EXXON MOBIL CORP. et al. v. SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES CORP.

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Syllabus
EXXON MOBIL CORP. et al. v. SAUDI BASIC
INDUSTRIES CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 03–1696. Argued February 23, 2005—Decided March 30, 2005
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, at issue in this case, has been applied by
this Court only twice, in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, and
in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462.
In Rooker, plaintiffs previously defeated in state court filed suit in a
Federal District Court alleging that the adverse state-court judgment
was unconstitutional and asking that it be declared “null and void.” 263
U. S., at 414–415. Noting preliminarily that the state court had acted
within its jurisdiction, this Court explained that if the state-court deci-
sion was wrong, “that did not make the judgment void, but merely left
it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate
proceeding.” Id., at 415. Federal district courts, Rooker recognized,
are empowered to exercise only original, not appellate, jurisdictions.
Id., at 416. Because Congress has empowered this Court alone to exer-
cise appellate authority “to reverse or modify” a state-court judgment,
ibid., the Court affirmed a decree dismissing the federal suit for lack of
jurisdiction, id., at 415, 417. In Feldman, two plaintiffs brought
federal-court actions after the District of Columbia’s highest court de-
nied their petitions to waive a court Rule requiring D. C. bar applicants
to have graduated from an accredited law school. Recalling Rooker,
this Court observed that the District Court lacked authority to review
a final judicial determination of the D. C. high court because such review
“can be obtained only in this Court.” 460 U. S., at 476. Concluding
that the D. C. court’s proceedings applying the accreditation Rule to the
plaintiffs were “judicial in nature,” id., at 479–482, this Court ruled that
the Federal District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, id., at 482.
However, concluding also that, in promulgating the bar admission Rule,
the D. C. court had acted legislatively, not judicially, id., at 485–486, this
Court held that 28 U. S. C. § 1257 did not bar the District Court from
addressing the validity of the Rule itself, so long as the plaintiffs did
not seek review of the Rule’s application in a particular case, 460 U. S.,
at 486. Since Feldman, this Court has never applied Rooker-Feldman
to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction. However, the lower fed-
eral courts have variously interpreted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, over-

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riding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with
jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary ap-
plication of preclusion law under 28 U. S. C. § 1738.
In this case, two subsidiaries of petitioner Exxon Mobil Corporation
formed joint ventures with respondent Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
(SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute
arose over royalties that SABIC had charged the joint ventures, SABIC
preemptively sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seek-
ing a declaratory judgment that the royalties were proper. Exxon-
Mobil and the subsidiaries then countersued in the Federal District
Court, alleging that SABIC overcharged them. Before the state-court
trial, which ultimately yielded a jury verdict of over $400 million for the
ExxonMobil subsidiaries, the District Court denied SABIC’s motion to
dismiss the federal suit. On interlocutory appeal, over eight months
after the state-court jury verdict, the Third Circuit, on its own motion,
raised the question whether subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal
suit failed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because ExxonMobil’s
claims had already been litigated in state court. The court did not
question the District Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction at the suit’s
outset, but held that federal jurisdiction terminated when the Delaware
court entered judgment on the jury verdict.
Held: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases of the kind from
which it acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complain-
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-Feldman does not
otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the cir-
cumscribed doctrines allowing federal courts to stay or dismiss proceed-
ings in deference to state-court actions. Pp. 291–294.
(a) Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which
this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, § 1257,
precludes a federal district court from exercising subject-matter juris-
diction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate
under a congressional grant of authority. In both cases, the plaintiffs,
alleging federal-question jurisdiction, called upon the District Court to
overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Because § 1257, as long
interpreted, vests authority to review a state-court judgment solely in
this Court, e. g., Feldman, 460 U. S., at 476, the District Courts lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, see, e. g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3. When there is parallel state
and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the
entry of judgment in state court. See, e. g., McClellan v. Carland, 217

