PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD, et al.

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408 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD,
et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the third circuit
No. 03–9627. Argued February 28, 2005—Decided April 27, 2005
After the Pennsylvania Superior Court found petitioner’s state postconvic-
tion petition untimely under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA) and the State Supreme Court denied review, petitioner
sought federal habeas. The District Court refused to dismiss the peti-
tion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s
(AEDPA) statute of limitations, finding that petitioner was entitled to
both statutory and equitable tolling while his PCRA petition was pend-
ing even though that petition was untimely under state law. Reversing,
the Third Circuit held, with regard to statutory tolling, that an untimely
PCRA petition is not “a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review” that tolls AEDPA’s limitations pe-
riod under 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2), and that there were no extraordinary
circumstances justifying equitable tolling.
Held: Because petitioner filed his federal habeas petition beyond the dead-
line and is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling for any of that
time period, his federal petition is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limita-
tions. Pp. 413–419.
(a) Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. When this Court
held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, 8, 11, that time limits on postcon-
viction petitions are “condition[s] to filing,” such that an untimely peti-
tion would not be deemed “properly filed,” it reserved the question
“whether the existence of certain exceptions to a timely filing require-
ment can prevent a late application from being considered improperly
filed,” id., at 8, n. 2. There are no grounds for treating the two differ-
ently. Under the common understanding of “properly filed” that guided
the Artuz Court, a petition filed after a time limit, which does not fit
within any exceptions to that limit, is no more “properly filed” than a
petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. This common-
sense reading is confirmed by the purpose of AEDPA’s statute of limita-
tions and is supported by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214. Petitioner’s
counterarguments—that “condition[s] to filing” are merely those condi-
tions necessary to get a clerk to accept the petition, not conditions re-
quiring judicial consideration; that a condition that must be applied on

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Syllabus
a claim-by-claim basis cannot be a “condition to filing”; and that this
Court’s interpretation is unfair to petitioners who try in good faith to
exhaust their state remedies—are rejected. Artuz does not require a
different result. There is an obvious distinction between time limits,
which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to con-
sider that petition, and the type of rule-of-decision procedural bars at
issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief. Pp. 413–417.
(b) Because petitioner waited for years after his claims became avail-
able to file his PCRA petition and five more months once his PCRA
proceedings became final before seeking relief in federal court, he has
not established that he pursued his claims diligently. Thus, assuming
equitable tolling applies here, he is not entitled to equitable tolling.
See, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 96.
Pp. 418–419.
71 Fed. Appx. 127, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined,
post, p. 419.
David W. Wycoff argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Billy H. Nolas and Maureen Kear-
ney Rowley.
Ronald Eisenberg argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief were Thomas W. Dolgenos, John W.
Goldsborough, Arnold H. Gordon, and Lynne Abraham.*
*Peter Goldberger, David Richman, Joseph Farber, and David M. Por-
ter filed a brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of
Alabama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, and Stephanie
N. Morman, Deputy Solicitor General, by John W. Suthers, Interim Attor-
ney General of Colorado, and Christopher L. Morano, Chief State’s Attor-
ney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, M. Jane Brady of Delaware,
Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G.
Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana,
Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Phill Kline of Kansas, G. Steven Rowe of Maine,
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah
W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Jim Petro of Ohio,

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410 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1-year statute of limita-
tions for filing a federal habeas corpus petition. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d)(1). That limitations period is tolled, however,
while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judg-
ment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). This case requires
us to decide whether a state postconviction petition rejected
by the state court as untimely nonetheless is “properly filed”
within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). We conclude that it is
not, and hold that petitioner John Pace’s federal petition is
time barred.
In February 1986, petitioner pleaded guilty to second-
degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime in a
Pennsylvania state court. He was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole. Petitioner did not file a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and he did not file a di-
rect appeal. In August 1986, he filed a petition under the
Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (1988) (amended and renamed by
Act No. 1988–47, §§ 3, 6, 1988 Pa. Laws pp. 337–342). These
proceedings concluded in September 1992, when the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court denied petitioner’s untimely request
for discretionary review.
Over four years later, on November 27, 1996, petitioner
filed another state postconviction petition, this time under
the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (1998). The PCRA had replaced
the PCHA in 1988 and was amended in 1995 to include, for
the first time, a statute of limitations for state postconviction
W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas
W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg
Abbott of Texas, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Rob McKenna of Washing-
ton, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.

