RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PADILLA et al.

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Syllabus
RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v. PADILLA
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 03–1027. Argued April 28, 2004—Decided June 28, 2004
Respondent Padilla, a United States citizen, was brought to New York for
detention in federal criminal custody after federal agents apprehended
him while executing a material witness warrant issued by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Southern District) in con-
nection with its grand jury investigation into the September 11, 2001,
al Qaeda terrorist attacks. While his motion to vacate the warrant was
pending, the President issued an order to Secretary of Defense Rums-
feld designating Padilla an “enemy combatant” and directing that he be
detained in military custody. Padilla was later moved to a Navy brig
in Charleston, S. C., where he has been held ever since. His counsel
then filed in the Southern District a habeas petition under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2241, which, as amended, alleged that Padilla’s military detention vio-
lates the Constitution, and named as respondents the President, the Sec-
retary, and Melanie Marr, the brig’s commander. The Government
moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Commander Marr, as Padil-
la’s immediate custodian, was the only proper respondent, and that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction over her because she is located outside
the Southern District. That court held that the Secretary’s personal
involvement in Padilla’s military custody rendered him a proper re-
spondent, and that it could assert jurisdiction over the Secretary under
New York’s long-arm statute, notwithstanding his absence from the Dis-
trict. On the merits, the court accepted the Government’s contention
that the President has authority as Commander in Chief to detain as
enemy combatants citizens captured on American soil during a time of
war. The Second Circuit agreed that the Secretary was a proper re-
spondent and that the Southern District had jurisdiction over the Secre-
tary under New York’s long-arm statute. The appeals court reversed
on the merits, however, holding that the President lacks authority to
detain Padilla militarily.
Held:
1. Because this Court answers the jurisdictional question in the nega-
tive, it does not reach the question whether the President has authority
to detain Padilla militarily. P. 430.

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2. The Southern District lacks jurisdiction over Padilla’s habeas peti-
tion. Pp. 434–451.
(a) Commander Marr is the only proper respondent to Padilla’s pe-
tition because she, not Secretary Rumsfeld, is Padilla’s custodian. The
federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper re-
spondent is “the person” having custody over the petitioner. §§ 2242,
2243. Its consistent use of the definite article indicates that there is
generally only one proper respondent, and the custodian is “the person”
with the ability to produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court,
see Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 574. In accord with the statutory
language and Wales’ immediate custodian rule, longstanding federal-
court practice confirms that, in “core” habeas challenges to present
physical confinement, the default rule is that the proper respondent is
the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the
Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official. No excep-
tions to this rule, either recognized or proposed, apply here. Padilla
does not deny the immediate custodian rule’s general applicability, but
argues that the rule is flexible and should not apply on the unique facts
of this case. The Court disagrees. That the Court’s understanding of
custody has broadened over the years to include restraints short of
physical confinement does nothing to undermine the rationale or statu-
tory foundation of the Wales rule where, in core proceedings such as
the present, physical custody is at issue. Indeed, that rule has consist-
ently been applied in this core context. The Second Circuit erred in
taking the view that this Court has relaxed the immediate custodian
rule with respect to prisoners detained for other than federal criminal
violations, and in holding that the proper respondent is the person exer-
cising the “legal reality of control” over the petitioner. The statute
itself makes no such distinction, nor does the Court’s case law support
a deviation from the immediate custodian rule here. Rather, the cases
Padilla cites stand for the simple proposition that the immediate physi-
cal custodian rule, by its terms, does not apply when a habeas petitioner
challenges something other than his present physical confinement. See,
e. g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484; Strait
v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341. That is not the case here: Marr exercises day-
to-day control over Padilla’s physical custody. The petitioner cannot
name someone else just because Padilla’s physical confinement stems
from a military order by the President. Identification of the party ex-
ercising legal control over the detainee only comes into play when there
is no immediate physical custodian. Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 304–
305, distinguished. Although Padilla’s detention is unique in many re-
spects, it is at bottom a simple challenge to physical custody imposed
by the Executive. His detention is thus not unique in any way that

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428 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
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would provide arguable basis for a departure from the immediate custo-
dian rule. Pp. 434–442.
(b) The Southern District does not have jurisdiction over Com-
mander Marr. Section 2241(a)’s language limiting district courts to
granting habeas relief “within their respective jurisdictions” requires
“that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian,”
Braden, supra, at 495. Because Congress added the “respective juris-
dictions” clause to prevent judges anywhere from issuing the Great Writ
on behalf of applicants far distantly removed, Carbo v. United States,
364 U. S. 611, 617, the traditional rule has always been that habeas relief
is issuable only in the district of confinement, id., at 618. This common-
sense reading is supported by other portions of the habeas statute, e. g.,
§ 2242, and by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a). Congress
has also legislated against the background of the “district of confine-
ment” rule by fashioning explicit exceptions: E. g., when a petitioner is
serving a state criminal sentence in a State containing more than one
federal district, “the district . . . wherein [he] is in custody” and “the
district . . . within which the State court was held which convicted and
sentenced him” have “concurrent jurisdiction,” § 2241(d). Such excep-
tions would have been unnecessary if, as the Second Circuit believed,
§ 2241 permits a prisoner to file outside the district of confinement. De-
spite this ample statutory and historical pedigree, Padilla urges that,
under Braden and Strait, jurisdiction lies in any district in which the
respondent is amenable to service of process. The Court disagrees, dis-
tinguishing those two cases. Padilla seeks to challenge his present
physical custody in South Carolina. Because the immediate custodian
rule applies, the proper respondent is Commander Marr, who is present
in South Carolina. There is thus no occasion to designate a “nominal”
custodian and determine whether he or she is “present” in the same
district as petitioner. The habeas statute’s “respective jurisdictions”
proviso forms an important corollary to the immediate custodian rule
in challenges to present physical custody under § 2241. Together they
compose a simple rule that has been consistently applied in the lower
courts, including in the context of military detentions: Whenever a
§ 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody
within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and
file the petition in the district of confinement. This rule serves the
important purpose of preventing forum shopping by habeas petition-
ers. The District of South Carolina, not the Southern District of New
York, was where Padilla should have brought his habeas petition.
Pp. 442–447.
(c) The Court rejects additional arguments made by the dissent in
support of the mistaken view that exceptions exist to the immediate

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custodian and district of confinement rules whenever exceptional, spe-
cial, or unusual cases arise. Pp. 447–451.
352 F. 3d 695, reversed and remanded.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 451. Stevens,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., joined, post, p. 455.
Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for
petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Olson, Sri Srinivasan, and Jonathan L. Marcus.
Jennifer S. Martinez argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Donna R. Newman, Andrew G.
Patel, Jonathan M. Freiman, David W. DeBruin, William
M. Hohengarten, and Matthew Hersh.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Common-
wealth of Virginia by Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General of Virginia, Wil-
liam H. Hurd, State Solicitor, Maureen Riley Matsen and William E.
Thro, Deputy State Solicitors, Alison P. Landry, Senior Assistant Attor-
ney General, and Courtney M. Malveaux and Russell E. McGuire, Assist-
ant Attorneys General; for the American Center for Law & Justice by Jay
Alan Sekulow, Thomas P. Monaghan, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May,
James M. Henderson, Sr., Joel H. Thornton, and Robert W. Ash; for the
Cato Institute by Timothy Lynch; for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda-
tion by Kent S. Scheidegger; and for the Washington Legal Foundation
et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, Sharon M. McGowan,
Lucas Guttentag, Robin L. Goldfaden, Arthur N. Eisenberg, Arthur H.
Bryant, and Rebecca E. Epstein; for the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York et al. by Joseph Gerard Davis; for the Beverly Hills Bar
Association et al. by Bridget Arimond, Stephen F. Rohde, and Marc J.
Poster; for the Center for National Security Studies et al. by John Payton,
Seth P. Waxman, Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Kate Martin, and Joseph Onek; for
Global Rights by James F. Fitzpatrick, Kathleen A. Behan, and Gay J.
McDougall; for Others Are Us et al. by Jonathan D. Wallace; for the
Rutherford Institute et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad, Joseph
R. Guerra, and Elliot M. Mincberg; for the Spartacist League et al. by
Rachel H. Wolkenstein; for Bruce A. Ackerman et al. by Jules Lobel, Bar-