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U. S. 268, 282. Comity or abstention doctrines may, in various circum-
stances, permit or require the federal court to stay or dismiss the fed-
eral action in favor of the state-court litigation. See, e. g., Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800. But
neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked
concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on
the same or a related question while the case remains sub judice in a
federal court. Disposition of the federal action, once the state-court
adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law. Under
28 U. S. C. § 1738, federal courts must “give the same preclusive effect
to a state-court judgment as another court of that State would give.”
Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U. S. 518, 523. Preclu-
sion is not a jurisdictional matter. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). In
parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound to recognize the claim-
and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment, but federal juris-
diction over an action does not terminate automatically on the entry of
judgment in the state court. Nor does § 1257 stop a district court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts
to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state court.
If a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, even one that denies
a state court’s legal conclusion in a case to which the plaintiff was a
party, there is jurisdiction, and state law determines whether the de-
fendant prevails under preclusion principles. Pp. 291–293.
(b) The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude the federal court
from proceeding in this case. ExxonMobil has not repaired to federal
court to undo the Delaware judgment in its favor, but appears to have
filed its federal-court suit (only two weeks after SABIC filed in Dela-
ware and well before any judgment in state court) to protect itself in
the event it lost in state court on grounds (such as the state statute
of limitations) that might not preclude relief in the federal venue.
Rooker-Feldman did not prevent the District Court from exercising
jurisdiction when ExxonMobil filed the federal action, and it did not
emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the Dela-
ware courts. The Third Circuit misperceived the narrow ground occu-
pied by Rooker-Feldman, and consequently erred in ordering the fed-
eral action dismissed. Pp. 293–294.
364 F. 3d 102, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Gregory S. Coleman argued the cause for petitioners.
With him on the briefs were Christian J. Ward, James W.
Quinn, David Lender, and Andrew S. Pollis.

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Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the briefs were Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Wil-
liam K. Shirey II, and Kenneth R. Adamo.*
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns what has come to be known as the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, applied by this Court only twice,
first in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923),
then, 60 years later, in District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983). Variously inter-
preted in the lower courts, the doctrine has sometimes been
construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker
and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of
federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exer-
cised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary applica-
tion of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1738. See,
e. g., Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95
F. 3d 195, 199–200 (CA2 1996).
Rooker was a suit commenced in Federal District Court to
have a judgment of a state court, adverse to the federal court
plaintiffs, “declared null and void.” 263 U. S., at 414. In
Feldman, parties unsuccessful in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals (the District’s highest court) commenced a
federal-court action against the very court that had rejected
their applications. Holding the federal suits impermissible,
we emphasized that appellate jurisdiction to reverse or mod-
ify a state-court judgment is lodged, initially by § 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, and now by 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257, exclusively in this Court. Federal district courts, we
noted, are empowered to exercise original, not appellate, ju-
risdiction. Plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman had litigated
and lost in state court. Their federal complaints, we ob-
served, essentially invited federal courts of first instance to
review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments. We
*Nancie G. Marzulla and Roger J. Marzulla filed a brief for Defenders
of Property Rights et al. as amici curiae.

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declared such suits out of bounds, i. e., properly dismissed
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined
to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its
name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of in-
juries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments. Rooker-
Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion
doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow
federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to
state-court actions.
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit misperceived the narrow ground occupied by
Rooker-Feldman, and consequently erred in ordering the
federal action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. We therefore reverse the Third Circuit’s judgment.
I
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413, the parties
defeated in state court turned to a Federal District Court
for relief. Alleging that the adverse state-court judgment
was rendered in contravention of the Constitution, they
asked the federal court to declare it “null and void.” Id.,
at 414–415. This Court noted preliminarily that the state
court had acted within its jurisdiction. Id., at 415. If the
state-court decision was wrong, the Court explained, “that
did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to
reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appel-
late proceeding.” Ibid. Federal district courts, the Rooker
Court recognized, lacked the requisite appellate authority,
for their jurisdiction was “strictly original.” Id., at 416.
Among federal courts, the Rooker Court clarified, Congress
had empowered only this Court to exercise appellate author-
ity “to reverse or modify” a state-court judgment. Ibid.

