WILKINSON, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, et al. v. DOTSON et al.

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74 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
WILKINSON, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, et al. v.
DOTSON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
No. 03–287. Argued December 6, 2004—Decided March 7, 2005
Respondents Dotson and Johnson are Ohio state prisoners. After parole
officials determined that Dotson was not eligible for parole and that
Johnson was not suitable for parole, they brought separate actions for
declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that
Ohio’s parole procedures violate the Federal Constitution. In each
case, the Federal District Court concluded that a § 1983 action does not
lie and that the prisoner would have to seek relief through a habeas
corpus suit. The Sixth Circuit ultimately consolidated the cases and
reversed, finding that the actions could proceed under § 1983.
Held: State prisoners may bring a § 1983 action for declaratory and in-
junctive relief challenging the constitutionality of state parole proce-
dures; they need not seek relief exclusively under the federal habeas
corpus statutes. Pp. 78–85.
(a) Ohio argues unsuccessfully that respondents’ claims may only be
brought in federal habeas (or similar state) proceedings because a state
prisoner cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration
of his confinement,” e. g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489, and
respondents’ lawsuits, in effect, collaterally attack their confinements’
duration. That argument jumps from a true premise (that in all likeli-
hood the prisoners hope their suits will help bring about earlier release)
to a faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole avenue for relief). This
Court’s case law makes clear that the connection between the constitu-
tionality of the prisoners’ parole proceedings and release from confine-
ment is too tenuous here to achieve Ohio’s legal door-closing objective.
From Preiser to Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, this Court has devel-
oped an exception from § 1983’s otherwise broad scope for actions that
lie “within the core of habeas corpus,” Preiser, supra, at 487, i. e., where
a state prisoner requests present or future release. Section 1983 re-
mains available for procedural challenges where success would not nec-
essarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner, e. g., Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, but the prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain
relief where success would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

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75 Cite as: 544 U. S. 74 (2005)
Syllabus
confinement or its duration, e. g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477.
Here, respondents’ claims are cognizable under § 1983, i. e., they do not
fall within the implicit habeas exception. They seek relief that will
render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility
(Dotson) and parole suitability (Johnson). See Wolff, supra, at 554–555.
Neither prisoner seeks an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier
release into the community. See, e. g., Preiser, supra, at 500. And as
in Wolff, a favorable judgment will not “necessarily imply the invalidity
of [their] conviction[s] or sentence[s].” Heck, supra, at 487. Success
for Dotson does not mean immediate release or a shorter stay in prison;
it means at most new eligibility review, which may speed consideration
of a new parole application. Success for Johnson means at most a new
parole hearing at which parole authorities may, in their discretion, de-
cline to shorten his prison term. Because neither prisoner’s claim
would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at “the core of
habeas corpus.” Preiser, supra, at 489. Finally, the prisoners’ claims
for future relief (which, if successful, will not necessarily imply the inva-
lidity of confinement or shorten its duration) are yet more distant from
that core. See Balisok, supra, at 648. Pp. 78–83.
(b) Ohio’s additional arguments—(1) that respondents’ § 1983 actions
cannot lie because a favorable judgment would “necessarily imply the
invalidity of [their] sentence[s],” Heck, supra, at 487 (emphasis added),
which sentences include particular state parole procedures; and (2) that
a decision for them would violate principles of federal/state comity by
opening the door to federal court without prior exhaustion of state-court
remedies—are not persuasive. Pp. 83–84.
329 F. 3d 463, affirmed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg,
JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J.,
joined, post, p. 85. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 88.
Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause
for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jim Petro, At-
torney General, Stephen P. Carney, Senior Deputy Solicitor,
and Todd R. Marti, Assistant Solicitor.
John Q. Lewis argued the cause for respondent Johnson.
With him on the brief were Donald B. Ayer, William K.
Shirey II, and David L. Shapiro.