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430 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Respondent Jose Padilla is a United States citizen de-
tained by the Department of Defense pursuant to the Presi-
dent’s determination that he is an “enemy combatant” who
conspired with al Qaeda to carry out terrorist attacks in the
United States. We confront two questions: First, did Padilla
properly file his habeas petition in the Southern District of
New York; and second, did the President possess authority
to detain Padilla militarily. We answer the threshold ques-
tion in the negative and thus do not reach the second ques-
tion presented.
Because we do not decide the merits, we only briefly re-
count the relevant facts. On May 8, 2002, Padilla flew from
Pakistan to Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. As he
stepped off the plane, Padilla was apprehended by federal
agents executing a material witness warrant issued by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
bara Olshansky, Nancy Chang, and Shayana Kadidal; for Susan Akram
et al. by Daniel Kanstroom; for Philip Alston et al. by David N. Rosen,
Homer E. Moyer, Jr., and Michael T. Brady; for the Honorable John Con-
yers, Jr., et al. by Brian S. Koukoutchos; for Samuel R. Gross et al. by
Jonathan L. Hafetz, Lawrence S. Lustberg, and Michael J. Wishnie; for
Louis Henkin et al. by Donald Francis Donovan, Carl Micarelli, and J.
Paul Oetken; for Fred Korematsu et al. by Arturo J. Gonza´ lez and Jon
B. Streeter; and for Janet Reno et al. by Robert S. Litt and Theodore
D. Frank.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers et al. by Donald G. Rehkopf, Jr., and Lisa B. Kemler;
for the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia by Catharine
F. Easterly, Giovanna Shay, and Timothy P. O’Toole; for William J. Aceves
et al. by Linda A. Malone and Jordan J. Paust; for Payam Akhavan
et al. by Allison Marston Danner; for the Honorable Shirley M. Huf-
stedler et al. by Robert P. LoBue; and for David J. Scheffer et al. by
Mr. Scheffer, pro se.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 03–6696, Hamdi et al.
v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, et al., post, p. 507, and reversal in
No. 03–1027 was filed for Senator John Cornyn et al. by Senator Cornyn,
pro se.

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New York (Southern District) in connection with its grand
jury investigation into the September 11th terrorist attacks.
Padilla was then transported to New York, where he was
held in federal criminal custody. On May 22, acting through
appointed counsel, Padilla moved to vacate the material wit-
ness warrant.
Padilla’s motion was still pending when, on June 9, the
President issued an order to Secretary of Defense Donald
H. Rumsfeld designating Padilla an “enemy combatant” and
directing the Secretary to detain him in military custody.
App. D to Brief for Petitioner 5a (June 9 Order). In support
of this action, the President invoked his authority as “Com-
mander in Chief of the U. S. armed forces” and the Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, Pub. L.
107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (AUMF),1 enacted by Congress on
September 18, 2001. June 9 Order 5a. The President
also made several factual findings explaining his decision to
designate Padilla an enemy combatant.2 Based on these
findings, the President concluded that it is “consistent with
U. S. law and the laws of war for the Secretary of Defense
to detain Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant.” Id., at 6a.
1 The AUMF provides in relevant part: “[T]he President is authorized
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organiza-
tions, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of inter-
national terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons.” 115 Stat. 224.
2 In short, the President “[d]etermine[d]” that Padilla (1) “is closely as-
sociated with al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization with which
the United States is at war;” (2) that he “engaged in . . . hostile and
war-like acts, including . . . preparation for acts of international terrorism”
against the United States; (3) that he “possesses intelligence” about al
Qaeda that “would aid U. S. efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda on the
United States”; and finally, (4) that he “represents a continuing, present
and grave danger to the national security of the United States,” such that
his military detention “is necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda
in its efforts to attack the United States.” June 9 Order 5a–6a.

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That same day, Padilla was taken into custody by Depart-
ment of Defense officials and transported to the Consolidated
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.3 He has been
held there ever since.
On June 11, Padilla’s counsel, claiming to act as his next
friend, filed in the Southern District a habeas corpus petition
under 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The petition, as amended, alleged
that Padilla’s military detention violates the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments and the Suspension Clause, Art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. The amended
petition named as respondents President Bush, Secretary
Rumsfeld, and Melanie A. Marr, Commander of the Consoli-
dated Naval Brig.
The Government moved to dismiss, arguing that Com-
mander Marr, as Padilla’s immediate custodian, is the only
proper respondent to his habeas petition, and that the Dis-
trict Court lacks jurisdiction over Commander Marr because
she is located outside the Southern District. On the merits,
the Government contended that the President has authority
to detain Padilla militarily pursuant to the Commander in
Chief Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, the con-
gressional AUMF, and this Court’s decision in Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942).
The District Court issued its decision in December 2002.
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564. The
court held that the Secretary’s “personal involvement” in
Padilla’s military custody renders him a proper respondent
to Padilla’s habeas petition, and that it can assert jurisdiction
over the Secretary under New York’s long-arm statute, not-
3 Also on June 9, the Government notified the District Court ex parte of
the President’s order; informed the court that it was transferring Padilla
into military custody in South Carolina and that it was consequently with-
drawing its grand jury subpoena of Padilla; and asked the court to vacate
the material witness warrant. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233
F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (SDNY 2002). The court vacated the warrant. Ibid.

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withstanding his absence from the Southern District.4 Id.,
at 581–587. On the merits, however, the court accepted the
Government’s contention that the President has authority to
detain as enemy combatants citizens captured on American
soil during a time of war. Id., at 587–599.5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
352 F. 3d 695 (2003). The court agreed with the District
Court that Secretary Rumsfeld is a proper respondent, rea-
soning that in cases where the habeas petitioner is detained
for “other than federal criminal violations, the Supreme
Court has recognized exceptions to the general practice of
naming the immediate physical custodian as respondent.”
Id., at 704–708. The Court of Appeals concluded that on
these “unique” facts Secretary Rumsfeld is Padilla’s custo-
dian because he exercises “the legal reality of control” over
Padilla and because he was personally involved in Padilla’s
military detention. Id., at 707–708. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the District Court’s holding that it has jurisdic-
tion over the Secretary under New York’s long-arm statute.
Id., at 708–710.
Reaching the merits, the Court of Appeals held that the
President lacks authority to detain Padilla militarily. Id., at
710–724. The court concluded that neither the President’s
4 The court dismissed Commander Marr, Padilla’s immediate custodian,
reasoning that she would be obliged to obey any order the court directed
to the Secretary. Id., at 583. The court also dismissed President Bush
as a respondent, a ruling Padilla does not challenge. Id., at 582–583.
5 Although the District Court upheld the President’s authority to detain
domestically captured enemy combatants, it rejected the Government’s
contentions that Padilla has no right to challenge the factual basis for his
detention and that he should be denied access to counsel. Instead, the
court held that the habeas statute affords Padilla the right to controvert
alleged facts, and granted him monitored access to counsel to effectuate
that right. Id., at 599–605. Finally, the court announced that after it
received Padilla’s factual proffer, it would apply a deferential “some evi-
dence” standard to determine whether the record supports the President’s
designation of Padilla as an enemy combatant. Id., at 605–608.

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Commander in Chief power nor the AUMF authorizes mili-
tary detentions of American citizens captured on American
soil. Id., at 712–718, 722–723. To the contrary, the Court
of Appeals found in both our case law and in the Non-
Detention Act, 18 U. S. C. § 4001(a),6 a strong presumption
against domestic military detention of citizens absent explicit
congressional authorization. 352 F. 3d, at 710–722. Ac-
cordingly, the court granted the writ of habeas corpus and
directed the Secretary to release Padilla from military cus-
tody within 30 days. Id., at 724.
We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to re-
view the Court of Appeals’ rulings with respect to the juris-
dictional and the merits issues, both of which raise important
questions of federal law. 540 U. S. 1173 (2004).7
The question whether the Southern District has jurisdic-
tion over Padilla’s habeas petition breaks down into two re-
lated subquestions. First, who is the proper respondent to
that petition? And second, does the Southern District have
jurisdiction over him or her? We address these questions
in turn.
I
The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides
that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is “the
person who has custody over [the petitioner].” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2242; see also § 2243 (“The writ, or order to show cause
shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained”). The consistent use of the definite article in ref-
erence to the custodian indicates that there is generally only
one proper respondent to a given prisoner’s habeas petition.
6 Section 4001(a) provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or oth-
erwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress.”
7 The word “jurisdiction,” of course, is capable of different interpreta-
tions. We use it in the sense that it is used in the habeas statute, 28
U. S. C. § 2241(a), and not in the sense of subject-matter jurisdiction of the
District Court.

