HIBBS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. WINN et al.

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88 OCTOBER TERM, 2003
Syllabus
HIBBS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE v. WINN et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 02–1809. Argued January 20, 2004—Decided June 14, 2004
Plaintiffs-respondents, Arizona taxpayers, filed suit in federal court
against the Director of Arizona’s Department of Revenue (Director)
seeking to enjoin the operation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43–1089 on
Establishment Clause grounds. Arizona’s law authorizes an income-tax
credit for payments to nonprofit “school tuition organizations” (STOs)
that award scholarships to students in private elementary or secondary
schools. Section 43–1089 provides that STOs may not designate schools
that “discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status
or national origin,” § 43–1089(F), but does not preclude STOs from des-
ignating schools that provide religious instruction or give religion-based
admissions preferences. The District Court granted the Director’s mo-
tion to dismiss on the ground that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28
U. S. C. § 1341, barred the suit. The TIA prohibits lower federal courts
from restraining “the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.” The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
TIA does not bar federal-court actions challenging state tax credits.
Held:
1. The Court rejects respondents’ contention that the Director’s cer-
tiorari petition was jurisdictionally untimely under 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c)
and this Court’s Rule 13.3. Section 2101(c) instructs that a petition
must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of . . . judgment,” and
this Court’s Rule 13.3 elaborates on that statute’s instruction. More
than 90 days elapsed between the date the Ninth Circuit first entered
judgment and the date the Director’s petition was filed. That time
lapse, respondents assert, made the filing untimely under Rule 13.3’s
first sentence: “[T]he time to file . . . runs from the date of entry of
the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.” Moreover, respondents
submit, because no party petitioned for rehearing, the extended filing
periods prescribed by the Rule’s second sentence never came into play.
This case, however, did not follow the typical course. The Ninth Cir-
cuit, on its own initiative, had recalled its mandate and ordered the
parties to brief the question whether the case should be reheard en
banc. That order, this Court holds, suspended the judgment’s finality

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under § 2101(c), just as a timely filed rehearing petition would or a
court’s appropriate decision to consider a late-filed rehearing petition,
see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 49. The Court of Appeals’ order
raised the question whether that court would modify the judgment and
alter the parties’ rights; thus, while the court-initiated briefing order
was pending, there was no “judgment” to be reviewed. See, e. g., id.,
at 46. The Director’s certiorari petition was timely under the statute
because it was filed within 90 days of the date the Ninth Circuit denied
rehearing en banc. Were this Court to read Rule 13 as the sole guide,
so that only a party’s rehearing petition could reset the statute’s 90-day
count, the Court would lose sight of the congressional objective under-
pinning § 2101(c): An appellate court’s final adjudication, Congress indi-
cated, marks the time from which the filing period begins to run. The
statute takes priority over the “procedural rules adopted by the Court
for the orderly transaction of its business.” Schacht v. United States,
398 U. S. 58, 64. Because the petition was timely under § 2101(c), the
Court has jurisdiction. Pp. 96–99.
2. The TIA does not bar respondents’ suit. Pp. 99–112.
(a) To determine whether the TIA bars this litigation, it is appro-
priate, first, to identify the relief sought. Respondents seek prospec-
tive relief only: injunctive relief prohibiting the Director from allowing
taxpayers to utilize the § 43–1089 tax credit for payments to STOs that
make religion-based tuition grants; a declaration that § 43–1089, on its
face and as applied, violates the Establishment Clause; and an order
that the Director inform such STOs that all funds in their possession as
of the order’s date must be paid into the state general fund. Taking
account of the prospective nature of the relief requested, the Court
reaches the dispositive question whether respondents’ suit seeks to “en-
join, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law,” § 1341. The answer turns on the meaning of the term
“assessment” as employed in the TIA. For Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) purposes, an assessment involves a “recording” of the amount the
taxpayer owes the Government. 26 U. S. C. § 6203. The Court does
not focus on the word “assessment” in isolation, however, but follows
“the cardinal rule that statutory language must be read in context.”
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 596. In
the TIA and tax law generally, an assessment is closely tied to the col-
lection of a tax, i. e., the assessment is the official recording of liability
that triggers levy and collection efforts. Complementing the cardinal
rule just stated, the rule against superfluities instructs courts to inter-
pret a statute to effectuate all its provisions, so that no part is rendered
superfluous. If, as the Director asserts, the term “assessment,” by it-
self, signified the entire taxing plan, the TIA would not need the words

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90 HIBBS v. WINN
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“levy” or “collection”; the term “assessment,” alone, would do all the
necessary work. In briefing United States v. Galletti, 541 U. S. 114, the
Government made clear that, under the IRC definition, an “assessment”
serves as the trigger for levy and collection efforts. The Government
did not describe “assessment” as synonymous with the entire taxation
plan, nor disassociate the word from the company (“levy or collection”)
it keeps. Instead, and in accord with this Court’s understanding, the
Government related “assessment” to the term’s collection-propelling
function. Pp. 99–102.
(b) Congress modeled § 1341 on earlier federal statutes of similar
import, which in turn paralleled state provisions proscribing state-court
actions to enjoin the collection of state and local taxes. Congress drew
particularly on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which bars “any court”
from entertaining a suit brought “for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any [federal] tax.” 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a).
This Court has recognized, from the AIA’s text, that the measure serves
twin purposes: It responds to the Government’s need to assess and col-
lect taxes expeditiously with a minimum of preenforcement judicial
interference; and it requires that the legal right to disputed sums be
determined in a refund suit. E. g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S.
725, 736. Lower federal courts have similarly comprehended § 7421(a).
Just as the AIA shields federal tax collections from federal-court injunc-
tions, so the TIA shields state tax collections from federal-court re-
straints. In both 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a) and 28 U. S. C. § 1341, Congress
directed taxpayers to pursue refund suits instead of attempting to
restrain collections. Third-party suits not seeking to stop the collection
(or contest the validity) of a tax imposed on plaintiffs were outside
Congress’ purview. The TIA’s legislative history shows that, in enact-
ing the statute, Congress focused on taxpayers who sought to avoid
paying their state tax bill by pursuing a challenge route other than
the one specified by the taxing authority. Nowhere does the history
announce a sweeping congressional direction to prevent federal-court
interference with all aspects of state tax administration. The foregoing
understanding of the TIA’s purposes and legislative history underpins
this Court’s previous applications of that statute. See, e. g., California
v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S. 393, 408–409. Id., at 410, distin-
guished. Contrary to the Director’s assertion, Arkansas v. Farm
Credit Servs. of Central Ark., 520 U. S. 821; National Private Truck
Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582; Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100; and Rosewell v.
LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U. S. 503, do not hold that state tax administra-
tion matters must be kept entirely free from lower federal-court “inter-
ference.” Like Grace Brethren Church, all of those cases fall within

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91 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
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§ 1341’s undisputed compass: All involved plaintiffs who mounted federal
litigation to avoid paying state taxes (or to gain a refund of such taxes).
Federal-court relief, therefore, would have operated to reduce the flow
of state tax revenue. Those decisions are not fairly portrayed cut loose
from their secure, state-revenue-protective moorings. See, e. g., Grace
Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at 410. This Court has interpreted and
applied the TIA only in cases Congress wrote the statute to address,
i. e., cases in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling
them to avoid paying state taxes. The Court has read harmoniously
the § 1341 instruction conditioning the jurisdictional bar on the availabil-
ity of “a plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in state court. The remedy
inspected in the Court’s decisions was not designed for the universe of
plaintiffs who sue the State, but was tailormade for taxpayers. See,
e. g., id., at 411. Pp. 102–108.
(c) In other federal courts as well, § 1341 has been read to restrain
taxpayers from instituting federal actions to contest their liability for
state taxes, but not to stop third parties from pursuing constitutional
challenges to state tax benefits in a federal forum. Further, numerous
federal-court decisions—including decisions of this Court reviewing
lower federal-court judgments—have reached the merits of third-party
constitutional challenges to tax benefits without mentioning the TIA.
See, e. g., Byrne v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey,
442 U. S. 907; Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U. S.
218. Consistent with the decades-long understanding prevailing on
this issue, respondents’ suit may proceed without any TIA impedi-
ment. Pp. 108–112.
307 F. 3d 1011, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a concur-
ring opinion, post, p. 112. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 113.
Terry Goddard, Attorney General of Arizona, argued the
cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Mary
O’Grady, Solicitor General, Paula S. Bickett, and Joseph
Kanefield, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Deputy Solicitor General Hungar argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant
Attorney General O’Connor, Kent L. Jones, and Kenneth L.
Greene.

