DECK v. MISSOURI

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Syllabus
DECK v. MISSOURI
certiorari to the supreme court of missouri
No. 04–5293. Argued March 1, 2005—Decided May 23, 2005
Petitioner Deck was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death,
but the Missouri Supreme Court set aside the sentence. At his new
sentencing proceeding, he was shackled with leg irons, handcuffs, and a
belly chain. The trial court overruled counsel’s objections to the shack-
les, and Deck was again sentenced to death. Affirming, the State Su-
preme Court rejected Deck’s claim that his shackling violated, inter
alia, the Federal Constitution.
Held: The Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during a capital
trial’s penalty phase, as it does during the guilt phase, unless that use is
“justified by an essential state interest”—such as courtroom security—
specific to the defendant on trial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560,
568–569. Pp. 626–635.
(a) The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during
a capital trial’s guilt phase, permitting shackling only in the presence of
a special need. In light of Holbrook, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337,
early English cases, and lower court shackling doctrine dating back to
the 19th century, it is now clear that this is a basic element of due
process protected by the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to the
jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion,
that restraints are justified by a state interest specific to the particular
defendant on trial. Pp. 626–629.
(b) If the reasons motivating the guilt phase constitutional rule—the
presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintain-
ing dignified proceedings—apply with like force at the penalty phase,
the same rule will apply there. The latter two considerations obviously
apply. As for the first, while the defendant’s conviction means that the
presumption of innocence no longer applies, shackles at the penalty
phase threaten related concerns. The jury, though no longer deciding
between guilt and innocence, is deciding between life and death, which,
given the sanction’s severity and finality, is no less important, Monge v.
California, 524 U. S. 721, 732. Nor is accuracy in making that decision
any less critical. Yet, the offender’s appearance in shackles almost in-
evitably implies to a jury that court authorities consider him a danger
to the community (which is often a statutory aggravator and always a
relevant factor); almost inevitably affects adversely the jury’s percep-

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Syllabus
tion of the defendant’s character; and thereby inevitably undermines
the jury’s ability to weigh accurately all relevant considerations when
determining whether the defendant deserves death. The constitutional
rule that courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or other
restraints visible to the jury during the penalty phase is not absolute.
In the judge’s discretion, account may be taken of special circumstances
in the case at hand, including security concerns, that may call for shack-
ling in order to accommodate the important need to protect the court-
room and its occupants. Pp. 630–633.
(c) Missouri’s arguments that its high court’s decision in this case
meets the Constitution’s requirements are unconvincing. The first—
that that court properly concluded that there was no evidence that the
jury saw the restraints—is inconsistent with the record, which shows
that the jury was aware of them, and overstates what the court actually
said, which was that trial counsel made no record of the extent of the
jury’s awareness of the shackles. The second—that the trial court
acted within its discretion—founders on the record, which does not
clearly indicate that the judge weighted the particular circumstances of
the case. The judge did not refer to an escape risk or threat to court-
room security or explain why, if shackles were necessary, he did not
provide nonvisible ones as was apparently done during the guilt phase
of this case. The third—that Deck suffered no prejudice—fails to take
account of Holbrook’s statement that shackling is “inherently prejudi-
cial,” 475 U. S., at 568, a view rooted in this Court’s belief that the prac-
tice will often have negative effects that “cannot be shown from a trial
transcript,” Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U. S. 127, 137. Thus, where a court,
without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles
visible to the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice
to make out a due process violation. The State must prove “beyond a
reasonable doubt that the [shackling] did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24. Pp. 634–635.
136 S. W. 3d 481, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined,
post, p. 635.
Rosemary E. Percival argued the cause and filed briefs
for petitioner.
Cheryl Caponegro Nield, Assistant Attorney General of
Missouri, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the

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Opinion of the Court
briefs were Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General,
James R. Layton, State Solicitor, and Evan J. Buchheim,
Assistant Attorney General.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
We here consider whether shackling a convicted offender
during the penalty phase of a capital case violates the Fed-
eral Constitution. We hold that the Constitution forbids the
use of visible shackles during the penalty phase, as it forbids
their use during the guilt phase, unless that use is “justified
by an essential state interest”—such as the interest in court-
room security—specific to the defendant on trial. Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, 568–569 (1986); see also Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 343–344 (1970).
I
In July 1996, petitioner Carman Deck robbed, shot, and
killed an elderly couple. In 1998, the State of Missouri tried
Deck for the murders and the robbery. At trial, state au-
thorities required Deck to wear leg braces that apparently
were not visible to the jury. App. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21, 25,
*A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of
California et al. by Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, Manuel
M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Ward A. Campbell, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Catherine
Chatman and Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, by John
W. Suthers, Interim Attorney General of Colorado, and by the Attorneys
General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, M.
Jane Brady of Delaware, Steve Carter of Indiana, Jim Hood of Mississippi,
Mike McGrath of Montana, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Brian Sandoval of
Nevada, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy
Myers of Oregon, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E.
Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah,
Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, Rob McKenna of Washington, Darrell V.
McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.
Thomas H. Speedy Rice filed a brief for the Bar Human Rights Commit-
tee of England and Wales et al. as amici curiae.

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29. Deck was convicted and sentenced to death. The State
Supreme Court upheld Deck’s conviction but set aside the
sentence. 68 S. W. 3d 418, 432 (2002) (en banc). The State
then held a new sentencing proceeding.
From the first day of the new proceeding, Deck was shack-
led with leg irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain. App. 58.
Before the jury voir dire began, Deck’s counsel objected to
the shackles. The objection was overruled. Ibid.; see also
id., at 41–55. During the voir dire, Deck’s counsel renewed
the objection. The objection was again overruled, the court
stating that Deck “has been convicted and will remain in
legirons and a belly chain.” Id., at 58. After the voir dire,
Deck’s counsel once again objected, moving to strike the jury
panel “because of the fact that Mr. Deck is shackled in front
of the jury and makes them think that he is . . . violent
today.” Id., at 58–59. The objection was again overruled,
the court stating that his “being shackled takes any fear out
of their minds.” Id., at 59. The penalty phase then pro-
ceeded with Deck in shackles. Deck was again sentenced to
death. 136 S. W. 3d 481, 485 (Mo. 2004) (en banc).
On appeal, Deck claimed that his shackling violated both
Missouri law and the Federal Constitution. The Missouri
Supreme Court rejected these claims, writing that there was
“no record of the extent of the jury’s awareness of the re-
straints”; there was no “claim that the restraints impeded”
Deck “from participating in the proceedings”; and there was
“evidence” of “a risk” that Deck “might flee in that he was a
repeat offender” who may have “killed his two victims to
avoid being returned to custody.” Ibid. Thus, there was
“sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s
exercise of its discretion” to require shackles, and in any
event Deck “has not demonstrated that the outcome of his
trial was prejudiced. . . . Neither being viewed in shackles
by the venire panel prior to trial, nor being viewed while
restrained throughout the entire trial, alone, is proof of prej-

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udice.” Ibid. The court rejected Deck’s other claims of
error and affirmed the sentence.
We granted certiorari to review Deck’s claim that his
shackling violated the Federal Constitution.
II
We first consider whether, as a general matter, the Consti-
tution permits a State to use visible shackles routinely in the
guilt phase of a criminal trial. The answer is clear: The law
has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the
guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defend-
ant only in the presence of a special need.
This rule has deep roots in the common law. In the 18th
century, Blackstone wrote that “it is laid down in our antient
books, that, though under an indictment of the highest na-
ture,” a defendant “must be brought to the bar without irons,
or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident
danger of an escape.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 317 (1769) (footnote omitted); see also
3 E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England *34 (“If felons
come in judgement to answer, . . . they shall be out of irons,
and all manner of bonds, so that their pain shall not take
away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer,
but at their free will”). Blackstone and other English au-
thorities recognized that the rule did not apply at “the time
of arraignment,” or like proceedings before the judge.
Blackstone, supra, at 317; see also Trial of Christopher
Layer, 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 99 (K. B. 1722). It was meant to
protect defendants appearing at trial before a jury. See
King v. Waite, 1 Leach 28, 36, 168 Eng. Rep. 117, 120 (K. B.
1743) (“[B]eing put upon his trial, the Court immediately or-
dered [the defendant’s] fetters to be knocked off ”).
American courts have traditionally followed Blackstone’s
“ancient” English rule, while making clear that “in extreme
and exceptional cases, where the safe custody of the prisoner
and the peace of the tribunal imperatively demand, the man-