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76 WILKINSON v. DOTSON
Opinion of the Court
Alan E. Untereiner argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent Dotson.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two state prisoners brought an action under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 claiming that Ohio’s state parole procedures violate
the Federal Constitution. The prisoners seek declaratory
and injunctive relief. The question before us is whether
they may bring such an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42
U. S. C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, or whether they
must instead seek relief exclusively under the federal habeas
corpus statutes. We conclude that these actions may be
brought under § 1983.
I
The two respondents, William Dotson and Rogerico
Johnson, are currently serving lengthy terms in Ohio pris-
ons. Dotson began to serve a life sentence in 1981. The
parole board rejected his first parole request in 1995; and a
parole officer, after reviewing Dotson’s records in the year
2000, determined that he should not receive further consider-
ation for parole for at least five more years. In reaching
this conclusion about Dotson’s parole eligibility, the officer
used parole guidelines first adopted in 1998, after Dotson
*A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Ala-
bama et al. by Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Kevin C. New-
som, Solicitor General, and Michael B. Billingsley, Deputy Solicitor Gen-
eral, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows:
Gregg D. Renkes of Alaska, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker
of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho,
Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Phill Kline of Kansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of
Maryland, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jim Hood of Mississippi,
Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Gerald J. Pappert of Pennsylvania, Harry Mc-
Master of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, Greg Abbott of
Texas, Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West
Virginia.
Norman L. Sirak and Leonard Yelsky filed a brief for 2,974 Former and
Current Ohio Inmates et al. as amici curiae.

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Opinion of the Court
began to serve his term. Dotson claims that the retroactive
application of these new, harsher guidelines to his preguide-
lines case violates the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto and Due
Process Clauses. He seeks a federal-court declaration to
that effect as well as a permanent injunction ordering prison
officials to grant him an “immediate parole hearing in accord-
ance with the statutory laws and administrative rules in
place when [he] committed his crimes.” App. 20 (Dotson
Complaint, Prospective Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
¶ 3).
Johnson began to serve a 10- to 30-year prison term in
1992. The parole board considered and rejected his first pa-
role request in 1999, finding him unsuitable for release. In
making this determination, the board applied the new 1998
guidelines. Johnson too claims that the application of these
new, harsher guidelines to his preguidelines case violated the
Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. He also alleges that
the parole board’s proceedings (by having too few mem-
bers present and by denying him an adequate opportunity
to speak) violated the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.
Johnson’s complaint seeks a new parole hearing conducted
under constitutionally proper procedures and an injunction
ordering the State to comply with constitutional due process
and ex post facto requirements in the future.
Both prisoners brought § 1983 actions in federal court. In
each case, the Federal District Court concluded that a § 1983
action does not lie and that the prisoner would have to seek
relief through a habeas corpus suit. Dotson v. Wilkinson,
No. 3:00 CV 7303 (ND Ohio, Aug. 7, 2000); Johnson v. Ghee,
No. 4:00 CV 1075 (ND Ohio, July 16, 2000). Each prisoner
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ulti-
mately consolidated the two appeals and heard both cases en
banc. The court found that the actions could proceed under
§ 1983, and it reversed the lower courts. 329 F. 3d 463, 472
(2003). Ohio parole officials then petitioned for certiorari,
and we granted review.

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78 WILKINSON v. DOTSON
Opinion of the Court
II
This Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot
use a § 1983 action to challenge “the fact or duration of his
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489
(1973); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 554 (1974);
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 481 (1994); Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, 648 (1997). He must seek federal
habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.
Ohio points out that the inmates in these cases attack their
parole-eligibility proceedings (Dotson) and parole-suitability
proceedings (Johnson) only because they believe that victory
on their claims will lead to speedier release from prison.
Consequently, Ohio argues, the prisoners’ lawsuits, in effect,
collaterally attack the duration of their confinement; hence,
such a claim may only be brought through a habeas corpus
action, not through § 1983.
The problem with Ohio’s argument lies in its jump from a
true premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners hope these
actions will help bring about earlier release) to a faulty con-
clusion (that habeas is their sole avenue for relief). A con-
sideration of this Court’s case law makes clear that the con-
nection between the constitutionality of the prisoners’ parole
proceedings and release from confinement is too tenuous
here to achieve Ohio’s legal door-closing objective.
The Court initially addressed the relationship between
§ 1983 and the federal habeas statutes in Preiser v. Rodri-
guez, supra. In that case, state prisoners brought civil
rights actions attacking the constitutionality of prison disci-
plinary proceedings that had led to the deprivation of their
good-time credits. Id., at 476. The Court conceded that
the language of § 1983 literally covers their claims. See
§ 1983 (authorizing claims alleging the deprivation of consti-
tutional rights against every “person” acting “under color
of ” state law). But, the Court noted, the language of the
federal habeas statutes applies as well. See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(a) (permitting claims by a person being held “in cus-

