to pro-
vide private details about his background, but merely to
state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion ex-
ists”). As we understand it, the statute does not require a
suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other
document. Provided that the suspect either states his name
or communicates it to the officer by other means—a choice,
we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satis-
fied and no violation occurs. See id., at 876–877, 59 P. 3d,
at 1206–1207.
III
Hiibel argues that his conviction cannot stand because the
officer’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
We disagree.
Asking questions is an essential part of police investiga-
tions. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask
a person for identification without implicating the Fourth
Amendment. “[I]nterrogation relating to one’s identity or a
request for identification by the police does not, by itself,
constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” INS v. Delgado,
466 U. S. 210, 216 (1984). Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has recognized that a law enforce-
ment officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be in-
volved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the
person for a brief time and take additional steps to inves-
tigate further. Delgado, supra, at 216; United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975). To ensure that
the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry
stop must be limited. The officer’s action must be “ ‘justi-
fied at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.’ ” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985)
(quoting Terry, supra, at 20). For example, the seizure can-

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Opinion of the Court
not continue for an excessive period of time, see United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709 (1983), or resemble a tradi-
tional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 212
(1979).
Our decisions make clear that questions concerning a sus-
pect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry
stops. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229
(1985) (“[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask ques-
tions, or check identification in the absence of probable cause
promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes
and bringing offenders to justice”); Hayes v. Florida, 470
U. S. 811, 816 (1985) (“[I]f there are articulable facts support-
ing a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a
criminal offense, that person may be stopped in order to
identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him briefly
while attempting to obtain additional information”); Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspi-
cious individual, in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts
known to the officer at the time”).
Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop
serves important government interests. Knowledge of
identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for
another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disor-
der. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear
a suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts
elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in
cases such as this, where the police are investigating what
appears to be a domestic assault. Officers called to investi-
gate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing
with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.
Although it is well established that an officer may ask a
suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop, it
has been an open question whether the suspect can be ar-

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Opinion of the Court
rested and prosecuted for refusal to answer. See Brown,
443 U. S., at 53, n. 3. Petitioner draws our attention to
statements in prior opinions that, according to him, answer
the question in his favor. In Terry, Justice White stated in
a concurring opinion that a person detained in an investiga-
tive stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer fur-
nishes no basis for an arrest.” 392 U. S., at 34. The Court
cited this opinion in dicta in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 439 (1984), a decision holding that a routine traffic stop
is not a custodial stop requiring the protections of Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In the course of explaining
why Terry stops have not been subject to Miranda, the
Court suggested reasons why Terry stops have a “nonthreat-
ening character,” among them the fact that a suspect de-
tained during a Terry stop “is not obliged to respond” to
questions. See Berkemer, supra, at 439, 440. According
to petitioner, these statements establish a right to refuse to
answer questions during a Terry stop.
We do not read these statements as controlling. The pas-
sages recognize that the Fourth Amendment does not impose
obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights against
the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself
cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case
concerns a different issue, however. Here, the source of the
legal obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth
Amendment. Further, the statutory obligation does not go
beyond answering an officer’s request to disclose a name.
See NRS § 171.123(3) (“Any person so detained shall identify
himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other in-
quiry of any peace officer”). As a result, we cannot view the
dicta in Berkemer or Justice White’s concurrence in Terry as
answering the question whether a State can compel a sus-
pect to disclose his name during a Terry stop.
The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect
to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The rea-