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92 HIBBS v. WINN
Opinion of the Court
Marvin S. Cohen argued the cause for respondents. With
him on the brief were Paul Bender and Steven R. Shapiro.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Arizona law authorizes income-tax credits for payments to
organizations that award educational scholarships and tu-
ition grants to children attending private schools. See Ariz.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Cali-
fornia et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel M.
Mederios, State Solicitor General, Andrea Lynn Hoch, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, David S. Chaney, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Randall P. Borcherding, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kristian
D. Whitten, Deputy Attorney General, and Anabelle Rodrı´guez, Secretary
of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-
tive jurisdictions as follows: William H. Pryor, Jr., of Alabama, Gregg D.
Renkes of Alaska, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Ken Salazar of Colorado, M.
Jane Brady of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Thurbert E.
Baker of Georgia, Douglas B. Moylan of Guam, Mark J. Bennett of
Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve
Carter of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisi-
ana, Steven Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Thomas
F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Mike Moore of
Mississippi, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Mon-
tana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Peter W. Heed of New Hampshire, Peter
C. Harvey of New Jersey, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot
Spitzer of New York, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of
Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Patrick
C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence
E. Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of
Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Christine
O. Gregoire of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and
Peggy A. Lautenschlager of Wisconsin; for the Council of State Govern-
ments et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; and for the Honorable
Trent Franks et al. by Benjamin W. Bull.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M.
Shaw, and Norman J. Chachkin.
A brief of amici curiae was filed for Americans United for Separation
of Church and State et al. by Ayesha N. Khan, Elliot M. Mincberg, and
Judith E. Schaeffer.

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Opinion of the Court
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43–1089 (West Supp. 2003). Plaintiffs
below, respondents here, brought an action in federal court
challenging § 43–1089, and seeking to enjoin its operation, on
Establishment Clause grounds. The question presented is
whether the Tax Injunction Act (TIA or Act), 28 U. S. C.
§ 1341, which prohibits a lower federal court from restraining
“the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law,” bars the suit. Plaintiffs-respondents do not contest
their own tax liability. Nor do they seek to impede Arizo-
na’s receipt of tax revenues. Their suit, we hold, is not the
kind § 1341 proscribes.
In decisions spanning a near half century, courts in the
federal system, including this Court, have entertained chal-
lenges to tax credits authorized by state law, without con-
ceiving of § 1341 as a jurisdictional barrier. On this first
occasion squarely to confront the issue, we confirm the au-
thority federal courts exercised in those cases.
It is hardly ancient history that States, once bent on main-
taining racial segregation in public schools, and allocating
resources disproportionately to benefit white students to the
detriment of black students, fastened on tuition grants and
tax credits as a promising means to circumvent Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). The federal
courts, this Court among them, adjudicated the ensuing
challenges, instituted under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and upheld
the Constitution’s equal protection requirement. See, e. g.,
Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U. S. 218,
233 (1964) (faced with unconstitutional closure of county pub-
lic schools and tuition grants and tax credits for contribu-
tions to private segregated schools, District Court could re-
quire county to levy taxes to fund nondiscriminatory public
schools), rev’g 322 F. 2d 332, 343–344 (CA4 1963) (abstention
required until state courts determine validity of grants, tax
credits, and public-school closing), aff ’g Allen v. County
School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 198 F. Supp. 497, 503 (ED
Va. 1961) (county enjoined from paying grants or providing

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94 HIBBS v. WINN
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tax credits to support private schools that exclude students
based on race while public schools remain closed), and aff ’g
207 F. Supp. 349, 355 (ED Va. 1962) (closure of public schools
enjoined). See also Moton v. Lambert, 508 F. Supp. 367, 368
(ND Miss. 1981) (challenge to tax exemptions for racially dis-
criminatory private schools may proceed in federal court).
In the instant case, petitioner Hibbs, Director of Arizona’s
Department of Revenue, argues, in effect, that we and other
federal courts were wrong in those civil-rights cases. The
TIA, petitioner maintains, trumps § 1983; the Act, according
to petitioner, bars all lower federal-court interference with
state tax systems, even when the challengers are not endeav-
oring to avoid a tax imposed on them, and no matter whether
the State’s revenues would be raised or lowered should the
plaintiffs prevail. The alleged jurisdictional bar, which peti-
tioner asserts has existed since the TIA’s enactment in 1937,
was not even imagined by the jurists in the pathmarking
civil-rights cases just cited, or by the defendants in those
cases, litigants with every interest in defeating federal-court
adjudicatory authority. Our prior decisions command no re-
spect, petitioner urges, because they constitute mere “sub
silentio holdings.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 8. We reject
that assessment.
We examine in this opinion both the scope of the term
“assessment” as used in the TIA, and the question whether
the Act was intended to insulate state tax laws from consti-
tutional challenge in lower federal courts even when the suit
would have no negative impact on tax collection. Conclud-
ing that this suit implicates neither § 1341’s conception of
assessment nor any of the statute’s underlying purposes, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Plaintiffs-respondents, Arizona taxpayers, filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43–1089 (West Supp.
2003) as incompatible with the Establishment Clause. Sec-

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tion 43–1089 provides a credit to taxpayers who contribute
money to “school tuition organizations” (STOs). An STO is
a nonprofit organization that directs moneys, in the form of
scholarship grants, to students enrolled in private elemen-
tary or secondary schools. STOs must disburse as scholar-
ship grants at least 90 percent of contributions received, may
allow donors to direct scholarships to individual students,
may not allow donors to name their own dependents, must
designate at least two schools whose students will receive
funds, and must not designate schools that “discriminate on
the basis of race, color, handicap, familial status or national
origin.” See §§ 43–1089(D)–(F). STOs are not precluded
by Arizona’s statute from designating schools that provide
religious instruction or that give admissions preference on
the basis of religion or religious affiliation. When taxpayers
donate money to a qualified STO, § 43–1089 allows them, in
calculating their Arizona tax liability, to credit up to $500 of
their donation (or $625 for a married couple filing jointly,
§ 43–1089(A)(2)).
In effect, § 43–1089 gives Arizona taxpayers an election.
They may direct $500 (or, for joint-return filers, $625) to an
STO, or to the Arizona Department of Revenue. As long as
donors do not give STOs more than their total tax liability,
their $500 or $625 contributions are costless.
The Arizona Supreme Court, by a 3-to-2 vote, rejected a
facial challenge to § 43–1089 before the statute went into ef-
fect. Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P. 2d 606
(1999) (en banc). That case took the form of a special discre-
tionary action invoking the court’s original jurisdiction. See
id., at 277, 972 P. 2d, at 610. Kotterman, it is undisputed,
has no preclusive effect on the instant as-applied challenge
to § 43–1089 brought by different plaintiffs.
Respondents’ federal-court complaint against the Director
of Arizona’s Department of Revenue (Director) alleged that
§ 43–1089 “authorizes the formation of agencies that have as
their sole purpose the distribution of State funds to children
of a particular religious denomination or to children attend-

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ing schools of a particular religious denomination.” Com-
plaint ¶ 13, App. 10. Respondents sought injunctive and de-
claratory relief, and an order requiring STOs to pay funds
still in their possession “into the state general fund.” Id.,
at 7–8, App. 15.
The Director moved to dismiss the action, relying on the
TIA, which reads in its entirety:
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain
the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be
had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341.
The Director did not assert that a federal-court order enjoin-
ing § 43–1089 would interfere with the State’s tax levy or
collection efforts. He urged only that a federal injunction
would restrain the “assessment” of taxes “under State law.”
Agreeing with the Director, the District Court held that the
TIA required dismissal of the suit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that “a federal action challenging the granting of a state
tax credit is not prohibited by the [TIA].” Winn v. Killian,
307 F. 3d 1011, 1017 (2002). Far from “adversely affect[ing]
the state’s ability to raise revenue,” the Court of Appeals
observed, “the relief requested by [respondents] . . . would
result in the state’s receiving more funds that could be used
for the public benefit.” Id., at 1017, 1018. We granted cer-
tiorari, 539 U. S. 986 (2003), in view of the division of opinion
on whether the TIA bars constitutional challenges to state
tax credits in federal court. Compare 307 F. 3d, at 1017,
with ACLU Foundation v. Bridges, 334 F. 3d 416, 421–423
(CA5 2003) (TIA bars federal action seeking to have any part
of a State’s tax system declared unconstitutional). We now
affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
II
Before reaching the merits of this case, we must address
respondents’ contention that the Director’s petition for cer-

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tiorari was jurisdictionally untimely under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2101(c) and our Rules. See Brief in Opposition 8–13. Sec-
tion 2101(c) instructs that a petition for certiorari must be
filed “within ninety days after the entry of . . . judgment.”
This Court’s Rule 13.3 elaborates:
“The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs
from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought
to be reviewed, and not from the issuance date of the
mandate (or its equivalent under local practice). But if
a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court
by any party, the time to file the petition for a writ of
certiorari for all parties (whether or not they requested
rehearing or joined in the petition for rehearing) runs
from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing
or, if the petition for rehearing is granted, the subse-
quent entry of judgment.”
Respondents assert that the Director’s petition missed the
Rule’s deadlines: More than 90 days elapsed between the
date the Court of Appeals first entered judgment and the
date the petition was filed, rendering the filing untimely
under the first sentence of the Rule; and because no party
petitioned for rehearing, the extended periods prescribed by
the Rule’s second sentence never came into play.
This case, however, did not follow the typical course. The
Court of Appeals, on its own motion, recalled its mandate
and ordered the parties to brief the question whether the
case should be reheard en banc. That order, we conclude,
suspended the judgment’s finality under § 2101(c), just as a
timely filed rehearing petition would, or a court’s appropriate
decision to consider a late-filed rehearing petition. Com-
pare Young v. Harper, 520 U. S. 143, 147, n. 1 (1997) (appeals
court agreed to consider a late-filed rehearing petition; time-
liness of petition for certiorari measured from date court dis-
posed of rehearing petition), with Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U. S. 33, 49 (1990) (“The time for applying for certiorari will

