CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES et al. v. ABRAMS

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
113 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES et al. v. ABRAMS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 03–1601. Argued January 19, 2005—Decided March 22, 2005
After petitioner City denied respondent Abrams permission to construct
a radio tower on his property, he filed this action seeking, inter alia,
injunctive relief under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) of the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U. S. C. § 332(c)(7), as added by the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (TCA), and money damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Section
332(c)(7) imposes specific limitations on the traditional authority of
state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, and
modification of wireless communications facilities, and provides, in
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v), that anyone “adversely affected by any final action . . .
by [such] a . . . government . . . may . . . commence an action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.” The District Court held that
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v) provided the exclusive remedy for the City’s actions
and, accordingly, ordered the City to grant respondent’s application for
a conditional-use permit, but refused respondent’s request for damages
under § 1983. The Ninth Circuit reversed on the latter point.
Held: An individual may not enforce § 332(c)(7)’s limitations on local zon-
ing authority through a § 1983 action. The TCA—by providing a judi-
cial remedy different from § 1983 in § 332(c)(7) itself—precluded resort
to § 1983. Pp. 119–127.
(a) Even after a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates
an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he
belongs, see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 285, the defendant
may rebut the presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983
by, inter alia, showing a contrary congressional intent from the statute’s
creation of a “comprehensive remedial scheme that is inconsistent with
individual enforcement under § 1983,” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U. S.
329, 341. The Court’s cases demonstrate that the provision of an ex-
press, private means of redress in the statute itself is ordinarily an indi-
cation that Congress did not intend to leave open a remedy under
§ 1983. Pp. 119–120.
(b) Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly au-
thorized by § 332(c)(7) to coexist with an alternative remedy available
under § 1983, since enforcement of the former through the latter would
distort the scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies
created by § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The TCA adds no remedies to those avail-

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
114 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Syllabus
able under § 1983, and limits relief in ways that § 1983 does not. In
contrast to a § 1983 action, TCA judicial review must be sought within
30 days after the governmental entity has taken “final action,” and, once
the action is filed, the court must “hear and decide” it “on an expedited
basis.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). Moreover, unlike § 1983 remedies, TCA rem-
edies perhaps do not include compensatory damages, and certainly do
not include attorney’s fees and costs. The Court rejects Abrams’s
arguments for borrowing § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s 30-day limitations period,
rather than applying the longer statute of limitations authorized under
42 U. S. C. § 1988 or 28 U. S. C. § 1658, in § 1983 actions asserting
§ 332(c)(7)(B) violations. Pp. 120–125.
(c) In concluding that Congress intended to permit plaintiffs to pro-
ceed under § 1983, the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the TCA’s so-called
“saving clause,” which provides: “This Act . . . shall not be construed
to . . . impair . . . Federal . . . law.” Construing § 332(c)(7), as this Court
does, to create rights that may be enforced only through the statute’s
express remedy does not “impair” § 1983 because it leaves § 1983’s pre-
TCA operation entirely unaffected. Pp. 125–127.
354 F. 3d 1094, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 127. Stevens, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 129.
Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were T. Peter Pierce, Gregory M.
Kunert, and Nicholas P. Miller.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney
General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, and
Thomas M. Bondy.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were William T. Lake, Jonathan J. Frankel,
Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Brian W. Murray, Wilkie Cheong,
Christopher D. Imlay, and David J. Kaufman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ala-
bama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Kevin C.
Newsom, Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respec-