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Opinion of the Court
sonableness of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is de-
termined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate government interests.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S.
648, 654 (1979). The Nevada statute satisfies that standard.
The request for identity has an immediate relation to the
purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.
The threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request
for identity does not become a legal nullity. On the other
hand, the Nevada statute does not alter the nature of the
stop itself: it does not change its duration, Place, supra, at
709, or its location, Dunaway, supra, at 212. A state law
requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a
valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment pro-
hibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Petitioner argues that the Nevada statute circumvents the
probable-cause requirement, in effect allowing an officer to
arrest a person for being suspicious. According to peti-
tioner, this creates a risk of arbitrary police conduct that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit. Brief for Petitioner
28–33. These are familiar concerns; they were central to
the opinion in Papachristou, and also to the decisions limit-
ing the operation of stop and identify statutes in Kolender
and Brown. Petitioner’s concerns are met by the require-
ment that a Terry stop must be justified at its inception and
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-
tified” the initial stop. 392 U. S., at 20. Under these princi-
ples, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify
himself if the request for identification is not reasonably re-
lated to the circumstances justifying the stop. The Court
noted a similar limitation in Hayes, where it suggested that
Terry may permit an officer to determine a suspect’s identity
by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only if
there is “a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting
will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that
crime.” 470 U. S., at 817. It is clear in this case that the

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request for identification was “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified” the stop. Terry, supra,
at 20. The officer’s request was a commonsense inquiry, not
an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a
Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the re-
quest, and the State’s requirement of a response did not con-
travene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.
IV
Petitioner further contends that his conviction violates
the Fif th Amendment’s prohibition on compelled self-
incrimination. The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself.” To qualify for the Fifth Amendment
privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminat-
ing, and compelled. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S.
27, 34–38 (2000).
Respondents urge us to hold that the statements NRS
§ 171.123(3) requires are nontestimonial, and so outside the
Clause’s scope. We decline to resolve the case on that basis.
“[T]o be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself,
explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.” Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 210
(1988). See also Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 35. Stating one’s
name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity.
Production of identity documents might meet the definition
as well. As we noted in Hubbell, acts of production may
yield testimony establishing “the existence, authenticity, and
custody of items [the police seek].” Id., at 41. Even if
these required actions are testimonial, however, petitioner’s
challenge must fail because in this case disclosure of his
name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony
that is incriminating. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
598 (1896) (noting that where “the answer of the witness will
not directly show his infamy, but only tend to disgrace him,

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Opinion of the Court
he is bound to answer”). A claim of Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege must establish
“ ‘reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness
from his being compelled to answer . . . . [T]he danger
to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with
reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordi-
nary course of things,—not a danger of an imaginary
and unsubstantial character, having reference to some
extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so im-
probable that no reasonable man would suffer it to in-
fluence his conduct.’ ” Id., at 599–600 (quoting Queen v.
Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 330, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q. B.
1861) (Cockburn, C. J.)).
As we stated in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445
(1972), the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination “protects against any disclosures that the
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal
prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be
so used.” Suspects who have been granted immunity from
prosecution may, therefore, be compelled to answer; with the
threat of prosecution removed, there can be no reasonable
belief that the evidence will be used against them. See id.,
at 453.
In this case petitioner’s refusal to disclose his name was
not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that
his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it “would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute”
him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951).
As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself
only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s
business. Even today, petitioner does not explain how the
disclosure of his name could have been used against him in a
criminal case. While we recognize petitioner’s strong belief
that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth

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191 Cite as: 542 U. S. 177 (2004)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature’s
judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the
disclosure would tend to incriminate him.
The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement is also im-
portant. One’s identity is, by definition, unique; yet it is,
in another sense, a universal characteristic. Answering a
request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in
the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs.
v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555 (1990) (suggesting that
“fact[s] the State could readily establish” may render “any
testimony regarding existence or authenticity [of them] in-
sufficiently incriminating”); cf. California v. Byers, 402 U. S.
424, 432 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). In every criminal
case, it is known and must be known who has been arrested
and who is being tried. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U. S. 582, 601–602 (1990) (principal opinion of Brennan, J.).
Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege answer when their names are called to take the
stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial
allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would
have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed
to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case,
the court can then consider whether the privilege applies,
and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy
must follow. We need not resolve those questions here.
The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens, dissenting.
The Nevada law at issue in this case imposes a narrow
duty to speak upon a specific class of individuals. The class
includes only those persons detained by a police officer
“under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the per-
son has committed, is committing or is about to commit a