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This custodian, moreover, is “the person” with the ability to
produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court. Ibid.
We summed up the plain language of the habeas statute over
100 years ago in this way: “[T]hese provisions contemplate a
proceeding against some person who has the immediate cus-
tody of the party detained, with the power to produce the
body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be
liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary.”
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 574 (1885) (emphasis added);
see also Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U. S. 484, 494–495 (1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus” acts
upon “the person who holds [the detainee] in what is alleged
to be unlawful custody,” citing Wales, supra, at 574); Braden,
supra, at 495 (“ ‘[T]his writ . . . is directed to . . . [the] jailer,’ ”
quoting In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 417, 439–440 (1867)).
In accord with the statutory language and Wales’ immedi-
ate custodian rule, longstanding practice confirms that in ha-
beas challenges to present physical confinement—“core chal-
lenges”—the default rule is that the proper respondent is the
warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not
the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory of-
ficial. See, e. g., Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F. 3d 189, 190 (CA7
1996); Brittingham v. United States, 982 F. 2d 378, 379 (CA9
1992); Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F. 2d 1487, 1491–1492
(CA10 1991) (per curiam); Brennan v. Cunningham, 813
F. 2d 1, 12 (CA1 1987); Guerra v. Meese, 786 F. 2d 414, 416
(CADC 1986) (per curiam); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 541 F. 2d 938, 948 (CA2 1976); Sanders v. Bennett,
148 F. 2d 19, 20 (CADC 1945); Jones v. Biddle, 131 F. 2d 853,
854 (CA8 1942).8 No exceptions to this rule, either recog-
8 In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), we left open the question
whether the Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition
filed by an alien detained pending deportation. Id., at 189, 193. The
lower courts have divided on this question, with the majority applying the
immediate custodian rule and holding that the Attorney General is not a
proper respondent. Compare Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F. 3d 667

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nized 9 or proposed, see post, at 454 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring), apply here.
If the Wales immediate custodian rule applies in this case,
Commander Marr—the equivalent of the warden at the mili-
tary brig—is the proper respondent, not Secretary Rums-
feld. See Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F. 3d 707, 708–709
(CA7 2004) (holding in the case of an alleged enemy combat-
ant detained at the Consolidated Naval Brig, the proper
respondent is Commander Marr, not Secretary Rumsfeld);
Monk v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F. 2d 364, 369 (CADC
1986) (holding that the proper respondent in a habeas action
brought by a military prisoner is the commandant of the mili-
tary detention facility, not the Secretary of the Navy); cf. 10
U. S. C. § 951(c) (providing that the commanding officer of a
military correctional facility “shall have custody and control”
of the prisoners confined therein). Neither Padilla, nor the
courts below, nor Justice Stevens’ dissent deny the gen-
eral applicability of the immediate custodian rule to habeas
petitions challenging physical custody. Post, at 458. They
argue instead that the rule is flexible and should not apply
on the “unique facts” of this case. Brief for Respondents 44.
We disagree.
(CA7 2003) (Attorney General is not proper respondent); Roman v. Ash-
croft, 340 F. 3d 314 (CA6 2003) (same); Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F. 3d 688
(CA1 2000) (same); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F. 3d 500 (CA3 1994) (same), with
Armentero v. INS, 340 F. 3d 1058 (CA9 2003) (Attorney General is proper
respondent). The Second Circuit discussed the question at some length,
but ultimately reserved judgment in Henderson v. INS, 157 F. 3d 106
(1998). Because the issue is not before us today, we again decline to re-
solve it.
9 We have long implicitly recognized an exception to the immediate cus-
todian rule in the military context where an American citizen is detained
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district court. Braden v. 30th
Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484, 498 (1973) (discussing the
exception); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955)
(court-martial convict detained in Korea named Secretary of the Air Force
as respondent); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953) (courts-martial con-
victs detained in Guam named Secretary of Defense as respondent).

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First, Padilla notes that the substantive holding of
Wales—that a person released on his own recognizance is
not “in custody” for habeas purposes—was disapproved in
Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial
Dist., Santa Clara Cty., 411 U. S. 345, 350, n. 8 (1973), as
part of this Court’s expanding definition of “custody” under
the habeas statute.10 Padilla seems to contend, and the dis-
sent agrees, post, at 461–462, that because we no longer re-
quire physical detention as a prerequisite to habeas relief,
the immediate custodian rule, too, must no longer bind us,
even in challenges to physical custody. That argument, as
the Seventh Circuit aptly concluded, is a “non sequitur.”
Al-Marri, supra, at 711. That our understanding of custody
has broadened to include restraints short of physical con-
finement does nothing to undermine the rationale or statu-
tory foundation of Wales’ immediate custodian rule where
physical custody is at issue. Indeed, as the cases cited
above attest, it has consistently been applied in this core
habeas context within the United States.11
The Court of Appeals’ view that we have relaxed the im-
mediate custodian rule in cases involving prisoners detained
for “other than federal criminal violations,” and that in such
cases the proper respondent is the person exercising the
“legal reality of control” over the petitioner, suffers from the
same logical flaw. 352 F. 3d, at 705, 707. Certainly the
statute itself makes no such distinction based on the source
of the physical detention. Nor does our case law support a
deviation from the immediate custodian rule here. Rather,
10 For other landmark cases addressing the meaning of “in custody”
under the habeas statute, see Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U. S. 39 (1995); Cara-
fas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 (1968);
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963).
11 Furthermore, Congress has not substantively amended in more than
130 years the relevant portions of the habeas statute on which Wales
based its immediate custodian rule, despite uniform case law embracing
the Wales rule in challenges to physical custody.

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the cases cited by Padilla stand for the simple proposition
that the immediate physical custodian rule, by its terms,
does not apply when a habeas petitioner challenges some-
thing other than his present physical confinement.
In Braden, for example, an Alabama prisoner filed a ha-
beas petition in the Western District of Kentucky. He did
not contest the validity of the Alabama conviction for which
he was confined, but instead challenged a detainer lodged
against him in Kentucky state court. Noting that petitioner
sought to challenge a “confinement that would be imposed
in the future,” we held that petitioner was “in custody” in
Kentucky by virtue of the detainer. 410 U. S., at 488–489.
In these circumstances, the Court held that the proper re-
spondent was not the prisoner’s immediate physical custo-
dian (the Alabama warden), but was instead the Kentucky
court in which the detainer was lodged. This made sense
because the Alabama warden was not “the person who [held]
him in what [was] alleged to be unlawful custody.” Id., at
494–495 (citing Wales, 114 U. S., at 574); Hensley, supra, at
351, n. 9 (observing that the petitioner in Braden “was in the
custody of Kentucky officials for purposes of his habeas cor-
pus action”). Under Braden, then, a habeas petitioner who
challenges a form of “custody” other than present physical
confinement may name as respondent the entity or person
who exercises legal control with respect to the challenged
“custody.” But nothing in Braden supports departing from
the immediate custodian rule in the traditional context of
challenges to present physical confinement. See Al-Marri,
supra, at 711–712; Monk, supra, at 369. To the contrary,
Braden cited Wales favorably and reiterated the traditional
rule that a prisoner seeking release from confinement must
sue his “jailer.” 410 U. S., at 495 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
For the same reason, Strait v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341 (1972),
does not aid Padilla. Strait involved an inactive reservist
domiciled in California who filed a § 2241 petition seeking

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relief from his military obligations. We noted that the re-
servist’s “nominal” custodian was a commanding officer in
Indiana who had charge of petitioner’s Army records. Id.,
at 344. As in Braden, the immediate custodian rule had no
application because petitioner was not challenging any pres-
ent physical confinement.
In Braden and Strait, the immediate custodian rule did not
apply because there was no immediate physical custodian
with respect to the “custody” being challenged. That is not
the case here: Commander Marr exercises day-to-day control
over Padilla’s physical custody. We have never intimated
that a habeas petitioner could name someone other than his
immediate physical custodian as respondent simply because
the challenged physical custody does not arise out of a crimi-
nal conviction. Nor can we do so here just because Padilla’s
physical confinement stems from a military order by the
President.
It follows that neither Braden nor Strait supports the
Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Secretary Rumsfeld is the
proper respondent because he exercises the “legal reality of
control” over Padilla.12 As we have explained, identification
of the party exercising legal control only comes into play
when there is no immediate physical custodian with respect
to the challenged “custody.” In challenges to present physi-
cal confinement, we reaffirm that the immediate custodian,
not a supervisory official who exercises legal control, is
the proper respondent. If the “legal control” test applied
to physical-custody challenges, a convicted prisoner would
be able to name the State or the Attorney General as a re-
spondent to a § 2241 petition. As the statutory language,
12 The Court of Appeals reasoned that “only [the Secretary]—not Com-
mander Marr—could inform the President that further restraint of Pa-
dilla as an enemy combatant is no longer necessary.” 352 F. 3d 695, 707
(CA2 2003). Justice Stevens’ dissent echoes this argument. Post, at
461–462.