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
115 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide in this case whether an individual may enforce
the limitations on local zoning authority set forth in
§ 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C.
§ 332(c)(7), through an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983.
I
Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(TCA), 110 Stat. 56, to promote competition and higher qual-
ity in American telecommunications services and to “encour-
age the rapid deployment of new telecommunications tech-
nologies.” Ibid. One of the means by which it sought to
accomplish these goals was reduction of the impediments im-
posed by local governments upon the installation of facilities
for wireless communications, such as antenna towers. To
this end, the TCA amended the Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1064, to include § 332(c)(7), which imposes specific
limitations on the traditional authority of state and local gov-
ernments to regulate the location, construction, and modifi-
cation of such facilities, 110 Stat. 151, codified at 47 U. S. C.
tive jurisdictions as follows: Gregg D. Renkes of Alaska, M. Jane Brady of
Delaware, Douglas B. Moylan of Guam, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa
Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts,
Mike McGrath of Montana, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Brian
Sandoval of Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Law-
rence E. Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff
of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia;
for Local Governments et al. by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Max Huffman, James
N. Horwood, and Peter J. Hopkins; and for the National League of Cities
et al. by Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, Robert A. Long, and Heidi
C. Doerhoff.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American
Mobile Telecommunications Association by Russell D. Lukas; for the Cel-
lular Telecommunications & Internet Association by Andrew G. McBride,
Joshua S. Turner, and Michael Altschul; for the Lawyers’ Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Reginald D. Steer and Michael L. Fore-
man; for Public Citizen, Inc., by Scott L. Nelson; and for James A. Kay,
Jr., by Barry Richard.

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
116 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
§ 332(c)(7). Under this provision, local governments may
not “unreasonably discriminate among providers of func-
tionally equivalent services,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), take actions
that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the pro-
vision of personal wireless services,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), or
limit the placement of wireless facilities “on the basis of
the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions,”
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). They must act on requests for authoriza-
tion to locate wireless facilities “within a reasonable period
of time,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), and each decision denying such a
request must “be in writing and supported by substantial
evidence contained in a written record,” § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
Lastly, § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), which is central to the present case,
provides as follows:
“Any person adversely affected by any final action or
failure to act by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this
subparagraph may, within 30 days after such action or
failure to act, commence an action in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.”
Respondent Mark Abrams owns a home in a low-density,
residential neighborhood in the city of Rancho Palos Verdes,
California (City). His property is located at a high eleva-
tion, near the peak of the Rancho Palos Verdes Peninsula.
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 101 Cal. App. 4th 367, 371,
124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 82 (2002). The record reflects that the
location is both scenic and, because of its high elevation, ideal
for radio transmissions. Id., at 371–372, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d,
at 82–83.
In 1989, respondent obtained a permit from the City to
construct a 52.5-foot antenna on his property for amateur
use.1 He installed the antenna shortly thereafter, and in the
1 The City’s approval specified a maximum height of 40 feet, but, because
of an administrative error, the permit itself authorized respondent to con-
struct a tower 12.5 feet taller. 354 F. 3d 1094, 1095 (CA9 2004).

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
117 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
years that followed placed several smaller, tripod antennas
on the property without prior permission from the City. He
used the antennas both for noncommercial purposes (to pro-
vide an amateur radio service and to relay signals from other
amateur radio operators) and for commercial purposes (to
provide customers two-way radio communications from por-
table and mobile transceivers, and to repeat the signals of
customers so as to enable greater range of transmission).
Ibid.
In 1998, respondent sought permission to construct a sec-
ond antenna tower. In the course of investigating that
application, the City learned that respondent was using his
antennas to provide a commercial service, in violation of a
City ordinance requiring a “conditional-use permit” from the
City Planning Commission (Commission) for commercial an-
tenna use. See Commission Resolution No. 2000–12 (“A
Resolution of the Planning Commission of the City of Rancho
Palos Verdes Denying With Prejudice Conditional Use Per-
mit No. 207 for the Proposed Commercial Use of Existing
Antennae on an Existing Antenna Support Structure, Lo-
cated at 44 Oceanaire Drive in the Del Cerro Neighbor-
hood”), App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. On suit by the City, Los
Angeles County Superior Court enjoined respondent from
using the antennas for a commercial purpose. Rancho
Palos Verdes, supra, at 373, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 84; App. to
Pet. for Cert. 35a.
Two weeks later, in July 1999, respondent applied to the
Commission for the requisite conditional-use permit. The
application drew strong opposition from several of respond-
ent’s neighbors. The Commission conducted two hearings
and accepted written evidence, after which it denied the ap-
plication. Id., at 54a–63a. The Commission explained that
granting respondent permission to operate commercially
“would perpetuate . . . adverse visual impacts” from respond-
ent’s existing antennas and establish precedent for similar
projects in residential areas in the future. Id., at 57a. The