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Opinion of the Court
petitions, with three exceptions. 1 Although petitioner’s
PCRA petition was filed after the date upon which the
new time limits became effective, the petition said nothing
about timeliness.
After reviewing petitioner’s PCRA petition, appointed
counsel submitted a “no-merit” letter. On July 23, 1997, the
Court of Common Pleas dismissed the petition, without call-
ing for a response from the Commonwealth. The court
noted that petitioner’s claims previously had been litigated
and were meritless. Petitioner appealed. On May 6, 1998,
the Commonwealth filed a brief in response, asserting that
petitioner’s PCRA petition was untimely under the PCRA’s
time bar, § 9545(b), and citing as support Commonwealth v.
Alcorn, 703 A. 2d 1054 (Pa. Super. 1997). On May 28, 1998,
petitioner responded by arguing that the time limit was
inapplicable to him. The Superior Court dismissed his peti-
tion as untimely on December 3, 1998. The Superior Court
reasoned that petitioner’s PCRA petition did not come
within the statutory note following § 9545(b), see ibid., and
that petitioner had “neither alleged nor proven” that he
fell within any statutory exception, see §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii).
App. 316–317. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied re-
view on July 29, 1999. Id., at 372.
On December 24, 1999, petitioner filed a federal habeas
petition under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the District Court for the
1 The amended statute states that “[a]ny” postconviction petition, “in-
cluding a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year”
from the date the petitioner’s conviction becomes final. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 9545(b)(1) (1998). However, three exceptions are provided: if govern-
mental interference prevented filing; if a new constitutional rule is made
retroactive; or if new facts arise that could not have been discovered
through due diligence. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii). A statutory note provides
that the 1995 amendments “shall apply to petitions filed after [January 16,
1996]; however, a petitioner whose judgment has become final on or before
[January 16, 1996] shall be deemed to have filed a timely petition . . . if
the petitioner’s first petition is filed within one year of [January 16, 1996].”
Statutory Note on § 9545(b).

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412 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
Opinion of the Court
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The Magistrate Judge
recommended dismissal of the petition under AEDPA’s stat-
ute of limitations, § 2244(d)(1), but the District Court re-
jected that recommendation, App. 447–466 (June 7, 2001,
memorandum and order), 503–533 (Mar. 29, 2002, memoran-
dum and order). The District Court recognized that, with-
out tolling, petitioner’s petition was time barred.2 But it
held that petitioner was entitled to both statutory and equi-
table tolling for the time during which his PCRA petition
was pending—November 27, 1996 to July 29, 1999. Begin-
ning with statutory tolling, the District Court held that, even
though the state court rejected his PCRA petition as un-
timely, that did not prevent the petition from being “properly
filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). It reasoned that
because the PCRA set up judicially reviewable exceptions to
the time limit, the PCRA time limit was not a “condition
to filing” but a “condition to obtaining relief ” as we de-
scribed those distinct concepts in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S.
4, 11 (2000). The District Court alternatively found extraor-
dinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
Pace v. Vaughn, 71 Fed. Appx. 127 (2003) (not precedential).
With regard to statutory tolling, it relied on a line of Third
Circuit cases to conclude that the PCRA time limit con-
stitutes a “condition to filing” and that, when a state court
deems a petition untimely, it is not “properly filed.” Id., at
128. With regard to equitable tolling, it held that there
were not extraordinary circumstances justifying that rem-
edy. Id., at 129. Because Circuits have divided over
whether a state postconviction petition that the state court
2 The District Court noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, “peti-
tioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations on April 24, 1996 have until one year from the enact-
ment of the habeas statute of limitations to file their petitions.” App. 453,
503. Without tolling, therefore, petitioner’s federal habeas petition was
filed well after the April 1997 deadline.

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Opinion of the Court
has rejected as untimely nonetheless may be “properly
filed,” we granted certiorari.3 542 U. S. 965 (2004). We
now affirm.
In Artuz v. Bennett, supra, we held that time limits on
postconviction petitions are “condition[s] to filing,” such that
an untimely petition would not be deemed “properly filed.”
Id., at 8, 11 (“[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its
delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applica-
ble laws and rules governing filings” including “time limits
upon its delivery”). However, we reserved the question we
face here: “whether the existence of certain exceptions to a
timely filing requirement can prevent a late application from
being considered improperly filed.” Id., at 8, n. 2. Having
now considered the question, we see no grounds for treating
the two differently.
As in Artuz, we are guided by the “common usage” and
“commo[n] underst[anding]” of the phrase “properly filed.”
Id., at 8, 9. In common understanding, a petition filed after
a time limit, and which does not fit within any exceptions to
that limit, is no more “properly filed” than a petition filed
after a time limit that permits no exception. The purpose of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations confirms this commonsense
reading. On petitioner’s theory, a state prisoner could toll
the statute of limitations at will simply by filing untimely
state postconviction petitions. This would turn § 2244(d)(2)
into a de facto extension mechanism, quite contrary to the
purpose of AEDPA, and open the door to abusive delay.
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214 (2002), points to the same
conclusion. In Saffold, we considered whether § 2244(d)(2)
required tolling during the 41 ⁄ 2 months between the Califor-
nia appellate court’s denial of Saffold’s postconviction peti-
tion and his further petition in the California Supreme
Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition
“on the merits and for lack of diligence,” which raised the
3 Compare, e. g., Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F. 3d 724, 726–728 (CA9
2001), with Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F. 3d 157, 162–168 (CA3 2003).