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acles may be retained.” 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Proce-
dure § 955, p. 573 (4th ed. 1895); see also id., at 572–573
(“[O]ne at the trial should have the unrestrained use of his
reason, and all advantages, to clear his innocence. Our
American courts adhere pretty closely to this doctrine” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Roberts, 86 N. J.
Super. 159, 163–165, 206 A. 2d 200, 203 (App. Div. 1965);
French v. State, 377 P. 2d 501, 502–504 (Okla. Crim. App.
1962); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 490, 174 P. 2d 717, 718
(1946) (en banc); State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 153–158, 165
P. 2d 389, 405–406 (1946); Blaine v. United States, 136 F. 2d
284, 285 (CADC 1943) (per curiam); Blair v. Common-
wealth, 171 Ky. 319, 327–329, 188 S. W. 390, 393 (App. 1916);
Hauser v. People, 210 Ill. 253, 264–267, 71 N. E. 416, 421
(1904); Parker v. Territory, 5 Ariz. 283, 287, 52 P. 361, 363
(1898); State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 48–50, 50 P. 580, 581
(1897); Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. App. 455, 472–473 (1886)
(opinion of White, P. J.); State v. Smith, 11 Ore. 205, 8 P. 343
(1883); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 674–678 (1882); State v.
Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592 (1877); People v. Harrington, 42 Cal.
165, 167 (1871); see also F. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and
Practice § 540a, p. 369 (8th ed. 1880); 12 Cyclopedia of Law
and Procedure 529 (1904). While these earlier courts dis-
agreed about the degree of discretion to be afforded trial
judges, see post, at 643–648 (Thomas, J., dissenting), they
settled virtually without exception on a basic rule embody-
ing notions of fundamental fairness: Trial courts may not
shackle defendants routinely, but only if there is a particular
reason to do so.
More recently, this Court has suggested that a version of
this rule forms part of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments’ due process guarantee. Thirty-five years ago, when
considering the trial of an unusually obstreperous criminal
defendant, the Court held that the Constitution sometimes
permitted special measures, including physical restraints.
Allen, 397 U. S., at 343–344. The Court wrote that “binding

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and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most reason-
able way to handle” such a defendant. Id., at 344. But the
Court immediately added that “even to contemplate such a
technique . . . arouses a feeling that no person should be tried
while shackled and gagged except as a last resort.” Ibid.
Sixteen years later, the Court considered a special court-
room security arrangement that involved having uniformed
security personnel sit in the first row of the courtroom’s
spectator section. The Court held that the Constitution al-
lowed the arrangement, stating that the deployment of secu-
rity personnel during trial is not “the sort of inherently prej-
udicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only
where justified by an essential state interest specific to each
trial.” Holbrook, 475 U. S., at 568–569. See also Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 503, 505 (1976) (making a defendant
appear in prison garb poses such a threat to the “fairness of
the factfinding process” that it must be justified by an “es-
sential state policy”).
Lower courts have treated these statements as setting
forth a constitutional standard that embodies Blackstone’s
rule. Courts and commentators share close to a consensus
that, during the guilt phase of a trial, a criminal defendant
has a right to remain free of physical restraints that are visi-
ble to the jury; that the right has a constitutional dimension;
but that the right may be overcome in a particular instance
by essential state interests such as physical security, escape
prevention, or courtroom decorum. See, e. g., Dyas v. Poole,
309 F. 3d 586, 588–589 (CA9 2002) (per curiam); Harrell v.
Israel, 672 F. 2d 632, 635 (CA7 1982) (per curiam); State v.
Herrick, 324 Mont. 76, 78–82, 101 P. 3d 755, 757–759 (2004);
Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S. W. 3d 221, 233–234 (Ky. 2004);
State v. Turner, 143 Wash. 2d 715, 723–727, 23 P. 3d 499,
504–505 (2001) (en banc); Myers v. State, 2000 OK CR 25,
¶ 19, 17 P. 3d 1021, 1033; State v. Shoen, 598 N. W. 2d 370,
374–377 (Minn. 1999); Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 635–645,

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702 A. 2d 261, 268–272 (1997); People v. Jackson, 14 Cal. App.
4th 1818, 1822–1830, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 588–594 (1993);
Cooks v. State, 844 S. W. 2d 697, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)
(en banc); State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 504–508, 594 A. 2d
906, 914–915 (1991); State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 93–98,
577 P. 2d 1135, 1141–1146 (1978); People v. Brown, 45 Ill. App.
3d 24, 26–28, 358 N. E. 2d 1362, 1363–1364 (1977); State v.
Tolley, 290 N. C. 349, 362–371, 226 S. E. 2d 353, 365–369
(1976); see also 21A Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §§ 1016, 1019
(1998); see generally Krauskopf, Physical Restraint of the
Defendant in the Courtroom, 15 St. Louis U. L. J. 351 (1970–
1971); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and
Trial by Jury 15–3.2, pp. 188–191 (3d ed. 1996).
Lower courts have disagreed about the specific procedural
steps a trial court must take prior to shackling, about the
amount and type of evidence needed to justify restraints, and
about what forms of prejudice might warrant a new trial,
but they have not questioned the basic principle. They have
emphasized the importance of preserving trial court discre-
tion (reversing only in cases of clear abuse), but they have
applied the limits on that discretion described in Holbrook,
Allen, and the early English cases. In light of this prece-
dent, and of a lower court consensus disapproving routine
shackling dating back to the 19th century, it is clear that
this Court’s prior statements gave voice to a principle deeply
embedded in the law. We now conclude that those state-
ments identify a basic element of the “due process of law”
protected by the Federal Constitution. Thus, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical re-
straints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination,
in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a
state interest specific to a particular trial. Such a determi-
nation may of course take into account the factors that courts
have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security
problems and the risk of escape at trial.

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III
We here consider shackling not during the guilt phase of
an ordinary criminal trial, but during the punishment phase
of a capital case. And we must decide whether that change
of circumstance makes a constitutional difference. To do so,
we examine the reasons that motivate the guilt-phase consti-
tutional rule and determine whether they apply with similar
force in this context.
A
Judicial hostility to shackling may once primarily have re-
flected concern for the suffering—the “tortures” and “tor-
ments”—that “very painful” chains could cause. Krauskopf,
supra, at 351, 353 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U. S. 127, 154, n. 4 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing English cases curbing the use
of restraints). More recently, this Court’s opinions have not
stressed the need to prevent physical suffering (for not all
modern physical restraints are painful). Instead they have
emphasized the importance of giving effect to three funda-
mental legal principles.
First, the criminal process presumes that the defendant is
innocent until proved guilty. Coffin v. United States, 156
U. S. 432, 453 (1895) (presumption of innocence “lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law”). Visi-
ble shackling undermines the presumption of innocence and
the related fairness of the factfinding process. Cf. Estelle,
supra, at 503. It suggests to the jury that the justice sys-
tem itself sees a “need to separate a defendant from the com-
munity at large.” Holbrook, supra, at 569; cf. State v. Rob-
erts, 86 N. J. Super., at 162, 206 A. 2d, at 202 (“[A] defendant
‘ought not be brought to the Bar in a contumelious Manner;
as with his Hands tied together, or any other Mark of Igno-
miny and Reproach . . . unless there be some Danger of a
Rescous [rescue] or Escape’ ” (quoting 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas

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of the Crown, ch. 28, § 1, p. 308 (1716–1721) (section on
arraignments))).
Second, the Constitution, in order to help the accused se-
cure a meaningful defense, provides him with a right to
counsel. See, e. g., Amdt. 6; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.
335, 340–341 (1963). The use of physical restraints dimin-
ishes that right. Shackles can interfere with the accused’s
“ability to communicate” with his lawyer. Allen, 397 U. S.,
at 344. Indeed, they can interfere with a defendant’s ability
to participate in his own defense, say, by freely choosing
whether to take the witness stand on his own behalf.
Cf. Cranburne’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 222 (K. B. 1696) (“Look
you, keeper, you should take off the prisoners irons when
they are at the bar, for they should stand at their ease when
they are tried” (footnote omitted)); People v. Harrington, 42
Cal., at 168 (shackles “impos[e] physical burdens, pains, and
restraints . . . , . . . ten[d] to confuse and embarrass” defend-
ants’ “mental faculties,” and thereby tend “materially to
abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights”).
Third, judges must seek to maintain a judicial process that
is a dignified process. The courtroom’s formal dignity,
which includes the respectful treatment of defendants, re-
flects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or inno-
cence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any
deprivation of an individual’s liberty through criminal pun-
ishment. And it reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps
to explain the judicial system’s power to inspire the confi-
dence and to affect the behavior of a general public whose
demands for justice our courts seek to serve. The routine
use of shackles in the presence of juries would undermine
these symbolic yet concrete objectives. As this Court has
said, the use of shackles at trial “affront[s]” the “dignity and
decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to
uphold.” Allen, supra, at 344; see also Trial of Christopher
Layer, 16 How. St. Tr., at 99 (statement of Mr. Hungerford)
(“[T]o have a man plead for his life” in shackles before