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
118 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
Commission also concluded that denial of respondent’s appli-
cation was consistent with 47 U. S. C. § 332(c)(7), making spe-
cific findings that its action complied with each of that provi-
sion’s requirements. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a–62a. The
city council denied respondent’s appeal. Id., at 52a. See
generally No. CV00–09071–SVW (RNBx) (CD Cal., Jan. 9,
2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a–23a.
On August 24, 2000, respondent filed this action against
the City in the District Court for the Central District
of California, alleging, as relevant, that denial of the use per-
mit violated the limitations placed on the City’s zoning
authority by § 332(c)(7). In particular, respondent charged
that the City’s action discriminated against the mobile
relay services he sought to provide, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I), ef-
fectively prohibited the provision of mobile relay serv-
ices, § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II), and was not supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record, § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). App. to Pet.
for Cert. 17a. Respondent sought injunctive relief under
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v), and money damages and attorney’s fees
under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Plaintiff/Petitioner’s
Brief Re: Remedies and Damages, Case No. 00–09071–SVW
(RNBx) (CD Cal., Feb. 25, 2002), App. to Reply Brief for
Petitioners 2a–7a.
Notwithstanding § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s direction that courts
“hear and decide” actions “on an expedited basis,” the Dis-
trict Court did not act on respondent’s complaint until Janu-
ary 9, 2002, 16 months after filing; it concluded that the City’s
denial of a conditional-use permit was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a–26a. The
court explained that the City could not rest its denial on
esthetic concerns, since the antennas in question were al-
ready in existence and would remain in place whatever the
disposition of the permit application. Id., at 23a–24a. Nor,
the court said, could the City reasonably base its decision on
the fear of setting precedent for the location of commercial
antennas in residential areas, since adverse impacts from

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
119 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
new structures would always be a basis for permit denial.
Id., at 25a. In light of the paucity of support for the City’s
action, the court concluded that denial of the permit was “an
act of spite by the community.” Id., at 24a. In an order
issued two months later, the District Court held that
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v) provided the exclusive remedy for the City’s
actions. Judgment of Injunction, No. CV00–09071–SVW
(RNBx) (CD Cal., Mar. 18, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a.
Accordingly, it ordered the City to grant respondent’s appli-
cation for a conditional-use permit, but refused respondent’s
request for damages under § 1983. Respondent appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on
the latter point, and remanded for determination of money
damages and attorney’s fees. 354 F. 3d 1094, 1101 (2004).
We granted certiorari. 542 U. S. 965 (2004).
II
A
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Ter-
ritory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), we held that this
section “means what it says” and authorizes suits to enforce
individual rights under federal statutes as well as the Consti-
tution. Id., at 4.
Our subsequent cases have made clear, however, that
§ 1983 does not provide an avenue for relief every time a
state actor violates a federal law. As a threshold matter,
the text of § 1983 permits the enforcement of “rights, not the

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
120 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests.’ ” Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 283 (2002) (emphasis in original). Ac-
cordingly, to sustain a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the federal statute creates an individually
enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries to which he
belongs. See id., at 285.
Even after this showing, “there is only a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.” Bless-
ing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 341 (1997). The defendant
may defeat this presumption by demonstrating that Con-
gress did not intend that remedy for a newly created right.
See ibid.; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, 1012 (1984).
Our cases have explained that evidence of such congressional
intent may be found directly in the statute creating the right,
or inferred from the statute’s creation of a “comprehensive
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual en-
forcement under § 1983.” Blessing, supra, at 341.2 See
also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 19–20 (1981). “The crucial
consideration is what Congress intended.” Smith, supra,
at 1012.
B
The City conceded below, and neither the City nor the
Government as amicus disputes here, that § 332(c)(7) creates
individually enforceable rights; we assume, arguendo, that
this is so. The critical question, then, is whether Congress
2 This does not contravene the canon against implied repeal, see Posadas
v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936), because we have held that
canon inapplicable to a statute that creates no rights but merely provides a
civil cause of action to remedy “some otherwise defined federal right,”
Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366, 376
(1979) (dealing with a provision related to § 1983, 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3)). In
such a case, “we are not faced . . . with a question of implied repeal,” but
with whether the rights created by a later statute “may be asserted within
the remedial framework” of the earlier one. Great American Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn., supra, at 376–377.