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established practice, and our precedent demonstrate, that is
not the case.13
At first blush Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944), might
seem to lend support to Padilla’s “legal control” argument.
There, a Japanese-American citizen interned in California by
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) sought relief by filing
a § 2241 petition in the Northern District of California, nam-
ing as a respondent her immediate custodian. After she
filed the petition, however, the Government moved her to
Utah. Thus, the prisoner’s immediate physical custodian
was no longer within the jurisdiction of the District Court.
We held, nonetheless, that the Northern District “acquired
jurisdiction in this case and that [Endo’s] removal . . . did not
cause it to lose jurisdiction where a person in whose custody
she is remains within the district.” Id., at 306. We held
that, under these circumstances, the assistant director of the
WRA, who resided in the Northern District, would be an
“appropriate respondent” to whom the District Court could
direct the writ. Id., at 304–305.
While Endo did involve a petitioner challenging her pres-
ent physical confinement, it did not, as Padilla and Justice
Stevens contend, hold that such a petitioner may properly
name as respondent someone other than the immediate phys-
ical custodian. Post, at 461–462 (citing Endo as supporting
a “more functional approach” that allows habeas petitioners
13 Even less persuasive is the Court of Appeals’ and the dissent’s belief
that Secretary Rumsfeld’s “unique” and “pervasive” personal involvement
in authorizing Padilla’s detention justifies naming him as the respondent.
352 F. 3d, at 707–708 (noting that the Secretary “was charged by the Presi-
dent in the June 9 Order with detaining Padilla” and that the Secretary
“determined that Padilla would be sent to the brig in South Carolina”);
post, at 462. If personal involvement were the standard, “then the prose-
cutor, the trial judge, or the governor would be named as respondents” in
criminal habeas cases. Al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 360 F. 3d 707, 711 (CA7
2004). As the Seventh Circuit correctly held, the proper respondent is
the person responsible for maintaining—not authorizing—the custody of
the prisoner. Ibid.

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to name as respondent an individual with “control” over the
petitioner). Rather, the Court’s holding that the writ could
be directed to a supervisory official came not in our holding
that the District Court initially acquired jurisdiction—it did
so because Endo properly named her immediate custodian
and filed in the district of confinement—but in our holding
that the District Court could effectively grant habeas relief
despite the Government-procured absence of petitioner from
the Northern District.14 Thus, Endo stands for the impor-
tant but limited proposition that when the Government
moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition
naming her immediate custodian, the District Court retains
jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent
within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate
the prisoner’s release.
Endo’s holding does not help respondents here. Padilla
was moved from New York to South Carolina before his law-
yer filed a habeas petition on his behalf. Unlike the District
Court in Endo, therefore, the Southern District never ac-
quired jurisdiction over Padilla’s petition.
Padilla’s argument reduces to a request for a new excep-
tion to the immediate custodian rule based upon the “unique
facts” of this case. While Padilla’s detention is undeniably
unique in many respects, it is at bottom a simple challenge
to physical custody imposed by the Executive—the tradi-
tional core of the Great Writ. There is no indication that
there was any attempt to manipulate behind Padilla’s trans-
fer—he was taken to the same facility where other al Qaeda
members were already being held, and the Government did
not attempt to hide from Padilla’s lawyer where it had taken
him. Infra, at 449–450, and n. 17; post, at 454 (Kennedy,
14 As we explained: “Th[e] objective [of habeas relief] may be in no way
impaired or defeated by the removal of the prisoner from the territorial
jurisdiction of the District Court. That end may be served and the decree
of the court made effective if a respondent who has custody of the [peti-
tioner] is within reach of the court’s process.” 323 U. S., at 307.

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J., concurring). His detention is thus not unique in any way
that would provide arguable basis for a departure from the
immediate custodian rule. Accordingly, we hold that Com-
mander Marr, not Secretary Rumsfeld, is Padilla’s custodian
and the proper respondent to his habeas petition.
II
We turn now to the second subquestion. District courts
are limited to granting habeas relief “within their respective
jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(a). We have interpreted
this language to require “nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.” Bra-
den, 410 U. S., at 495. Thus, jurisdiction over Padilla’s ha-
beas petition lies in the Southern District only if it has ju-
risdiction over Commander Marr. We conclude it does not.
Congress added the limiting clause—“within their respec-
tive jurisdictions”—to the habeas statute in 1867 to avert
the “inconvenient [and] potentially embarrassing” possibility
that “every judge anywhere [could] issue the Great Writ on
behalf of applicants far distantly removed from the courts
whereon they sat.” Carbo v. United States, 364 U. S. 611,
617 (1961). Accordingly, with respect to habeas petitions
“designed to relieve an individual from oppressive confine-
ment,” the traditional rule has always been that the Great
Writ is “issuable only in the district of confinement.” Id.,
at 618.
Other portions of the habeas statute support this common-
sense reading of § 2241(a). For example, if a petitioner
seeks habeas relief in the court of appeals, or from this Court
or a Justice thereof, the petition must “state the reasons for
not making application to the district court of the district in
which the applicant is held.” 28 U. S. C. § 2242 (emphases
added). Moreover, the court of appeals, this Court, or a Jus-
tice thereof “may decline to entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application . . .
to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.”

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§ 2241(b) (emphasis added). The Federal Rules similarly
provide that an “application for a writ of habeas corpus must
be made to the appropriate district court.” Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 22(a) (emphasis added).
Congress has also legislated against the background of the
“district of confinement” rule by fashioning explicit excep-
tions to the rule in certain circumstances. For instance,
§ 2241(d) provides that when a petitioner is serving a state
criminal sentence in a State that contains more than one fed-
eral district, he may file a habeas petition not only “in the
district court for the district wherein [he] is in custody,” but
also “in the district court for the district within which the
State court was held which convicted and sentenced him”;
and “each of such district courts shall have concurrent juris-
diction to entertain the application.” Similarly, until Con-
gress directed federal criminal prisoners to file certain post-
conviction petitions in the sentencing courts by adding § 2255
to the habeas statute, federal prisoners could litigate such
collateral attacks only in the district of confinement. See
United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 212–219 (1952).
Both of these provisions would have been unnecessary if,
as the Court of Appeals believed, § 2241’s general habeas
provisions permit a prisoner to file outside the district of
confinement.
The plain language of the habeas statute thus confirms the
general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging pres-
ent physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district:
the district of confinement. Despite this ample statutory
and historical pedigree, Padilla contends, and the Court of
Appeals held, that the district of confinement rule no longer
applies to core habeas challenges. Rather, Padilla, as well
as today’s dissenters, post, at 462–464, urge that our deci-
sions in Braden and Strait stand for the proposition that ju-
risdiction will lie in any district in which the respondent is
amenable to service of process. We disagree.

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Prior to Braden, we had held that habeas jurisdiction de-
pended on the presence of both the petitioner and his custo-
dian within the territorial confines of the district court. See
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188, 190–192 (1948). By allowing
an Alabama prisoner to challenge a Kentucky detainer in the
Western District of Kentucky, Braden changed course and
held that habeas jurisdiction requires only “that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.” 410
U. S., at 495.
But we fail to see how Braden’s requirement of jurisdiction
over the respondent alters the district of confinement rule
for challenges to present physical custody. Braden itself did
not involve such a challenge; rather, Braden challenged his
future confinement in Kentucky by suing his Kentucky custo-
dian. We reasoned that “[u]nder these circumstances it
would serve no useful purpose to apply the Ahrens rule and
require that the action be brought in Alabama.” Id., at 499.
In habeas challenges to present physical confinement, by con-
trast, the district of confinement is synonymous with the
district court that has territorial jurisdiction over the proper
respondent. This is because, as we have held, the immedi-
ate custodian rule applies to core habeas challenges to pres-
ent physical custody. By definition, the immediate custo-
dian and the prisoner reside in the same district.
Rather than focusing on the holding and historical context
of Braden, Justice Stevens, post, at 462, like the Court of
Appeals, seizes on dicta in which we referred to “service of
process” to contend that the Southern District could assert
jurisdiction over Secretary Rumsfeld under New York’s
long-arm statute. See Braden, 410 U. S., at 495 (“So long as
the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court
can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ . . . even if the pris-
oner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial juris-
diction”). But that dicta did not indicate that a custodian
may be served with process outside of the district court’s
territorial jurisdiction. To the contrary, the facts and hold-

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ing of Braden dictate the opposite inference. Braden served
his Kentucky custodian in Kentucky. Accordingly, we con-
cluded that the Western District of Kentucky had jurisdic-
tion over the petition “since the respondent was properly
served in that district.” Id., at 500 (emphasis added); see
also Endo, 323 U. S., at 304–305 (noting that the court could
issue the writ to a WRA official “whose office is at San Fran-
cisco, which is in the jurisdiction of the [Northern District of
California]”). Thus, Braden in no way authorizes district
courts to employ long-arm statutes to gain jurisdiction over
custodians who are outside of their territorial jurisdiction.
See Al-Marri, 360 F. 3d, at 711; Guerra, 786 F. 2d, at
417. Indeed, in stating its holding, Braden favorably cites
Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U. S. 487 (1971), a case squarely
holding that the custodian’s absence from the territorial ju-
risdiction of the district court is fatal to habeas jurisdiction.
410 U. S., at 500. Thus, Braden does not derogate from the
traditional district of confinement rule for core habeas peti-
tions challenging present physical custody.
The Court of Appeals also thought Strait supported its
long-arm approach to habeas jurisdiction. But Strait offers
even less help than Braden. In Strait, we held that the
Northern District of California had jurisdiction over Strait’s
“nominal” custodian—the commanding officer of the Army
records center—even though he was physically located in In-
diana. We reasoned that the custodian was “present” in
California “through the officers in the hierarchy of the com-
mand who processed [Strait’s] application for discharge.”
406 U. S., at 345. The Strait Court contrasted its broad
view of “presence” in the case of a nominal custodian with a
“ ‘commanding officer who is responsible for the day to day
control of his subordinates,’ ” who would be subject to habeas
jurisdiction only in the district where he physically resides.
Ibid. (quoting Arlen v. Laird, 451 F. 2d 684, 687 (CA2 1971)).
The Court of Appeals, much like Justice Stevens’ dis-
sent, reasoned that Secretary Rumsfeld, in the same way as