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not be tolled when it appears that the lower court granted
rehearing or amended its order solely for the purpose of ex-
tending that time.”).
A timely rehearing petition, a court’s appropriate decision
to entertain an untimely rehearing petition, and a court’s
direction, on its own initiative, that the parties address
whether rehearing should be ordered share this key charac-
teristic: All three raise the question whether the court will
modify the judgment and alter the parties’ rights. See id.,
at 46 (“A timely petition for rehearing . . . operates to sus-
pend the finality of the . . . court’s judgment, pending the
court’s further determination whether the judgment should
be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights of the
parties” (quoting Department of Banking of Neb. v. Pink,
317 U. S. 264, 266 (1942) (per curiam); alterations in origi-
nal)). In other words, “while [a] petition for rehearing is
pending,” or while the court is considering, on its own initia-
tive, whether rehearing should be ordered, “there is no
‘judgment’ to be reviewed.” Jenkins, 495 U. S., at 46.
In this light, we hold that the Director’s petition for a writ
of certiorari was timely. When the Court of Appeals or-
dered briefing on the rehearing issue, 90 days had not yet
passed from the issuance of the panel opinion. Because
§ 2101(c)’s 90-day limit had not yet expired, the clock could
still be reset by an order that left unresolved whether
the court would modify its judgment. The court-initiated
briefing order had just that effect. Because a genuinely
final judgment is critical under the statute, we must treat
the date of the court’s order denying rehearing en banc as
the date judgment was entered. The petition was filed
within 90 days of that date and was thus timely under the
statute.
Were we to read Rule 13 as our sole guide, so that only a
rehearing petition filed by a party could reset the statute’s
90-day count, we would lose sight of the congressional objec-
tive underpinning § 2101(c): An appellate court’s final adjudi-

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cation, Congress indicated, marks the time from which the
period allowed for a certiorari petition begins to run. The
statute takes priority over the “procedural rules adopted
by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business.”
Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 64 (1970). When
court-created rules fail to anticipate unusual circumstances
that fit securely within a federal statute’s compass, the
statute controls our decision. See, e. g., Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U. S. 443, 453 (2004) (“ ‘[I]t is axiomatic’ that [court-
prescribed procedural rules] ‘do not create or withdraw fed-
eral jurisdiction.’ ” (quoting Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U. S. 365, 370 (1978))). Because the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was timely under § 2101(c), we
have jurisdiction to decide whether the TIA bars respond-
ents’ suit.
III
To determine whether this litigation falls within the TIA’s
prohibition, it is appropriate, first, to identify the relief
sought. Respondents seek prospective relief only. Spe-
cifically, their complaint requests “injunctive relief prohibit-
ing [the Director] from allowing taxpayers to utilize the tax
credit authorized by A. R. S. § 43–1089 for payments made
to STOs that make tuition grants to children attending reli-
gious schools, to children attending schools of only one reli-
gious denomination, or to children selected on the basis of
their religion.” Complaint 7, App. 15. Respondents fur-
ther ask for a “declaration that A. R. S. § 43–1089, on its
face and as applied,” violates the Establishment Clause “by
affirmatively authorizing STOs to use State income-tax reve-
nues to pay tuition for students attending religious schools
or schools that discriminate on the basis of religion.” Ibid.
Finally, respondents seek “[a]n order that [the Director] in-
form all [such] STOs that . . . all funds in their possession as
of the date of this Court’s order must be paid into the state
general fund.” Complaint 7–8, App. 15. Taking account of
the prospective nature of the relief requested, does respond-

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ents’ suit, in 28 U. S. C. § 1341’s words, seek to “enjoin, sus-
pend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law”? The answer to that question turns on the
meaning of the term “assessment” as employed in the TIA.1
As used in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), the term
“assessment” involves a “recording” of the amount the tax-
payer owes the Government. 26 U. S. C. § 6203. The “as-
sessment” is “essentially a bookkeeping notation.” Laing
v. United States, 423 U. S. 161, 170, n. 13 (1976). Section
6201(a) of the IRC authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
“to make . . . assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this
title.” An assessment is made “by recording the liability of
the taxpayer in the office of the Secretary in accordance with
rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” § 6203.2
See also M. Saltzman, IRS Practice and Procedure ¶ 10.02,
pp. 10–4 to 10–7 (2d ed. 1991) (when Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) signs “summary list” of assessment to record
amount of tax liability, “the official act of assessment has
occurred for purposes of the Code”).3
1 State taxation, for § 1341 purposes, includes local taxation. See 17
C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4237,
pp. 643–644 (2d ed. 1988) (“Local taxes are imposed under authority of
state law and the courts have held that the Tax Injunction Act applies to
them.”); R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1173 (5th ed. 2003) (“For purposes
of the Act, local taxes have uniformly been held to be collected ‘under
State law.’ ”).
2 Section 301.6203–1 of the Treasury Regulations states that an assess-
ment is accomplished by the “assessment officer signing the summary rec-
ord of assessment,” which, “through supporting records,” provides “identi-
fication of the taxpayer, the character of the liability assessed, the taxable
period, if applicable, and the amount of the assessment. ” 26 CFR
§ 301.6203–1 (2003).
3 The term “assessment” is used in a variety of ways in tax law. In the
property-tax setting, the word usually refers to the process by which the
taxing authority assigns a taxable value to real or personal property.
See, e. g., F. Schoettle, State and Local Taxation: The Law and Policy of
Multi-Jurisdictional Taxation 799 (2003) (“ASSESSMENT—The process of

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We do not focus on the word “assessment” in isolation,
however. Instead, we follow “the cardinal rule that statu-
tory language must be read in context [since] a phrase gath-
ers meaning from the words around it.” General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 596 (2004) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In § 1341 and tax law gener-
ally, an assessment is closely tied to the collection of a tax,
i. e., the assessment is the official recording of liability that
triggers levy and collection efforts.
The rule against superfluities complements the principle
that courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.
See 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 46.06, pp. 181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000) (“A statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that
no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignifi-
cant . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). If, as the Director asserts,
the term “assessment,” by itself, signified “[t]he entire plan
or scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing,” Brief for Peti-
tioner 12 (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary
of the English Language 166 (2d ed. 1934)), the TIA would
not need the words “levy” or “collection”; the term “assess-
ment,” alone, would do all the necessary work.
putting a value on real or personal property for purposes of a tax to be
measured as a percentage of property values. The valuation is ordinarily
done by a government official, the ‘assessor’ or ‘tax assessor,’ who will
sometimes hire a private professional to do the actual valuations.”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 112 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “assessment” as, inter
alia: “Official valuation of property for purposes of taxation <assessment
of the beach house>.—Also termed tax assessment. Cf. appraisal.”).
See also 5 R. Powell, Real Property § 39.02 (M. Wolf ed. 2000). To calcu-
late the amount of property taxes owed, the tax assessor multiplies the
assessed value by the appropriate tax rate. See, e. g., R. Werner, Real
Estate Law 534 (11th ed. 2002). Income taxes, by contrast, are typically
self-assessed in the United States. As anyone who has filed a tax return
is unlikely to forget, the taxpayer, not the taxing authority, is the first
party to make the relevant calculation of income taxes owed. The word
“self-assessment,” however, is not a technical term; as IRC § 6201(a) indi-
cates, the IRS executes the formal act of income-tax assessment.

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Earlier this Term, in United States v. Galletti, 541 U. S.
114 (2004), the Government identified “two important conse-
quences” that follow from the IRS’ timely tax assessment:
“[T]he IRS may employ administrative enforcement methods
such as tax liens and levies to collect the outstanding tax,”
see 26 U. S. C. §§ 6321–6327, 6331–6344; and “the time within
which the IRS may collect the tax either administratively or
by a ‘proceeding in court’ is extended [from 3 years] to 10
years after the date of assessment,” see §§ 6501(a), 6502(a).
Brief for United States in United States v. Galletti, O. T.
2003, No. 02–1389, pp. 15–16. The Government thus made
clear in briefing Galletti that, under the IRC definition, the
tax “assessment” serves as the trigger for levy and collection
efforts. The Government did not describe the term as syn-
onymous with the entire plan of taxation. Nor did it disas-
sociate the word “assessment” from the company (“levy or
collection”) that word keeps.4 Instead, and in accord with
our understanding, the Government related “assessment” to
the term’s collection-propelling function.
IV
Congress modeled § 1341 upon earlier federal “statutes of
similar import,” laws that, in turn, paralleled state provi-
sions proscribing “actions in State courts to enjoin the collec-
tion of State and county taxes.” S. Rep. No. 1035, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1937) (hereinafter S. Rep.). In compos-
ing the TIA’s text, Congress drew particularly on an 1867
measure, sometimes called the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA),
which bars “any court” from entertaining a suit brought “for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any [federal] tax.” Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat.
4 The dissent is of two minds in this regard. On the one hand, it twice
suggests that a proper definition of the term “assessment,” for § 1341 pur-
poses, is “the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing.”
Post, at 117. On the other hand, the dissent would disconnect the word
from the enforcement process (“levy or collection”) that “assessment” sets
in motion. See post, at 117–119.