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
121 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by § 332(c)(7)
to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983
action. We conclude not.
The provision of an express, private means of redress in
the statute itself is ordinarily an indication that Congress did
not intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under
§ 1983. As we have said in a different setting, “[t]he express
provision of one method of enforcing a substantive rule sug-
gests that Congress intended to preclude others.” Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 290 (2001). Thus, the exist-
ence of a more restrictive private remedy for statutory
violations has been the dividing line between those cases in
which we have held that an action would lie under § 1983 and
those in which we have held that it would not.
We have found § 1983 unavailable to remedy violations of
federal statutory rights in two cases: Sea Clammers and
Smith. Both of those decisions rested upon the existence of
more restrictive remedies provided in the violated statute
itself. See Smith, supra, at 1011–1012 (recognizing a § 1983
action “would . . . render superfluous most of the detailed
procedural protections outlined in the statute”); Sea Clam-
mers, supra, at 20 (“[W]hen a state official is alleged to have
violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehen-
sive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforce-
ment procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit
directly under § 1983” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, in all of the cases in which we have held that
§ 1983 is available for violation of a federal statute, we have
emphasized that the statute at issue, in contrast to those in
Sea Clammers and Smith, did not provide a private judicial
remedy (or, in most of the cases, even a private administra-
tive remedy) for the rights violated. See Blessing, supra,
at 348 (“Unlike the federal programs at issue in [Sea Clam-
mers and Smith], Title IV–D contains no private remedy—
either judicial or administrative—through which aggrieved
persons can seek redress”); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S.

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
122 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
107, 133–134 (1994) (there was a “complete absence of provi-
sion for relief from governmental interference” in the stat-
ute); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S.
103, 108–109 (1989) (“There is . . . no comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme for preventing state interference with federally
protected labor rights that would foreclose the § 1983 rem-
edy”); Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 521
(1990) (“The Medicaid Act contains no . . . provision for pri-
vate judicial or administrative enforcement” comparable to
those in Sea Clammers and Smith); Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 427
(1987) (“In both Sea Clammers and Smith . . . , the statutes
at issue themselves provided for private judicial remedies,
thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the
§ 1983 remedy. There is nothing of that kind found in the
. . . Housing Act”).
The Government as amicus, joined by the City, urges us
to hold that the availability of a private judicial remedy is
not merely indicative of, but conclusively establishes, a con-
gressional intent to preclude § 1983 relief. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 17; Brief for Petitioners 35. We
decline to do so. The ordinary inference that the remedy
provided in the statute is exclusive can surely be overcome
by textual indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is
to complement, rather than supplant, § 1983.
There is, however, no such indication in the TCA, which
adds no remedies to those available under § 1983, and limits
relief in ways that § 1983 does not. Judicial review of zoning
decisions under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) must be sought within 30
days after the governmental entity has taken “final action,”
and, once the action is filed, the court must “hear and decide”
it “on an expedited basis.” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The remedies
available, moreover, perhaps do not include compensatory
damages (the lower courts are seemingly in disagreement on