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“a court of justice, the highest in the kingdom for criminal
matters, where the king himself is supposed to be personally
present,” undermines the “dignity of the Court”).
There will be cases, of course, where these perils of shack-
ling are unavoidable. See Allen, supra, at 344. We do not
underestimate the need to restrain dangerous defendants to
prevent courtroom attacks, or the need to give trial courts
latitude in making individualized security determinations.
We are mindful of the tragedy that can result if judges are
not able to protect themselves and their courtrooms. But
given their prejudicial effect, due process does not permit
the use of visible restraints if the trial court has not taken
account of the circumstances of the particular case.
B
The considerations that militate against the routine use of
visible shackles during the guilt phase of a criminal trial
apply with like force to penalty proceedings in capital cases.
This is obviously so in respect to the latter two considera-
tions mentioned, securing a meaningful defense and main-
taining dignified proceedings. It is less obviously so in re-
spect to the first consideration mentioned, for the defendant’s
conviction means that the presumption of innocence no
longer applies. Hence shackles do not undermine the jury’s
effort to apply that presumption.
Nonetheless, shackles at the penalty phase threaten re-
lated concerns. Although the jury is no longer deciding be-
tween guilt and innocence, it is deciding between life and
death. That decision, given the “ ‘severity’ ” and “ ‘finality’ ”
of the sanction, is no less important than the decision about
guilt. Monge v. California, 524 U. S. 721, 732 (1998) (quot-
ing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357 (1977)).
Neither is accuracy in making that decision any less criti-
cal. The Court has stressed the “acute need” for reliable
decisionmaking when the death penalty is at issue. Monge,
supra, at 732 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978)

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(plurality opinion)). The appearance of the offender during
the penalty phase in shackles, however, almost inevitably im-
plies to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that court au-
thorities consider the offender a danger to the community—
often a statutory aggravator and nearly always a relevant
factor in jury decisionmaking, even where the State does not
specifically argue the point. Cf. Brief for Respondent 25–27.
It also almost inevitably affects adversely the jury’s percep-
tion of the character of the defendant. See Zant v. Ste-
phens, 462 U. S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in judgment) (character and propensities of the defendant
are part of a “unique, individualized judgment regarding the
punishment that a particular person deserves”). And it
thereby inevitably undermines the jury’s ability to weigh
accurately all relevant considerations—considerations that
are often unquantifiable and elusive—when it determines
whether a defendant deserves death. In these ways, the use
of shackles can be a “thumb [on] death’s side of the scale.”
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527, 532 (1992) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also Riggins, 504 U. S., at 142
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (through control of
a defendant’s appearance, the State can exert a “powerful
influence on the outcome of the trial”).
Given the presence of similarly weighty considerations, we
must conclude that courts cannot routinely place defendants
in shackles or other physical restraints visible to the jury
during the penalty phase of a capital proceeding. The con-
stitutional requirement, however, is not absolute. It per-
mits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take
account of special circumstances, including security concerns,
that may call for shackling. In so doing, it accommodates
the important need to protect the courtroom and its occu-
pants. But any such determination must be case specific;
that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, spe-
cial security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant
on trial.

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IV
Missouri claims that the decision of its high court meets
the Constitution’s requirements in this case. It argues that
the Missouri Supreme Court properly found: (1) that the rec-
ord lacks evidence that the jury saw the restraints; (2) that
the trial court acted within its discretion; and, in any event,
(3) that the defendant suffered no prejudice. We find these
arguments unconvincing.
The first argument is inconsistent with the record in this
case, which makes clear that the jury was aware of the
shackles. See App. 58–59 (Deck’s attorney stated on the
record that “Mr. Deck [was] shackled in front of the jury”
(emphasis added)); id., at 59 (trial court responded that “him
being shackled takes any fear out of their minds”). The ar-
gument also overstates the Missouri Supreme Court’s hold-
ing. The court said: “Trial counsel made no record of the
extent of the jury’s awareness of the restraints throughout
the penalty phase, and Appellant does not claim that the re-
straints impeded him from participating in the proceedings.”
136 S. W. 3d, at 485 (emphasis added). This statement does
not suggest that the jury was unaware of the restraints.
Rather, it refers to the degree of the jury’s awareness, and
hence to the kinds of prejudice that might have occurred.
The second argument—that the trial court acted within
its discretion—founders on the record’s failure to indicate
that the trial judge saw the matter as one calling for discre-
tion. The record contains no formal or informal findings.
Cf. supra, at 632 (requiring a case-by-case determination).
The judge did not refer to a risk of escape—a risk the State
has raised in this Court, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37—or a
threat to courtroom security. Rather, he gave as his reason
for imposing the shackles the fact that Deck already “has
been convicted.” App. 58. While he also said that the
shackles would “tak[e] any fear out of ” the juror’s “minds,”
he nowhere explained any special reason for fear. Id., at 59.
Nor did he explain why, if shackles were necessary, he chose

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635 Cite as: 544 U. S. 622 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
not to provide for shackles that the jury could not see—ap-
parently the arrangement used at trial. If there is an excep-
tional case where the record itself makes clear that there are
indisputably good reasons for shackling, it is not this one.
The third argument fails to take account of this Court’s
statement in Holbrook that shackling is “inherently prejudi-
cial.” 475 U. S., at 568. That statement is rooted in our
belief that the practice will often have negative effects,
but—like “the consequences of compelling a defendant to
wear prison clothing” or of forcing him to stand trial while
medicated—those effects “cannot be shown from a trial tran-
script.” Riggins, supra, at 137. Thus, where a court, with-
out adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear
shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need
not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process
violation. The State must prove “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not con-
tribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California,
386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967).
V
For these reasons, the judgment of the Missouri Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.
Carman Deck was convicted of murdering and robbing an
elderly couple. He stood before the sentencing jury not as
an innocent man, but as a convicted double murderer and
robber. Today this Court holds that Deck’s due process
rights were violated when he appeared at sentencing in leg
irons, handcuffs, and a belly chain. The Court holds that
such restraints may only be used where the use is “ ‘justified
by an essential state interest’ ” that is “specific to the defend-

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636 DECK v. MISSOURI
Thomas, J., dissenting
ant on trial,” ante, at 624, and that is supported by specific
findings by the trial court. Tradition—either at English
common law or among the States—does not support this con-
clusion. To reach its result, the Court resurrects an old rule
the basis for which no longer exists. It then needlessly ex-
tends the rule from trials to sentencing. In doing so, the
Court pays only superficial heed to the practice of States and
gives conclusive force to errant dicta sprinkled in a trio of
this Court’s cases. The Court’s holding defies common sense
and all but ignores the serious security issues facing our
courts. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
Carman Deck and his sister went to the home of Zelma
and James Long on a summer evening in 1996. After wait-
ing for nightfall, Deck and his sister knocked on the door of
the Longs’ home, and when Mrs. Long answered, they asked
for directions. Mrs. Long invited them in, and she and
Mr. Long assisted them with directions. When Deck moved
toward the door to leave, he drew a pistol, pointed it at the
Longs, and ordered them to lie face down on their bed. The
Longs did so, offering up money and valuables throughout
the house and all the while begging that he not harm them.
After Deck finished robbing their house, he stood at the
edge of their bed, deliberating for 10 minutes over whether
to spare them. He ignored their pleas and shot them each
twice in the head. Deck later told police that he shot the
Longs because he thought that they would be able to
recognize him.
Deck was convicted of the murders and robbery of the
Longs and sentenced to death. The death sentence was
overturned on appeal. Deck then had another sentencing
hearing, at which he appeared in leg irons, a belly chain, and
handcuffs. At the hearing, the jury heard evidence of
Deck’s numerous burglary and theft convictions and his as-
sistance in a jailbreak by two prisoners.

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On resentencing, the jury unanimously found six aggravat-
ing factors: Deck committed the murders while engaged in
the commission of another unlawful homicide; Deck mur-
dered each victim for the purpose of pecuniary gain; each
murder involved depravity of mind; each murder was com-
mitted for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest; each mur-
der was committed while Deck was engaged in a burglary;
and each murder was committed while Deck was engaged
in a robbery. The jury recommended, and the trial court
imposed, two death sentences.
Deck sought postconviction relief from his sentence, as-
serting, among other things, that his due process and equal
protection rights were violated by the trial court’s require-
ment that he appear in shackles. The Missouri Supreme
Court rejected that claim. 136 S. W. 3d 481 (2004) (en banc).
The court reasoned that “there was a risk that [Deck] might
flee in that he was a repeat offender and evidence from the
guilt phase of his trial indicated that he killed his two victims
to avoid being returned to custody,” and thus it could not
conclude that the trial court had abused its discretion. Id.,
at 485.
II
My legal obligation is not to determine the wisdom or the
desirability of shackling defendants, but to decide a purely
legal question: Does the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment preclude the visible shackling of a de-
fendant? Therefore, I examine whether there is a deeply
rooted legal principle that bars that practice. Medina v.
California, 505 U. S. 437, 446 (1992); Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey, 530 U. S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); see
also Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 102–106 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). As I explain below, although the
English common law had a rule against trying a defendant
in irons, the basis for the rule makes clear that it should not
be extended by rote to modern restraints, which are dissimi-
lar in certain essential respects to the irons that gave rise to