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Accordingly, the Court affirmed a decree dismissing the suit
for lack of jurisdiction. Id., at 415, 417.
Sixty years later, the Court decided District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462. The two plain-
tiffs in that case, Hickey and Feldman, neither of whom had
graduated from an accredited law school, petitioned the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals to waive a court Rule
that required D. C. bar applicants to have graduated from
a law school approved by the American Bar Association.
After the D. C. court denied their waiver requests, Hickey
and Feldman filed suits in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. Id., at 465–473. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit disagreed on the question whether the federal suit
could be maintained, and we granted certiorari. Id., at
474–475.
Recalling Rooker, this Court’s opinion in Feldman ob-
served first that the District Court lacked authority to
review a final judicial determination of the D. C. high court.
“Review of such determinations,” the Feldman opinion reit-
erated, “can be obtained only in this Court.” 460 U. S., at
476. The “crucial question,” the Court next stated, was
whether the proceedings in the D. C. court were “judicial in
nature.” Ibid. Addressing that question, the Court con-
cluded that the D. C. court had acted both judicially and
legislatively.
In applying the accreditation Rule to the Hickey and Feld-
man waiver petitions, this Court determined, the D. C. court
had acted judicially. Id., at 479–482. As to that adjudica-
tion, Feldman held, this Court alone among federal courts
had review authority. Hence, “to the extent that Hickey
and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions
for waiver, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over their complaints.” Id., at 482. But that determi-
nation did not dispose of the entire case, for in promulgating

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the bar admission rule, this Court said, the D. C. court had
acted legislatively, not judicially. Id., at 485–486. “Chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules,” the Court
elaborated, “do not necessarily require a United States dis-
trict court to review a final state-court judgment in a judi-
cial proceeding.” Id., at 486. Thus, the Court reasoned,
28 U. S. C. § 1257 did not bar District Court proceedings
addressed to the validity of the accreditation Rule itself.
Feldman, 460 U. S., at 486. The Rule could be contested in
federal court, this Court held, so long as plaintiffs did not
seek review of the Rule’s application in a particular case.
Ibid.
The Court endeavored to separate elements of the Hickey
and Feldman complaints that failed the jurisdictional thresh-
old from those that survived jurisdictional inspection.
Plaintiffs had urged that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals acted arbitrarily in denying the waiver petitions of
Hickey and Feldman, given that court’s “former policy of
granting waivers to graduates of unaccredited law schools.”
Ibid. That charge, the Court held, could not be pursued, for
it was “inextricably intertwined with the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals’ decisions, in judicial proceedings, to
deny [plaintiffs’] petitions.” Id., at 486–487.1
On the other hand, the Court said, plaintiffs could maintain
“claims that the [bar admission] rule is unconstitutional be-
cause it creates an irrebuttable presumption that only gradu-
ates of accredited law schools are fit to practice law, discrimi-
nates against those who have obtained equivalent legal
training by other means, and impermissibly delegates the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ power to regulate the
1 Earlier in the opinion the Court had used the same expression. In
a footnote, the Court explained that a district court could not entertain
constitutional claims attacking a state-court judgment, even if the state
court had not passed directly on those claims, when the constitutional
attack was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s judgment.
Feldman, 460 U. S., at 482, n. 16.

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bar to the American Bar Association,” for those claims “do
not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case.”
Id., at 487. The Court left open the question whether the
doctrine of res judicata foreclosed litigation of the elements
of the complaints spared from dismissal for want of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Id., at 487–488.
Since Feldman, this Court has never applied Rooker-
Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction. The
few decisions that have mentioned Rooker and Feldman
have done so only in passing or to explain why those cases
did not dictate dismissal. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 644, n. 3 (2002) (Rooker-
Feldman does not apply to a suit seeking review of state
agency action); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1005–
1006 (1994) (Rooker-Feldman bars a losing party in state
court “from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district
court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judg-
ment itself violates the loser’s federal rights,” but the doc-
trine has no application to a federal suit brought by a non-
party to the state suit.); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U. S. 356,
369–370, n. 16 (1990) (citing Rooker and Feldman for “the
rule that a federal district court cannot entertain an original
action alleging that a state court violated the Constitution
by giving effect to an unconstitutional state statute”);
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 622–623 (1989) (If,
instead of seeking review of an adverse state supreme court
decision in the Supreme Court, petitioners sued in federal
district court, the federal action would be an attempt to ob-
tain direct review of the state supreme court decision and
would “represent a partial inroad on Rooker-Feldman’s con-
struction of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.”); 2 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.,
2 Respondent Saudi Basic Industries Corp. urges that ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U. S. 605 (1989), expanded Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional
bar to include federal actions that simply raise claims previously liti-
gated in state court. Brief for Respondent 20–22. This is not so. In