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Opinion of the Court
question whether that court had dismissed for lack of merit,
for untimeliness, or for both. Id., at 225 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although we ultimately remanded, we ex-
plained that, “[i]f the California Supreme Court had clearly
ruled that Saffold’s 41 ⁄ 2-month delay was ‘unreasonable,’ ”
i. e., untimely, “that would be the end of the matter, regard-
less of whether it also addressed the merits of the claim, or
whether its timeliness ruling was ‘entangled’ with the mer-
its.” Id., at 226 (emphasis added); see also id., at 236 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (“If the California court held that all of
[Saffold’s] state habeas petitions were years overdue, then
they were not ‘properly filed’ at all, and there would be no
tolling of the federal limitations period”). What we inti-
mated in Saffold we now hold: When a postconviction peti-
tion is untimely under state law, “that [is] the end of the
matter” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner makes three principal arguments against this
reading. First, he asserts that “condition[s] to filing” are
merely those conditions necessary to get a clerk to accept the
petition, as opposed to conditions that require some judicial
consideration. Respondent David DiGuglielmo (hereinafter
respondent) characterizes petitioner’s position, which the
dissent also appears to embrace, see post, at 426, as a juridi-
cal game of “hot potato,” in which a petition will be “properly
filed” so long as a petitioner is able to hand it to the clerk
without the clerk tossing it back. Brief for Respondent 16.
Be that as it may, petitioner’s theory is inconsistent with
Artuz, where we explained that jurisdictional matters and
fee payments, both of which often necessitate judicial scru-
tiny, are “condition[s] to filing.” 4 See 531 U. S., at 9. We
4 With regard to jurisdiction, see, e. g., Commonwealth v. Judge, 568 Pa.
377, 387–389, 797 A. 2d 250, 257 (2002) (Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction
over PCRA petition, despite the fact the petitioner was not in Pennsylva-
nia custody). With regard to filing fees, see, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proc.
904(F) (2005) (“When a defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is
unable to pay the costs of the post-conviction collateral proceedings, the

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Opinion of the Court
fail to see how timeliness is any less a “filing” requirement
than the mechanical rules that are enforceable by clerks, if
such rules exist.5 For example, Pennsylvania Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 901 (2005), which is entitled “Initiation of
Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings,” lists two manda-
tory conditions: (A) the petition “shall” be filed within the
time limit, and (B) the proceedings “shall be initiated by fil-
ing” a verified petition and “3 copies with the clerk of the
court in which the defendant was convicted and sentenced.”
The natural reading is that (A) is every bit as much of a
“condition to filing” as (B).
Petitioner also argues that, because § 2244(d)(2) refers to
a “properly filed application,” then any condition that must
be applied on a claim-by-claim basis, such as Pennsylvania’s
time limit, cannot be a “condition to filing.” (Emphasis
added.) Section 2244, however, refutes this position. Sec-
tion 2244(b)(3)(C), for example, states that the court of ap-
judge shall order that the defendant be permitted to proceed in forma
pauperis”).
5 Perhaps not unintentionally, petitioner fails to provide us any guidance
on exactly which Pennsylvania Rules are subject to a clerk’s striking for
noncompliance. We doubt there are many such rules, both because few
truly mechanical rules exist and because the role of the clerk in refusing
petitions in most courts is quite limited. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 5(e) (“The clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper pre-
sented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form
as required by these rules or any local rules or practices”); 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254 Rule 3(b) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“The clerk must file the petition and
enter it on the docket”); see also Advisory Committee’s Note on Habeas
Corpus Rule 3(b), 28 U. S. C., p. 42 (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Rule 3(b) requires
the clerk to file a petition, even though it may otherwise fail to comply
with Rule 2. This rule . . . is not limited to those instances where the
petition is defective only in form; the clerk would also be required, for
example, to file the petition even though it lacked the requisite filing fee
or an in forma pauperis form”). Indeed, not even filing in the right court
would be a “condition to filing” under petitioner’s limited theory. See 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(a) (2004) (instructing that, when a petition is filed
in the wrong court, it is not to be stricken but transferred to the proper
court). Under this theory, “filing” conditions may be an empty set.