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638 DECK v. MISSOURI
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the rule. Despite the existence of a rule at common law,
state courts did not even begin to address the use of physical
restraints until the 1870’s, and the vast majority of state
courts would not take up this issue until the 20th century,
well after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Neither the earliest case nor the more modern cases reflect
a consensus that would inform our understanding of the re-
quirements of due process. I therefore find this evidence
inconclusive.
A
English common law in the 17th and 18th centuries recog-
nized a rule against bringing the defendant in irons to the
bar for trial. See, e. g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 317 (1769); 3 Coke, Institutes of
the Laws of England *34 (hereinafter Coke). This rule
stemmed from none of the concerns to which the Court
points, ante, at 630–633—the presumption of innocence, the
right to counsel, concerns about decorum, or accuracy in de-
cisionmaking. Instead, the rule ensured that a defendant
was not so distracted by physical pain during his trial that
he could not defend himself. As one source states, the rule
prevented prisoners from “any Torture while they ma[de]
their defence, be their Crime never so great.” J. Kelyng, A
Report of Divers Cases in Pleas of the Crown 10 (1708).1
This concern was understandable, for the irons of that period
were heavy and painful. In fact, leather strips often lined
the irons to prevent them from rubbing away a defendant’s
1 See Coke *34 (“If felons come in judgement to answer, . . . they shall
be out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their pain shall not take
away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at their
free will”); Cranburne’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 222 (K. B. 1696) (prisoners
“should stand at their ease when they are tried”); The Conductor Gener-
alis 403 (J. Parker ed. 1801) (reciting same); cf. ibid. (“[t]hat where the law
requires that a prisoner should be kept in salva & arcta custodia, yet that
must be without pain or torment to the prisoner”).

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skin. T. Gross, Manacles of the World: A Collector’s Guide
to International Handcuffs, Leg Irons and other Miscellane-
ous Shackles and Restraints 25 (1997). Despite Coke’s ad-
monition that “[i]t [was] an abuse that prisoners be chained
with irons, or put to any pain before they be attained,” Coke
*34, suspected criminals often wore irons during pretrial
confinement, J. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal
Trial 50, and n. 197 (2003) (hereinafter Langbein). For ex-
ample, prior to his trial in 1722 for treason, Christopher
Layer spent his confinement in irons. Layer’s counsel urged
that his irons be struck off, for they allowed him to “sleep
but in one posture.” Trial of Christopher Layer, 16 How.
St. Tr. 94, 98 (K. B. 1722).
The concern that felony defendants not be in severe pain
at trial was acute because, before the 1730’s, defendants were
not permitted to have the assistance of counsel at trial, with
an early exception made for those charged with treason.
Langbein 170–172. Instead, the trial was an “ ‘accused
speaks’ ” trial, at which the accused defended himself. The
accused was compelled to respond to the witnesses, making
him the primary source of information at trial. Id., at 48;
see also Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 823–824 (1975).
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 626, the rule against
shackling did not extend to arraignment.2 A defendant re-
mained in irons at arraignment because “he [was] only called
upon to plead by advice of his counsel”; he was not on trial,
2 When arraignment and trial occurred on separate occasions, the de-
fendant could be brought to his arraignment in irons. Trial of Christo-
pher Layer, 16 How. St. Tr. 94, 97 (K. B. 1722) (defendant arraigned in
irons); King v. Waite, 1 Leach 28, 36, 168 Eng. Rep. 117, 120 (K. B. 1743)
(fetters could not be removed until the defendant had pleaded); but cf. R.
Burns, Abridgment, or the American Justice 37 (1792) (“The prisoner on
his arraignment . . . must be brought to the bar without irons and all
manner of shackles or bonds, unless there be a danger of escape, and then
he may be brought with irons”).

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640 DECK v. MISSOURI
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where he would play the main role in defending himself.
Trial of Christopher Layer, supra, at 100 (emphasis added).
A modern-day defendant does not spend his pretrial con-
finement wearing restraints. The belly chain and handcuffs
are of modest, if not insignificant, weight. Neither they nor
the leg irons cause pain or suffering, let alone pain or suffer-
ing that would interfere with a defendant’s ability to assist
in his defense at trial. And they need not interfere with a
defendant’s ability to assist his counsel—a defendant remains
free to talk with counsel during trial, and restraints can be
employed so as to ensure that a defendant can write to his
counsel during the trial. Restraints can also easily be re-
moved when a defendant testifies, so that any concerns about
testifying can be ameliorated. Modern restraints are there-
fore unlike those that gave rise to the traditional rule.
The Court concedes that modern restraints are nothing
like the restraints of long ago, ante, at 630, and even that
the rule at common law did not rest on any of the “three
fundamental legal principles” the Court posits to support its
new rule, ibid. Yet the Court treats old and modern re-
straints as similar for constitutional purposes merely be-
cause they are both types of physical restraints. This logi-
cal leap ignores that modern restraints do not violate the
principle animating the common-law rule. In making this
leap, the Court strays from the appropriate legal inquiry of
examining common-law traditions to inform our understand-
ing of the Due Process Clause.
B
In the absence of a common-law rule that applies to
modern-day restraints, state practice is also relevant to de-
termining whether a deeply rooted tradition supports the
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause limits shackling. See Morales, 527 U. S., at 102–106
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The practice among the States,
however, does not support, let alone require, the conclusion

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that shackling can be done only where “particular con-
cerns . . . related to the defendant on trial” are articulated as
findings in the record. Ante, at 633. First, state practice
is of modern, not longstanding, vintage. The vast majority
of States did not address the issue of physical restraints on
defendants during trial until the 20th century. Second, the
state cases—both the earliest to address shackling and even
the later cases—reflect substantial differences that under-
mine the contention that the Due Process Clause so limits
the use of physical restraints. Third, state- and lower
federal-court cases decided after Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S.
337 (1970), Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501 (1976), and Hol-
brook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986), are not evidence of
a current consensus about the use of physical restraints.
Such cases are but a reflection of the dicta contained in
Allen, Estelle, and Holbrook.
1
State practice against shackling defendants was estab-
lished in the 20th century. In 35 States, no recorded state-
court decision on the issue appears until the 20th century.3
3 State v. Mitchell, 824 P. 2d 469, 473–474 (Utah App. 1991); Smith v.
State, 773 P. 2d 139, 140–141 (Wyo. 1989); Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va.
370, 381–382, 345 S. E. 2d 267, 276 (1986); State v. White, 456 A. 2d 13, 15
(Me. 1983); State v. Baugh, 174 Mont. 456, 462–463, 571 P. 2d 779, 782–783
(1977); Brookins v. State, 354 A. 2d 422, 425 (Del. 1976); State v. Phifer,
290 N. C. 203, 219, 225 S. E. 2d 786, 797 (1976); State v. Lemire, 115 N. H.
526, 531, 345 A. 2d 906, 910 (1975); Anthony v. State, 521 P. 2d 486, 496
(Alaska 1974); State v. Palmigiano, 112 R. I. 348, 357–358, 309 A. 2d 855,
861 (1973); Jones v. State, 11 Md. App. 686, 693–694, 276 A. 2d 666, 670
(1971); State v. Polidor, 130 Vt. 34, 39, 285 A. 2d 770, 773 (1971); State v.
Moen, 94 Idaho 477, 479–480, 491 P. 2d 858, 860–861 (1971); State v. Yurk,
203 Kan. 629, 631, 456 P. 2d 11, 13–14 (1969); People v. Thomas, 1 Mich.
App. 118, 126, 134 N. W. 2d 352, 357 (1965); State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d
527, 564–565, 129 N. W. 2d 155, 171 (1964), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 463, 132 N. W. 2d 502, 508 (1965); State v.
Brooks, 44 Haw. 82, 84–86, 352 P. 2d 611, 613–614 (1960); State v. Coursolle,