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481 U. S. 1, 6–10 (1987) (abstaining under Younger v. Harris,
401 U. S. 37 (1971), rather than dismissing under Rooker-
Feldman, in a suit that challenged Texas procedures for en-
forcing judgments); 481 U. S., at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(The “so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine” does not deprive
the Court of jurisdiction to decide Texaco’s challenge to the
Texas procedures); id., at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (Rooker and Feldman do not apply; Texaco filed its
federal action to protect its “right to a meaningful opportu-
nity for appellate review, not to challenge the merits of the
Texas suit.”). But cf. 481 U. S., at 25–26 (Marshall, J., con-
curring in judgment) (Rooker-Feldman would apply because
Texaco’s claims necessarily called for review of the merits of
its state appeal). See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755,
783–784, n. 21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (it would be
anomalous to allow courts to sit in review of judgments en-
tered by courts of equal, or greater, authority (citing Rooker
and Feldman)). 3
ASARCO, the petitioners (defendants below in the state-court action)
sought review in this Court of the Arizona Supreme Court’s invalidation
of a state statute governing mineral leases on state lands. 490 U. S., at
610. This Court dismissed the suggestion of the United States that the
petitioners should have pursued their claim as a new action in federal
district court. Such an action, we said, “in essence, would be an attempt
to obtain direct review of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in the
lower federal courts” in contravention of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. 490 U. S., at
622–623. The injury of which the petitioners (the losing parties in state
court) could have complained in the hypothetical federal suit would have
been caused by the state court’s invalidation of their mineral leases, and
the relief they would have sought would have been to undo the state
court’s invalidation of the statute. The hypothetical suit in ASARCO,
therefore, shares the characteristics of the suits in Rooker and Feldman,
i. e., loser in state court invites federal district court to overturn state-
court judgment.
3 Between 1923, when the Court decided Rooker, and 1983, when it de-
cided Feldman, the Court cited Rooker in one opinion, Fishgold v. Sulli-
van Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275, 283 (1946), in reference to the
finality of prior judgments. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S.
413, 415 (1923) (“Unless and until . . . reversed or modified, [the state-court
judgment] would be an effective and conclusive adjudication.”). Rooker’s

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II
In 1980, two subsidiaries of petitioner Exxon Mobil Corpo-
ration (then the separate companies Exxon Corp. and Mobil
Corp.) formed joint ventures with respondent Saudi Basic
Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi
Arabia. 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (NJ 2002). Two decades
later, the parties began to dispute royalties that SABIC had
charged the joint ventures for sublicenses to a polyethylene
manufacturing method. 364 F. 3d 102, 103 (CA3 2004).
SABIC preemptively sued the two ExxonMobil subsidiar-
ies in Delaware Superior Court in July 2000 seeking a declar-
atory judgment that the royalty charges were proper under
the joint venture agreements. 194 F. Supp. 2d, at 385–386.
About two weeks later, ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries
countersued SABIC in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, alleging that SABIC overcharged
the joint ventures for the sublicenses. Id., at 385; App. 3.
ExxonMobil invoked subject-matter jurisdiction in the New
Jersey action under 28 U. S. C. § 1330, which authorizes dis-
trict courts to adjudicate actions against foreign states. 194
F. Supp. 2d, at 401.4
In January 2002, the ExxonMobil subsidiaries answered
SABIC’s state-court complaint, asserting as counterclaims
the same claims ExxonMobil had made in the federal suit in
New Jersey. 364 F. 3d, at 103. The state suit went to trial
in March 2003, and the jury returned a verdict of over $400
million in favor of the ExxonMobil subsidiaries. Ibid.;
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical
Co., 866 A. 2d 1, 11 (Del. 2005). SABIC appealed the judg-
ment entered on the verdict to the Delaware Supreme Court.
Before the state-court trial, SABIC moved to dismiss the
federal suit, alleging, inter alia, immunity under the Foreign
only other appearance in the United States Reports before 1983 occurs in
Justice White’s dissent from denial of certiorari in Florida State Bd. of
Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U. S. 960, 961 (1971).
4 SABIC is a Saudi Arabian corporation, 70% owned by the Saudi Gov-
ernment and 30% owned by private investors. 194 F. Supp. 2d, at 384.

