HOLLAND, WARDEN v. JACKSON

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Syllabus
HOLLAND, WARDEN v. JACKSON
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 03–1200. Decided June 28, 2004
Tennessee’s principal evidence at respondent’s murder trial was Jonathan
Hughes’ eyewitness testimony that he was at the scene with Melissa
Gooch, who did not testify. Respondent was convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, he
sought state postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his trial
counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct an adequate investiga-
tion. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668. The trial court de-
nied relief after an evidentiary hearing, finding that counsel’s perform-
ance was not deficient and that, in any event, respondent suffered no
prejudice. Respondent then moved for a new trial, claiming for the
first time—after seven years—that Gooch would testify that she was
not with Hughes on the night in question. The trial court denied the
motion. In affirming that denial, the State Court of Criminal Appeals
found that respondent had filed an earlier such motion and given no
satisfactory reason for failing to locate Gooch in seven years, and that
Gooch’s testimony would only impeach Hughes’ memory. In affirming
the denial of postconviction relief, the court noted that there had been
no showing on the record of favorable evidence that counsel could have
elicited from Gooch and that respondent’s pleading did not contradict
what Hughes claimed to have seen. The Federal District Court
granted the State summary judgment on respondent’s subsequent fed-
eral habeas claim, finding the state court’s application of Strickland
erroneous but not unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the state court
had unreasonably applied Strickland, given that Gooch’s statement un-
dermined Hughes’ credibility, and finding that the state court’s opin-
ion was contrary to Strickland because it assessed prejudice under
a preponderance-of-the-evidence, rather than a reasonable-probability,
standard.
Held: The Sixth Circuit erred in granting relief under § 2254(d)(1). First,
it found the state court’s application of Strickland unreasonable on the
basis of evidence not properly before the state court. Although the
state court ventured that it would deny relief on the merits taking
Gooch’s statement into account, its judgment also rested on the holding
that her statement was not properly before it. Granting relief in disre-

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gard of this independent basis for decision was error, for the question
whether a state court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in
light of the record before that court, see, e. g., Yarborough v. Gentry,
540 U. S. 1, 6. Second, the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that the state
court required proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The state
court recited the correct reasonable-probability standard, but the Sixth
Circuit inferred from three subsequent passages in the state court’s
opinion that the state court had actually applied a preponderance stand-
ard. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit ignored § 2254(d)’s requirements that
“state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 24, and that “readiness to attribute error is incon-
sistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the
law,” ibid.
Certiorari granted; 80 Fed. Appx. 392, reversed and remanded.
Per Curiam.
I
Respondent Jessie Jackson was tried in 1987 by the State
of Tennessee for the murder of James Crawley. The State
asserted that he had shot Crawley after an argument over
drugs. Its principal evidence at trial was the eyewitness
testimony of Jonathan Hughes, who claimed to have been at
the scene with his girlfriend Melissa Gooch when the shoot-
ing occurred. Gooch did not testify. The jury convicted,
and respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment.
After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial, respondent
sought state postconviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that
his trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to conduct an
adequate investigation. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U. S. 668 (1984). The state court held an evidentiary hear-
ing and then denied the petition, finding that counsel’s per-
formance was not deficient and that, in any event, respondent
suffered no prejudice. Respondent then filed a “Motion for
Hearing in Nature of Motion for New Trial,” alleging newly
discovered evidence. He claimed for the first time—seven
years after his conviction—that Gooch would now testify
that, contrary to Hughes’ trial testimony, she was not with

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Hughes on the night of the shooting. The state court denied
this motion, and respondent appealed both rulings to the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
That court affirmed. It upheld the denial of new trial,
observing that respondent had already filed an earlier such
motion, that there was “no satisfactory reason given for the
defendant’s failure to locate this witness” during the seven
years that had elapsed, and that the proposed testimony
“would serve merely to impeach Hughes’ memory about hav-
ing seen [Gooch] that night.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 88. It
also affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, noting that
there had never “been any showing on the record of favor-
able testimony that would have been elicited” from Gooch
had counsel interviewed her, and that even crediting re-
spondent’s “unsubstantiated pleading,” “it in no way rises
to the level of contradicting what Hughes claims to have
seen” respecting the shooting itself. Id., at 96–97 (empha-
sis added).
Respondent then sought federal habeas relief, and the Dis-
trict Court granted the State’s motion for summary judg-
ment. It found that there had been ineffective assistance of
counsel, noting several shortcomings and opining that there
was a reasonable probability of prejudice. It observed,
however, that it could grant relief only if the state court’s
adjudication of respondent’s claim was “contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). It concluded that the
state court’s application of Strickland, while erroneous, was
not unreasonable.
The Sixth Circuit reversed. 80 Fed. Appx. 392 (2003).
Although it found a number of flaws in counsel’s perform-
ance, its grant of relief under § 2254(d)(1) was based on only
two specific grounds: first, that the state court had unreason-
ably applied Strickland, given that Gooch’s statement under-
mined the credibility of Hughes’ testimony; and second, that
the state court’s opinion was contrary to Strickland because