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642 DECK v. MISSOURI
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Of those 35 States, 21 States have no recorded decision on
the question until the 1950’s or later.4 The 14 state (includ-
ing then-territorial) courts that addressed the matter before
the 20th century only began to do so in the 1870’s.5 The
255 Minn. 384, 389, 97 N. W. 2d 472, 476–477 (1959) (handcuffing of wit-
nesses); Allbright v. State, 92 Ga. App. 251, 252–253, 88 S. E. 2d 468, 469–
470 (1955); State v. Roscus, 16 N. J. 415, 428, 109 A. 2d 1, 8 (1954); People
v. Snyder, 305 N. Y. 790, 791, 113 N. E. 2d 302 (1953); Eaddy v. People, 115
Colo. 488, 491, 174 P. 2d 717, 718 (1946) (en banc); State v. McKay, 63 Nev.
118, 161–163, 165 P. 2d 389, 408–409 (1946) (also discussing a 1929 Nevada
statute that limited the use of restraints prior to conviction); Rayburn v.
State, 200 Ark. 914, 920–922, 141 S. W. 2d 532, 535–536 (1940); Shultz v.
State, 131 Fla. 757, 758, 179 So. 764, 765 (1938); Commonwealth v. Millen,
289 Mass. 441, 477–478, 194 N. E. 463, 480 (1935); Pierpont v. State, 49
Ohio App. 77, 83–84, 195 N. E. 264, 266–267 (1934); Corey v. State, 126
Conn. 41, 42–43, 9 A. 2d 283, 283–284 (1939); Bradbury v. State, 51 Okla.
Cr. 56, 59–61, 299 P. 510, 512 (App. 1931); State v. Hanrahan, 49 S. D. 434,
435–437, 207 N. W. 224, 225 (1926); South v. State, 111 Neb. 383, 384–386,
196 N. W. 684, 685–686 (1923); Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 327,
188 S. W. 390, 393 (1916); McPherson v. State, 178 Ind. 583, 584–585, 99
N. E. 984, 985 (1912); State v. Kenny, 77 S. C. 236, 240–241, 57 S. E. 859,
861 (1907); State v. Bone, 114 Iowa 537, 541–543, 87 N. W. 507, 509 (1901).
The North Dakota courts have yet to pass upon the question in any re-
ported decision.
4 See n. 3, supra. It bears noting, however, that in 1817 Georgia
enacted a statute limiting the use of physical restraints on defendants at
trial, long before any decision was reported in the Georgia courts.
Prince’s Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia § 21, p. 372 (1822). Its
courts did not address shackling until 1955. Allbright v. State, supra, at
252–253, 88 S. E. 2d, at 469–470.
5 Parker v. Territory, 5 Ariz. 283, 287–288, 52 P. 361, 363 (1898); State v.
Allen, 45 W. Va. 65, 68–70, 30 S. E. 209, 210–211 (1898), overruled in rele-
vant part, State v. Brewster, 164 W. Va. 173, 182, 261 S. E. 2d 77, 82 (1979)
(relying on Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (1970), and Estelle v. Williams,
425 U. S. 501 (1976)); State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 50–51, 50 P. 580,
581–582 (1897); Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa. 153, 165–166, 31 A. 481,
484 (1895); Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. Ct. App. 455, 472 (1886); Upstone v.
People, 109 Ill. 169, 179 (1883); State v. Thomas, 35 La. Ann. 24, 26 (1883);
State v. Smith, 11 Ore. 205, 208, 8 P. 343 (1883); Territory v. Kelly, 2 N. M.
292, 304–306 (1882); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 677–678 (1882); Faire v.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Harrington,
42 Cal. 165 (1871), “seems to have been the first case in this
country where this ancient rule of the common law was con-
sidered and enforced.” State v. Smith, 11 Ore. 205, 208, 8
P. 343 (1883). The practice in the United States is thus of
contemporary vintage. State practice that was only nascent
in the late 19th century is not evidence of a consistent unbro-
ken tradition dating to the common law, as the Court sug-
gests. Ante, at 626–627. The Court does not even attempt
to account for the century of virtual silence between the
practice established at English common law and the emer-
gence of the rule in the United States. Moreover, the be-
lated and varied state practice is insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that shackling of a defendant violates his due
process rights. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal.,
Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 159 (2000) (where no
history of a right to appeal much before the 20th century,
no historical support for a right to self-representation on
appeal).
2
The earliest state cases reveal courts’ divergent views of
visible shackling, undermining the notion that due process
cabins shackling to cases in which “particular concerns . . .
related to the defendant on trial” are supported by findings
on the record. Ante, at 633.
The Supreme Court of the New Mexico Territory held that
great deference was to be accorded the trial court’s decision
to put the defendant in shackles, permitting a reviewing
court to presume that there had been a basis for doing so if
the record lay silent. Territory v. Kelly, 2 N. M. 292, 304–
306 (1882). Only if the record “affirmatively” showed “no
State, 58 Ala. 74, 80–81 (1877); State v. Kring, 1 Mo. App. 438, 441–442
(1876); Lee v. State, 51 Miss. 566, 569–574 (1875), overruled on other
grounds, Wingo v. State, 62 Miss. 311, 315–316 (1884); People v. Harring-
ton, 42 Cal. 165, 168–169 (1871).

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reason whatever” for shackling was the decision to shackle a
defendant erroneous. Ibid.; see State v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65,
68–70, 30 S. E. 209, 211 (1898) (following Kelly), overruled in
relevant part, State v. Brewster, 164 W. Va. 173, 182, 261 S. E.
2d 77, 82 (1979). The Alabama Supreme Court also left the
issue to the trial court’s discretion and went so far as to
bar any appeal from the trial court’s decision to restrain the
defendant. Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74, 80–81 (1877); see Poe
v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 677 (1882) (decision to manacle a de-
fendant during trial “left to the sound discretion of the trial
court” and subject to abuse-of-discretion standard of review).
Mississippi concluded that the decision to shackle a defend-
ant “may be safely committed to courts and sheriffs, whose
acts are alike open to review in the courts and at the ballot
box.” 6 Lee v. State, 51 Miss. 566, 574 (1875), overruled on
other grounds, Wingo v. State, 62 Miss. 311 (1884).
By contrast, California, Missouri, Washington, and Oregon
adopted more restrictive approaches. In People v. Harring-
ton, supra, the California Supreme Court held that shackling
a defendant “without evident necessity” of any kind violated
the common-law rule as well as state law and was prejudicial
to the defendant. Id., at 168–169. A few years later, the
Missouri courts took an even more restrictive view, conclud-
ing that the use of shackles or other such restraints was per-
mitted only if warranted by the defendant’s conduct “at the
time of the trial.” State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877); see
State v. Smith, supra, at 207–208, 8 P., at 343 (following
Kring and Harrington without discussion); State v. Wil-
liams, 18 Wash. 47, 50–51, 50 P. 580, 581–582 (1897) (adopting
Kring’s test).
6 Pennsylvania first addressed the question of the shackling of a de-
fendant in the context of a grand jury proceeding. It too concluded that
deference was required, finding that the appropriate security for the de-
fendant’s transport was best left to the officers guarding him. Common-
wealth v. Weber, supra, at 165, 31 A., at 484.

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Texas took an intermediate position. The Texas Court of
Appeals relied on Kring, and at the same time deferred to
the decision made by the sheriff to bring the defendant into
the courtroom in shackles. See Rainey v. State, 20 Tex. Ct.
App. 455, 472 (1886); see also Parker v. Territory, 5 Ariz.
283, 287–288, 52 P. 361, 363 (1898) (following Harrington but
permitting the shackling of a defendant at arraignment
based on the crime for which he had been arrested as well
as the reward that had been offered for his recapture).
Thus, in the late 19th century States agreed that generally
defendants ought to come to trial unfettered, but they dis-
agreed over the breadth of discretion to be afforded trial
courts. A bare majority of States required that trial courts
and even jailers be given great leeway in determining when
a defendant should be restrained; a minority of States se-
verely constrained such discretion, in some instances by lim-
iting the information that could be considered; and an even
smaller set of States took an intermediate position. While
the most restrictive view adopted by States is perhaps con-
sistent with the rule Deck seeks, the majority view is flatly
inconsistent with requiring a State to show, and for a trial
court to set forth, findings of an “ ‘essential state interest’ ”
“specific to the defendant on trial” before shackling a defend-
ant. Ante, at 624. In short, there was no consensus that
supports elevating the rule against shackling to a federal
constitutional command.
3
The modern cases provide no more warrant for the Court’s
approach than do the earliest cases. The practice in the
20th century did not resolve the divisions among States that
emerged in the 19th century. As more States addressed the
issue, they continued to express a general preference that
defendants be brought to trial without shackles. They con-
tinued, however, to disagree about the latitude to be given
trial courts. Many deferred to the judgment of the trial