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475, now codified at 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). See Jefferson
County v. Acker, 527 U. S. 423, 434–435 (1999). While
§ 7421(a) “apparently has no recorded legislative history,”
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725, 736 (1974), the
Court has recognized, from the AIA’s text, that the measure
serves twin purposes: It responds to “the Government’s need
to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with
a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference”; and it
“ ‘require[s] that the legal right to the disputed sums be de-
termined in a suit for refund,’ ” ibid. (quoting Enochs v. Wil-
liams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U. S. 1, 7 (1962)).5 Lower
federal courts have similarly comprehended § 7421(a). See,
e. g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453–454 (DC
1972) (three-judge court) (§ 7421(a) does not bar action seek-
ing to enjoin income-tax exemptions to fraternal orders that
exclude nonwhites from membership, for in such an action,
plaintiff “does not contest the amount of his own tax, nor
does he seek to limit the amount of tax revenue collectible
by the United States” (footnote omitted)); Tax Analysts and
Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 892 (DC 1974) (Section
7421(a) does not bar challenge to IRS revenue ruling allow-
ing contributors to political candidate committees to avoid
federal gift tax on contributions in excess of $3,000 ceiling;
while § 7421(a) “precludes suits to restrain the assessment or
collection of taxes,” the proscription does not apply when
“plaintiffs seek not to restrain the Commissioner from col-
lecting taxes, but rather to require him to collect additional
taxes according to the mandates of the law.” (emphases in
original)).6
5 That Congress had in mind challenges to assessments triggering collec-
tions, i. e., attempts to prevent the collection of revenue, is borne out by
the final clause of 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a), added in 1966: “whether or not such
person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” (Emphasis
added.)
6 The dissent incorrectly ranks South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U. S.
367 (1984), with McGlotten and Tax Analysts and Advocates. Post,
at 120–121. See also post, at 122. The latter decisions, as the text notes,
did not seek to stop the collection of taxes. In contrast, in South Caro-

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Just as the AIA shields federal tax collections from
federal-court injunctions, so the TIA shields state tax collec-
tions from federal-court restraints. In both 26 U. S. C.
§ 7421(a) and 28 U. S. C. § 1341, Congress directed taxpayers
to pursue refund suits instead of attempting to restrain col-
lections. Third-party suits not seeking to stop the collection
(or contest the validity) of a tax imposed on plaintiffs, as
McGlotten, 338 F. Supp., at 453–454, and Tax Analysts, 376
F. Supp., at 892, explained, were outside Congress’ purview.
The TIA’s legislative history is not silent in this regard.
The Act was designed expressly to restrict “the jurisdiction
of the district courts of the United States over suits relating
to the collection of State taxes.” S. Rep., p. 1.
Specifically, the Senate Report commented that the Act
had two closely related, state-revenue-protective objectives:
(1) to eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could
seek injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state
corporations asserting diversity jurisdiction—and taxpayers
with recourse only to state courts, which generally required
taxpayers to pay first and litigate later; and (2) to stop tax-
payers, with the aid of a federal injunction, from withholding
large sums, thereby disrupting state government finances.
Id., at 1–2; see R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1173
(5th ed. 2003) (citing Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450
U. S. 503, 522–523, and nn. 28–29, 527 (1981)). See also Jef-
ferson County, 527 U. S., at 435 (observing that the TIA was
“shaped by state and federal provisions barring anticipatory
actions by taxpayers to stop the tax collector from initiating
collection proceedings”). In short, in enacting the TIA,
lina v. Regan, the State’s suit aimed to reduce federal revenue receipts:
South Carolina sought to enjoin as a violation of its Tenth Amendment
rights not “a federal tax exemption,” post, at 120, but federal income taxa-
tion of the interest on certain state-issued bonds. The Court held in that
unique suit that § 7421(a) did not bar this Court’s exercise of original juris-
diction over the case. 465 U. S., at 381.

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Congress trained its attention on taxpayers who sought to
avoid paying their tax bill by pursuing a challenge route
other than the one specified by the taxing authority. No-
where does the legislative history announce a sweeping con-
gressional direction to prevent “federal-court interference
with all aspects of state tax administration.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 20; post, at 123.7
The understanding of the Act’s purposes and legislative
history set out above underpins this Court’s previous ap-
plications of the TIA. In California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U. S. 393 (1982), for example, we recognized that
the principal purpose of the TIA was to “limit drastically”
federal-court interference with “the collection of [state]
taxes.” Id., at 408–409 (quoting Rosewell, 450 U. S., at 522).
True, the Court referred to the disruption of “state tax ad-
ministration,” but it did so specifically in relation to “the
collection of revenue.” 457 U. S., at 410 (quoting Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)). The complainants in
Grace Brethren Church were several California churches and
religious schools. They sought federal-court relief from an
unemployment compensation tax that state law imposed on
them. 457 U. S., at 398. Their federal action, which by-
passed state remedies, was exactly what the TIA was de-
signed to ward off. The Director and the dissent endeavor
to reconstruct Grace Brethren Church as precedent for the
proposition that the TIA totally immunizes from lower
federal-court review “all aspects of state tax administration,
7 The language of the TIA differs significantly from that of the Johnson
Act, which provides in part: “The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the operation of, or compliance with,” public-utility rate or-
ders made by state regulatory bodies. 28 U. S. C. § 1342 (emphasis
added). The TIA does not prohibit interference with “the operation of,
or compliance with,” state tax laws; rather, § 1341 proscribes interference
only with those aspects of state tax regimes that are needed to produce
revenue—i. e., assessment, levy, and collection.

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and not just interference with the collection of revenue.”
Brief for Petitioner 20; see post, at 123–124. The endeavor
is unavailing given the issue before the Court in Grace
Brethren Church and the context in which the words “state
tax administration” appear.
The Director invokes several other decisions alleged to
keep matters of “state tax administration” entirely free from
lower federal-court “interference.” Brief for Petitioner
17–21; accord post, at 124–125. Like Grace Brethren
Church, all of them fall within § 1341’s undisputed compass:
All involved plaintiffs who mounted federal litigation to
avoid paying state taxes (or to gain a refund of such taxes).
Federal-court relief, therefore, would have operated to re-
duce the flow of state tax revenue. See Arkansas v. Farm
Credit Servs. of Central Ark., 520 U. S. 821, 824 (1997) (cor-
porations chartered under federal law claimed exemption
from Arkansas sales and income taxation); National Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582,
584 (1995) (action seeking to prevent Oklahoma from collect-
ing taxes State imposed on nonresident motor carriers); Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S.
100, 105–106 (1981) (taxpayers, alleging unequal taxation of
real property, sought, inter alia, damages measured by al-
leged tax overassessments); Rosewell, 450 U. S., at 510 (state
taxpayer, alleging her property was inequitably assessed, re-
fused to pay state taxes). 8
Our prior decisions are not fairly portrayed cut loose from
their secure, state-revenue-protective moorings. See, e. g.,
8 Petitioner urges, and the dissent agrees, that the TIA safeguards an-
other vital state interest: the authority of state courts to determine what
state law means. Brief for Petitioner 21; post, at 125. Respondents,
however, have not asked the District Court to interpret any state law—
there is no disagreement as to the meaning of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43–
1089 (West Supp. 2003), only about whether, as applied, the State’s law
violates the Federal Constitution. See supra, at 94–95. That is a ques-
tion federal courts are no doubt equipped to adjudicate.

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Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at 410 (“If federal declara-
tory relief were available to test state tax assessments, state
tax administration might be thrown into disarray, and tax-
payers might escape the ordinary procedural requirements
imposed by state law. During the pendency of the federal
suit the collection of revenue under the challenged law
might be obstructed, with consequent damage to the State’s
budget, and perhaps a shift to the State of the risk of tax-
payer insolvency.” (quoting Ledesma, 401 U. S., at 128, n. 17
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); em-
phases added)); Rosewell, 450 U. S., at 527–528 (“The com-
pelling nature of these considerations [identified by Justice
Brennan in Perez] is underscored by the dependency of state
budgets on the receipt of local tax revenues. . . . We may
readily appreciate the difficulties encountered by the county
should a substantial portion of its rightful tax revenue be
tied up in injunction actions.”).9
In sum, this Court has interpreted and applied the TIA
only in cases Congress wrote the Act to address, i. e., cases
in which state taxpayers seek federal-court orders enabling
them to avoid paying state taxes. See supra, at 105–106.
We have read harmoniously the § 1341 instruction condition-
ing the jurisdictional bar on the availability of “a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy” in state court. The remedy
inspected in our decisions was not one designed for the uni-
verse of plaintiffs who sue the State. Rather, it was a rem-
edy tailormade for taxpayers. See, e. g., Rosewell, 450
U. S., at 528 (“Illinois’ legal remedy that provides property
9 We note, furthermore, that this Court has relied upon “principles of
comity,” Brief for Petitioner 26, to preclude original federal-court jurisdic-
tion only when plaintiffs have sought district-court aid in order to arrest
or countermand state tax collection. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 107–108 (1981) (Missouri taxpayers
sought damages for increased taxes caused by alleged overassessments);
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 296–299 (1943)
(plaintiffs challenged Louisiana’s unemployment compensation tax).