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Opinion of the Court
peals “may authorize the filing of a second or successive ap-
plication only if it determines that the application makes a
prima facie showing that the application satisfies the re-
quirements of this subsection.” (Emphases added.) Yet
the “requirements” of the subsection are not applicable to
the application as a whole; instead, they require inquiry into
specific “claim[s].” See § 2244(b)(2)(A) (“claim” relies on a
new rule made retroactive); § 2244(b)(2)(B) (“claim” with new
factual predicate).6 In fact, petitioner’s argument is incon-
sistent with § 2244(d)(2) itself, which refers not just to a
“properly filed application,” but to a “properly filed applica-
tion . . . with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim.”
(Emphasis added.)
Finally, petitioner challenges the fairness of our interpre-
tation. He claims that a “petitioner trying in good faith to
exhaust state remedies may litigate in state court for years
only to find out at the end that he was never ‘properly filed,’ ”
and thus that his federal habeas petition is time barred.
Brief for Petitioner 30. A prisoner seeking state postcon-
viction relief might avoid this predicament, however, by fil-
ing a “protective” petition in federal court and asking the
federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceed-
ings until state remedies are exhausted. See Rhines v.
Weber, ante, at 278. A petitioner’s reasonable confusion
about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily
constitute “good cause” for him to file in federal court. Ibid.
(“[I]f the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust,
his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and
there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in in-
6 Similarly, § 2244(d)(1) provides that a “1-year period of limitation shall
apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” (Emphasis added.)
The subsection then provides one means of calculating the limitation
with regard to the “application” as a whole, § 2244(d)(1)(A) (date of final
judgment), but three others that require claim-by-claim consideration,
§ 2244(d)(1)(B) (governmental interference); § 2244(d)(1)(C) (new right
made retroactive); § 2244(d)(1)(D) (new factual predicate).

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Opinion of the Court
tentionally dilatory tactics,” then the district court likely
“should stay, rather than dismiss, the mixed petition”).
The dissent suggests that our conclusion in Artuz, that
state procedural bars “prescrib[ing] a rule of decision for a
court” confronted with certain claims previously adjudicated
or not properly presented are not “filing” conditions, re-
quires the conclusion that the time limit at issue here also is
not a “filing” condition. Post, at 425–426; see Artuz v. Ben-
nett, 531 U. S., at 10–11 (discussing N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§§ 440.10(2)(a) and (c) (McKinney 1994)). The dissent ig-
nores the fact that Artuz itself distinguished between time
limits and procedural bars. 531 U. S., at 8–10. For pur-
poses of determining what are “filing” conditions, there is an
obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very
initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that
petition, and the type of “rule of decision” procedural bars
at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief.7
Far from requiring “verbal gymnastics,” it must be the case
that a petition that cannot even be initiated or considered
due to the failure to include a timely claim is not “properly
filed.” Id., at 10.
For these reasons, we hold that time limits, no matter their
form, are “filing” conditions. Because the state court re-
jected petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not
“properly filed,” and he is not entitled to statutory tolling
under § 2244(d)(2).
7 Compare, e. g., Pa. Rule Crim. Proc. 901(A) (2005) (titled “Initiation of
Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings” and listing compliance with the
time limit as one mandatory condition); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b) (2002)
(titled “Jurisdiction and proceedings” and listing the time limit); Common-
wealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 328, 737 A. 2d 214, 222 (1999) (describing the
time limit as “jurisdictional”); 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2004–2005)
(stating that a court “shall not entertain” a time-barred petition), with 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9543(a) (2002) (titled “Eligibility for relief ” and listing
procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz); 2 Ala. Rule Crim.
Proc. 32.2(a) (2004–2005) (stating that a “petitioner will not be given re-
lief ” if certain procedural bars, like those at issue in Artuz, are present).