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646 DECK v. MISSOURI
Thomas, J., dissenting
court,7 and some to the views of those responsible for guard-
ing the defendant.8 States also continued to disagree over
whether the use of shackles was inherently prejudicial.9
Moreover, States differed over the information that could
7 See, e. g., State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio St. 3d 1, 18–19, 776 N. E. 2d 26,
46 (2002) (decision to shackle a defendant is left to the sound discretion of
a trial court); Commonwealth v. Agiasottelis, 336 Mass. 12, 16, 142 N. E.
2d 386, 389 (1957) (“[A] judge properly should be reluctant to interfere
with reasonable precautions which a sheriff deems necessary to keep se-
cure prisoners for whose custody he is responsible and, if a judge fails
to require removal of shackles, his exercise of a sound discretion will be
sustained”); Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark., at 920–921, 141 S. W. 2d, at 536
(“Trial Courts must be allowed a discretion as to the precautions which
they will permit officers . . . to take to prevent the prisoner’s escape, or
to prevent him from harming any person connected with the trial, or from
being harmed”); State v. Hanrahan, 49 S. D., at 436, 207 N. W., at 225 (“It
is the universal rule that while no unreasonable restraint may be exercised
over the defendant during his trial, yet it is within the discretion of the
trial court to determine what is and what is not reasonable restraint”);
McPherson v. State, 178 Ind., at 585, 99 N. E., at 985 (“[W]hether it is
necessary for a prisoner to be restrained by shackles or manacles during
the trial must be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge”).
8 See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass., at 477–478, 194 N. E.,
at 477–478.
9 See, e. g., Smith v. State, 773 P. 2d, at 141 (“The general law applicable
in situations where jurors see a handcuffed defendant is that, absent a
showing of prejudice, their observations do not constitute grounds for a
mistrial”); People v. Martin, 670 P. 2d 22, 25 (Colo. App. 1983) (shackling
is not inherently prejudical); State v. Gilbert, 121 N. H. 305, 310, 429 A. 2d
323, 327 (1981) (shackling is not inherently prejudicial); State v. Moore, 45
Ore. App. 837, 840, 609 P. 2d 866, 867 (1980) (“[A]bsent a strongly persua-
sive showing of prejudice to the defendant and that the court abused its
discretion, we will not second guess [the trial court’s] assessment of its
security needs”); State v. Palmigiano, 112 R. I., at 358, 309 A. 2d, at 861;
State v. Polidor, 130 Vt., at 39, 285 A. 2d, at 773; State v. Norman, 8 N. C.
App. 239, 242, 174 S. E. 2d 41, 44 (1970); State v. Brooks, 44 Haw., at 84–86,
352 P. 2d, at 613–614; State v. Brewer, 218 Iowa 1287, 1299, 254 N. W. 834,
840 (1934) (“[T]his court cannot presume that the defendant was preju-
diced because he was handcuffed”), overruled by State v. Wilson, 406 N. W.
2d 442, 449, and n. 1 (Iowa 1987); but see State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn., at
389, 97 N. W. 2d, at 476–477 (shackling is inherently prejudicial).

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be considered in deciding to shackle the defendant and the
certainty of the risk that had to be established, with a small
minority limiting the use of shackles to instances arising
from conduct specific to the particular trial or otherwise re-
quiring an imminent threat.10 The remaining States permit-
ted courts to consider a range of information outside the
trial, including past escape,11 prior convictions,12 the nature
of the crime for which the defendant was on trial,13 conduct
prior to trial while in prison,14 any prior disposition toward
10 See, e. g., ibid. (defining “immediate necessity” as “some reason based
on the conduct of the prisoner at the time of the trial”); Blair v. Common-
wealth, 171 Ky., at 327–328, 188 S. W., at 393; State v. Temple, 194 Mo. 237,
247, 92 S. W. 869, 872 (1906) (citing State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592–593
(1877)).
11 See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Chase, 350 Mass. 738, 740, 217 N. E. 2d
195, 197 (1966) (attempted escape on two prior occasions, plus the serious
nature of the offense for which defendant was being tried supported use
of restraints); People v. Thomas, 1 Mich. App., at 126, 134 N. W. 2d, at 357
(prison escape for which defendant was on trial sufficed to permit use of
shackles); People v. Bryant, 5 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 166 N. Y. S. 2d 59, 61
(1957) (attempts to escape “on prior occasions while in custody,” among
other things, supported the use of restraints).
12 See, e. g., State v. Roberts, 86 N. J. Super. 159, 165, 206 A. 2d 200, 204
(App. Div. 1965) (“In addition to a defendant’s conduct at the time of trial,
. . . defendant’s reputation, his known criminal record, his character, and
the nature of the case must all be weighed” in deciding whether to shackle
a defendant (second emphasis added)); State v. Moen, 94 Idaho, at 480–481,
491 P. 2d, at 861–862 (that three defendants were on trial for escape, had
been convicted of burglary two days before their trial for escape, and were
being tried together sufficed to uphold trial court’s shackling him); State
v. McKay, 63 Nev., at 164, 165 P. 2d, at 409 (prior conviction for burglary
and conviction by army court-martial for desertion, among other things,
taken into account); People v. Deveny, 112 Cal. App. 2d 767, 770, 247 P. 2d
128, 130 (1952) (defendant previously convicted of escape from prison);
State v. Franklin, supra, at 19, 776 N. E. 2d, at 46–47 (defendant just
convicted of three brutal murders).
13 See, e. g., State v. Roberts, supra, at 165–167, 206 A. 2d, at 204.
14 See, e. g., State v. Franklin, supra, at 18–20, 776 N. E. 2d, at 46–47
(defendant “had stabbed a fellow inmate with a pen six times in a dispute
over turning out a light”).

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648 DECK v. MISSOURI
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violence,15 and physical attributes of the defendant, such as
his size, physical strength, and age.16
The majority permits courts to continue to rely on these
factors, which are undeniably probative of the need for
shackling, as a basis for shackling a defendant both at trial
and at sentencing. Ante, at 629. In accepting these tradi-
tional factors, the Court rejects what has been adopted by
few States—that courts may consider only a defendant’s con-
duct at the trial itself or other information demonstrating
that it is a relative certainty that the defendant will engage
in disruptive or threatening conduct at his trial. See State
v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 389, 97 N. W. 2d 472, 477 (1959)
(defining “immediate necessity” to be demonstrated only by
the defendant’s conduct “at the time of the trial”); State v.
Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792, 850, 975 P. 2d 967, 1001 (1999) (en
banc); Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 327–328, 188
S. W. 390, 393 (1916); State v. Temple, 194 Mo. 237, 247–248,
92 S. W. 869, 872 (1906); but see 136 S. W. 3d, at 485 (case
below) (appearing to have abandoned this test).
A number of those traditional factors were present in this
case. Here, Deck killed two people to avoid arrest, a fact to
which he had confessed. Evidence was presented that Deck
had aided prisoners in an escape attempt. Moreover, a jury
15 See, e. g., Frye v. Commonwealth, 231 Va., at 381, 345 S. E. 2d, at 276
(permitting consideration of a “defendant’s temperament”); De Wolf v.
State, 95 Okla. Cr. 287, 293–294, 245 P. 2d 107, 114–115 (App. 1952) (permit-
ting consideration of both the defendant’s “character” and “disposition to-
ward being a violent and dangerous person, both to the court, the public
and to the defendant himself ”).
16 See, e. g., Frye v. Commonwealth, supra, at 381–382, 345 S. E. 2d, at
276 (“A trial court may consider various factors in determining whether a
defendant should be restrained” including his “physical attributes”); State
v. Dennis, 250 La. 125, 137–138, 194 So. 2d 720, 724 (1967) (no prejudice
from “defendant’s appearance in prisoner garb, handcuffs and leg-irons
before the jury venire” where it was a “ ‘prison inmate case’ ” and “defend-
ant is a vigorous man of twenty-eight or twenty-nine years of age, about
six feet tall, and weighing approximately two hundred and twenty to two
hundred and twenty-five pounds”).

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had found Deck guilty of two murders, the facts of which not
only make this crime heinous but also demonstrate a propen-
sity for violence. On this record, and with facts found by a
jury, the Court says that it needs more. Since the Court
embraces reliance on the traditional factors supporting the
use of visible restraints, its only basis for reversing is the
requirement of specific on-the-record findings by the trial
judge. This requirement is, however, inconsistent with the
traditional discretion afforded to trial courts and is unsup-
ported by state practice. This additional requirement of
on-the-record findings about that which is obvious from the
record makes little sense to me.
4
In recent years, more of a consensus regarding the use of
shackling has developed, with many courts concluding that
shackling is inherently prejudicial. But rather than being
firmly grounded in deeply rooted principles, that consensus
stems from a series of ill-considered dicta in Illinois v. Allen,
397 U. S. 337 (1970), Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501 (1976),
and Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986).
In Allen, the trial court had removed the defendant from
the courtroom until the court felt he could conform his con-
duct to basic standards befitting a court proceeding. 397
U. S., at 340–341. This Court held that removing the de-
fendant did not violate his due process right to be present
for his trial. In dicta, the Court suggested alternatives to
removal, such as citing the defendant for contempt or bind-
ing and gagging him. Id., at 344. The Court, however, did
express some revulsion at the notion of binding and gagging
a defendant. Ibid. Estelle and Holbrook repeated Allen’s
dicta. Estelle, supra, at 505; Holbrook, supra, at 568. The
Court in Holbrook went one step further than it had in
Allen, describing shackling as well as binding and gagging
in dicta as “inherently prejudicial.” 475 U. S., at 568.