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108 HIBBS v. WINN
Opinion of the Court
owners paying property taxes under protest a refund with-
out interest in two years is a ‘plain, speedy and efficient rem-
edy’ under the [TIA]”); Grace Brethren Church, 457 U. S., at
411 (“[A] state-court remedy is ‘plain, speedy and efficient’
only if it ‘provides the taxpayer with a “full hearing and judi-
cial determination” at which she may raise any and all consti-
tutional objections to the tax.’ ” (quoting Rosewell, 450 U. S.,
at 514)).10
V
In other federal courts as well, § 1341 has been read to
restrain state taxpayers from instituting federal actions to
contest their liability for state taxes, but not to stop third
parties from pursuing constitutional challenges to tax bene-
fits in a federal forum. Relevant to the distinction between
taxpayer claims that would reduce state revenues and third-
party claims that would enlarge state receipts, Seventh Cir-
cuit Judge Easterbrook wrote trenchantly:
“Although the district court concluded that § 1341 ap-
plies to any federal litigation touching on the subject of
state taxes, neither the language nor the legislative his-
tory of the statute supports this interpretation. The
text of § 1341 does not suggest that federal courts should
tread lightly in issuing orders that might allow local gov-
ernments to raise additional taxes. The legislative his-
tory . . . shows that § 1341 is designed to ensure that
federal courts do not interfere with states’ collection of
taxes, so long as the taxpayers have an opportunity to
present to a court federal defenses to the imposition and
collection of the taxes. The legislative history is filled
with concern that federal judgments were emptying
10 Far from “ignor[ing]” the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” proviso,
as the dissent charges, post, at 121, we agree that this “codified exception”
is key to a proper understanding of the Act. The statute requires the
State to provide taxpayers with a swift and certain remedy when they
resist tax collections. An action dependent on a court’s discretion, for ex-
ample, would not qualify as a fitting taxpayer’s remedy. Cf. supra, at 96.

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state coffers and that corporations with access to the
diversity jurisdiction could obtain remedies unavailable
to resident taxpayers. There was no articulated con-
cern about federal courts’ flogging state and local gov-
ernments to collect additional taxes.” Dunn v. Carey,
808 F. 2d 555, 558 (1986) (emphasis added).
Second Circuit Judge Friendly earlier expressed a similar
view of § 1341:
“The [TIA’s] context and the legislative history . . . lead
us to conclude that, in speaking of ‘collection,’ Congress
was referring to methods similar to assessment and levy,
e. g., distress or execution . . . that would produce money
or other property directly, rather than indirectly
through a more general use of coercive power. Con-
gress was thinking of cases where taxpayers were re-
peatedly using the federal courts to raise questions of
state or federal law going to the validity of the particu-
lar taxes imposed upon them . . . .” Wells v. Malloy,
510 F. 2d 74, 77 (1975) (emphasis added).
See also In re Jackson County, 834 F. 2d 150, 151–152 (CA8
1987) (observing that Ҥ 1341 has been held to be inapplicable
to efforts to require collection of additional taxes, as opposed
to efforts to inhibit the collection of taxes”).11
11 In conflict with sister Circuits, and at odds with its own prior opinions,
the Fifth Circuit, in ACLU Foundation v. Bridges, 334 F. 3d 416 (2003),
recently construed the TIA in the way the Director does here. Bridges
involved a challenge to tax exemptions for religious activities in several
Louisiana statutes. The District Court, in line with earlier Fifth Circuit
decisions, held that the TIA did not apply because the plaintiff was not
seeking to restrain the “assessment, levy or collection” of state taxes, but
to eliminate allegedly unconstitutional tax exemptions. Reversing, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that the TIA bars any federal suit seeking to have any
portion of a State’s tax system declared unconstitutional. Id., at 421–423.
The Director and the United States refer to four other federal-court
decisions lending some support for their view that, for § 1341 purposes, no
line should be drawn between challenges that would reduce revenues and

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Further, numerous federal-court decisions—including de-
cisions of this Court reviewing lower federal-court judg-
ments—have reached the merits of third-party constitutional
challenges to tax benefits without mentioning the TIA. See,
e. g., Byrne v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jer-
sey, 442 U. S. 907 (1979), summarily aff ’g 590 F. 2d 514 (CA3
1979) (state tax deduction for taxpayers with children at-
tending nonpublic schools violates Establishment Clause),
aff ’g 444 F. Supp. 1228 (NJ 1978); Franchise Tax Board of
California v. United Americans for Public Schools, 419
attacks that might augment collections. See Reply Brief for Petitioner
8–9 (citing Kraebel v. New York City Dept. of Housing Preservation and
Development, 959 F. 2d 395 (CA2 1992); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins,
921 F. 2d 1237 (CA11 1991); In re Gillis, 836 F. 2d 1001 (CA6 1988); United
States Brewers Assn., Inc. v. Perez, 592 F. 2d 1212 (CA1 1979)). See also
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14–15. In two of the cases,
taxpayers were seeking relief aimed at lightening their own tax burdens.
Kraebel held that § 1341 barred a taxpayer’s constitutional challenge to a
property-tax exemption and abatement scheme. 959 F. 2d, at 400. Colo-
nial Pipeline held that a taxpayer’s suit seeking a court-ordered redistri-
bution of Georgia’s ad valorem tax system, which might have reduced
plaintiff ’s tax bill, implicated § 1341’s jurisdictional bar. 921 F. 2d, at 1243.
The court did observe, broadly: “[The] requested relief, if granted, . . .
would clearly conflict with the principle underlying the [TIA] that the
federal courts should generally avoid interfering with the sensitive and
peculiarly local concerns surrounding state taxation schemes.” Id., at
1242.
Gillis, unlike Kraebel and Colonial Pipeline, was a third-party action.
The court declined to decide “[w]hether the [TIA] actually does bar the
availability of such relief,” but noted that a suit seeking to enhance state
revenues may nonetheless fall within § 1341’s bar because “the Act is not,
by its own language, limited to the collection of taxes.” 836 F. 2d, at 1005
(emphasis in original). Finally, Perez concerned the Butler Act, 48
U. S. C. § 872, a TIA analog applicable to Puerto Rico. Ordering dismissal
of the case for want of jurisdiction, the court rested its decision not on
statutory construction, but on “underl[ying]” comity concerns, stating:
“[A]n order of a federal court requiring Commonwealth officials to collect
taxes which its legislature has not seen fit to impose on its citizens strikes
us as a particularly inappropriate involvement in a state’s management of
its fiscal operations.” 592 F. 2d, at 1214–1215.

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U. S. 890 (1974) (summarily affirming district-court judgment
striking down state statute that provided income-tax reduc-
tions for taxpayers sending children to nonpublic schools);
Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U. S. 756 (1973) (state tax benefits for parents of children
attending nonpublic schools violates Establishment Clause),
rev’g in relevant part 350 F. Supp. 655 (SDNY 1972) (three-
judge court); Grit v. Wolman, 413 U. S. 901 (1973), sum-
marily aff ’g Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744, 755–756
(SD Ohio 1972) (three-judge court) (state tax credits for ex-
penses relating to children’s enrollment in nonpublic schools
violate Establishment Clause); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F. 2d
1158 (CA4 1990) (state statute exempting Christian Bibles,
but not holy books of other religions or other books, from
state tax violates Establishment Clause); Luthens v. Bair,
788 F. Supp. 1032 (SD Iowa 1992) (state law authorizing tax
benefit for tuition payments and textbook purchases does not
violate Establishment Clause); Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (Minn. 1978) (three-
judge court) (state law allowing parents of public or private
school students to claim part of tuition and transportation
expenses as tax deduction does not violate Establishment
Clause).12
* * *
In a procession of cases not rationally distinguishable from
this one, no Justice or member of the bar of this Court ever
raised a § 1341 objection that, according to the petitioner in
12 In school desegregation cases, as a last resort, federal courts have
asserted authority to direct the imposition of, or increase in, local tax
levies, even in amounts exceeding the ceiling set by state law. See Mis-
souri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 57 (1990); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F. 2d
1294, 1320 (CA8 1984) (en banc); cf. Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward
Cty., 377 U. S. 218, 233 (1964). Controversial as such a measure may be,
see Jenkins, 495 U. S., at 65–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment), it is noteworthy that § 1341 was not raised in those
cases by counsel, lower courts, or this Court on its own motion.