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Stevens, J., dissenting
crime” 1 —persons who are, in other words, targets of a crimi-
nal investigation. The statute therefore is directed not “at
the public at large,” but rather “at a highly selective group
inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Albertson v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Bd., 382 U. S. 70, 79 (1965).
Under the Nevada law, a member of the targeted class
“may not be compelled to answer” any inquiry except a com-
mand that he “identify himself.” 2 Refusal to identify one-
self upon request is punishable as a crime.3 Presumably the
statute does not require the detainee to answer any other
question because the Nevada Legislature realized that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling the target of a crimi-
nal investigation to make any other statement. In my judg-
ment, the broad constitutional right to remain silent, which
derives from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself,” 4 is not as circumscribed as the
Court suggests, and does not admit even of the narrow ex-
ception defined by the Nevada statute.
“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and
serves to protect persons in all settings in which their free-
dom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.” Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U. S. 436, 467 (1966). It is a “settled principle”
that “the police have the right to request citizens to answer
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes, ” but
1 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123(1) (2003).
2 § 171.123(3).
3 In this case, petitioner was charged with violating § 199.280, which
makes it a crime to “willfully resis[t], dela[y] or obstruc[t] a public officer
in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office.” A
violation of that provision is a misdemeanor unless a dangerous weapon
is involved.
4 The Fi f th Amendment’s protec ti on agai nst compel led self-
incrimination applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 6 (1964).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
“they have no right to compel them to answer.” Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 727, n. 6 (1969). The protections
of the Fifth Amendment are directed squarely toward those
who are the focus of the government’s investigative and
prosecutorial powers. In a criminal trial, the indicted de-
fendant has an unqualified right to refuse to testify and may
not be punished for invoking that right. See Carter v. Ken-
tucky, 450 U. S. 288, 299–300 (1981). The unindicted target
of a grand jury investigation enjoys the same constitutional
protection even if he has been served with a subpoena. See
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760, 767–768 (2003). So does
an arrested suspect during custodial interrogation in a police
station. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 467.
There is no reason why the subject of police interrogation
based on mere suspicion, rather than probable cause, should
have any lesser protection. Indeed, we have said that the
Fifth Amendment’s protections apply with equal force in the
context of Terry stops, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
where an officer’s inquiry “must be ‘reasonably related in
scope to the justification for [the stop’s] initiation,’ ” Ber-
kemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984) (some internal
quotation marks omitted). “Typically, this means that the
officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions
to determine his identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the de-
tainee is not obliged to respond.” Ibid. See also Terry, 392
U. S., at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“Of course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be com-
pelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation”). Given our statements to the effect that citi-
zens are not required to respond to police officers’ questions
during a Terry stop, it is no surprise that petitioner assumed,
as have we, that he had a right not to disclose his identity.
The Court correctly observes that a communication does
not enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege unless it is testi-

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Stevens, J., dissenting
monial. Although the Court declines to resolve this ques-
tion, ante, at 189, I think it clear that this case concerns
a testimonial communication. Recognizing that whether a
communication is testimonial is sometimes a “difficult ques-
tion,” Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 214–215 (1988), we
have stated generally that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of informa-
tion from the accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose
the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the Self-
Incrimination Clause,” id., at 211 (citations omitted). While
“[t]he vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testi-
monial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privi-
lege,” id., at 213–214, certain acts and physical evidence fall
outside the privilege.5 In all instances, we have afforded
Fifth Amendment protection if the disclosure in question
was being admitted because of its content rather than some
other aspect of the communication.6
Considered in light of these precedents, the compelled
statement at issue in this case is clearly testimonial. It is
significant that the communication must be made in response
5 A suspect may be made, for example, to provide a blood sample,
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 765 (1966), a voice exemplar,
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 7 (1973), or a handwriting sample,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 266–267 (1967).
6 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582, 598–599 (1990) (respond-
ent’s answer to the “birthday question” was protected because the “con-
tent of his truthful answer supported an inference that his mental faculties
were impaired”); Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 211, n. 10 (1988) (“The
content itself must have testimonial significance”); Fisher v. United States,
425 U. S. 391, 410–411 (1976) (“[H]owever incriminating the contents of
the accountant’s workpapers might be, the act of producing them—the
only thing which the taxpayer is compelled to do—would not itself involve
testimonial self-incrimination”); Gilbert, 388 U. S., at 266–267 (“A mere
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like
the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside its
protection”); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 223 (1967) (“[I]t de-
serves emphasis that this case presents no question of the admissibility
in evidence of anything Wade said or did at the lineup which implicates
his privilege”).

