NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE et al.

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Syllabus
NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v.
SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 03–101. Argued March 29, 2004—Decided June 14, 2004
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), an Interior Department agency,
manages the Utah land at issue here under the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976. Pursuant to 43 U. S. C. § 1782, the Secretary
of the Interior has identified certain federal lands as “wilderness study
areas” (WSAs) and recommended some of these as suitable for wilder-
ness designation. Land designated as wilderness by Act of Congress
enjoys special protection; until Congress acts, the Secretary must “man-
age [WSAs] . . . so as not to impair the[ir] suitability . . . for preservation
as wilderness.” § 1782(c). In addition, each WSA or other area is man-
aged “in accordance with” a land use plan, § 1732(a), a BLM document
which generally describes, for a particular area, allowable uses, goals
for the land’s future condition, and next steps. 43 CFR § 1601.0–5(k).
Respondents Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and others (collec-
tively SUWA) sought declaratory and injunctive relief for BLM’s failure
to act to protect Utah public lands from environmental damage caused
by off-road vehicles (ORVs), asserting three claims relevant here, and
contending that they could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(1). The Tenth Circuit reversed the District
Court’s dismissal of the claims.
Held: BLM’s alleged failures to act are not remediable under the APA.
Pp. 61–73.
(a) A § 706(1) claim can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an
agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.
The discrete-action limitation precludes a broad programmatic attack
such as that rejected in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497
U. S. 871, and the required-action limitation rules out judicial direction
of even discrete agency action that is not demanded by law. Pp. 61–65.
(b) SUWA first claims that BLM violated § 1782(c)’s nonimpairment
mandate by permitting ORV use in certain WSAs. While § 1782(c) is
mandatory as to the object to be achieved, it leaves BLM discretion to
decide how to achieve that object. SUWA argues that the nonimpair-
ment mandate will support an APA suit, but a general deficiency in
compliance lacks the requisite specificity. The principal purpose of this

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56 NORTON v. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE
Syllabus
limitation is to protect agencies from undue judicial interference with
their lawful discretion and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract
policy disagreements which courts lack the expertise and information to
resolve. If courts were empowered to enter general orders compelling
compliance with broad statutory mandates, they would necessarily be
empowered to decide whether compliance was achieved. The APA does
not contemplate such pervasive federal-court oversight. Pp. 65–67.
(c) SUWA also claims that BLM’s failure to comply with provisions
of its land use plans contravenes the requirement that the Secretary
manage public lands in accordance with such plans, 43 U. S. C. § 1732(a).
A land use plan, however, is a tool to project present and future use.
Unlike a specific statutory command requiring an agency to promulgate
regulations by a certain date, a land use plan is generally a statement
of priorities; it guides and restrains actions, but does not prescribe
them. A statement about what BLM plans to do, if it has funds and
there are not more pressing priorities, cannot be plucked out of context
and made a basis for a § 706(1) suit. The land use plan statements at
issue here are not a legally binding commitment enforceable under
§ 706(1). Pp. 67–72.
(d) SUWA finally contends that BLM did not fulfill its obligation
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to take a “hard
look” at whether to undertake supplemental environmental analyses for
areas where ORV use had increased. Because the applicable regulation
requires an environmental impact statement (EIS) to be supplemented
where there “are significant new circumstances or information relevant
to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its
impacts,” 40 CFR § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii), an agency must take a “hard look”
at new information to assess the need for supplementation, Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S. 360, 385. However, sup-
plementation is required only if “there remains major Federal actio[n]
to occur,” id., at 374. Since the BLM’s approval of a land use plan is
the “action” that requires an EIS, once a plan has been approved, there
is no ongoing “major Federal actio[n]” that could require supplementa-
tion. Pp. 72–73.
301 F. 3d 1217, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General
Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General Clark, Barbara McDowell, An-