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112 HIBBS v. WINN
Stevens, J., concurring
this case, should have caused us to order dismissal of the
action for want of jurisdiction. See Mueller v. Allen, 463
U. S. 388 (1983) (state tax deduction for parents who send
their children to parochial schools does not violate Establish-
ment Clause); Byrne, 442 U. S. 907; United Americans for
Public Schools, 419 U. S. 890; Committee for Public Ed. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 756; Wolman, 413 U. S. 901;
Griffin, 377 U. S. 218. Consistent with the decades-long un-
derstanding prevailing on this issue, respondents’ suit may
proceed without any TIA impediment.13
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens, concurring.
In Part IV of his dissent, Justice Kennedy observes that
“years of unexamined habit by litigants and the courts” do
not lessen this Court’s obligation correctly to interpret a
statute. Post, at 126. It merits emphasis, however, that
prolonged congressional silence in response to a settled in-
terpretation of a federal statute provides powerful support
for maintaining the status quo. In statutory matters, judi-
cial restraint strongly counsels waiting for Congress to take
the initiative in modifying rules on which judges and liti-
gants have relied. See BedRoc Limited, LLC v. United
States, 541 U. S. 176, 192 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund,
513 U. S. 88, 100–105 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Com-
missioner v. Fink, 483 U. S. 89, 101–103 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 189–192
13 In confirming that cases of this order may be brought in federal court,
we do not suggest that “state courts are second rate constitutional arbi-
ters.” Post, at 113. Instead, we underscore that adjudications of great
moment discerning no § 1341 barrier, see supra, at 93–94, cannot be writ-
ten off as reflecting nothing more than “unexamined custom,” post, at 114,
or unthinking “habit,” post, at 126.

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113 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). In a contest between the
dictionary and the doctrine of stare decisis, the latter clearly
wins. The Court’s fine opinion, which I join without reser-
vation, is consistent with these views.
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
In this case, the Court shows great skepticism for the state
courts’ ability to vindicate constitutional wrongs. Two
points make clear that the Court treats States as diminished
and disfavored powers, rather than merely applies statutory
text. First, the Court’s analysis of the Tax Injunction Act
(TIA or Act), 28 U. S. C. § 1341, contrasts with a literal read-
ing of its terms. Second, the Court’s assertion that legisla-
tive histories support the conclusion that “[t]hird-party suits
not seeking to stop the collection (or contest the validity) of
a tax imposed on plaintiffs . . . were outside Congress’ pur-
view” in enacting the TIA and the anti-injunction provision
on which the TIA was modeled, ante, at 104, is not borne out
by those sources, as previously recognized by the Court. In
light of these points, today’s holding should probably be at-
tributed to the concern the Court candidly shows animates
it. See ante, at 93 (noting it was the federal courts that
“upheld the Constitution’s equal protection requirement”
when States circumvented Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483 (1954), by manipulating their tax laws). The
concern, it seems, is that state courts are second rate con-
stitutional arbiters, unequal to their federal counterparts.
State courts are due more respect than this. Dismissive
treatment of state courts is particularly unjustified since the
TIA, by express terms, provides a federal safeguard: The
Act lifts its bar on federal-court intervention when state
courts fail to provide “a plain, speedy, and efficient rem-
edy.” § 1341.
In view of the TIA’s text, the congressional judgment that
state courts are qualified constitutional arbiters, and the re-

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114 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
spect state courts deserve, I disagree with the majority’s
superseding the balance the Act strikes between federal- and
state-court adjudication. I agree with the majority that the
petition for certiorari was timely under 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c),
see ante, at 96–99, and so submit this respectful dissent on
the merits of the decision.
I
Today is the first time the Court has considered whether
the TIA bars federal district courts from granting injunctive
relief that would prevent States from giving citizens statuto-
rily mandated state tax credits. There are cases, some dat-
ing back almost 50 years, which proceeded as if the jurisdic-
tional bar did not apply to tax credit challenges; but some
more recent decisions have said the bar is applicable. Com-
pare, e. g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Committee
for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756
(1973); Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U. S.
218 (1964), with, e. g., ACLU Foundation of La. v. Bridges,
334 F. 3d 416 (CA5 2003); In re Gillis, 836 F. 2d 1001 (CA6
1988). While unexamined custom favors the first position,
the statutory text favors the latter. In these circumstances
a careful explanation for the conclusion is necessary; but in
the end the scope and purpose of the Act should be under-
stood from its terms alone.
The question presented—whether the TIA bars the Dis-
trict Court from granting injunctive relief against the tax
credit—requires two inquiries. First, the term assessment,
as used in § 1341, must be defined. Second, we must deter-
mine if an injunction prohibiting the Director of Arizona’s
Department of Revenue (Director) from allowing the credit
would enjoin, suspend, or restrain an assessment.
The word assessment in the TIA is not isolated from its
use in another federal statute. The TIA was modeled on
the anti-injunction provision of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code), 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a). See Jefferson County v. Acker,
527 U. S. 423, 434 (1999). That provision specifies, and has

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115 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
specified since 1867, that federal courts may not restrain or
enjoin an “assessment or collection of any [federal] tax.” 26
U. S. C. § 7421(a) (first codified by Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169,
§ 10, 14 Stat. 475). The meaning of the term assessment in
this Code provision is discernible by reference to other Code
sections. 26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
Chapter 63 of Title 26 addresses the subject of assess-
ments and sheds light on the meaning of the term in
the Code. Section 6201 first instructs that “[t]he Secre-
tary [of the Internal Revenue Service] is . . . required to
make the . . . assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by this
title . . . .” 26 U. S. C. § 6201(a). Further it provides, “[t]he
Secretary shall assess all taxes determined by the taxpayer
or by the Secretary . . . .” § 6201(a)(1). Section 6203 in
turn sets forth a method for making an assessment: “The
assessment shall be made by recording the liability of the
taxpayer in the office of the Secretary.”
Taken together, the provisions of Title 26 establish that an
assessment, as that term is used in § 7421(a), must at the
least encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax
liability. This is what the taxpayer owes the Government.
See also Laing v. United States, 423 U. S. 161, 170, n. 13
(1976) (“The ‘assessment,’ essentially a bookkeeping nota-
tion, is made when the Secretary or his delegate establishes
an account against the taxpayer on the tax rolls”). Whether
the Secretary or his delegate (today, the Commissioner)
makes the recording on the basis of a taxpayer’s self-
reported filing form or instead chooses to rely on his own
calculation of the taxpayer’s liability (e. g., via an audit) is
irrelevant. The recording of the liability on the Govern-
ment’s tax rolls is itself an assessment.
The TIA was modeled on the anti-injunction provision, see
Jefferson County, supra; it incorporates the same terminol-
ogy employed by the provision; and it employs that terminol-
ogy for the same purpose. It is sensible, then, to interpret
the TIA’s terms by reference to the Code’s use of the term.

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116 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here, as
here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated
law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute”). The
Court of Appeals, which concluded that an assessment was
the official estimate of the value of income or property used
to calculate a tax or the imposition of a tax on someone,
Winn v. Killian, 307 F. 3d 1011, 1015 (CA9 2002), placed prin-
cipal reliance for its interpretation on a dictionary definition.
That was not entirely misplaced; but unless the definition is
considered in the context of the prior statute, the advantage
of that statute’s interpretive guidance is lost.
Furthermore, the court defined the term in an unusual
way. It relied on a dictionary that was unavailable when
the TIA was enacted; it relied not on the definition of the
term under consideration, “assessment,” but on the definition
of the term’s related verb form, “assess”; and it examined
only a portion of that term’s definition. In the dictionary
used by the Court of Appeals, the verb is defined in two
ways not noted by the court. One of the alternative defini-
tions is quite relevant—“(2) to fix or determine the amount
of (damages, a tax, a fine, etc.).” Compare ibid. with Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language 90 (1979).
Further:
“Had [the panel] looked in a different lay dictionary, [it]
would have found a definition contrary to the one it pre-
ferred, such as ‘the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for
charging or taxing.’ . . . Had the panel considered tax
treatises and law dictionaries . . . it would have found
much in accord with this broader definition. . . . Even
the federal income tax code supports a broad reading of
‘assessment.’ ” Winn v. Killian, 321 F. 3d 911, 912
(CA9 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc).