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418 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
Opinion of the Court
We now turn to petitioner’s argument that he is entitled
to equitable tolling for the time during which his untimely
PCRA petition was pending in the state courts.8 Generally,
a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of estab-
lishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way. See, e. g., Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 96 (1990). Petitioner argues that he
has satisfied the extraordinary circumstance test. He rea-
sons that Third Circuit law at the time he sought relief re-
quired him to exhaust his state remedies and thus seek
PCRA relief, even if it was unlikely the state court would
reach the merits of his claims, and that state law made it
appear as though he might gain relief, despite the petition’s
untimeliness. Thus, he claims, “state law and Third Circuit
exhaustion law created a trap” on which he detrimentally
relied as his federal time limit slipped away. Brief for Peti-
tioner 34. Even if we were to accept petitioner’s theory, he
would not be entitled to relief because he has not established
the requisite diligence.
Petitioner’s PCRA petition set forth three claims: that his
sentence was “illegal”; that his plea was invalid because he
did not understand his life sentence was without the possibil-
ity of parole; and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at “all levels of representation.” App. 202, 220.
The first two of these claims were available to petitioner as
early as 1986. Indeed, petitioner asserted a version of his
invalid plea claim in his August 21, 1986, PCHA petition.
See id., at 144. The third claim—ineffective assistance of
8 We have never squarely addressed the question whether equitable toll-
ing is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Cf. Pliler v. Ford,
542 U. S. 225 (2004). Because respondent assumes that equitable tolling
applies and because petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling under
any standard, we assume without deciding its application for purposes of
this case.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
counsel—related only to events occurring in or before 1991.
See id., at 191.
Yet petitioner waited years, without any valid justification,
to assert these claims in his November 27, 1996, PCRA peti-
tion.9 Had petitioner advanced his claims within a reason-
able time of their availability, he would not now be facing
any time problem, state or federal.10 And not only did peti-
tioner sit on his rights for years before he filed his PCRA
petition, but he also sat on them for five more months after
his PCRA proceedings became final before deciding to seek
relief in federal court. See id., at 372, 373. Under long-
established principles, petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes
equity’s operation. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, supra, at 96; McQuiddy v. Ware, 20 Wall. 14, 19
(1874) (“Equity always refuses to interfere where there has
been gross laches in the prosecution of rights”).
Because petitioner filed his federal habeas petition beyond
the deadline, and because he was not entitled to statutory or
equitable tolling for any of that period, his federal petition
is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners in state custody have a 1-year
9 Petitioner’s PCRA petition did cite allegedly “new” evidence to sup-
port his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that
his plea was invalid because he did not understand his life sentence was
without the possibility of parole. However, this new evidence was not
new at all: It consisted of affidavits from petitioner’s parents and brother
regarding a meeting they attended with petitioner’s counsel and petitioner
in 1985 or 1986. App. 195–199.
10 As noted previously, the PCRA time limit only came into effect in
January 1996, see n. 1, supra, and petitioner’s federal habeas petition was
due in April 1997, see n. 2, supra.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
window in which they may file a federal habeas corpus
petition. 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides,
however, for tolling of the statute of limitations during the
pendency of any “properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review.” § 2244(d)(2). Under
the interpretation of that statutory provision adopted by the
Court today, a petition for state postconviction relief does
not constitute a “properly filed application for . . . collateral
review,” even if the application has been accepted, filed, and
reviewed in full by the state court. The Court’s chosen rule
means that a state application will not be deemed properly
filed—no matter how long the state court has held the peti-
tion, how carefully it has reviewed the merits of the peti-
tion’s claims, or how it has justified its decision—if the court
ultimately determines that particular claims contained in the
application fail to comply with the applicable state statute of
limitations. The Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) is not
compelled by the text of that provision and will most as-
suredly frustrate its purpose.1
I
The words “properly filed application for . . . collateral re-
view” are not defined in AEDPA. We did, however, inter-
pret those words in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), by
considering their ordinary meaning in the context of the stat-
utory scheme in which they appear. This Court has long
understood that a “paper is filed when it is delivered to the
proper official and by him received and filed.” United
States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 76 (1916). In Artuz, we
expanded upon that understanding, explaining that an “ap-
plication is ‘filed,’ as that term is commonly understood,
when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate
court officer for placement into the official record. And an
1 Because I would hold that Pace was entitled to statutory tolling, I need
not answer the question whether the Court of Appeals erred by reversing
the District Court’s decision to grant Pace equitable tolling.

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application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and accept-
ance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules
governing filings.” 531 U. S., at 8 (citations omitted). Be-
cause applications and claims are distinct, we held that a
petitioner’s application for postconviction review is “prop-
erly filed” even when his legal claims are procedurally
barred under state law.
Artuz left open the question presented here—whether a
state statute of limitations that allows certain categories of
petitioners to file otherwise late applications is comparable
to a general precondition to filing (such as the payment of a
filing fee) or is instead more akin to a procedural bar that
prevents a court from considering particular claims. Id., at
8–9, n. 2. If the state time bar at issue here is more like
the former, Pace’s failure to comply with it would make his
application improperly filed under AEDPA. If, however,
the state time bar is more like the procedural bar in Artuz,
Pace’s failure to comply with it would not change the fact
that his application was “properly filed.” Before answering
that question, it is useful to explain why the state court ulti-
mately found Pace’s application to be untimely.
II
Pace filed the application in question—his second request
for state postconviction review—pro se on November 27,
1996, under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (1998).2 Pace’s
2 Pace’s conviction became final in 1986, long before the Pennsylvania
Legislature adopted the PCRA’s current statute of limitations. Pace’s
original petition for postconviction relief was filed under the Pennsylvania
Post Conviction Hearing Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. (1988)
(amended and renamed by Act No. 1988–47, §§ 3, 6, 1988 Pa. Laws
pp. 337–342), which did not include a statute of limitations. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court denied Pace’s request for review on September 3,
1992. The PCRA time bar did not become effective until January 16,
1996. See Act No. 1995–32, § 9579, 1995 Pa. Laws pp. 1125–1126 (Spec.
Sess. 1).