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Strait’s commanding officer, was “present” in the Southern
District through his subordinates who took Padilla into mili-
tary custody. 352 F. 3d, at 709–710; post, at 462. We
think not.
Strait simply has no application to the present case.
Strait predated Braden, so the then-applicable Ahrens rule
required that both the petitioner and his custodian be pres-
ent in California. Thus, the only question was whether
Strait’s commanding officer was present in California not-
withstanding his physical absence from the district. Distin-
guishing Schlanger, supra, we held that it would “exalt fic-
tion over reality” to require Strait to sue his “nominal
custodian” in Indiana when Strait had always resided in Cali-
fornia and had his only meaningful contacts with the Army
there. 406 U. S., at 344–346. Only under these limited cir-
cumstances did we invoke concepts of personal jurisdiction
to hold that the custodian was “present” in California
through the actions of his agents. Id., at 345.
Here, by contrast, Padilla seeks to challenge his pres-
ent physical custody in South Carolina. Because the im-
mediate custodian rule applies to such habeas challenges,
the proper respondent is Commander Marr, who is also pres-
ent in South Carolina. There is thus no occasion to desig-
nate a “nominal” custodian and determine whether he or she
is “present” in the same district as petitioner.15 Under Bra-
den and the district of confinement rule, as we have ex-
plained, Padilla must file his habeas action in South Carolina.
Were we to extend Strait’s limited exception to the territo-
rial nature of habeas jurisdiction to the context of physical-
custody challenges, we would undermine, if not negate, the
purpose of Congress in amending the habeas statute in 1867.
The proviso that district courts may issue the writ only
“within their respective jurisdictions” forms an important
15 In other words, Commander Marr is the equivalent of the “command-
ing officer [with] day to day control” that we distinguished in Strait. 406
U. S., at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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corollary to the immediate custodian rule in challenges to
present physical custody under § 2241. Together they com-
pose a simple rule that has been consistently applied in the
lower courts, including in the context of military detentions:
Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his
present physical custody within the United States, he should
name his warden as respondent and file the petition in the
district of confinement. See Al-Marri, supra, at 710, 712
(alleged enemy combatant detained at Consolidated Naval
Brig must file petition in the District of South Carolina; col-
lecting cases dismissing § 2241 petitions filed outside the dis-
trict of confinement); Monk, 793 F. 2d, at 369 (court-martial
convict must file in district of confinement).16
This rule, derived from the terms of the habeas statute,
serves the important purpose of preventing forum shopping
by habeas petitioners. Without it, a prisoner could name a
high-level supervisory official as respondent and then sue
that person wherever he is amenable to long-arm jurisdic-
tion. The result would be rampant forum shopping, district
courts with overlapping jurisdiction, and the very inconven-
ience, expense, and embarrassment Congress sought to avoid
when it added the jurisdictional limitation 137 years ago.
III
Justice Stevens’ dissent, not unlike the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision, rests on the mistaken belief that we have
16 As a corollary to the previously referenced exception to the immediate
custodian rule, n. 8, supra, we have similarly relaxed the district of con-
finement rule when “American citizens confined overseas (and thus outside
the territory of any district court) have sought relief in habeas corpus.”
Braden, 410 U. S., at 498 (citing cases). In such cases, we have allowed
the petitioner to name as respondent a supervisory official and file the
petition in the district where the respondent resides. Burns v. Wilson,
346 U. S. 137 (1953) (courts-martial convicts held in Guam sued Secretary
of Defense in the District of Columbia); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955) (court-martial convict held in Korea sued Sec-
retary of the Air Force in the District of Columbia).

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made various exceptions to the immediate custodian and dis-
trict of confinement rules whenever “exceptional,” “ ‘spe-
cial,’ ” or “unusual” cases have arisen. Post, at 455, 458, 462,
n. 5. We have addressed most of his contentions in the fore-
going discussion, but we briefly touch on a few additional
points.
Apparently drawing a loose analogy to Endo, Justice
Stevens asks us to pretend that Padilla and his immediate
custodian were present in the Southern District at the time
counsel filed the instant habeas petition, thus rendering ju-
risdiction proper. Post, at 458–459. The dissent asserts
that the Government “depart[ed] from the time-honored
practice of giving one’s adversary fair notice of an intent to
present an important motion to the court,” when on June 9
it moved ex parte to vacate the material witness warrant and
allegedly failed to immediately inform counsel of its intent to
transfer Padilla to military custody in South Carolina. Post,
at 459; cf. n. 3, supra. Constructing a hypothetical “sce-
nario,” the dissent contends that if counsel had been immedi-
ately informed, she “would have filed the habeas application
then and there,” while Padilla remained in the Southern Dis-
trict, “rather than waiting two days.” Post, at 458. There-
fore, Justice Stevens concludes, the Government’s alleged
misconduct “justifies treating the habeas application as the
functional equivalent of one filed two days earlier.” Post,
at 459 (“[W]e should not permit the Government to ob-
tain a tactical advantage as a consequence of an ex parte
proceeding”).
The dissent cites no authority whatsoever for its extraordi-
nary proposition that a district court can exercise statutory
jurisdiction based on a series of events that did not occur, or
that jurisdiction might be premised on “punishing” alleged
Government misconduct. The lower courts—unlike the dis-
sent—did not perceive any hint of Government misconduct
or bad faith that would warrant extending Endo to a case
where both the petitioner and his immediate custodian were

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outside of the district at the time of filing. Not surprisingly,
then, neither Padilla nor the lower courts relied on the dis-
sent’s counterfactual theory to argue that habeas jurisdiction
was proper. Finding it contrary to our well-established
precedent, we are not persuaded either.17
The dissent contends that even if we do not indulge its
hypothetical scenario, the Court has made “numerous excep-
tions” to the immediate custodian and district of confinement
rules, rendering our bright-line rule “far from bright.”
Post, at 460. Yet the dissent cannot cite a single case in
which we have deviated from the longstanding rule we reaf-
firm today—that is, a case in which we allowed a habeas
petitioner challenging his present physical custody within
the United States to name as respondent someone other than
17 On a related note, the dissent argues that the facts as they actually
existed at the time of filing should not matter, because “what matters for
present purposes are the facts available to [counsel] at the time of filing.”
Post, at 459, n. 3. According to the dissent, because the Government
“shrouded . . . in secrecy” the location of Padilla’s military custody, counsel
was entitled to file in the district where Padilla’s presence was “last offi-
cially confirmed.” Ibid. As with the argument addressed above, neither
Padilla nor the District Court—which was much closer to the facts of
the case than we are—or the Court of Appeals ever suggested that the
Government concealed Padilla’s whereabouts from counsel, much less con-
tended that such concealment was the basis for habeas jurisdiction in the
Southern District. And even if this were a valid legal argument, the rec-
ord simply does not support the dissent’s inference of Government secrecy.
The dissent relies solely on a letter written by Padilla’s counsel. In that
same letter, however, counsel states that she “was informed [on June 10]”
that her client had been taken into custody by the Department of Defense
and “detain[ed] at a naval military prison.” App. 66. When counsel filed
Padilla’s habeas petition on June 11, she averred that “Padilla is being held
in segregation at the high-security Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston,
South Carolina.” Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. 02 Civ. 4445
(SDNY), p. 2, Record, Doc. 1. The only reasonable inference, particularly
in light of Padilla’s failure to argue to the contrary, is that counsel was
well aware of Padilla’s presence in South Carolina when she filed the ha-
beas petition, not that the Government “shrouded” Padilla’s whereabouts
in secrecy.