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117 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
Guided first by the Internal Revenue Code, an assessment
under § 1341, at a minimum, is the recording of taxpayers’
liability on the State’s tax rolls. The TIA, though a federal
statute that must be interpreted as a matter of federal law,
operates in a state-law context. In this respect, the Act
must be interpreted so as to apply evenly to the 50 various
state-law regimes and to the various recording schemes
States employ. It is therefore irrelevant whether state offi-
cials record taxpayer liabilities with their own pen in a speci-
fied location, by collecting and maintaining taxpayers’ self-
reported filing forms, or in some other manner. The
recordkeeping that equates to the determination of taxpayer
liability on the State’s tax rolls is the assessment, whatever
the method. The Court seems to agree with this. See
ante, at 99–102.
The dictionary definition of assessment provides further
relevant information. Contemporaneous dictionaries from
the time of the TIA’s enactment define assessment in expan-
sive terms. They would broaden any understanding of the
term, and so the Act’s bar. See, e. g., Webster’s New Inter-
national Dictionary 139 (1927) (providing three context rele-
vant definitions for the term assessment: It is the act of ap-
portioning or determining an amount to be paid; a valuation
of property for the purpose of taxation; or the entire plan or
scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing). See also United
States v. Galletti, 541 U. S. 114, 122 (2004) (noting that under
the Code the term assessment refers not only to recordings
of tax liability but also to “the calculation . . . of a tax liabil-
ity,” including self-calculation done by the taxpayer). The
Court need not decide the full scope of the term assessment
in the TIA, however. For present purposes, a narrow defi-
nition of the term suffices. Applying the narrowest defini-
tion, the TIA’s literal text bars district courts from enjoining,
suspending, or restraining a State’s recording of taxpayer
liability on its tax rolls, whether the recordings are made by

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118 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
self-reported taxpayer filing forms or by a State’s calculation
of taxpayer liability.
The terms “enjoin, suspend, or restrain” require little
scrutiny. No doubt, they have discrete purposes in the con-
text of the TIA; but they also have a common meaning.
They refer to actions that restrict assessments to varying
degrees. It is noteworthy that the term “enjoin” has not
just its meaning in the restrictive sense but also has meaning
in an affirmative sense. The Black’s Law Dictionary current
at the TIA’s enactment gives as a definition of the term, “to
require; command; positively direct.” Black’s Law Diction-
ary 663 (3d ed. 1933). That definition may well be impli-
cated here, since an order invalidating a tax credit would
seem to command States to collect taxes they otherwise
would not collect. The parties, however, proceed on the as-
sumption that enjoin means to bar. It is unobjectionable for
the Court to make the assumption too, leaving the broader
definition for later consideration.
Respondents argue the TIA does not bar the injunction
they seek because even after the credit is enjoined, the Di-
rector will be able to record and enforce taxpayers’ liabili-
ties. See Brief for Respondents 16. In fact, respondents
say, with the credit out of the way the Director will be able
to record and enforce a higher level of liability and so profit
the State. Ibid. (“The amount of tax payable by some tax-
payers would increase, but that can hardly be characterized
as an injunction or restraint of the assessment process”).
The argument, however, ignores an important part of
the Act: “under State law.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341 (“The dis-
trict courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assess-
ment . . . of any tax under State law”). The Act not only
bars district courts from enjoining, suspending, or restrain-
ing a State’s recording of taxpayer liabilities altogether; but
it also bars them from enjoining, suspending, or restraining
a State from recording the taxpayer liability that state law
mandates.

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
Arizona Rev. Stat. Ann. §43–1089 (West Supp. 2003) is
state law. It is an integral part of the State’s tax statute; it
is reflected on state tax forms; and the State Supreme Court
has held that it is part of the calculus necessary to determine
tax liability. See Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 279,
285, 972 P. 2d 606, 612, 618 (1999). A recording of a taxpay-
er’s liability under state law must be made in accordance
with § 43–1089. The same can be said with respect to each
and every provision of the State’s tax law. To order the
Director not to record on the State’s tax rolls taxpayer liabil-
ity that reflects the operation of § 43–1089 (or any other state
tax law provision for that matter) would be to bar the Direc-
tor from recording the correct taxpayer liability. The TIA’s
language bars this relief and so bars this suit.
The Court tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that
the recordings that constitute assessments under § 1341 must
have a “collection-propelling function,” ante, at 102, and that
the recordings at issue here do not have such a function.
See also ante, at 102, n. 4 (“[T]he dissent would disconnect
the word [assessment] from the enforcement process”).
That is wrong. A recording of taxpayer liability on the
State’s tax rolls of course propels collection. In most cases
the taxpayer’s payment will accompany his filing, and thus
will accompany the assessment so that no literal collection
of moneys is necessary. As anyone who has paid taxes must
know, however, if owed payment were not included with the
tax filing, the State’s recording of one’s liability on the State’s
rolls would certainly cause subsequent collection efforts, for
the filing’s recording (i. e., the assessment) would propel col-
lection by establishing the State’s legal right to the taxpay-
er’s moneys.
II
The majority offers prior judicial interpretations of the
Code’s similarly worded anti-injunction provision to support
its contrary conclusions about the statutory text. See ante,
at 102–103. That this Court and other federal courts have

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120 HIBBS v. WINN
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allowed nontaxpayer suits challenging tax credits to proceed
in the face of the anti-injunction provision is not at all con-
trolling. Those cases are quite distinguishable. Had the
plaintiffs in those cases been barred from suit, there would
have been no available forum at all for their claims. See
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453–454 (DC 1972)
(three-judge court) (“The preferred course of raising [such
tax exemption and deduction] objections in a suit for refund
is not available. In this situation we cannot read the statute
to bar the present suit”). See also Tax Analysts and Advo-
cates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889, 892 (DC 1974) (“Since plain-
tiffs are not seeking to restrain the collection of taxes, and
since they cannot obtain relief through a refund suit, [26
U. S. C.] § 7421(a) does not bar the injunctive relief they
seek”). The Court ratified those decisions only insofar as
they relied on this limited rationale as the basis for an excep-
tion to the statutory bar on adjudication. See South Caro-
lina v. Regan, 465 U. S. 367, 373 (1984) (holding the anti-
injunction provision inapplicable to a State’s challenge to
the constitutionality of a federal tax exemption provision,
§ 103(a) of the Code (which exempts from a taxpayer’s gross
income the interest earned on the obligations of any State),
as amended by § 310(b)(1) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 596, because “the
[anti-injunction provision] was not intended to bar an action
where . . . Congress has not provided the plaintiff with an
alternative legal way to challenge the validity of a tax”).
Even that strict limitation was not strict enough for four
Members of the Court, one of whom noted “the broad sweep
of the [a]nti-[i]njunction [provision].” 465 U. S., at 382
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). The other three
Justices went further still. They would have allowed an
exception to the anti-injunction provision’s literal bar on non-
taxpayer suits challenging tax exemption provisions only if
due process rights were at stake. See id., at 394 (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring in judgment) (“Bob Jones University’s

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121 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
recognition that the complete inaccessibility of judicial re-
view might implicate due process concerns provides abso-
lutely no basis for crafting an exception” to the anti-
injunction Act for a plaintiff who has “no due process right
to review of its claim in a judicial forum”).
In contrast to the anti-injunction provision, the TIA on its
own terms ensures an adequate forum for claims it bars.
The TIA specially exempts actions that could not be heard
in state courts by providing an exception for instances
“where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may [not] be had
in the courts of [the] State.” 28 U. S. C. § 1341. The TIA’s
text thus already incorporates the check that Regan con-
cluded could be read into the anti-injunction provision even
though “[t]he [anti-injunction provision]’s language ‘could
scarcely be more explicit’ in prohibiting nontaxpayer suits
like this one.” 465 U. S., at 385 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in judgment) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S.
725, 736 (1974)). The practical effect is that a literal reading
of the TIA provides for federal district courts to stand at the
ready where litigants encounter legal or practical obstacles
to challenging state tax credits in state courts. And this
Court, of course, stands at the ready to review decisions by
state courts on these matters.
The Court does not discuss this codified exception, yet the
clause is crucial. It represents a congressional judgment
about the balance that should exist between the respect due
to the States (for both their administration of tax schemes
and their courts’ interpretation of tax laws) and the need
for constitutional vindication. To ignore the provision is to
ignore that Congress has already balanced these interests.
Respondents admit they would be heard in state court.
Indeed a quite similar action previously was heard there.
See Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P. 2d 606 (1999).
As a result, the TIA’s exception (akin to that recognized by
Regan) does not apply. To proceed as if it does is to replace
Congress’ balancing of the noted interests with the Court’s.

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122 HIBBS v. WINN
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III
The Court and respondents further argue that the TIA’s
policy purposes and relatedly the federal anti-injunction pro-
vision’s policy purposes (as discerned from legislative histor-
ies) justify today’s holding. The two Acts, they say, reflect
a unitary purpose: “In both . . . Congress directed taxpayers
to pursue refund suits instead of attempting to restrain [tax]
collections.” Ante, at 104. See also ante, at 105 (concluding
that the Act’s underlying purpose is to bar suits by “taxpay-
ers who sought to avoid paying their tax bill”); see also Brief
for Respondents 18–20. This purpose, the Court and re-
spondents say, shows that the Act was not intended to fore-
close relief in challenges to tax credits. The proposition
rests on the premise that the TIA’s sole purpose is to prevent
district court orders that would decrease the moneys in state
fiscs. Because the legislative histories of the Acts are not
carefully limited in the manner that this reading suggests,
the policy argument against a literal application of the Act’s
terms fails.
Taking the federal anti-injunction provision first, as has
been noted before, “[its] history expressly reflects the con-
gressional desire that all injunctive suits against the tax col-
lector be prohibited.” Regan, 465 U. S., at 387 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in judgment). The provision responded to
“the grave dangers which accompany intrusion of the injunc-
tive power of the courts into the administration of the reve-
nue.” Id., at 388. It “generally precludes judicial resolu-
tion of all abstract tax controversies,” whether brought by a
taxpayer or a nontaxpayer. Id., at 392; see also id., at 387–
392 (reviewing the legislative history of the anti-injunction
provision, its various amendments, and related enactments).
Thus, the provision’s object is not just to bar suits that might
“interrupt ‘the process of collecting . . . taxes,’ ” but “[s]imi-
larly, the language and history evidence a congressional de-
sire to prohibit courts from restraining any aspect of the tax
laws’ administration.” Id., at 399.