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Opinion of the Court
drew Mergen, John A. Bryson, Susan Pacholski, and Roder-
ick E. Walston.
Paul M. Smith argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief for respondents Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance et al. were Jerome L. Epstein, William M. Hohen-
garten, Elaine J. Goldenberg, Stephen H. M. Bloch, James S.
Angell, Patti Goldman, and Todd D. True. Paul A. Turcke
and Paul W. Mortensen filed a brief for respondents Utah
Shared Access Alliance et al.*
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we must decide whether the authority of a
federal court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreason-
ably delayed,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(1), extends to the review of the
United States Bureau of Land Management’s stewardship of
*Robin L. Rivett filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus
curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel
Medeiros, Solicitor General, Richard Frank, Chief Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, William Brieger, Acting Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora
Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ken Alex and Craig Thomp-
son, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Susan Durbin and
James Potter, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, Richard
Blumenthal of Connecticut, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Thomas F. Reilly
of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of
Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Patricia Madrid of New Mexico,
Eliot Spitzer of New York, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy
Myers of Oregon, Larry Long of South Dakota, and Peggy A. Lauten-
schlager of Wisconsin; for the Defenders of Wildlife et al. by Katherine A.
Meyer and Eric R. Glitzenstein; for the Montana Wilderness Association
by Jack R. Tuholske; for the National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates
by Daniel D. Wedemeyer; for the Natural Resources Defense Council et al.
by Charles E. Koob and Johanna H. Wald; for Robert W. Adler et al. by
Robert G. Dreher; and for Russell Train et al. by Nicholas C. Yost and
Gary Widman.

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public lands under certain statutory provisions and its own
planning documents.
I
Almost half the State of Utah, about 23 million acres, is
federal land administered by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment (BLM), an agency within the Department of Interior.
For nearly 30 years, BLM’s management of public lands has
been governed by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.,
which “established a policy in favor of retaining public lands
for multiple use management.” Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 877 (1990). “Multiple use manage-
ment” is a deceptively simple term that describes the enor-
mously complicated task of striking a balance among the
many competing uses to which land can be put, “including,
but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, water-
shed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] natural scenic,
scientific and historical values.” 43 U. S. C. § 1702(c). A
second management goal, “sustained yield,” requires BLM
to control depleting uses over time, so as to ensure a high
level of valuable uses in the future. § 1702(h). To these
ends, FLPMA establishes a dual regime of inventory and
planning. Sections 1711 and 1712, respectively, provide for
a comprehensive, ongoing inventory of federal lands, and
for a land use planning process that “project[s]” “present
and future use,” § 1701(a)(2), given the lands’ inventoried
characteristics.
Of course not all uses are compatible. Congress made the
judgment that some lands should be set aside as wilderness
at the expense of commercial and recreational uses. A pre-
FLPMA enactment, the Wilderness Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 890,
provides that designated wilderness areas, subject to certain
exceptions, “shall [have] no commercial enterprise and no
permanent road,” no motorized vehicles, and no manmade
structures. 16 U. S. C. § 1133(c). The designation of a wil-

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derness area can be made only by Act of Congress, see 43
U. S. C. § 1782(b).
Pursuant to § 1782, the Secretary of the Interior (Sec-
retary) has identified so-called “wilderness study areas”
(WSAs), roadless lands of 5,000 acres or more that possess
“wilderness characteristics,” as determined in the Secre-
tary’s land inventory. § 1782(a); see 16 U. S. C. § 1131(c).
As the name suggests, WSAs (as well as certain wild lands
identified prior to the passage of FLPMA) have been sub-
jected to further examination and public comment in order
to evaluate their suitability for designation as wilderness.
In 1991, out of 3.3 million acres in Utah that had been identi-
fied for study, 2 million were recommended as suitable for
wilderness designation. 1 U. S. Dept. of Interior, BLM,
Utah Statewide Wilderness Study Report 3 (Oct. 1991).
This recommendation was forwarded to Congress, which has
not yet acted upon it. Until Congress acts one way or the
other, FLPMA provides that “the Secretary shall continue
to manage such lands . . . in a manner so as not to impair the
suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness.” 43
U. S. C. § 1782(c). This nonimpairment mandate applies to
all WSAs identified under § 1782, including lands considered
unsuitable by the Secretary. See §§ 1782(a), (b); App. 64
(BLM Interim Management Policy for Lands Under Wilder-
ness Review).
Aside from identification of WSAs, the main tool that BLM
employs to balance wilderness protection against other uses
is a land use plan—what BLM regulations call a “resource
management plan.” 43 CFR § 1601.0–5(k) (2003). Land
use plans, adopted after notice and comment, are “designed
to guide and control future management actions,” § 1601.0–2.
See 43 U. S. C. § 1712; 43 CFR § 1610.2 (2003). Generally, a
land use plan describes, for a particular area, allowable uses,
goals for future condition of the land, and specific next steps.
§ 1601.0–5(k). Under FLPMA, “[t]he Secretary shall man-
age the public lands under principles of multiple use and sus-