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it assessed prejudice under a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard rather than a reasonable-probability standard.
We now grant the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari
and respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pau-
peris, and reverse.
II
A
The Sixth Circuit erred in finding the state court’s applica-
tion of Strickland unreasonable on the basis of evidence not
properly before the state court. Although the state court
had ventured that it would deny relief on the merits even
taking Gooch’s statement into account, its judgment also
rested on the holding that the statement was not properly
before it. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 86–89, 95–98. Grant-
ing relief in disregard of this independent basis for decision
was error.
The “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) ap-
plies when the “state court identifies the correct governing
legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably
applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 413 (2000). In this and
related contexts we have made clear that whether a state
court’s decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light
of the record the court had before it. See Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U. S. 1, 6 (2003) (per curiam) (denying relief
where state court’s application of federal law was “supported
by the record”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 348
(2003) (reasonableness of state court’s factual finding as-
sessed “in light of the record before the court”); cf. Bell v.
Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 697, n. 4 (2002) (declining to consider
evidence not presented to state court in determining
whether its decision was contrary to federal law).
Under the habeas statute, Gooch’s statement could have
been the subject of an evidentiary hearing by the District
Court, but only if respondent was not at fault in failing to

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develop that evidence in state court, or (if he was at fault)
if the conditions prescribed by § 2254(e)(2) were met. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 431–437 (2000). Those
same restrictions apply a fortiori when a prisoner seeks re-
lief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing.
See, e. g., Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F. 3d 1196, 1209 (CA10 2003),
and cases cited. Where new evidence is admitted, some
Courts of Appeals have conducted de novo review on the
theory that there is no relevant state-court determination to
which one could defer. See, e. g., Monroe v. Angelone, 323
F. 3d 286, 297–299, and n. 19 (CA4 2003). Assuming, argu-
endo, that this analysis is correct and that it applies where,
as here, the evidence does not support a new claim but
merely buttresses a previously rejected one, it cannot sup-
port the Sixth Circuit’s action.
The District Court made no finding that respondent had
been diligent in pursuing Gooch’s testimony (and thus that
§ 2254(e)(2) was inapplicable) or that the limitations set forth
in § 2254(e)(2) were met. Nor did the Sixth Circuit inde-
pendently inquire into these matters; it simply ignored en-
tirely the state court’s independent ground for its decision,
that Gooch’s statement was not properly before it. It is dif-
ficult to see, moreover, how respondent could claim due dili-
gence given the 7-year delay. He complains that his state
postconviction counsel did not heed his pleas for assistance.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 65. Attorney negligence, how-
ever, is chargeable to the client and precludes relief unless
the conditions of § 2254(e)(2) are satisfied. See Williams,
supra, at 439–440; cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722,
753–754 (1991).
The Sixth Circuit therefore erred in finding the state
court’s decision an unreasonable application of Strickland.*
*We reject respondent’s contention that the State failed adequately to
preserve this error. See, e. g., Final Brief for Appellee in No. 01–5720
(CA6), p. 18, and n. 3.

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B
The Sixth Circuit also erred in holding that the state court
acted contrary to federal law by requiring proof of prejudice
by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by a reason-
able probability. The state court began by reciting the cor-
rect Strickland standard:
“ ‘[T]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to un-
dermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 95 (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S., at 694).
The Sixth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the state court
had actually applied a preponderance standard, based on
three subsequent passages from its opinion.
First was the statement that “[i]n a post-conviction pro-
ceeding, the defendant has the burden of proving his allega-
tions by a preponderance of the evidence.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 95. In context, however, this statement is reasonably
read as addressing the general burden of proof in postconvic-
tion proceedings with regard to factual contentions—for ex-
ample, those relating to whether defense counsel’s perform-
ance was deficient. Although it is possible to read it as
referring also to the question whether the deficiency was
prejudicial, thereby supplanting Strickland, such a reading
would needlessly create internal inconsistency in the opinion.
Second was the statement that “it is asking too much that
we draw the inference that the jury would not have believed
Hughes at all had Melissa Gooch testified.” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 96. Although the Court of Appeals evidently thought
that this passage intimated a preponderance standard, it is
difficult to see why. The quoted language does not imply
any particular standard of probability.
Last was the statement that respondent had “failed to
carry his burden of proving that the outcome of the trial

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would probably have been different but for those errors.”
Id., at 98. We have held that such use of the unadorned
word “probably” is permissible shorthand when the complete
Strickland standard is elsewhere recited. See Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U. S. 19, 23–24 (2002) (per curiam).
As we explained in Visciotti, § 2254(d) requires that
“state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Id., at 24. “[R]eadiness to attribute error is inconsistent
with the presumption that state courts know and follow the
law.” Ibid. The Sixth Circuit ignored those prescriptions.
* * *
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg,
and Justice Breyer would deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.