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Stevens, J., dissenting
to a question posed by a police officer. As we recently ex-
plained, albeit in the different context of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s Confrontation Clause, “[w]hatever else the term [‘tes-
timonial’] covers, it applies at a minimum . . . to police
interrogations.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 68
(2004). Surely police questioning during a Terry stop quali-
fies as an interrogation, and it follows that responses to such
questions are testimonial in nature.
Rather than determining whether the communication at
issue is testimonial, the Court instead concludes that the
State can compel the disclosure of one’s identity because it
is not “incriminating.” Ante, at 189. But our cases have
afforded Fifth Amendment protection to statements that are
“incriminating” in a much broader sense than the Court sug-
gests. It has “long been settled that [the Fifth Amend-
ment’s] protection encompasses compelled statements that
lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence even though
the statements themselves are not incriminating and are not
introduced into evidence.” United States v. Hubbell, 530
U. S. 27, 37 (2000). By “incriminating” we have meant dis-
closures that “could be used in a criminal prosecution or
could lead to other evidence that might be so used,” Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U. S. 441, 445 (1972)—communications,
in other words, that “would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal
crime,” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951).
Thus, “[c]ompelled testimony that communicates information
that may ‘lead to incriminating evidence’ is privileged even
if the information itself is not inculpatory.” Hubbell, 530
U. S., at 38 (quoting Doe, 487 U. S., at 208, n. 6).
Given a proper understanding of the category of “incrimi-
nating” communications that fall within the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, it is clear that the disclosure of petitioner’s
identity is protected. The Court reasons that we should not
assume that the disclosure of petitioner’s “name would be
used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in [a]

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196 HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,
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Stevens, J., dissenting
chain of evidence needed to prosecute him.” Ante, at 190
(internal quotation marks omitted). But why else would an
officer ask for it? And why else would the Nevada Legisla-
ture require its disclosure only when circumstances “reason-
ably indicate that the person has committed, is committing
or is about to commit a crime”? 7 If the Court is correct,
then petitioner’s refusal to cooperate did not impede the po-
lice investigation. Indeed, if we accept the predicate for the
Court’s holding, the statute requires nothing more than a
useless invasion of privacy. I think that, on the contrary,
the Nevada Legislature intended to provide its police officers
with a useful law enforcement tool, and that the very exist-
ence of the statute demonstrates the value of the information
it demands.
A person’s identity obviously bears informational and in-
criminating worth, “even if the [name] itself is not inculpa-
tory.” Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 38. A name can provide the
key to a broad array of information about the person, partic-
ularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a range
of law enforcement databases. And that information, in
turn, can be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution.
It is therefore quite wrong to suggest that a person’s identity
provides a link in the chain to incriminating evidence “only
in unusual circumstances.” Ante, at 191.
The officer in this case told petitioner, in the Court’s
words, that “he was conducting an investigation and needed
to see some identification.” Ante, at 181. As the target of
that investigation, petitioner, in my view, acted well within
his rights when he opted to stand mute. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.
7 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123(1) (2003). The Court suggests that furnish-
ing identification also allows the investigating officer to assess the threat
to himself and others. See ante, at 186. But to the extent that officer
or public safety is immediately at issue, that concern is sufficiently allevi-
ated by the officer’s ability to perform a limited patdown search for weap-
ons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 25–26 (1968).