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422 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
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PCRA petition raised two claims that he alleged had not
been presented during his first round of postconviction re-
view: first, that his life-without-parole sentence was uncon-
stitutional under state and federal law; and second, that his
guilty plea colloquy violated due process. Pace provided
new evidence that he had not presented during his first
round of postconviction review, see App. 191, 195–201, and
explained to the court that his two new claims should not be
procedurally barred because they had not been “fully liti-
gated or waived” under state law, id., at 191. Pace’s justifi-
cations for raising these two new claims make plain that he
was attempting to fit his application within the commonly
recognized judicial exceptions to Pennsylvania’s then-
applicable state procedural bars.3
At the time Pace filed his PCRA petition, no Pennsylvania
court had yet applied the PCRA statute of limitations to a
petitioner whose conviction had become final prior to the ef-
fective date of the Act.4 Nor had the time in which Pace
had a right to file a federal habeas petition expired. Under
3 For instance, Pace argued that his failure to raise the claims below
should be excused because of ineffective assistance of counsel. See App.
191–194, 220–226. Pace also argued that a failure to consider the new
claim would constitute a “miscarriage of justice,” id., at 192, 217–219, and
that his new claims challenged the legality of his sentence, id., at 189, 192.
To support each of these arguments, Pace cited state cases demonstrating
the existence of judicial exceptions to procedural default.
4 That time bar provides that “[a]ny petition under this subchapter, in-
cluding a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim . . . ; (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of
due diligence; or (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 9545(b) (1998) (emphasis added).

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AEDPA, Pace had until April 24, 1997, to file a federal ha-
beas petition. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 217 (2002)
(1-year limitations period runs from April 24, 1996, for any
prisoner whose conviction became final prior to the effective
date of the Act). Pace could not, however, obtain relief in a
federal court without first exhausting his state remedies.
28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Thus, as far as Pace knew on No-
vember 27, 1996, there was no state or federal statute of
limitations that precluded him from obtaining relief, but he
was required (1) by AEDPA to go to state court and (2) by
state law to demonstrate that his claim was not procedurally
barred. Unless Pace’s PCRA petition tolled the federal
statute of limitations, his claims would be time barred in
federal court on April 24, 1997.
Pace’s petition was docketed and the court appointed coun-
sel. On July 23, 1997, the state trial court denied relief on
the merits. Pace appealed. In May 1998, well after Pace’s
time to file a federal habeas petition had expired, the Com-
monwealth filed a brief in the state appellate court, which
argued for the first time that Pace’s petition was untimely
under the PCRA’s statute of limitations. On December 3,
1998, the state appellate court agreed, explaining that none
of Pace’s several claims fell within the three statutory excep-
tions to untimeliness contained in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9545(b)
(1998). The state appellate court’s conclusion became final
on July 29, 1999. It is that determination that provides the
basis for this Court’s ruling that, as a matter of federal law,
the pleading that generated protracted litigation in the state
courts was never “properly filed” in the first place.
III
In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000), we held that an
application for state postconviction review may be con-
sidered “properly filed” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C.
§ 2244(d)(2) even if the application fails to comply with state-
law procedural requirements that preclude relief on the mer-

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424 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
Stevens, J., dissenting
its of the applicant’s claims. 531 U. S., at 8. To construe
“ ‘properly filed application’ to mean ‘application raising
claims that are not mandatorily procedurally barred,’ [would
elide] the difference between an ‘application’ and a ‘claim.’
Only individual claims, and not the application containing
those claims, can be procedurally defaulted under state
law . . . .” Id., at 9. Furthermore:
“Ignoring this distinction would require judges to en-
gage in verbal gymnastics when an application contains
some claims that are procedurally barred and some that
are not. Presumably a court would have to say that the
application is ‘properly filed’ as to the nonbarred claims,
and not ‘properly filed’ as to the rest. The statute,
however, . . . does not contain the peculiar suggestion
that a single application can be both ‘properly filed’ and
not ‘properly filed.’ Ordinary English would refer to
certain claims as having been properly presented or
raised, irrespective of whether the application contain-
ing those claims was properly filed.” Id., at 10.
The same reasoning applies with equal force to the PCRA
time bar, which in effect operates in the same manner as the
procedural bar in Artuz. Under the PCRA, the state court
must determine not whether the entire application is time
barred, but rather whether individual claims are time
barred given the various exceptions enumerated in § 9545(b).
See n. 3, supra. Imagine, for example, a Pennsylvania peti-
tioner who states two claims in what is his second state ha-
beas petition. The first claim asserts a violation of due proc-
ess rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), in
which the petitioner demonstrates that his failure to raise
the claim during his first round of state postconviction
review was “the result of interference by government offi-
cials with the presentation of the claim” under 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (1998). The second claim asserts an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the same evi-