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
123 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
this point 3 ), and certainly do not include attorney’s fees and
costs.4 A § 1983 action, by contrast, can be brought much
later than 30 days after the final action,5 and need not be
heard and decided on an expedited basis. And the success-
ful plaintiff may recover not only damages but reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Thibou-
tot, 448 U. S., at 9. Liability for attorney’s fees would have
a particularly severe impact in the § 332(c)(7) context, mak-
ing local governments liable for the (often substantial) legal
expenses of large commercial interests for the misapplication
of a complex and novel statutory scheme. See Nextel Part-
ners Inc. v. Kingston Township, 286 F. 3d 687, 695 (CA3
3 Compare Primeco Personal Communications, Ltd. Partnership v.
Mequon, 352 F. 3d 1147, 1152–1153 (CA7 2003) (damages are presumptively
available), with Omnipoint Communications MB Operations, LLC v.
Lincoln, 107 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120–121 (Mass. 2000) (“[T]he majority of
district courts . . . have held that the appropriate remedy for a violation
of the TCA is a mandatory injunction”).
4 Absent express provision to the contrary, litigants must bear their own
costs. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240,
249–250 (1975). The Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the award
of attorney’s fees in a number of provisions, but not in § 332(c)(7)(B)(v).
See, e. g., 47 U. S. C. §§ 206, 325(e)(10), 551(f)(2)(C), 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
5 The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is generally the applicable
state-law period for personal-injury torts. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S.
261, 275, 276 (1985); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U. S. 235, 240–241 (1989).
On this basis, the applicable limitations period for respondent’s § 1983 ac-
tion would presumably be one year. See Silva v. Crain, 169 F. 3d 608,
610 (CA9 1999) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 340(3) (West 1982)). It
may be, however, that this limitations period does not apply to respond-
ent’s § 1983 claim. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U. S. C. § 1658(a) (2000
ed., Supp. II), which provides a 4-year, catchall limitations period applica-
ble to “civil action[s] arising under an Act of Congress enacted after” De-
cember 1, 1990. In Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369
(2004), we held that this 4-year limitations period applies to all claims
“made possible by a post-1990 [congressional] enactment.” Id., at 382.
Since the claim here rests upon violation of the post-1990 TCA, § 1658
would seem to apply.

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
124 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
2002) (Alito, J.) (“TCA plaintiffs are often large corporations
or affiliated entities, whereas TCA defendants are often
small, rural municipalities”); Primeco Personal Communi-
cations, Ltd. Partnership v. Mequon, 352 F. 3d 1147, 1152
(CA7 2003) (Posner, J.) (similar).
Respondent’s only response to the attorney’s-fees point is
that it is a “policy argumen[t],” properly left to Congress.
Brief for Respondent 35–36. That response assumes, how-
ever, that Congress’s refusal to attach attorney’s fees to the
remedy that it created in the TCA does not itself represent
a congressional choice. Sea Clammers and Smith adopt the
opposite assumption—that limitations upon the remedy con-
tained in the statute are deliberate and are not to be evaded
through § 1983. See Smith, 468 U. S., at 1011–1012, and n. 5;
Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 14, 20.
Respondent disputes that a § 1983 action to enforce
§ 332(c)(7)(B) would enjoy a longer statute of limitations than
an action under § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). He argues that the rule
adopted in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), that § 1983
claims are governed by the state-law statute of limitations
for personal-injury torts, does not apply to § 1983 actions to
enforce statutes that themselves contain a statute of limita-
tions; in such cases, he argues, the limitations period in the
federal statute displaces the otherwise applicable state stat-
ute of limitations. This contention cannot be reconciled
with our decision in Wilson, which expressly rejected the
proposition that the limitations period for a § 1983 claim de-
pends on the nature of the underlying right being asserted.
See id., at 271–275. We concluded instead that 42 U. S. C.
§ 1988 is “a directive to select, in each State, the one most
appropriate statute of limitations for all § 1983 claims.” 471
U. S., at 275 (emphasis added); see also Owens v. Okure, 488
U. S. 235, 240–241 (1989) (“42 U. S. C. § 1988 requires courts
to borrow and apply to all § 1983 claims the one most analo-
gous state statute of limitations” (emphasis added)). We ac-
knowledged that “a few § 1983 claims are based on statutory