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
The majority’s reading of the TIA’s legislative history is
also inconsistent with the interpretation of this same history
in the Court’s earlier cases. The Court has made clear that
the TIA’s purpose is not only to protect the fisc but also to
protect the State’s tax system administration and tax policy
implementation. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457
U. S. 393 (1982), is a prime example.
In Grace Brethren Church the Court held that the TIA
not only bars actions by individuals to stop tax collectors
from collecting moneys (i. e., injunctive suits) but also bars
declaratory suits. See id., at 408–410. The Court ex-
plained that permitting declaratory suits to proceed would
“defea[t] the principal purpose of the Tax Injunction Act: ‘to
limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to inter-
fere with so important a local concern as the collection of
taxes.’ ” Id., at 408–409 (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat.
Bank, 450 U. S. 503, 522 (1981)). It continued:
“ ‘If federal declaratory relief were available to test
state tax assessments, state tax administration might be
thrown into disarray, and taxpayers might escape the
ordinary procedural requirements imposed by state law.
During the pendency of the federal suit the collection of
revenue under the challenged law might be obstructed,
with consequent damage to the State’s budget, and per-
haps a shift to the State of the risk of taxpayer in-
solvency. Moreover, federal constitutional issues are
likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like
issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard
in the state courts.’ ” Grace Brethren Church, supra,
at 410 (quoting with approval Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U. S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
While this, of course, demonstrates that protecting the
state fisc from damage is part of the TIA’s purpose, it equally
shows that actions that would throw the “state tax adminis-

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124 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
tration . . . into disarray” also implicate the Act and its pur-
pose. The Court’s concern with preventing administrative
disarray puts in context its explanation that the TIA’s princi-
pal concern is to limit federal district court interference with
the “collection of taxes.” The phrase, in this context, refers
to the operation of the whole tax collection system and the
implementation of entire tax policy, not just a part of it.
While an order interfering with a specific collection suit dis-
rupts one of the most essential aspects of a State’s tax sys-
tem, it is not the only way in which federal courts can disrupt
the State’s tax system:
“[T]he legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act dem-
onstrates that Congress worried not so much about the
form of relief available in the federal courts, as about
divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere
with state tax administration.” Grace Brethen Church,
supra, at 409, n. 22.
The Court’s decisions in Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 (1981), National Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 515 U. S. 582
(1995) (NPTC), and Rosewell, supra, make the same point.
Though the majority says these cases support its holding be-
cause they “involved plaintiffs who mounted federal litiga-
tion to avoid paying state taxes,” ante, at 106, the language
of these cases is too clear to be ignored and is contrary to
the Court’s holding today. In Fair Assessment, the Court
observed that “[t]he [TIA] ‘has its roots in equity practice,
in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the impera-
tive need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations.’
This last consideration was [its] principal motivating force.”
454 U. S., at 110 (quoting Rosewell, supra, at 522, in turn
quoting Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 73 (1976) (other
citation omitted)). In NPTC, the Court said, “Congress and
this Court repeatedly have shown an aversion to federal in-
terference with state tax administration. The passage of
the [TIA] in 1937 is one manifestation of this aversion.” 515

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125 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
U. S., at 586 (summing up this aversion, generated also from
principles of comity and federalism, as creating a “back-
ground presumption that federal law generally will not inter-
fere with administration of state taxes,” id., at 588). In
Rosewell, the Court described the Act’s language as “broad”
and “prophylactic.” 450 U. S., at 524 (majority opinion of
Brennan, J.). See also ibid. (the TIA was “passed to limit
federal-court interference in state tax matters”).
The Act is designed to respect not only the administration
of state tax systems but also state-court authority to say
what state law means. “[F]ederal constitutional issues are
likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues
of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state
courts.” Grace Brethren Church, supra, at 410 (internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Rosewell, supra, at 527.
This too establishes that the TIA’s purpose is not solely to
ensure that the State’s fisc is not decreased. There would
be only a diminished interest in allowing state courts to say
what the State’s tax statutes mean if the Act protected just
the state fisc. The TIA protects the responsibility of the
States and their courts to administer their own tax systems
and to be accountable to the citizens of the State for their
policies and decisions. The majority objects that “there is
no disagreement as to the meaning of ” state law in this case,
ante, at 106, n. 8. As an initial matter, it is not clear that
this is a fair conclusion. The litigation in large part turns
on what state law requires and whether the product of those
requirements violates the Constitution. More to the point,
however, even if there were no controversy about the statu-
tory framework the Arizona tax provision creates, the ma-
jority’s ruling has implications far beyond this case and will
most certainly result in federal courts in other States and in
other cases being required to interpret state tax law in order
to complete their review of challenges to state tax statutes.
Our heretofore consistent interpretation of the Act’s legis-
lative history to prohibit interference with state tax systems

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126 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
and their administration accords with the direct, broad, and
unqualified language of the statute. The Act bars all orders
that enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment of any tax
under state law. In effecting congressional intent we should
give full force to simple and broad proscriptions in the statu-
tory language.
Because the TIA’s language and purpose are comprehen-
sive, arguments based on congressional silence on the ques-
tion whether the TIA applies to actions that increase moneys
a state tax system collects are of no moment. Contra,
Winn, 307 F. 3d, at 1017–1018 (relying on Dunn v. Carey, 808
F. 2d 555, 558 (CA7 1986)); see also ante, at 108–109 (relying
on Dunn). Whatever weight one gives to legislative histor-
ies, silence in the legislative record is irrelevant when a plain
congressional declaration exists on a matter. “[W]hen
terms are unambiguous we may not speculate on probabili-
ties of intention.” Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, 545
(1867). Here, Congress has said district courts are barred
from disrupting the State’s tax operations. It is immaterial
whether the State’s collection is raised or lowered. A court
order will thwart and replace the State’s chosen tax policy if
it causes either result. No authority supports the proposi-
tion that a State lacks an interest in reducing its citizens’ tax
burden. It is a troubling proposition for this Court to pro-
ceed on the assumption that the State’s interest in limit-
ing the tax burden on its citizens to that for which its law
provides is a secondary policy, deserving of little respect
from us.
IV
The final basis on which both the majority and respondents
rest is that years of unexamined habit by litigants and the
courts alike have resulted in federal courts’ entertaining
challenges to state tax credits. See ante, at 110–111 (citing
representative cases). While we should not reverse the
course of our unexamined practice lightly, our obligation is
to give a correct interpretation of the statute. We are not

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127 Cite as: 542 U. S. 88 (2004)
Kennedy, J., dissenting
obliged to maintain the status quo when the status quo is
unfounded. The exercise of federal jurisdiction does not and
cannot establish jurisdiction. See United States v. L. A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U. S. 33, 37–38 (1952). “[T]his
Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a
case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub si-
lentio.” Id., at 38. In this respect, the present case is no
different than Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political
Victory Fund, 513 U. S. 88 (1994). The case presented the
question whether we had jurisdiction to consider a certiorari
petition filed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC),
and not by the Solicitor General on behalf of the FEC.
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction. See id., at 99.
Though that answer seemed to contradict the Court’s prior
practices, the Court said:
“Nor are we impressed by the FEC’s argument that it
has represented itself before this Court on several occa-
sions in the past without any question having been
raised about its authority to do so . . . . The jurisdiction
of this Court was challenged in none of these actions,
and therefore the question is an open one before us.”
Id., at 97.
See also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58,
63, n. 4 (1989) (“ ‘[T]his Court has never considered itself
bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdic-
tional issue before us.’ Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 535,
n. 5 (1974)” (alteration in original)). These cases make clear
that our failure to consider a question hardly equates to a
thing’s being decided. Contra, ante, at 112–113 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (referring to prior silences of the courts with
respect to the TIA as stare decisis and settled interpre-
tation). As a consequence, I would follow the statutory
language.
* * *

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128 HIBBS v. WINN
Kennedy, J., dissenting
After today’s decision, “[n]ontaxpaying associations of tax-
payers, and most other nontaxpayers, will now be allowed to
sidestep Congress’ policy against [federal] judicial resolution
of abstract [state] tax controversies.” Regan, 465 U. S., at
394 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). This unfortu-
nate result deprives state courts of the first opportunity to
hear such cases and to grant the relief the Constitution
requires.
For the foregoing reasons, with respect, I dissent.