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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq.
(2000 ed. and Supp. II). The Federal District Court denied
SABIC’s motion to dismiss. 194 F. Supp. 2d, at 401–407,
416–417. SABIC took an interlocutory appeal, and the
Court of Appeals heard argument in December 2003, over
eight months after the state-court jury verdict. 364 F. 3d,
at 103–104.5
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, raised the ques-
tion whether “subject matter jurisdiction over this case fails
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because ExxonMobil’s
claims have already been litigated in state court.” Id., at
104.6 The court did not question the District Court’s posses-
sion of subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset of the suit,
but held that federal jurisdiction terminated when the Dela-
ware Superior Court entered judgment on the jury verdict.
Id., at 104–105. The court rejected ExxonMobil’s argument
that Rooker-Feldman could not apply because ExxonMobil
filed its federal complaint well before the state-court judg-
ment. The only relevant consideration, the court stated, “is
whether the state judgment precedes a federal judgment on
the same claims.” 364 F. 3d, at 105. If Rooker-Feldman
did not apply to federal actions filed prior to a state-court
judgment, the Court of Appeals worried, “we would be en-
couraging parties to maintain federal actions as ‘insurance
policies’ while their state court claims were pending.” 364
F. 3d, at 105. Once ExxonMobil’s claims had been litigated
to a judgment in state court, the Court of Appeals held,
Rooker-Feldman “preclude[d] [the] federal district court
5 At ExxonMobil’s request, the Court of Appeals initially stayed its con-
sideration of the appeal to await resolution of the proceedings in Delaware.
App. 9–10. In November 2003, shortly after SABIC filed its appeal in the
Delaware Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, on SABIC’s motion, lifted
the stay and set the appeal for argument. Id., at 11–13.
6 One day before argument, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to
be prepared to address whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived
the District Court of jurisdiction over the case. App. 17.

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from proceeding.” 364 F. 3d, at 104 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
ExxonMobil, at that point prevailing in Delaware, was not
seeking to overturn the state-court judgment. Neverthe-
less, the Court of Appeals hypothesized that, if SABIC won
on appeal in Delaware, ExxonMobil would be endeavoring in
the federal action to “invalidate” the state-court judgment,
“the very situation,” the court concluded, “contemplated by
Rooker-Feldman’s ‘inextricably intertwined’ bar.” Id., at
106.
We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. 924 (2004), to resolve con-
flict among the Courts of Appeals over the scope of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We now reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.7
III
Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in
which this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state-court
judgments, 28 U. S. C. § 1257, precludes a United States dis-
trict court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an
action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under
a congressional grant of authority, e. g., § 1330 (suits against
foreign states), § 1331 (federal question), and § 1332 (diver-
sity). In both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit
in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complain-
ing of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and
seeking review and rejection of that judgment. Plaintiffs in
both cases, alleging federal-question jurisdiction, called upon
7 SABIC contends that this case is moot because the Delaware Supreme
Court has affirmed the trial-court judgment in favor of ExxonMobil, Saudi
Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A. 2d 1
(2005), and has denied reargument en banc, Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., No. 493, 2003 (Feb. 22, 2005). Brief for
Respondent 10–13. SABIC continues to oppose the Delaware judgment,
however, and has represented that it will petition this Court for a writ of
certiorari. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22–23. The controversy therefore remains
live.