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tained yield, in accordance with the land use plans . . . when
they are available.” 43 U. S. C. § 1732(a).
Protection of wilderness has come into increasing conflict
with another element of multiple use, recreational use of
so-called off-road vehicles (ORVs), which include vehicles
primarily designed for off-road use, such as lightweight,
four-wheel “all-terrain vehicles,” and vehicles capable of
such use, such as sport utility vehicles. See 43 CFR
§ 8340.0–5(a) (2003). According to the United States Forest
Service’s most recent estimates, some 42 million Americans
participate in off-road travel each year, more than double the
number two decades ago. H. Cordell, Outdoor Recreation
for 21st Century America 40 (2004). United States sales
of all-terrain vehicles alone have roughly doubled in the past
five years, reaching almost 900,000 in 2003. See Tanz,
Making Tracks, Making Enemies, N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2004,
p. F1, col. 5; Discover Today’s Motorcycling, Motorcycle
Industry Council, Press Release (Feb. 13, 2004), http://
www.motorcycles.org (all Internet materials as visited June
4, 2004, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The use
of ORVs on federal land has negative environmental conse-
quences, including soil disruption and compaction, harass-
ment of animals, and annoyance of wilderness lovers. See
Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council et al. as Amici
Curiae 4–7, and studies cited therein. Thus, BLM faces a
classic land use dilemma of sharply inconsistent uses, in a
context of scarce resources and congressional silence with
respect to wilderness designation.
In 1999, respondents Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
and other organizations (collectively SUWA) filed this action
in the United States District Court for Utah against peti-
tioners BLM, its Director, and the Secretary. In its second
amended complaint, SUWA sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief for BLM’s failure to act to protect public lands in
Utah from damage caused by ORV use. SUWA made three
claims that are relevant here: (1) that BLM had violated its

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nonimpairment obligation under § 1782(c) by allowing degra-
dation in certain WSAs; (2) that BLM had failed to imple-
ment provisions in its land use plans relating to ORV use;
and (3) that BLM had failed to take a “hard look” at whether,
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq., it should un-
dertake supplemental environmental analyses for areas in
which ORV use had increased. SUWA contended that it
could sue to remedy these three failures to act pursuant to
the APA’s provision of a cause of action to “compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5
U. S. C. § 706(1).
The District Court entered a dismissal with respect to the
three claims. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed.
301 F. 3d 1217 (2002). The majority acknowledged that
under § 706(1), “federal courts may order agencies to act only
where the agency fails to carry out a mandatory, nondiscre-
tionary duty.” Id., at 1226. It concluded, however, that
BLM’s nonimpairment obligation was just such a duty, and
therefore BLM could be compelled to comply. Under simi-
lar reasoning, it reversed the dismissal with respect to the
land use plan claim; and likewise reversed dismissal of the
NEPA claim. We granted certiorari. 540 U. S. 980 (2003).
II
All three claims at issue here involve assertions that BLM
failed to take action with respect to ORV use that it was
required to take. Failures to act are sometimes remediable
under the APA, but not always. We begin by considering
what limits the APA places upon judicial review of agency
inaction.
The APA authorizes suit by “[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute.” 5 U. S. C. § 702. Where no other statute provides
a private right of action, the “agency action” complained