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and Jus-
tice Ginsburg join, dissenting.
Notwithstanding the vagrancy statutes to which the ma-
jority refers, see ante, at 183–184, this Court’s Fourth
Amendment precedents make clear that police may conduct
a Terry stop only within circumscribed limits. And one of
those limits invalidates laws that compel responses to po-
lice questioning.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court considered
whether police, in the absence of probable cause, can stop,
question, or frisk an individual at all. The Court recognized
that the Fourth Amendment protects the “ ‘right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person.’ ”
Id., at 9 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S.
250, 251 (1891)). At the same time, it recognized that in
certain circumstances, public safety might require a limited
“seizure,” or stop, of an individual against his will. The
Court consequently set forth conditions circumscribing when
and how the police might conduct a Terry stop. They in-
clude what has become known as the “reasonable suspicion”
standard. 392 U. S., at 20–22. Justice White, in a separate
concurring opinion, set forth further conditions. Justice
White wrote: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged
to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to an-
swer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert
the officer to the need for continued observation.” Id., at 34.
About 10 years later, the Court, in Brown v. Texas, 443
U. S. 47 (1979), held that police lacked “any reasonable suspi-
cion” to detain the particular petitioner and require him to
identify himself. Id., at 53. The Court noted that the trial
judge had asked the following: “ ‘I’m sure [officers conducting
a Terry stop] should ask everything they possibly could find
out. What I’m asking is what’s the State’s interest in put-
ting a man in jail because he doesn’t want to answer . . . .’ ”
Id., at 54 (Appendix to opinion of the Court) (emphasis in

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Breyer, J., dissenting
original). The Court referred to Justice White’s Terry con-
currence. 443 U. S., at 53, n. 3. And it said that it “need
not decide” the matter. Ibid.
Then, five years later, the Court wrote that an “officer may
ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number of questions
to determine his identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the de-
tainee is not obliged to respond.” Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984) (emphasis added). See also Ko-
lender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (Terry suspect “must be free to . . . decline to an-
swer the questions put to him”); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U. S. 119, 125 (2000) (stating that allowing officers to stop
and question a fleeing person “is quite consistent with the
individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and
remain silent in the face of police questioning”).
This lengthy history—of concurring opinions, of refer-
ences, and of clear explicit statements—means that the
Court’s statement in Berkemer, while technically dicta, is the
kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes
as a statement of the law. And that law has remained undis-
turbed for more than 20 years.
There is no good reason now to reject this generation-old
statement of the law. There are sound reasons rooted in
Fif th Amendment considerations for adhering to this
Fourth Amendment legal condition circumscribing police
authority to stop an individual against his will. See ante, at
192–196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Administrative consider-
ations also militate against change. Can a State, in addition
to requiring a stopped individual to answer “What’s your
name?” also require an answer to “What’s your license num-
ber?” or “Where do you live?” Can a police officer, who
must know how to make a Terry stop, keep track of the con-
stitutional answers? After all, answers to any of these
questions may, or may not, incriminate, depending upon the
circumstances.

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Breyer, J., dissenting
Indeed, as the Court points out, a name itself—even if it
is not “Killer Bill” or “Rough ’em up Harry”—will sometimes
provide the police with “a link in the chain of evidence
needed to convict the individual of a separate offense.”
Ante, at 191. The majority reserves judgment about
whether compulsion is permissible in such instances. Ibid.
How then is a police officer in the midst of a Terry stop to
distinguish between the majority’s ordinary case and this
special case where the majority reserves judgment?
The majority presents no evidence that the rule enunci-
ated by Justice White and then by the Berkemer Court,
which for nearly a generation has set forth a settled Terry-
stop condition, has significantly interfered with law enforce-
ment. Nor has the majority presented any other convincing
justification for change. I would not begin to erode a clear
rule with special exceptions.
I consequently dissent.