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650 DECK v. MISSOURI
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The current consensus that the Court describes is one of
its own making. Ante, at 628. It depends almost exclu-
sively on the dicta in this Court’s opinions in Holbrook, Es-
telle, and Allen. Every lower court opinion the Court cites
as evidence of this consensus traces its reasoning back to one
or more of these decisions.17 These lower courts were inter-
17 Dyas v. Poole, 309 F. 3d 586, 588–589 (CA9 2002) (per curiam) (relying
on Holbrook), amended and superseded by 317 F. 3d 934 (2003) (per cu-
riam); Harrell v. Israel, 672 F. 2d 632, 635 (CA7 1982) (per curiam) (rely-
ing on Allen and Estelle); State v. Herrick, 324 Mont. 76, 80–81, 101 P. 3d
755, 758–759 (2004) (relying on Allen and Holbrook); Hill v. Common-
wealth, 125 S. W. 3d 221, 233 (Ky. 2004) (relying on Holbrook); State v.
Turner, 143 Wash. 2d 715, 724–727, 23 P. 3d 499, 504–505 (2001) (en banc)
(relying on State v. Finch, 137 Wash. 2d 792, 842, 975 P. 2d 967, 997–999
(1999) (en banc), which relies on Allen, Estelle, and Holbrook); Myers v.
State, 2000 OK CR 25, ¶¶ 46–47, 17 P. 3d 1021, 1033 (relying on Owens v.
State, 1982 OK CR 1, 187, ¶¶ 4–6, 654 P. 2d 657, 658–659, which relies on
Estelle); State v. Shoen, 598 N. W. 2d 370, 375–376 (Minn. 1999) (relying
on Allen, Estelle, and Holbrook); Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 638–639,
702 A. 2d 261, 268–269 (1997) (same); People v. Jackson, 14 Cal. App. 4th
1818, 1829–1830, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 593–594 (1993) (relying on People v.
Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 290–291, 545 P. 2d 1322, 1327 (1976) (in bank), which
relies on Allen); Cooks v. State, 844 S. W. 2d 697, 722 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (en banc) (relying on Marquez v. State, 725 S. W. 2d 217, 230 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, Moody v. State,
827 S. W. 2d 875, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc), which relies on
Holbrook); State v. Tweedy, 219 Conn. 489, 505, 508, 594 A. 2d 906, 914,
916 (1991) (relying on Estelle and Holbrook); State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho
87, 95–96, 577 P. 2d 1135, 1143–1144 (1978) (relying on Allen and Estelle);
People v. Brown, 45 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26, 358 N. E. 2d 1362, 1363 (1977)
(same); State v. Tolley, 290 N. C. 349, 367, 226 S. E. 2d 353, 367 (1976)
(same). See also, e. g., Anthony v. State, 521 P. 2d, at 496, and n. 33 (rely-
ing on Allen for the proposition that manacles, shackles, and other physical
restraints must be avoided unless necessary to protect some manifest ne-
cessity); State v. Brewster, 164 W. Va., at 180–181, 261 S. E. 2d, at 81–82
(relying on Allen and Estelle to overrule prior decision permitting review-
ing court to presume that the trial court reasonably exercised its discre-
tion even where the trial court had not made findings supporting the use
of restraints); Asch v. State, 62 P. 3d 945, 963–964 (Wyo. 2003) (relying on
Holbrook and Estelle to conclude that shackling is inherently prejudicial,
and on Allen to conclude that shackling offends the dignity and decorum

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Thomas, J., dissenting
preting this Court’s dicta, not reaching their own independ-
ent consensus about the content of the Due Process Clause.
More important, these decisions represent recent practice,
which does not determine whether the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as properly and traditionally interpreted, i. e., as a
statement of law, not policy preferences, embodies a right to
be free from visible, painless physical restraints at trial.
III
Wholly apart from the propriety of shackling a defendant
at trial, due process does not require that a defendant re-
main free from visible restraints at the penalty phase of a
capital trial. Such a requirement has no basis in tradition
or even modern state practice. Treating shackling at sen-
tencing as inherently prejudicial ignores the commonsense
distinction between a defendant who stands accused and a
defendant who stands convicted.
A
There is no tradition barring the use of shackles or other
restraints at sentencing. Even many modern courts have
concluded that the rule against visible shackling does not
apply to sentencing. See, e. g., State v. Young, 853 P. 2d 327,
350 (Utah 1993); Duckett v. State, 104 Nev. 6, 11, 752 P. 2d
752, 755 (1988) (per curiam); State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio
St. 3d 1, 18–19, 776 N. E. 2d 26, 46–47 (2002); but see Bello
v. State, 547 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1989) (applying rule against
shackling at sentencing, but suggesting that “lesser showing
of necessity” may be appropriate). These courts have re-
jected the suggestion that due process imposes such limits
because they have understood the difference between a man
of judicial proceedings); State v. Wilson, 406 N. W. 2d, at 449, n. 1 (relying
in part on Holbrook to hold that visible shackling is inherently prejudicial,
overruling prior decision that refused to presume prejudice); State v. Mad-
sen, 57 P. 3d 1134, 1136 (Utah App. 2002) (relying on Holbrook for the
proposition that shackling is inherently prejudicial).

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652 DECK v. MISSOURI
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accused and a man convicted. See, e. g., Young, supra, at
350; Duckett, supra, at 11, 752 P. 2d, at 755.
This same understanding is reflected even in the guilt-
innocence phase. In instances in which the jury knows that
the defendant is an inmate, though not yet convicted of the
crime for which he is on trial, courts have frequently held
that the defendant’s status as inmate ameliorates any preju-
dice that might have flowed from the jury seeing him in
handcuffs.18 The Court’s decision shuns such common sense.
B
In the absence of a consensus with regard to the use of
visible physical restraints even in modern practice, we
should not forsake common sense in determining what due
process requires. Capital sentencing jurors know that the
defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime. It
18 See, e. g., Harlow v. State, 105 P. 3d 1049, 1060 (Wyo. 2005) (where jury
knew that the prisoner and two witnesses were all inmates, no prejudice
from seeing them in shackles); Hill v. Commonwealth, supra, at 236 (“The
trial court’s admonition and the fact that the jury already knew Appellant
was a convicted criminal and a prisoner in a penitentiary mitigated the
prejudice naturally attendant to such restraint”); State v. Woodard, 121
N. H. 970, 974, 437 A. 2d 273, 275 (1981) (where jury already aware that
the defendant was confined, any prejudice was diminished); see also Payne
v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 466, 357 S. E. 2d 500, 504 (1987) (no error
for inmate-witnesses to be handcuffed where jurors were aware that they
“were . . . convicted felons and that the crime took place inside a penal
institution”); State v. Moss, 192 Neb. 405, 407, 222 N. W. 2d 111, 113 (1974)
(where defendant was an inmate, his appearance at arraignment in leg
irons did not prejudice him); Jessup v. State, 256 Ind. 409, 413, 269 N. E.
2d 374, 376 (1971) (“It would be unrealistic indeed . . . to hold that it was
reversible error for jurors to observe the transportation of an inmate of a
penal institution through a public hall in a shackled condition”); People v.
Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 778, 447 P. 2d 106, 115 (1968) (in bank) (where
defendant was charged with attacking another inmate, “the use of hand-
cuffs was not unreasonable”); State v. Dennis, 250 La., at 138, 194 So. 2d,
at 724 (no prejudice where defendant of considerable size appeared in
prisoner garb, leg irons, and handcuffs before the jury where it was a
“ ‘prison inmate case’ ”).

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strains credulity to think that they are surprised at the sight
of restraints. Here, the jury had already concluded that
there was a need to separate Deck from the community at
large by convicting him of double murder and robbery.
Deck’s jury was surely aware that Deck was jailed; jurors
know that convicted capital murderers are not left to roam
the streets. It blinks reality to think that seeing a con-
victed capital murderer in shackles in the courtroom could
import any prejudice beyond that inevitable knowledge.
Jurors no doubt also understand that it makes sense for a
capital defendant to be restrained at sentencing. By sen-
tencing, a defendant’s situation is at its most dire. He no
longer may prove himself innocent, and he faces either life
without liberty or death. Confronted with this reality, a de-
fendant no longer has much to lose—should he attempt es-
cape and fail, it is still lengthy imprisonment or death that
awaits him. For any person in these circumstances, the rea-
sons to attempt escape are at their apex. A defendant’s best
opportunity to do so is in the courtroom, for he is otherwise
in jail or restraints. See Westman, Handling the Problem
Criminal Defendant in the Courtroom: The Use of Physical
Restraints and Expulsion in the Modern Era, 2 San Diego
Justice J. 507, 526–527 (1994) (hereinafter Westman).
In addition, having been convicted, a defendant may be
angry. He could turn that ire on his own counsel, who has
failed in defending his innocence. See, e. g., State v. Forrest,
168 N. C. App. 614, 626, 609 S. E. 2d 241, 248–249 (2005)
(defendant brutally attacked his counsel at sentencing). Or,
for that matter, he could turn on a witness testifying at his
hearing or the court reporter. See, e. g., People v. Byrnes,
33 N. Y. 2d 343, 350, 308 N. E. 2d 435, 438 (1974) (defendant
lunged at witness during trial); State v. Harkness, 252 Kan.
510, 516, 847 P. 2d 1191, 1197 (1993) (defendant attacked court
reporter at arraignment). Such thoughts could well enter
the mind of any defendant in these circumstances, from the
most dangerous to the most docile. That a defendant now