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of must be “final agency action.” § 704 (emphasis added).
“[A]gency action” is defined in § 551(13) to include “the whole
or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.” (Empha-
sis added.) The APA provides relief for a failure to act in
§ 706(1): “The reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”
Sections 702, 704, and 706(1) all insist upon an “agency
action,” either as the action complained of (in §§ 702 and 704)
or as the action to be compelled (in § 706(1)). The definition
of that term begins with a list of five categories of decisions
made or outcomes implemented by an agency—“agency rule,
order, license, sanction [or] relief.” § 551(13). All of those
categories involve circumscribed, discrete agency actions, as
their definitions make clear: “an agency statement of . . .
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe
law or policy” (rule); “a final disposition . . . in a matter other
than rule making” (order); a “permit . . . or other form of
permission” (license); a “prohibition . . . or . . . taking [of]
other compulsory or restrictive action” (sanction); or a
“grant of money, assistance, license, authority,” etc., or “rec-
ognition of a claim, right, immunity,” etc., or “taking of other
action on the application or petition of, and beneficial to, a
person” (relief). §§ 551(4), (6), (8), (10), (11).
The terms following those five categories of agency
action are not defined in the APA: “or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act.” § 551(13). But an “equiv-
alent . . . thereof ” must also be discrete (or it would not
be equivalent), and a “denial thereof ” must be the denial of
a discrete listed action (and perhaps denial of a discrete
equivalent).
The final term in the definition, “failure to act,” is in our
view properly understood as a failure to take an agency
action—that is, a failure to take one of the agency actions
(including their equivalents) earlier defined in § 551(13).
Moreover, even without this equation of “act” with “agency

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action” the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis would at-
tribute to the last item (“failure to act”) the same character-
istic of discreteness shared by all the preceding items. See,
e. g., Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 384–385
(2003). A “failure to act” is not the same thing as a “denial.”
The latter is the agency’s act of saying no to a request; the
former is simply the omission of an action without formally
rejecting a request—for example, the failure to promulgate
a rule or take some decision by a statutory deadline. The
important point is that a “failure to act” is properly under-
stood to be limited, as are the other items in § 551(13), to a
discrete action.
A second point central to the analysis of the present case
is that the only agency action that can be compelled under
the APA is action legally required. This limitation appears
in § 706(1)’s authorization for courts to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld.” 1 (Emphasis added.) In this regard
the APA carried forward the traditional practice prior to its
passage, when judicial review was achieved through use of
the so-called prerogative writs—principally writs of manda-
mus under the All Writs Act, now codified at 28 U. S. C.
§ 1651(a). The mandamus remedy was normally limited to
enforcement of “a specific, unequivocal command,” ICC v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 287 U. S. 178, 204 (1932), the
ordering of a “ ‘precise, definite act . . . about which [an offi-
cial] had no discretion whatever,’ ” United States ex rel.
Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 46 (1888) (quoting Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 613 (1838)). See
also ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S. S. Co., 224
U. S. 474, 484 (1912). As described in the Attorney Gener-
al’s Manual on the APA, a document whose reasoning we
have often found persuasive, see, e. g., Darby v. Cisneros, 509
1 Of course § 706(1) also authorizes courts to “compel agency action . . .
unreasonably delayed”—but a delay cannot be unreasonable with respect
to action that is not required.