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
125 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
rights,” Wilson, supra, at 278, but carved out no exception
for them.
Respondent also argues that, if 28 U. S. C. § 1658 (2000 ed.,
Supp. II), rather than Wilson, applies to his § 1983 action,
see n. 5, supra, § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations is inap-
plicable. This is so, he claims, because § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s re-
quirement that actions be filed within 30 days falls within
§ 1658’s prefatory clause, “Except as otherwise provided by
law.” 6 We think not. The language of § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) that
imposes the limitations period (“within 30 days after such
action or failure to act”) is inextricably linked to—indeed, is
embedded within—the language that creates the right of ac-
tion (“may . . . commence an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction”). It cannot possibly be regarded as a statute
of limitations generally applicable to any action to enforce
the rights created by § 332(c)(7)(B). Cf. Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 168
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Federal stat-
utes of limitations . . . are almost invariably tied to specific
causes of action”). Respondent’s argument thus reduces to
a suggestion that we “borrow” § 332(c)(7)(B)(v)’s statute of
limitations and attach it to § 1983 actions asserting violations
of § 332(c)(7)(B). Section 1658’s “[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
vided by law” clause does not support this suggestion.
C
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion that Congress in-
tended to permit plaintiffs to proceed under § 1983, in part,
on the TCA’s so-called “saving clause,” TCA § 601(c)(1), 110
Stat. 143, note following 47 U. S. C. § 152. 354 F. 3d, at
1099–1100. That provision reads as follows:
6 Title 28 U. S. C. § 1658(a) provides as follows:
“Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an
Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section
may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action
accrues.”

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
126 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Opinion of the Court
“(1) No implied effect—This Act and the amend-
ments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify,
impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.”
The Court of Appeals took this to be an express statement
of Congress’s intent not to preclude an action under § 1983,
reasoning that to do so would be to “ ‘impair’ ” the operation
of that section. Id., at 1100.
We do not think this an apt assessment of what “impair-
[ment]” consists of. Construing § 332(c)(7), as we do, to cre-
ate rights that may be enforced only through the statute’s
express remedy leaves the pre-TCA operation of § 1983 en-
tirely unaffected. Indeed, the crux of our holding is that
§ 332(c)(7) has no effect on § 1983 whatsoever: The rights
§ 332(c)(7) created may not be enforced under § 1983 and, con-
versely, the claims available under § 1983 prior to the enact-
ment of the TCA continue to be available after its enactment.
The saving clause of the TCA does not require a court to go
further and permit enforcement under § 1983 of the TCA’s
substantive standards. To apply to the present case what
we said with regard to a different statute: “The right
[Abrams] claims under [§ 332(c)(7)] did not even arguably
exist before the passage of [the TCA]. The only question
here, therefore, is whether the rights created by [the TCA]
may be asserted within the remedial framework of [§ 1983].”
Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442
U. S. 366, 376–377 (1979).
This interpretation of the saving clause is consistent with
Sea Clammers. Saving clauses attached to the statutes at
issue in that case provided that the statutes should not be
interpreted to “ ‘restrict any right which any person . . . may
have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement
of any . . . standard or limitation or to seek any other re-
lief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency).’ 33 U. S. C. § 1365(e).” 453 U. S., at 7, n. 10; see

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
127 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Breyer, J., concurring
also id., at 7–8, n. 11. We refused to read those clauses to
“preserve” a § 1983 action, holding that they did not “refer
. . . to a suit for redress of a violation of th[e] statutes [at
issue] . . . .” Id., at 20–21, n. 31.
* * *
Enforcement of § 332(c)(7) through § 1983 would distort the
scheme of expedited judicial review and limited remedies
created by § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). We therefore hold that the
TCA—by providing a judicial remedy different from § 1983
in § 332(c)(7) itself—precluded resort to § 1983. The judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O’Connor, Jus-
tice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, concurring.
I agree with the Court. It wisely rejects the Govern-
ment’s proposed rule that the availability of a private judicial
remedy “conclusively establishes . . . a congressional intent
to preclude [Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.] § 1983 relief.”
Ante, at 122 (emphasis added). The statute books are too
many, federal laws too diverse, and their purposes too com-
plex for any legal formula to provide more than general
guidance. Cf. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 291
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). The Court
today provides general guidance in the form of an “ordinary
inference” that when Congress creates a specific judicial
remedy, it does so to the exclusion of § 1983. Ante, at 122.
I would add that context, not just literal text, will often lead
a court to Congress’ intent in respect to a particular statute.
Cf. ibid. (referring to “implicit” textual indications).
Context here, for example, makes clear that Congress saw
a national problem, namely, an “inconsistent and, at times,