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dence raised in the petitioner’s first PCRA application.
Under the rule announced by the Court today, a federal court
would be forced to conclude that the petitioner’s first claim
was a “properly filed application for . . . collateral review”
for AEDPA purposes, while his second claim was improperly
filed. This is precisely the type of incoherent result that
Artuz sought to avoid.
Incoherent results will not be limited to petitions filed in
Pennsylvania. Many States provide exceptions from their
postconviction statutes of limitations that apply to appli-
cants’ individual claims. See, e. g., Alaska Stat. § 12.72.020
(Lexis 2004) (exempting from the statute of limitations, inter
alia, any claims “based on newly discovered evidence”); Fla.
Rule Crim. Proc. 3.850 (2005 Supp. Pamphlet) (excepting
from the general time bar any claim based on newly discov-
ered evidence, newly recognized rights, or neglect of coun-
sel); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 725, § 5/122–1(c) (West Supp.
2004) (allowing for late filings when petitioner can show that
delay was not due to negligence and excepting entirely from
the limitations period any “claim of actual innocence”); Iowa
Code § 822.3 (2003) (exception for any “ground of fact or law
that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period”); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 22, §§ 1089(D)(4)–(8) (West
Supp. 2005) (requiring the reviewing court to examine each
claim and permitting late filing if any included claim could
not have previously been presented on account of legal or
factual unavailability). For all applications originating in
such States, federal district courts must now engage in the
very “verbal gymnastics” that Artuz condemned. See 531
U. S., at 10.
The Court’s interpretation of “properly filed” in this con-
text conflicts with the meaning we gave the phrase in Artuz.
Indeed, the Court’s rule suggests that the phrase “properly
filed” takes on a different meaning when applied to time bars
than it does in the context of procedural bars. This Court

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426 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
Stevens, J., dissenting
has generally declined to adopt rules that would give the
same statutory provision different meanings in different con-
texts, see, e. g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 386 (2005),
and I would decline to do so here.
It would be much wiser simply to apply Artuz’s rule to
state time bars that, like the PCRA, operate like a proce-
dural bar. In this case, the PCRA time bar’s enumerated
exceptions, which require state courts to review the claims
elucidated in postconviction petitions and to determine
whether particular claims trigger the applicability of the
exceptions, plainly function like a procedural bar. Thus,
I would hold that Pace’s petition was “properly filed”—it was
“delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer
for placement into the official record” and complied with the
“applicable laws and rules governing filings.” Artuz, 531
U. S., at 8.
Application of the Artuz rule in this context is clearly con-
sonant with the statutory text.5 A time bar is nothing more
than a species of the larger category of procedural bars that
may preclude consideration of the merits of the state peti-
tion, and may raise questions that are equally difficult to
decide. Indeed, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,
the contention that a claim is untimely is an affirmative de-
fense that can be waived. Because most state laws respect-
ing untimely filings of postconviction petitions function in a
manner identical to the procedural bar at issue in Artuz,
there is no justification for giving special treatment to any
state rule based on untimeliness.
5 The majority claims that this interpretation of “properly filed” is incon-
sistent with the text of § 2244(d)(2). See ante, at 416. But the rule I
favor relies on the same interpretation, of the same statutory text, that
we adopted in Artuz. See 531 U. S., at 10. Unless the Court means im-
plicitly to overrule Artuz, its rule compels the conclusion that the singular
phrase “properly filed” takes on different meanings in different contexts.
That is the same interpretive exercise we unequivocally rejected in Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 386 (2005).