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U. S. 137, 148, n. 10 (1993); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S.
281, 302, n. 31 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519,
546 (1978), § 706(1) empowers a court only to compel an
agency “to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,”
or “to take action upon a matter, without directing how it
shall act.” Attorney General’s Manual on the Administra-
tive Procedure Act 108 (1947) (emphasis added). See also L.
Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 372 (1965);
K. Davis, Administrative Law § 257, p. 925 (1951).
Thus, a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a
plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete
agency action that it is required to take. These limitations
rule out several kinds of challenges. The limitation to dis-
crete agency action precludes the kind of broad program-
matic attack we rejected in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S. 871 (1990). There we considered
a challenge to BLM’s land withdrawal review program,
couched as unlawful agency “action” that the plaintiffs
wished to have “set aside” under § 706(2).2 Id., at 879. We
concluded that the program was not an “agency action”:
“[R]espondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of
this program by court decree, rather than in the offices
of the Department or the halls of Congress, where pro-
grammatic improvements are normally made. Under
the terms of the APA, respondent must direct its attack
against some particular ‘agency action’ that causes it
harm.” Id., at 891 (emphasis in original).
2 Title 5 U. S. C. § 706(2) provides, in relevant part:
“The reviewing court shall—
. . . . .
“(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be—
“(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . .”

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The plaintiffs in National Wildlife Federation would have
fared no better if they had characterized the agency’s alleged
“failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion” and “fail-
ure to consider multiple use,” ibid., in terms of “agency ac-
tion unlawfully withheld” under § 706(1), rather than agency
action “not in accordance with law” under § 706(2).
The limitation to required agency action rules out judicial
direction of even discrete agency action that is not demanded
by law (which includes, of course, agency regulations that
have the force of law). Thus, when an agency is compelled
by law to act within a certain time period, but the manner
of its action is left to the agency’s discretion, a court can
compel the agency to act, but has no power to specify what
the action must be. For example, 47 U. S. C. § 251(d)(1),
which required the Federal Communications Commission “to
establish regulations to implement” interconnection require-
ments “[w]ithin 6 months” of the date of enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, would have supported a ju-
dicial decree under the APA requiring the prompt issuance
of regulations, but not a judicial decree setting forth the con-
tent of those regulations.
III
A
With these principles in mind, we turn to SUWA’s first
claim, that by permitting ORV use in certain WSAs, BLM
violated its mandate to “continue to manage [WSAs] . . . in
a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for
preservation as wilderness,” 43 U. S. C. § 1782(c). SUWA
relies not only upon § 1782(c) but also upon a provision of
BLM’s Interim Management Policy for Lands Under Wilder-
ness Review, which interprets the nonimpairment mandate
to require BLM to manage WSAs so as to prevent them from
being “degraded so far, compared with the area’s values for
other purposes, as to significantly constrain the Congress’s

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prerogative to either designate [it] as wilderness or release
it for other uses.” App. 65.
Section 1782(c) is mandatory as to the object to be
achieved, but it leaves BLM a great deal of discretion in
deciding how to achieve it. It assuredly does not mandate,
with the clarity necessary to support judicial action under
§ 706(1), the total exclusion of ORV use.
SUWA argues that § 1782 does contain a categorical im-
perative, namely, the command to comply with the nonim-
pairment mandate. It contends that a federal court could
simply enter a general order compelling compliance with
that mandate, without suggesting any particular manner of
compliance. It relies upon the language from the Attorney
General’s Manual quoted earlier, that a court can “take ac-
tion upon a matter, without directing how [the agency] shall
act,” and upon language in a case cited by the Manual noting
that “mandamus will lie . . . even though the act required
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion,” Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 138 F. 2d 278, 280 (Emerg. Ct. App.
1943). The action referred to in these excerpts, however, is
discrete agency action, as we have discussed above. General
deficiencies in compliance, unlike the failure to issue a ruling
that was discussed in Safeway Stores, lack the specificity
requisite for agency action.
The principal purpose of the APA limitations we have dis-
cussed—and of the traditional limitations upon mandamus
from which they were derived—is to protect agencies from
undue judicial interference with their lawful discretion, and
to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagree-
ments which courts lack both expertise and information to
resolve. If courts were empowered to enter general orders
compelling compliance with broad statutory mandates, they
would necessarily be empowered, as well, to determine
whether compliance was achieved—which would mean that
it would ultimately become the task of the supervising court,
rather than the agency, to work out compliance with the