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the immediate custodian and to file somewhere other than
the district of confinement.18 If Justice Stevens’ view
were accepted, district courts would be consigned to making
ad hoc determinations as to whether the circumstances of a
given case are “exceptional,” “special,” or “unusual” enough
to require departure from the jurisdictional rules this Court
has consistently applied. We do not think Congress in-
tended such a result.
Finally, the dissent urges us to bend the jurisdictional
rules because the merits of this case are indisputably of “pro-
found importance,” post, at 455, 460–461. But it is surely
18 Instead, Justice Stevens, like the Court of Appeals, relies heavily
on Braden, Strait, and other cases involving challenges to something other
than present physical custody. Post, at 461–464, and n. 4; post, at 461, n. 4
(citing Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U. S. 39 (1995) (habeas petitioner challeng-
ing expired sentence named Governor as respondent; immediate custodian
issue not addressed); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25 (1976) (putative
habeas class action challenging court-martial procedures throughout the
military; immediate custodian issue not addressed)); post, at 463 (citing
Eisel v. Secretary of the Army, 477 F. 2d 1251 (CADC 1973) (allowing an
inactive reservist challenging his military status to name the Secretary of
the Army as respondent)). Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F. 2d 1114 (CADC
1986), on which the dissent relies, post, at 458, is similarly unhelpful:
When, as in that case, a prisoner is held in an undisclosed location by an
unknown custodian, it is impossible to apply the immediate custodian and
district of confinement rules. That is not the case here, where the iden-
tity of the immediate custodian and the location of the appropriate district
court are clear.
The dissent also cites two cases in which a state prisoner proceeding
under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 named as respondent the State’s officer in charge
of penal institutions. Post, at 461, n. 4 (citing California Dept. of Correc-
tions v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U. S.
284 (1986)). But such cases do not support Padilla’s cause. First of all,
the respondents did not challenge their designation as inconsistent with
the immediate custodian rule. More to the point, Congress has author-
ized § 2254 petitioners challenging present physical custody to name either
the warden or the chief state penal officer as a respondent. Rule 2(a) of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts; Advisory Committee’s Note on Rule 2(a), 28 U. S. C., pp. 469–470
(adopted in 1976). Congress has made no such provision for § 2241 peti-
tioners like Padilla.

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just as necessary in important cases as in unimportant ones
that courts take care not to exceed their “respective jurisdic-
tions” established by Congress.
The District of South Carolina, not the Southern District
of New York, was the district court in which Padilla should
have brought his habeas petition. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O’Connor joins,
concurring.
Though I join the opinion of the Court, this separate opin-
ion is added to state my understanding of how the statute
should be interpreted in light of the Court’s holding. The
Court’s analysis relies on two rules. First, the habeas ac-
tion must be brought against the immediate custodian. Sec-
ond, when an action is brought in the district court, it must
be filed in the district court whose territorial jurisdiction
includes the place where the custodian is located.
These rules, however, are not jurisdictional in the sense
of a limitation on subject-matter jurisdiction. Ante, at 434,
n. 7. That much is clear from the many cases in which peti-
tions have been heard on the merits despite their noncompli-
ance with either one or both of the rules. See, e. g., Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484, 495
(1973); Strait v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341, 345 (1972); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955); Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953); Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283
(1944).
In my view, the question of the proper location for a ha-
beas petition is best understood as a question of personal
jurisdiction or venue. This view is more in keeping with
the opinion in Braden, and its discussion explaining the rules
for the proper forum for habeas petitions. 410 U. S., at 493,
500 (indicating that the analysis is guided by “traditional

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452 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
Kennedy, J., concurring
venue considerations” and “traditional principles of venue”);
see also Moore v. Olson, 368 F. 3d 757, 759–760 (CA7 2004)
(suggesting that the territorial-jurisdiction rule is a venue
rule, and the immediate-custodian rule is a personal-
jurisdiction rule). This approach is consistent with the ref-
erence in the statute to the “respective jurisdictions” of the
district court. 28 U. S. C. § 2241. As we have noted twice
this Term, the word “jurisdiction” is susceptible of different
meanings, not all of which refer to the power of a federal
court to hear a certain class of cases. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U. S. 443 (2004); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401
(2004). The phrase “respective jurisdictions” does establish
a territorial restriction on the proper forum for habeas peti-
tions, but does not of necessity establish that the limitation
goes to the power of the court to hear the case.
Because the immediate-custodian and territorial-
jurisdiction rules are like personal-jurisdiction or venue
rules, objections to the filing of petitions based on those
grounds can be waived by the Government. Moore, supra,
at 759; cf. Endo, supra, at 305 (“The fact that no respondent
was ever served with process or appeared in the proceedings
is not important. The United States resists the issuance of
a writ. A cause exists in that state of the proceedings and
an appeal lies from denial of a writ without the appearance
of a respondent”). For the same reason, the immediate-
custodian and territorial rules are subject to exceptions, as
acknowledged in the Court’s opinion. Ante, at 436, n. 9,
438–442, 444–446. This does not mean that habeas petitions
are governed by venue rules and venue considerations that
apply to other sorts of civil lawsuits. Although habeas ac-
tions are civil cases, they are not automatically subject to all
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 81(a)(2) (“These rules are applicable to proceedings
for . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in
such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United
States, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, or the

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Kennedy, J., concurring
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings”). Instead,
these forum-location rules for habeas petitions are based on
the habeas statutes and the cases interpreting them. Fur-
thermore, the fact that these habeas rules are subject to ex-
ceptions does not mean that, in the exceptional case, a peti-
tion may be properly filed in any one of the federal district
courts. When an exception applies, see, e. g., Rasul v. Bush,
post, p. 466, courts must still take into account the considera-
tions that in the ordinary case are served by the immediate-
custodian rule, and, in a similar fashion, limit the available
forum to the one with the most immediate connection to the
named custodian.
I would not decide today whether these habeas rules func-
tion more like rules of personal jurisdiction or rules of venue.
It is difficult to describe the precise nature of these restric-
tions on the filing of habeas petitions, as an examination of
the Court’s own opinions in this area makes clear. Compare,
e. g., Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), with Schlanger v.
Seamans, 401 U. S. 487, 491 (1971), and Braden, supra, at
495. The precise question of how best to characterize the
statutory direction respecting where the action must be filed
need not be resolved with finality in this case. Here there
has been no waiver by the Government; there is no estab-
lished exception to the immediate-custodian rule or to the
rule that the action must be brought in the district court
with authority over the territory in question; and there is no
need to consider some further exception to protect the integ-
rity of the writ or the rights of the person detained.
For the purposes of this case, it is enough to note that,
even under the most permissive interpretation of the habeas
statute as a venue provision, the Southern District of New
York was not the proper place for this petition. As the
Court concludes, in the ordinary case of a single physical
custody within the borders of the United States, where the
objection has not been waived by the Government, the
immediate-custodian and territorial-jurisdiction rules must

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454 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
Kennedy, J., concurring
apply. Ante, at 451. I also agree with the arguments from
statutory text and case law that the Court marshals in sup-
port of these two rules. Ante, at 434–435, 442–443. Only
in an exceptional case may a court deviate from those basic
rules to hear a habeas petition filed against some person
other than the immediate custodian of the prisoner, or in
some court other than the one in whose territory the custo-
dian may be found.
The Court has made exceptions in the cases of nonphysical
custody, see, e. g., Strait, 406 U. S., at 345, of dual custody,
see, e. g., Braden, 410 U. S., at 500, and of removal of the
prisoner from the territory of a district after a petition has
been filed, see, e. g., Endo, 323 U. S., at 306; see also ante, at
440–441, 444. In addition, I would acknowledge an excep-
tion if there is an indication that the Government’s purpose
in removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his law-
yer to know where the habeas petition should be filed, or
where the Government was not forthcoming with respect to
the identity of the custodian and the place of detention. In
cases of that sort, habeas jurisdiction would be in the district
court from whose territory the petitioner had been removed.
In this case, if the Government had removed Padilla from
the Southern District of New York but refused to tell his
lawyer where he had been taken, the District Court would
have had jurisdiction over the petition. Or, if the Govern-
ment did inform the lawyer where a prisoner was being
taken but kept moving him so a filing could not catch up to
the prisoner, again, in my view, habeas jurisdiction would lie
in the district or districts from which he had been removed.
None of the exceptions apply here. There is no indication
that the Government refused to tell Padilla’s lawyer where
he had been taken. The original petition demonstrates that
the lawyer knew where Padilla was being held at that time.
Ante, at 449, n. 17. In these circumstances, the basic rules
apply, and the District of South Carolina was the proper

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455 Cite as: 542 U. S. 426 (2004)
Stevens, J., dissenting
forum. The present case demonstrates the wisdom of those
rules.
Both Padilla’s change in location and his change of custo-
dian reflected a change in the Government’s rationale for de-
taining him. He ceased to be held under the authority of
the criminal justice system, see 18 U. S. C. § 3144, and began
to be held under that of the military detention system.
Rather than being designed to play games with forums, the
Government’s removal of Padilla reflected the change in the
theory on which it was holding him. Whether that theory
is a permissible one, of course, is a question the Court does
not reach today.
The change in custody, and the underlying change in ra-
tionale, should be challenged in the place the Government
has brought them to bear and against the person who is the
immediate representative of the military authority that is
detaining him. That place is the District of South Carolina,
and that person is Commander Marr. The Second Circuit
erred in holding that the Southern District of New York was
a proper forum for Padilla’s petition. With these further ob-
servations, I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this case
raises questions of profound importance to the Nation. The
arguments set forth by the Court do not justify avoidance of
our duty to answer those questions. It is quite wrong to
characterize the proceeding as a “simple challenge to physi-
cal custody,” ante, at 441, that should be resolved by slavish
application of a “bright-line rule,” ante, at 449, designed to
prevent “rampant forum shopping” by litigious prison in-
mates, ante, at 447. As the Court’s opinion itself demon-
strates, that rule is riddled with exceptions fashioned to pro-
tect the high office of the Great Writ. This is an exceptional
case that we clearly have jurisdiction to decide.