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IV
A rule treating statutes of limitations equivalently to pro-
cedural bars would accomplish the statutory purposes Con-
gress sought to vindicate in AEDPA. Congress fashioned
28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(2) in order to provide a strong “incentive
for individuals to seek relief from the state courts before
filing federal habeas petitions.” Duncan v. Walker, 533
U. S. 167, 180 (2001). As we explained in Duncan:
“The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) balances the inter-
ests served by the exhaustion requirement and the limi-
tation period. Section 2244(d)(2) promotes the exhaus-
tion of state remedies by protecting a state prisoner’s
ability later to apply for federal habeas relief while state
remedies are being pursued. At the same time, the pro-
vision limits the harm to the interest in finality by ac-
cording tolling effect only to ‘properly filed applica-
tion[s] . . . .’ ” Id., at 179–180.
In construing the words “properly filed,” therefore, we must
consider not only the “potential for delay in the adjudication
of federal law claims,” but also the need to avoid overburden-
ing district courts by encouraging “the very piecemeal litiga-
tion that the exhaustion requirement is designed to reduce.”
Id., at 180. AEDPA, after all, was designed to “streamline
and simplify” the federal habeas system in order to reduce
the “interminable delays” and “shameful overloading” that
had resulted from “various aspects of this Court’s habeas
corpus jurisprudence.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S.
236, 264–265 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court’s
rule is unfaithful to these legislative goals.
The Court’s principal justification for its rule is the fear
that allowing statutory tolling in this context would allow
prisoners to extend the federal statute of limitations indefi-
nitely by repeatedly filing meritless state petitions. See
ante, at 413 (“[A] state prisoner could toll the statute of limi-
tations at will simply by filing untimely state postconviction

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petitions”). That fear is misguided for two reasons. First,
it ignores a basic fact that we have recognized repeatedly—
a “prisoner’s principal interest, of course, is in obtaining
speedy federal relief on his claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455
U. S. 509, 520 (1982) (plurality opinion). Indeed, it is an un-
derstatement to say that the vast majority of federal prison-
ers “have no incentive to delay adjudication of their claims,”
Duncan, 533 U. S., at 191 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Most
prisoners have precisely the opposite incentive because de-
laying the initiation of federal postconviction relief will al-
most assuredly maximize their periods of incarceration.
Second, the Court’s concern is premised on the incorrect
assumption that the phrase “properly filed” has no meaning-
ful content unless all untimely petitions are by definition im-
proper. The reason that assumption is wrong is because any
claim that a state application has tolled the limitations period
will always depend on the district court’s finding that the
petition was “properly filed.” In my view, it would be en-
tirely appropriate, and consistent with the text and purposes
of AEDPA, to define “properly filed” as excluding any filings
deemed by the district court to be repetitious or abusive. If
an application for postconviction review is not filed in good
faith—filed, in other words, explicitly to prolong the federal
statute of limitations—it would be improper under AEDPA,
and statutory tolling would not be appropriate. Federal and
state courts have considerable experience identifying and
preventing the kind of dilatory pleadings that concern the
Court today. See, e. g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467,
479–489 (1991). There is no reason that courts could not
engage in similar analyses to prevent state prisoners from
prolonging indefinitely the AEDPA statute of limitations.6
6 Such an inquiry is consistent with Artuz, which distinguished between
properly filed applications and individual claims contained within those
applications. An application filed intentionally to prolong the federal
statute of limitations would be improper in its entirety. Indeed, it is dif-
ficult to imagine how one particular claim in an application could be im-

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Stevens, J., dissenting
Unfortunately, the most likely consequence of the Court’s
new rule will be to increase, not reduce, delays in the federal
system. The inevitable result of today’s decision will be a
flood of protective filings in the federal district courts. As
the history of this case demonstrates, litigants, especially
those proceeding pro se, cannot predict accurately whether
a state court will find their application timely filed. Because
a state court’s timeliness ruling cannot be predicted with
certainty, prisoners who would otherwise run the risk of
having the federal statute of limitations expire while they
are exhausting their state remedies will have no choice but
to file premature federal petitions accompanied by a request
to stay federal proceedings pending the exhaustion of their
state remedies. Cf. Rhines v. Weber, ante, at 278. The
Court admits that this type of protective filing will result
from its holding. See ante, at 416. I fail to see any merit
in a rule that knowingly and unnecessarily “add[s] to the
burdens on the district courts in a way that simple tolling
. . . would not.” Duncan, 533 U. S., at 192 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
Beyond increasing the burdens faced by district courts,
the Court’s tacit encouragement of countless new protec-
tive filings will diminish the “statutory incentives to proceed
first in state court” and thereby “increase the risk of the
very piecemeal litigation that the exhaustion requirement
is designed to reduce.” Id., at 180. Congress enacted
§ 2244(d)(2), along with § 2254(b), to “encourage litigants first
to exhaust all state remedies and then to file their federal
habeas petitions as soon as possible.” Id., at 181. The
Court’s rule turns that statutory goal on its head—in es-
sence, encouraging all petitioners who have doubts re-
garding the timeliness of their state petitions to file si-
multaneously for relief in federal and state court. Artuz
appropriately prevented such a result with respect to proce-
properly motivated to delay federal proceedings, while another claim was
“properly filed” under AEDPA.

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430 PACE v. DiGUGLIELMO
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dural bars. Because I see no reason to depart from that
sound approach, I would hold that Pace’s application was
“properly filed” under AEDPA. I respectfully dissent.