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broad statutory mandate, injecting the judge into day-to-day
agency management. To take just a few examples from fed-
eral resources management, a plaintiff might allege that the
Secretary had failed to “manage wild free-roaming horses
and burros in a manner that is designed to achieve and main-
tain a thriving natural ecological balance,” or to “manage
the [New Orleans Jazz National] [H]istorical [P]ark in such
a manner as will preserve and perpetuate knowledge and
understanding of the history of jazz,” or to “manage the
[Steens Mountain] Cooperative Management and Protection
Area for the benefit of present and future generations.” 16
U. S. C. §§ 1333(a), 410bbb–2(a)(1), 460nnn–12(b). The pros-
pect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the man-
ner and pace of agency compliance with such congressional
directives is not contemplated by the APA.
B
SUWA’s second claim is that BLM failed to comply with
certain provisions in its land use plans, thus contravening
the requirement that “[t]he Secretary shall manage the pub-
lic lands . . . in accordance with the land use plans . . . when
they are available.” 43 U. S. C. § 1732(a); see also 43 CFR
§ 1610.5–3(a) (2003) (“All future resource management au-
thorizations and actions . . . and subsequent more detailed or
specific planning, shall conform to the approved plan”). The
relevant count in SUWA’s second amended complaint alleged
that BLM had violated a variety of commitments in its land
use plans, but over the course of the litigation these have
been reduced to two, one relating to the 1991 resource man-
agement plan for the San Rafael area, and the other to vari-
ous aspects of the 1990 ORV implementation plan for the
Henry Mountains area.
The actions contemplated by the first of these alleged com-
mitments (completion of a route designation plan in the San
Rafael area), and by one aspect of the second (creation of
“use supervision files” for designated areas in the Henry

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Opinion of the Court
Mountains area) have already been completed,3 and these
claims are therefore moot. There remains the claim, with
respect to the Henry Mountains plan, that “in light of dam-
age from ORVs in the Factory Butte area,” a sub-area of
Henry Mountains open to ORV use, “the [plan] obligated
BLM to conduct an intensive ORV monitoring program.”
Brief for SUWA 7–8. This claim is based upon the plan’s
statement that the Factory Butte area “will be monitored
and closed if warranted.” App. 140. SUWA does not con-
test BLM’s assertion in the court below that informal moni-
toring has taken place for some years, see Brief for Appellee
Secretary of Interior et al. in No. 01–4009 (CA10), p. 23, but
it demands continuing implementation of a monitoring pro-
gram. By this it apparently means to insist upon adherence
to the plan’s general discussion of “Use Supervision and
Monitoring” in designated areas, App. 148–149, which (in ad-
dition to calling for the use supervision files that have al-
ready been created) provides that “[r]esource damage will be
documented and recommendations made for corrective ac-
tion,” “[m]onitoring in open areas will focus on determining
damage which may necessitate a change in designation,” and
“emphasis on use supervision will be placed on [limited and
closed areas].” Id., at 149. SUWA acknowledges that a
monitoring program has recently been commenced. Brief
for SUWA 12. In light, however, of the continuing action
3 See U. S. Dept. of Interior, BLM, San Rafael Route Designation Plan
(2003), http://www.ut.blm.gov/sanrafaelohv/wtheplan.htm; 3 App. to Brief
for Appellants in No. 01–4009 (CA10), p. 771 (declaration of manager for
relevant BLM field office, noting the establishment of monitoring files for
the Henry Mountains area); Brief for Respondent SUWA et al. 12 (herein-
after Brief for SUWA) (acknowledging completion of these actions).
It is arguable that the complaint sought not merely creation but continu-
ing maintenance of use supervision files, in which case (for the reasons set
forth with respect to the ORV monitoring program later in text) that claim
would not be moot. If so, what we say below with regard to the merits
of the ORV monitoring claim would apply equally to the use supervision
file claim.