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456 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
Stevens, J., dissenting
I
In May 2002, a grand jury convened in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York was conducting an investigation into the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In response to an ap-
plication by the Department of Justice, the Chief Judge of
the District issued a material witness warrant authorizing
Padilla’s arrest when his plane landed in Chicago on May
8.1 Pursuant to that warrant, agents of the Department of
Justice took Padilla (hereinafter respondent) into custody
and transported him to New York City, where he was de-
tained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. On May 15,
the court appointed Donna R. Newman, a member of the
New York bar, to represent him. She conferred with re-
spondent in person and filed motions on his behalf, seeking
his release on the ground that his incarceration was unau-
thorized and unconstitutional. The District Court sched-
uled a hearing on those motions for Tuesday, June 11, 2002.
On Sunday, June 9, 2002, before that hearing could occur,
the President issued a written command to the Secretary of
Defense concerning respondent. “Based on the information
available to [him] from all sources,” the President deter-
mined that respondent is an “enemy combatant,” that he is
“closely associated with al Qaeda, an international terrorist
organization with which the United States is at war,” and
that he possesses intelligence that, “if communicated to the
U. S., would aid U. S. efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda”
1 As its authority for detaining respondent as a material witness, the
Government relied on a federal statute that provides: “If it appears from
an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in
a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable
to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may
order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance with the
provisions of section 3142 . . . . Release of a material witness may be
delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness
can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 18
U. S. C. § 3144.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
on U. S. targets. App. A to Pet. for Cert. 57a. The com-
mand stated that “it is in the interest of the United States”
and “consistent with U. S. law and the laws of war for the
Secretary of Defense to detain Mr. Padilla as an enemy com-
batant.” Id., at 58a. The President’s order concluded: “Ac-
cordingly, you are directed to receive Mr. Padilla from the
Department of Justice and to detain him as an enemy com-
batant.” Ibid.
On the same Sunday that the President issued his order,
the Government notified the District Court in an ex parte
proceeding that it was withdrawing its grand jury subpoena,
and it asked the court to enter an order vacating the material
witness warrant. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233
F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (SDNY 2002). In that proceeding, in
which respondent was not represented, the Government in-
formed the court that the President had designated respond-
ent an enemy combatant and had directed the Secretary of
Defense, petitioner Donald Rumsfeld, to detain respondent.
Ibid. The Government also disclosed that the Department
of Defense would take custody of respondent and immedi-
ately transfer him to South Carolina. The District Court
complied with the Government’s request and vacated the
warrant.2
On Monday, June 10, 2002, the Attorney General publicly
announced respondent’s detention and transfer “to the cus-
tody of the Defense Department,” which he called “a signifi-
cant step forward in the War on Terrorism.” Amended Pet.
2 The order vacating the material witness warrant that the District
Court entered in the ex parte proceeding on June 9 terminated the Gov-
ernment’s lawful custody of respondent. After that order was entered,
Secretary Rumsfeld’s agents took custody of respondent. The authority
for that action was based entirely on the President’s command to the Sec-
retary—a document that, needless to say, would not even arguably qualify
as a valid warrant. Thus, whereas respondent’s custody during the pe-
riod between May 8 and June 9, 2002, was pursuant to a judicially author-
ized seizure, he has been held ever since—for two years—pursuant to a
warrantless arrest.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. 02 Civ. 4445 (SDNY), Exh.
A, p. 1, Record, Doc. 4. On June 11, 2002, presumably in
response to that announcement, Newman commenced this
proceeding by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Southern District of New York. 233 F. Supp. 2d, at 571.
At a conference on that date, which had been originally
scheduled to address Newman’s motion to vacate the mate-
rial witness warrant, the Government conceded that Defense
Department personnel had taken custody of respondent in
the Southern District of New York. Id., at 571–572.
II
All Members of this Court agree that the immediate custo-
dian rule should control in the ordinary case and that habeas
petitioners should not be permitted to engage in forum shop-
ping. But we also all agree with Judge Bork that “special
circumstances” can justify exceptions from the general rule.
Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F. 2d 1114, 1116 (CADC 1986). See
ante, at 450, n. 18. Cf. ante, at 452 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). More narrowly, we agree that if jurisdiction was
proper when the petition was filed, it cannot be defeated by
a later transfer of the prisoner to another district. Ex parte
Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 306 (1944). See ante, at 441.
It is reasonable to assume that if the Government had
given Newman, who was then representing respondent in an
adversary proceeding, notice of its intent to ask the District
Court to vacate the outstanding material witness warrant
and transfer custody to the Department of Defense, Newman
would have filed the habeas petition then and there, rather
than waiting two days.3 Under that scenario, respondent’s
3 The record indicates that the Government had not officially informed
Newman of her client’s whereabouts at the time she filed the habeas peti-
tion on June 11. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. 02 Civ. 4445
(SDNY), p. 2, ¶ 4, Record, Doc. 1 (“On information and belief, Padilla is
being held in segregation at the high-security Consolidated Naval Brig in
Charleston, South Carolina”); Letter from Donna R. Newman to General

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Stevens, J., dissenting
immediate custodian would then have been physically pres-
ent in the Southern District of New York carrying out orders
of the Secretary of Defense. Surely at that time Secretary
Rumsfeld, rather than the lesser official who placed the hand-
cuffs on petitioner, would have been the proper person to
name as a respondent to that petition.
The difference between that scenario and the secret trans-
fer that actually occurred should not affect our decision, for
we should not permit the Government to obtain a tactical
advantage as a consequence of an ex parte proceeding. The
departure from the time-honored practice of giving one’s ad-
versary fair notice of an intent to present an important mo-
tion to the court justifies treating the habeas application as
the functional equivalent of one filed two days earlier. See
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864) (“Common justice
Counsel of the Department of Defense, June 17, 2002 (“I understand from
the media that my client is being held in Charleston, South Carolina in
the military brig” (emphasis added)), Amended Pet. for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in No. 02 Civ. 4445 (SDNY), Exh. A, p. 4, Record, Doc. 4. Thus,
while it is true, as the Court observes, that “Padilla was moved from New
York to South Carolina before his lawyer filed a habeas petition on his
behalf,” ante, at 441, what matters for present purposes are the facts avail-
able to Newman at the time of filing. When the Government shrouded
those facts in secrecy, Newman had no option but to file immediately in
the district where respondent’s presence was last officially confirmed.
Moreover, Newman was appointed to represent respondent by the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. Once the Government
removed her client, it did not permit her to counsel him until February
11, 2004. Consultation thereafter has been allowed as a matter of the
Government’s grace, not as a matter of right stemming from the Southern
District of New York appointment. Further, it is not apparent why the
District of South Carolina, rather than the Southern District of New York,
should be regarded as the proper forum to determine the validity of the
“change in the Government’s rationale for detaining” respondent. Ante,
at 455. If the Government’s theory is not “a permissible one,” ibid., then
the New York federal court would remain the proper forum in this case.
Why should the New York court not have the authority to determine the
legitimacy of the Government’s removal of respondent beyond that
court’s borders?