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the District Court to overturn an injurious state-court judg-
ment. Because § 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority
to review a state court’s judgment solely in this Court, e. g.,
Feldman, 460 U. S., at 476; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Locomotive Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 286 (1970); Rooker, 263
U. S., at 416, the District Courts in Rooker and Feldman
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See Verizon Md. Inc.,
535 U. S., at 644, n. 3 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine merely
recognizes that 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is a grant of original juris-
diction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise
appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which
Congress has reserved to this Court, see § 1257(a).”).8
When there is parallel state and federal litigation,
Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of
judgment in state court. This Court has repeatedly held
that “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar
to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal
court having jurisdiction.” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S.
268, 282 (1910); accord Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S.
922, 928 (1975); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 398 U. S., at 295.
Comity or abstention doctrines may, in various circum-
stances, permit or require the federal court to stay or dis-
miss the federal action in favor of the state-court litigation.
See, e. g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U. S. 800 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401
U. S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943);
Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496
(1941). But neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the no-
tion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes
if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related
question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.
8 Congress, if so minded, may explicitly empower district courts to over-
see certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in author-
izing federal habeas review of state prisoners’ petitions. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(a).

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293 Cite as: 544 U. S. 280 (2005)
Opinion of the Court
Disposition of the federal action, once the state-court adju-
dication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law.
The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1738, originally
enacted in 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, requires the federal court
to “give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment
as another court of that State would give.” Parsons Steel,
Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U. S. 518, 523 (1986); accord
Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367,
373 (1996); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U. S. 373, 380–381 (1985). Preclusion, of
course, is not a jurisdictional matter. See Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 8(c) (listing res judicata as an affirmative defense). In
parallel litigation, a federal court may be bound to recognize
the claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judg-
ment, but federal jurisdiction over an action does not termi-
nate automatically on the entry of judgment in the state
court.
Nor does § 1257 stop a district court from exercising
subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts
to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in
state court. If a federal plaintiff “present[s] some independ-
ent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that
a state court has reached in a case to which he was a
party . . . , then there is jurisdiction and state law determines
whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclu-
sion.” GASH Assocs. v. Rosemont, 995 F. 2d 726, 728 (CA7
1993); accord Noel v. Hall, 341 F. 3d 1148, 1163–1164 (CA9
2003).
This case surely is not the “paradigm situation in which
Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from pro-
ceeding.” 364 F. 3d, at 104 (quoting E. B. v. Verniero, 119
F. 3d 1077, 1090–1091 (CA3 1997)). ExxonMobil plainly has
not repaired to federal court to undo the Delaware judgment
in its favor. Rather, it appears ExxonMobil filed suit in Fed-
eral District Court (only two weeks after SABIC filed in
Delaware and well before any judgment in state court) to

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294 EXXON MOBIL CORP. v. SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES CORP.
Opinion of the Court
protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds
(such as the state statute of limitations) that might not pre-
clude relief in the federal venue. Tr. of Oral Arg. 46; App.
35–36.9 Rooker-Feldman did not prevent the District Court
from exercising jurisdiction when ExxonMobil filed the fed-
eral action, and it did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction
after ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
9 The Court of Appeals criticized ExxonMobil for pursuing its federal
suit as an “insurance policy” against an adverse result in state court. 364
F. 3d 102, 105–106 (CA3 2004). There is nothing necessarily inappropri-
ate, however, about filing a protective action. See, e. g., Rhines v. Weber,
ante, at 277–278 (permitting a federal district court to stay a federal ha-
beas action and hold the petition in abeyance while a petitioner exhausts
claims in state court); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Department of Revenue of
Ore., 920 F. 2d 581, 584, and n. 9 (CA9 1990) (noting that the railroad
company had filed protective actions in state court to prevent expiration
of the state statute of limitations); Government of Virgin Islands v.
Neadle, 861 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (MD Fla. 1994) (staying an action brought
by plaintiffs “to protect themselves” in the event that personal jurisdiction
over the defendants failed in the United States District Court for the
Virgin Islands); see also England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U. S. 411, 421 (1964) (permitting a party to reserve litigation of federal
constitutional claims for federal court while a state court resolves ques-
tions of state law).