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that existence of a “program” contemplates, and in light of
BLM’s contention that the program cannot be compelled
under § 706(1), this claim cannot be considered moot.
The statutory directive that BLM manage “in accordance
with” land use plans, and the regulatory requirement that
authorizations and actions “conform to” those plans, prevent
BLM from taking actions inconsistent with the provisions of
a land use plan. Unless and until the plan is amended, such
actions can be set aside as contrary to law pursuant to 5
U. S. C. § 706(2). The claim presently under discussion, how-
ever, would have us go further, and conclude that a state-
ment in a plan that BLM “will” take this, that, or the other
action, is a binding commitment that can be compelled under
§ 706(1). In our view it is not—at least absent clear indica-
tion of binding commitment in the terms of the plan.
FLPMA describes land use plans as tools by which “pres-
ent and future use is projected.” 43 U. S. C. § 1701(a)(2) (em-
phasis added). The implementing regulations make clear
that land use plans are a preliminary step in the overall proc-
ess of managing public lands—“designed to guide and control
future management actions and the development of subse-
quent, more detailed and limited scope plans for resources
and uses.” 43 CFR § 1601.0–2 (2003). The statute and reg-
ulations confirm that a land use plan is not ordinarily
the medium for affirmative decisions that implement the
agency’s “project[ions].” 4 Title 43 U. S. C. § 1712(e) provides
that “[t]he Secretary may issue management decisions to im-
plement land use plans”—the decisions, that is, are distinct
from the plan itself. Picking up the same theme, the regula-
4 The exceptions “are normally limited to those required by regulation,
such as designating [ORV] areas, roads, and trails (see 43 CFR 8342).”
U. S. Dept. of Interior, BLM, Land Use Planning Handbook II–2 (2000)
(hereinafter Handbook). See, e. g., U. S. Dept. of Interior, BLM, San
Rafael Final Resource Management Plan 63 (1991) (hereinafter San
Rafael Plan) (available at http://www.ut.blm.gov/planning/OTHERS/
SRARMP-ROD%20MAY%201991.pdf).

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tion defining a land use plan declares that a plan “is not a
final implementation decision on actions which require fur-
ther specific plans, process steps, or decisions under specific
provisions of law and regulations.” 43 CFR § 1601.0–5(k)
(2003). The BLM’s Land Use Planning Handbook specifies
that land use plans are normally not used to make site-
specific implementation decisions. See Handbook II–2.
Plans also receive a different agency review process from
implementation decisions. Appeal to the Department’s
Board of Land Appeals is available for “a specific action
being proposed to implement some portion of a resource
management plan or amendment.” 43 CFR § 1610.5–3(b)
(2003). However, the Board, which reviews “decisions ren-
dered by Departmental officials relating to . . . [t]he use and
disposition of public lands and their resources,” § 4.1(b)(3)(i),
does not review the approval of a plan, since it regards a
plan as a policy determination, not an implementation deci-
sion. See, e. g., Wilderness Society, 109 I. B. L. A. 175, 178
(1989); Wilderness Society, 90 I. B. L. A. 221, 224 (1986); see
also Handbook II–2, IV–3. Plans are protested to the BLM
director, not appealed.
The San Rafael plan provides an apt illustration of the im-
mense scope of projected activity that a land use plan can
embrace. Over 100 pages in length, it presents a compre-
hensive management framework for 1.5 million acres of
BLM-administered land. Twenty categories of resource
management are separately discussed, including mineral ex-
traction, wilderness protection, livestock grazing, preserva-
tion of cultural resources, and recreation. The plan lays out
an ambitious agenda for the preparation of additional, more
detailed plans and specific next steps for implementation.
Its introduction notes that “[a]n [ORV] implementation plan
is scheduled to be prepared within 1 year following approval
of the [San Rafael plan].” San Rafael Plan 9. Similarly
“scheduled for preparation” are activity plans for certain en-
vironmentally sensitive areas, “along with allotment man-