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Stevens, J., dissenting
requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity to make his de-
fence”). “The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are sur-
faced and corrected.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 291
(1969). But even if we treat respondent’s habeas petition as
having been filed in the Southern District after the Govern-
ment removed him to South Carolina, there is ample prece-
dent for affording special treatment to this exceptional case,
both by recognizing Secretary Rumsfeld as the proper re-
spondent and by treating the Southern District as the most
appropriate venue.
Although the Court purports to be enforcing a “bright-line
rule” governing district courts’ jurisdiction, ante, at 449, an
examination of its opinion reveals that the line is far from
bright. Faced with a series of precedents emphasizing the
writ’s “scope and flexibility,” Harris, 394 U. S., at 291, the
Court is forced to acknowledge the numerous exceptions we
have made to the immediate custodian rule. The rule does
not apply, the Court admits, when physical custody is not at
issue, ante, at 437–438, or when American citizens are con-
fined overseas, ante, at 447, n. 16, or when the petitioner
has been transferred after filing, ante, at 441, or when the
custodian is “ ‘present’ ” in the district through his agents’
conduct, ante, at 445. In recognizing exception upon excep-
tion and corollaries to corollaries, the Court itself persua-
sively demonstrates that the rule is not ironclad. It is, in-
stead, a workable general rule that frequently gives way
outside the context of “ ‘core challenges’ ” to executive con-
finement. Ante, at 435.
In the Court’s view, respondent’s detention falls within the
category of “ ‘core challenges’ ” because it is “not unique in
any way that would provide arguable basis for a departure
from the immediate custodian rule.” Ante, at 442. It is,
however, disingenuous at best to classify respondent’s peti-
tion with run-of-the-mill collateral attacks on federal crimi-

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Stevens, J., dissenting
nal convictions. On the contrary, this case is singular not
only because it calls into question decisions made by the Sec-
retary himself, but also because those decisions have created
a unique and unprecedented threat to the freedom of every
American citizen.
“[W]e have consistently rejected interpretations of the ha-
beas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling
formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of
arcane and scholastic procedural requirements.” Hensley v.
Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., Santa
Clara Cty., 411 U. S. 345, 350 (1973). With respect to the
custody requirement, we have declined to adopt a strict
reading of Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564 (1885), see Hens-
ley, 411 U. S., at 350, n. 8, and instead have favored a more
functional approach that focuses on the person with the
power to produce the body, see Endo, 323 U. S., at 306–307.4
In this case, the President entrusted the Secretary of De-
4 For other cases in which the immediate custodian rule has not been
strictly applied, see Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U. S. 39 (1995) (prisoner
named Governor of Mississippi, not warden, as respondent); California
Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995) (prisoner named
Department of Corrections, not warden, as respondent); Wainwright v.
Greenfield, 474 U. S. 284 (1986) (prisoner named Secretary of Florida De-
partment of Corrections, not warden, as respondent); Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U. S. 25 (1976) (persons convicted or ordered to stand trial at
summary courts-martial named Secretary of the Navy as respondent);
Strait v. Laird, 406 U. S. 341, 345–346 (1972) (“The concepts of ‘custody’
and ‘custodian’ are sufficiently broad to allow us to say that the command-
ing officer in Indiana, operating through officers in California in processing
petitioner’s claim, is in California for the limited purposes of habeas corpus
jurisdiction”); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137 (1953) (service members con-
victed and held in military custody in Guam named Secretary of Defense
as respondent); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955)
(next friend of ex-service member in military custody in Korea named
Secretary of the Air Force as respondent); Endo, 323 U. S., at 304 (Califor-
nia District Court retained jurisdiction over Japanese-American’s habeas
challenge to her internment, despite her transfer to Utah, noting absence
of any “suggestion that there is no one within the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court who is responsible for the detention of appellant and who
would be an appropriate respondent”).

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462 RUMSFELD v. PADILLA
Stevens, J., dissenting
fense with control over respondent. To that end, the Secre-
tary deployed Defense Department personnel to the South-
ern District with instructions to transfer respondent to
South Carolina. Under the President’s order, only the Sec-
retary—not a judge, not a prosecutor, not a warden—has had
a say in determining respondent’s location. As the District
Court observed, Secretary Rumsfeld has publicly shown
“both his familiarity with the circumstances of Padilla’s de-
tention, and his personal involvement in the handling of Pa-
dilla’s case.” 233 F. Supp. 2d, at 574. Having “emphasized
and jealously guarded” the Great Writ’s “ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes,” Harris, 394
U. S., at 291, surely we should acknowledge that the writ
reaches the Secretary as the relevant custodian in this case.
Since the Secretary is a proper custodian, the question
whether the petition was appropriately filed in the South-
ern District is easily answered. “So long as the custodian
can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a
writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the prisoner be
brought before the court for a hearing on his claim . . . even if
the prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky.,
410 U. S. 484, 495 (1973).5 See also Endo, 323 U. S., at 306
(“[T]he court may act if there is a respondent within reach
of its process who has custody of the petitioner”). In this
case, Secretary Rumsfeld no doubt has sufficient contacts
with the Southern District properly to be served with proc-
ess there. The Secretary, after all, ordered military person-
nel to that forum to seize and remove respondent.
5 Although, as the Court points out, ante, at 445, the custodian in Braden
was served within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, the
salient point is that Endo and Braden decoupled the District Court’s juris-
diction from the detainee’s place of confinement and adopted for unusual
cases a functional analysis that does not depend on the physical location
of any single party.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
It bears emphasis that the question of the proper forum to
determine the legality of Padilla’s incarceration is not one of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See ante, at 434, n. 7;
ante, at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Federal courts un-
doubtedly have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus
to custodians who can be reached by service of process
“within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(a).
Rather, the question is one of venue, i. e., in which federal
court the habeas inquiry may proceed.6 The Government
purports to exercise complete control, free from judicial sur-
veillance, over that placement. Venue principles, however,
center on the most convenient and efficient forum for resolu-
tion of a case, see Braden, 410 U. S., at 493–494, 499–500
(considering those factors in allowing Alabama prisoner to
sue in Kentucky), and on the placement most likely to mini-
mize forum shopping by either party, see Eisel v. Secretary
of the Army, 477 F. 2d 1251, 1254 (CADC 1973) (preferring
such functional considerations to “blind incantation of words
with implied magical properties, such as ‘immediate custo-
dian’ ”). 7 Cf. Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 136 (1807) (“It
would . . . be extremely dangerous to say, that because the
6 Although the Court makes no reference to venue principles, it is clear
that those principles, not rigid jurisdictional rules, govern the forum de-
termination. In overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), the
Court in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973),
clarified that the place of detention pertains only to the question of venue.
See id., at 493–495 (applying “traditional venue considerations” and re-
jecting a stricter jurisdictional approach); id., at 502 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (“Today the Court overrules Ahrens”); Moore v. Olson, 368 F. 3d
757, 758 (CA7 2004) (“[A]fter Braden . . . , which overruled Ahrens, the
location of a collateral attack is best understood as a matter of venue”);
Armentero v. INS, 340 F. 3d 1058, 1070 (CA9 2003) (“District courts may
use traditional venue considerations to control where detainees bring ha-
beas petitions” (citing Braden, 410 U. S., at 493–494)).
7 If, upon consideration of traditional venue principles, the district court
in which a habeas petition is filed determines that venue is inconvenient
or improper, it of course has the authority to transfer the petition. See
28 U. S. C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a).

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prisoners were apprehended, not by a civil magistrate, but
by the military power, there could be given by law a right
to try the persons so seized in any place which the general
might select, and to which he might direct them to be
carried”).
When this case is analyzed under those traditional venue
principles, it is evident that the Southern District of New
York, not South Carolina, is the more appropriate place to
litigate respondent’s petition. The Government sought a
material witness warrant for respondent’s detention in the
Southern District, indicating that it would be convenient for
its attorneys to litigate in that forum. As a result of the
Government’s initial forum selection, the District Judge and
counsel in the Southern District were familiar with the legal
and factual issues surrounding respondent’s detention both
before and after he was transferred to the Defense Depart-
ment’s custody. Accordingly, fairness and efficiency counsel
in favor of preserving venue in the Southern District. In
sum, respondent properly filed his petition against Secretary
Rumsfeld in the Southern District of New York.
III
Whether respondent is entitled to immediate release is a
question that reasonable jurists may answer in different
ways.8 There is, however, only one possible answer to the
question whether he is entitled to a hearing on the justifica-
tion for his detention.9
8 Consistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I believe that
the Non-Detention Act, 18 U. S. C. § 4001(a), prohibits—and the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115 Stat. 224, adopted on
September 18, 2001, does not authorize—the protracted, incommunicado
detention of American citizens arrested in the United States.
9 Respondent’s custodian has been remarkably candid about the Govern-
ment’s motive in detaining respondent: “ ‘[O]ur interest really in his case
is not law enforcement, it is not punishment because he was a terrorist or
working with the terrorists. Our interest at the moment is to try and
find out everything he knows so that hopefully we can stop other terrorist

542US2 Unit: $U73 [11-01-06 18:21:14] PAGES PGT: OPIN
465 Cite as: 542 U. S. 426 (2004)
Stevens, J., dissenting
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a
free society. Even more important than the method of se-
lecting the people’s rulers and their successors is the charac-
ter of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the rule
of law. Unconstrained executive detention for the purpose
of investigating and preventing subversive activity is the
hallmark of the Star Chamber.10 Access to counsel for the
purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and
mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.
Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention
of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may some-
times be justified to prevent persons from launching or be-
coming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be jus-
tified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to
extract information. Incommunicado detention for months
on end is such a procedure. Whether the information so
procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by more
extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this
Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag,
it must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault
by the forces of tyranny.
I respectfully dissent.
acts.’ ” 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573–574 (SDNY 2002) (quoting News
Briefing, Dept. of Defense (June 12, 2002), 2002 WL 22026773).
10 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 54 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter,
J.). “There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as much affected
by fear as by force. And there comes a point where this Court should
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.” Id., at 52.