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
128 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Breyer, J., concurring
conflicting patchwork” of state and local siting requirements,
which threatened “the deployment” of a national wireless
communication system. H. R. Rep. No. 104–204, pt. 1, p. 94
(1995). Congress initially considered a single national solu-
tion, namely, a Federal Communications Commission wire-
less tower siting policy that would pre-empt state and local
authority. Ibid.; see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–458,
p. 207 (1996). But Congress ultimately rejected the national
approach and substituted a system based on cooperative fed-
eralism. Id., at 207–208. State and local authorities would
remain free to make siting decisions. They would do so,
however, subject to minimum federal standards—both sub-
stantive and procedural—as well as federal judicial review.
The statute requires local zoning boards, for example,
to address permit applications “within a reasonable pe-
riod of time”; the boards must maintain a “written record”
and give reasons for denials “in writing.” 47 U. S. C.
§§ 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), (iii). Those “adversely affected” by “final
action” of a state or local government (including their “fail-
ure to act”) may obtain judicial review provided they file
their review action within 30 days. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The
reviewing court must “hear and decide such action on an
expedited basis.” Ibid. And the court must determine,
among other things, whether a zoning board’s decision
denying a permit is supported by “substantial evidence.”
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).
This procedural and judicial review scheme resembles that
governing many federal agency decisions. See H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 104–458, at 208 (“The phrase ‘substantial evidence
contained in a written record’ is the traditional standard
used for judicial review of agency actions”). Section 1983
suits, however, differ considerably from ordinary review of
agency action. The former involve plenary judicial evalua-
tion of asserted rights deprivations; the latter involves defer-
ential consideration of matters within an agency’s expertise.
And, in my view, to permit § 1983 actions here would under-

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
129 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
mine the compromise—between purely federal and purely
local siting policies—that the statute reflects.
For these reasons, and for those set forth by the Court,
I agree that Congress, in this statute, intended its judicial
remedy as an exclusive remedy. In particular, Congress
intended that remedy to foreclose—not to supplement—
§ 1983 relief.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment.
When a federal statute creates a new right but fails to
specify whether plaintiffs may or may not recover damages
or attorney’s fees, we must fill the gap in the statute’s text
by examining all relevant evidence that sheds light on the
intent of the enacting Congress. The inquiry varies from
statute to statute. Sometimes the question is whether, de-
spite its silence, Congress intended us to recognize an im-
plied cause of action. See, e. g., Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979). Sometimes we ask whether,
despite its silence, Congress intended us to enforce the pre-
existing remedy provided in Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980). And
still other times, despite Congress’ inclusion of specific
clauses designed specifically to preserve pre-existing reme-
dies, we have nevertheless concluded that Congress im-
pliedly foreclosed the § 1983 remedy. See Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13 (1981). Whenever we perform this
gap-filling task, it is appropriate not only to study the text
and structure of the statutory scheme, but also to examine
its legislative history. See, e. g., id., at 17–18; Smith v. Rob-
inson, 468 U. S. 992, 1009 (1984); Cannon, 441 U. S., at 694.
In this case the statute’s text, structure, and history all
provide convincing evidence that Congress intended the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA) to operate as a com-
prehensive and exclusive remedial scheme. The structure
of the statute appears fundamentally incompatible with the