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agement plans, habitat management plans, a fire manage-
ment plan, recreation management plans . . . , cultural
resource management plans for selected sites, watershed ac-
tivity plans, and the wild and scenic river management plan.”
Ibid. The projected schedule set forth in the plan shows
“[a]nticipated [i]mplementation” of some future plans within
one year, others within three years, and still others, such as
certain recreation and cultural resource management plans,
at a pace of “one study per fiscal year.” Id., at 95–102.
Quite unlike a specific statutory command requiring an
agency to promulgate regulations by a certain date, a land
use plan is generally a statement of priorities; it guides and
constrains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case)
prescribe them. It would be unreasonable to think that
either Congress or the agency intended otherwise, since land
use plans nationwide would commit the agency to actions far
in the future, for which funds have not yet been appro-
priated. Some plans make explicit that implementation of
their programmatic content is subject to budgetary con-
straints. See Brief for Petitioners 42–43, and n. 18 (quoting
from such plans). While the Henry Mountains plan does not
contain such a specification, we think it must reasonably be
implied. A statement by BLM about what it plans to do, at
some point, provided it has the funds and there are not more
pressing priorities, cannot be plucked out of context and
made a basis for suit under § 706(1).
Of course, an action called for in a plan may be compelled
when the plan merely reiterates duties the agency is already
obligated to perform, or perhaps when language in the plan
itself creates a commitment binding on the agency. But
allowing general enforcement of plan terms would lead to
pervasive interference with BLM’s own ordering of priori-
ties. For example, a judicial decree compelling immediate
preparation of all of the detailed plans called for in the San
Rafael plan would divert BLM’s energies from other projects
throughout the country that are in fact more pressing. And

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while such a decree might please the environmental plaintiffs
in the present case, it would ultimately operate to the detri-
ment of sound environmental management. Its predictable
consequence would be much vaguer plans from BLM in the
future—making coordination with other agencies more diffi-
cult, and depriving the public of important information con-
cerning the agency’s long-range intentions.
We therefore hold that the Henry Mountains plan’s state-
ments to the effect that BLM will conduct “Use Supervision
and Monitoring” in designated areas—like other “will do”
projections of agency action set forth in land use plans—are
not a legally binding commitment enforceable under § 706(1).
That being so, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the
action envisioned by the statements is sufficiently discrete to
be amenable to compulsion under the APA.5
IV
Finally, we turn to SUWA’s contention that BLM failed to
fulfill certain obligations under NEPA. Before addressing
whether a NEPA-required duty is actionable under the APA,
we must decide whether NEPA creates an obligation in the
first place. NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) as part of any “pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”
42 U. S. C. § 4332(2)(C). Often an initial EIS is sufficient,
but in certain circumstances an EIS must be supplemented.
See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U. S.
360, 370–374 (1989). A regulation of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality requires supplementation where “[t]here
are significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action
or its impacts.” 40 CFR § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (2003). In Marsh,
5 We express no view as to whether a court could, under § 706(1), enforce
a duty to monitor ORV use imposed by a BLM regulation, see 43 CFR
§ 8342.3 (2003). That question is not before us.

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we interpreted § 4332 in light of this regulation to require an
agency to take a “hard look” at the new information to assess
whether supplementation might be necessary. 490 U. S., at
385; see id., at 378–385.
SUWA argues that evidence of increased ORV use is “sig-
nificant new circumstances or information” that requires a
“hard look.” We disagree. As we noted in Marsh, supple-
mentation is necessary only if “there remains ‘major Federal
actio[n]’ to occur,” as that term is used in § 4332(2)(C). Id.,
at 374. In Marsh, that condition was met: The dam con-
struction project that gave rise to environmental review was
not yet completed. Here, by contrast, although the “[a]p-
proval of a [land use plan]” is a “major Federal action” re-
quiring an EIS, 43 CFR § 1601.0–6 (2003) (emphasis added),
that action is completed when the plan is approved. The
land use plan is the “proposed action” contemplated by the
regulation. There is no ongoing “major Federal action” that
could require supplementation (though BLM is required to
perform additional NEPA analyses if a plan is amended or
revised, see §§ 1610.5–5, 5–6).
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.