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654 DECK v. MISSOURI
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convicted of his crimes appears before the jury in shackles
thus would be unremarkable to the jury. To presume that
such a defendant suffers prejudice by appearing in handcuffs
at sentencing does not comport with reality.
IV
The modern rationales proffered by the Court for its
newly minted rule likewise fail to warrant the conclusion
that due process precludes shackling at sentencing. More-
over, though the Court purports to be mindful of the tragedy
that can take place in a courtroom, the stringent rule it
adopts leaves no real room for ensuring the safety of the
courtroom.
A
Although the Court offers the presumption of innocence as
a rationale for the modern rule against shackling at trial, it
concedes the presumption has no application at sentencing.
Ante, at 632. The Court is forced to turn to the far more
amorphous need for “accuracy” in sentencing. Ibid. It is
true that this Court’s cases demand reliability in the fact-
finding that precedes the imposition of a sentence of death.
Monge v. California, 524 U. S. 721, 732 (1998). But shack-
les may undermine the factfinding process only if seeing a
convicted murderer in them is prejudicial. As I have
explained, this farfetched conjecture defies the reality of
sentencing.
The Court baldly asserts that visible physical restraints
could interfere with a defendant’s ability to participate in his
defense. Ante, at 631. I certainly agree that shackles
would be impermissible if they were to seriously impair a
defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, Riggins v. Ne-
vada, 504 U. S. 127, 154, n. 4 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting),
but there is no evidence that shackles do so. Deck does not
argue that the shackles caused him pain or impaired his men-
tal faculties. Nor does he argue that the shackles prevented
him from communicating with his counsel during trial.

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Counsel sat next to him; he remained fully capable of speak-
ing with counsel. Likewise, Deck does not claim that he was
unable to write down any information he wished to convey
to counsel during the course of the trial. Had the shackles
impaired him in that way, Deck could have sought to have at
least one of his hands free to make it easier for him to write.
Courts have permitted such arrangements. See, e. g., Peo-
ple v. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 155, 191, 926 P. 2d 365, 386 (1996);
State v. Jimerson, 820 S. W. 2d 500, 502 (Mo. App. 1991).
The Court further expresses concern that physical re-
straints might keep a defendant from taking the stand on his
own behalf in seeking the jury’s mercy. Ante, at 631. But
this concern is, again, entirely hypothetical. Deck makes no
claim that, but for the physical restraints, he would have
taken the witness stand to plead for his life. And under the
rule the Court adopts, Deck and others like him need make
no such assertion, for prejudice is presumed absent a show-
ing by the government to the contrary. Even assuming this
concern is real rather than imagined, it could be ameliorated
by removing the restraints if the defendant wishes to take
the stand. See, e. g., De Wolf v. State, 96 Okla. Cr. 382, 383,
256 P. 2d 191, 193 (App. 1953) (leg irons removed from de-
fendant in capital case when he took the witness stand). In-
stead, the Court says, the concern requires a categorical rule
that the use of visible physical restraints violates the Due
Process Clause absent a demanding showing. The Court’s
solution is overinclusive.
The Court also asserts the rule it adopts is necessary to
protect courtroom decorum, which the use of shackles would
offend. Ante, at 631–632. This courtroom decorum ration-
ale misunderstands this Court’s precedent. No decision of
this Court has ever intimated, let alone held, that the protec-
tion of the “courtroom’s formal dignity,” ante, at 631, is an
individual right enforceable by criminal defendants. Cer-
tainly, courts have always had the inherent power to ensure
that both those who appear before them and those who ob-

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656 DECK v. MISSOURI
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serve their proceedings conduct themselves appropriately.
See, e. g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 540–541 (1965).
The power of the courts to maintain order, however, is not
a right personal to the defendant, much less one of constitu-
tional proportions. Far from viewing the need for decorum
as a right the defendant can invoke, this Court has relied
on it to limit the conduct of defendants, even when their
constitutional rights are implicated. This is why a defend-
ant who proves himself incapable of abiding by the most
basic rules of the court is not entitled to defend himself, Far-
etta v. California, 422 U. S., at 834–835, n. 46, or to remain
in the courtroom, see Allen, 397 U. S., at 343. The concern
for courtroom decorum is not a concern about defendants, let
alone their right to due process. It is a concern about soci-
ety’s need for courts to operate effectively.
Wholly apart from the unwarranted status the Court ac-
cords “courtroom decorum,” the Court fails to explain the
affront to the dignity of the courts that the sight of physical
restraints poses. I cannot understand the indignity in hav-
ing a convicted double murderer and robber appear before
the court in visible physical restraints. Our Nation’s judges
and juries are exposed to accounts of heinous acts daily, like
the brutal murders Deck committed in this case. Even out-
side the courtroom, prisoners walk through courthouse halls
wearing visible restraints. Courthouses are thus places in
which members of the judiciary and the public come into fre-
quent contact with defendants in restraints. Yet, the Court
says, the appearance of a convicted criminal in a belly chain
and handcuffs at a sentencing hearing offends the sensibili-
ties of our courts. The courts of this Nation do not have
such delicate constitutions.
Finally, the Court claims that “[t]he appearance of the of-
fender during the penalty phase in shackles . . . almost inevi-
tably implies to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that
court authorities consider the offender a danger to the com-
munity—often a statutory aggravator and nearly always a

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relevant factor in jury decisionmaking.” Ante, at 633. This
argument is flawed. It ignores the fact that only relatively
recently have the penalty and guilt phases been conducted
separately. That the historical evidence reveals no consen-
sus prohibiting visible modern-day shackles during capital
trials suggests that there is similarly no consensus prohibit-
ing shackling during capital sentencing. Moreover, con-
cerns about a defendant’s dangerousness exist at the guilt
phase just as they exist at the penalty phase—jurors will
surely be more likely to convict a seemingly violent defend-
ant of murder than a seemingly placid one. If neither com-
mon law nor modern state cases support the Court’s position
with respect to the guilt phase, I see no reason why the fact
that a defendant may be perceived as a future danger would
support the Court’s position with respect to the penalty
phase.
B
The Court expresses concern for courtroom security, but
its concern rings hollow in light of the rule it adopts. The
need for security is real. Judges face the possibility that a
defendant or his confederates might smuggle a weapon into
court and harm those present, or attack with his bare hands.
For example, in 1999, in Berks County, Pennsylvania, a “de-
fendant forced his way to the bench and beat the judge un-
conscious.” Calhoun, Violence Toward Judicial Officials, 576
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 54, 61 (2001). One study of Pennsylvania judges pro-
jected that over a 20-year career, district justices had a 31
percent probability of being physically assaulted one or more
times. See Harris, Kirschner, Rozek, & Weiner, Violence in
the Judicial Workplace: One State’s Experience, 576 Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 38,
42 (2001). Judges are not the only ones who face the risk
of violence. Sheriffs and courtroom bailiffs face the second
highest rate of homicide in the workplace, a rate which is 15
times higher than the national average. Faust & Raffo,

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658 DECK v. MISSOURI
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Local Trial Court Response to Courthouse Safety, 576 An-
nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
91, 93–94 (2001); Weiner et al., Safe and Secure: Protecting
Judicial Officials, 36 Court Review 26, 27 (Winter 2000).
The problem of security may only be worsening. Accord-
ing to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the nature of
the prisoners in the federal system has changed: “[T]here
are more ‘hard-core tough guys’ and more multiple-
defendant cases,” making the work of the federal marshals
increasingly difficult. GAO, Federal Judicial Security: Com-
prehensive Risk-Based Program Should Be Fully Imple-
mented 21 (July 1994). Security issues are particularly
acute in state systems, in which limited manpower and re-
sources often leave judges to act as their own security. See
Harris, supra, at 46. Those resources further vary between
rural and urban areas, with many rural areas able to supply
only minimal security. Security may even be at its weakest
in the courtroom itself, for there the defendant is the least
restrained. Westman 526.
In the face of this real danger to courtroom officials and
bystanders, the Court limits the use of visible physical re-
straints to circumstances “specific to a particular trial,” ante,
at 629, i. e., “particular concerns . . . related to the defend-
ant on trial,” ante, at 633. Confining the analysis to trial-
specific circumstances precludes consideration of limits on
the security resources of courts. Under that test, the par-
ticulars of a given courthouse (being nonspecific to any par-
ticular defendant) are irrelevant, even if the judge himself is
the only security, or if a courthouse has few on-duty officers
standing guard at any given time, or multiple exits. Forbid-
ding courts from considering such circumstances fails to ac-
commodate the unfortunately dire security situation faced by
this Nation’s courts.
* * *

544US2 Unit: $U49 [11-04-07 13:43:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN
659 Cite as: 544 U. S. 622 (2005)
Thomas, J., dissenting
The Court’s decision risks the lives of courtroom person-
nel, with little corresponding benefit to defendants. This is
a risk that due process does not require. I respectfully
dissent.