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
130 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
private remedy offered by § 1983.* Moreover, there is not
a shred of evidence in the legislative history suggesting that,
despite this structure, Congress intended plaintiffs to be able
to recover damages and attorney’s fees. Thus, petitioners
have made “the difficult showing that allowing § 1983 ac-
tions to go forward in these circumstances ‘would be incon-
sistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.’ ” Bless-
ing v. Freestone, 520 U. S. 329, 346 (1997) (quoting Golden
State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S. 103, 107 (1989);
emphasis added). I therefore join the judgment of the
Court without reservation.
Two flaws in the Court’s approach, however, persuade me
to write separately. First, I do not believe that the Court
has properly acknowledged the strength of our normal pre-
sumption that Congress intended to preserve, rather than
preclude, the availability of § 1983 as a remedy for the en-
forcement of federal statutory rights. Title 42 U. S. C.
*The evidence supporting this conclusion is substantial. It includes,
inter alia, the fact that the private remedy specified in 47 U. S. C.
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(v) requires all enforcement actions to be brought in any court
of competent jurisdiction “within 30 days after such action or failure to
act.” Once a plaintiff brings such an action, the statute requires the court
both to “hear and decide” the case “on an expedited basis.” Ibid. As
the Court properly notes, ante, at 122–123, the TCA’s streamlined and
expedited scheme for resolving telecommunication zoning disputes is fun-
damentally incompatible with the applicable limitations periods that gen-
erally govern § 1983 litigation, see, e. g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261
(1985), as well as the deliberate pace with which civil rights litigation
generally proceeds. See, e. g., H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–458, pp. 208–209
(1996) (expressing the intent of the congressional Conference that zoning
decisions should be “rendered in a reasonable period of time” and that
Congress expected courts to “act expeditiously in deciding such cases”
that may arise from disputed decisions). Like the Court, I am not per-
suaded that the statutory requirements can simply be mapped onto the
existing structure of § 1983, and there is nothing in the legislative history
to suggest that Congress would have wanted us to do so. For these rea-
sons, among others, I believe it is clear that Congress intended § 332(c)(7)
to operate as the exclusive remedy by which plaintiffs can obtain judicial
relief for violations of the TCA.

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
131 Cite as: 544 U. S. 113 (2005)
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
§ 1983 was “intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly con-
strued, against all forms of official violation of federally pro-
tected rights.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 700–701 (1978). “We do not lightly con-
clude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983
as a remedy . . . . Since 1871, when it was passed by Con-
gress, § 1983 has stood as an independent safeguard against
deprivations of federal constitutional and statutory rights.”
Smith, 468 U. S., at 1012. Although the Court is correct to
point out that this presumption is rebuttable, it remains true
that only an exceptional case—such as one involving an un-
usually comprehensive and exclusive statutory scheme—will
lead us to conclude that a given statute impliedly forecloses a
§ 1983 remedy. See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority, 479 U. S. 418, 425 (1987) (statutory
scheme must be “sufficiently comprehensive and effective to
raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a
§ 1983 cause of action”). While I find it easy to conclude
that petitioners have met that heavy burden here, there will
be many instances in which § 1983 will be available even
though Congress has not explicitly so provided in the text of
the statute in question. See, e. g., id., at 424–425; Blessing,
520 U. S., at 346–348.
Second, the Court incorrectly assumes that the legislative
history of the statute is totally irrelevant. This is contrary
to nearly every case we have decided in this area of law, all of
which have surveyed, or at least acknowledged, the available
legislative history or lack thereof. See, e. g., Wright, 479
U. S., at 424–426 (citing legislative history); Smith, 468 U. S.,
at 1009–1010 (same); Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 17–18 (not-
ing that one of the relevant factors in the Court’s inquiry
“include[s] the legislative history”); Cannon, 441 U. S., at
694 (same).
Additionally, as a general matter of statutory interpreta-
tion, Congress’ failure to discuss an issue during prolonged
legislative deliberations may itself be probative. As The

544US1 Unit: $U31 [11-02-07 17:37:51] PAGES PGT: OPIN
132 RANCHO PALOS VERDES v. ABRAMS
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment
Chief Justice has cogently observed: “In a case where the
construction of legislative language such as this makes so
sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made
here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into con-
sideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the
night.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 602
(1980) (dissenting opinion). The Court has endorsed the
view that Congress’ silence on questions such as this one
“can be likened to the dog that did not bark.” Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 396, n. 23 (1991) (citing A. Doyle,
Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335 (1927)).
Congressional silence is surely probative in this case be-
cause, despite the fact that awards of damages and attorney’s
fees could have potentially disastrous consequences for the
likely defendants in most private actions under the TCA, see
Primeco Personal Communications v. Mequon, 352 F. 3d
1147, 1152 (CA7 2003), nowhere in the course of Congress’
lengthy deliberations is there any hint that Congress wanted
damages or attorney’s fees to be available. That silence re-
inforces every other clue that we can glean from the statute’s
text and structure.
For these reasons, I concur in the Court’s judgment.