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tody in violation of the Constitution”). Moreover, the Court
observed, the language of the habeas statute is more specific,
and the writ’s history makes clear that it traditionally “has
been accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release
from [unlawful] confinement.” Preiser, 411 U. S., at 486.
Finally, habeas corpus actions require a petitioner fully to
exhaust state remedies, which § 1983 does not. Id., at 490–
491; see also Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496,
507 (1982). These considerations of linguistic specificity, his-
tory, and comity led the Court to find an implicit excep-
tion from § 1983’s otherwise broad scope for actions that
lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U. S.,
at 487.
Defining the scope of that exception, the Court concluded
that a § 1983 action will not lie when a state prisoner chal-
lenges “the fact or duration of his confinement,” id., at 489,
and seeks either “immediate release from prison,” or the
“shortening” of his term of confinement, id., at 482. Be-
cause an action for restoration of good-time credits in effect
demands immediate release or a shorter period of detention,
it attacks “the very duration of . . . physical confinement,”
id., at 487–488, and thus lies at “the core of habeas corpus,”
id., at 487. Therefore, the Court held, the Preiser prisoners
could not pursue their claims under § 1983.
In Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, the Court elaborated the
contours of this habeas corpus “core.” As in Preiser, state
prisoners brought a § 1983 action challenging prison officials’
revocation of good-time credits by means of constitutionally
deficient disciplinary proceedings. 418 U. S., at 553. The
Court held that the prisoners could not use § 1983 to obtain
restoration of the credits because Preiser had held that “an
injunction restoring good time improperly taken is fore-
closed.” 418 U. S., at 555. But the inmates could use § 1983
to obtain a declaration (“as a predicate to” their requested
damages award) that the disciplinary procedures were
invalid. Ibid. They could also seek “by way of ancillary

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relief[,] an otherwise proper injunction enjoining the pro-
spective enforcement of invalid prison regulations.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). In neither case would victory for the
prisoners necessarily have meant immediate release or a
shorter period of incarceration; the prisoners attacked only
the “wrong procedures, not . . . the wrong result (i. e., [the
denial of] good-time credits).” Heck, supra, at 483 (discuss-
ing Wolff).
In Heck, the Court considered a different, but related, cir-
cumstance. A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action for
damages, challenging the conduct of state officials who, the
prisoner claimed, had unconstitutionally caused his convic-
tion by improperly investigating his crime and destroying
evidence. 512 U. S., at 479. The Court pointed to “the
hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate ve-
hicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal
judgments.” Id., at 486. And it held that where “establish-
ing the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates
the invalidity of the conviction,” id., at 481–482, a § 1983 ac-
tion will not lie “unless . . . the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated,” id., at 487. The Court then
added that, where the § 1983 action, “even if successful, will
not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal
judgment . . . , the action should be allowed to proceed.”
Ibid. (footnote omitted).
Finally, in Edwards v. Balisok, supra, the Court returned
to the prison disciplinary procedure context of the kind it
had addressed previously in Preiser and Wolff. Balisok
sought “a declaration that the procedures employed by state
officials [to deprive him of good-time credits] violated due
process, . . . damages for use of the unconstitutional proce-
dures, [and] an injunction to prevent future violations.” 520
U. S., at 643. Applying Heck, the Court found that habeas
was the sole vehicle for the inmate’s constitutional challenge
insofar as the prisoner sought declaratory relief and money
damages, because the “principal procedural defect com-

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plained of,” namely, deceit and bias on the part of the deci-
sionmaker, “would, if established, necessarily imply the inva-
lidity of the deprivation of [Balisok’s] good-time credits.”
520 U. S., at 646. Hence, success on the prisoner’s claim for
money damages (and the accompanying claim for declaratory
relief) would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punish-
ment imposed.” Id., at 648. Nonetheless, the prisoner’s
claim for an injunction barring future unconstitutional proce-
dures did not fall within habeas’ exclusive domain. That is
because “[o]rdinarily, a prayer for such prospective relief will
not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of a previous loss of
good-time credits.” Ibid.
Throughout the legal journey from Preiser to Balisok, the
Court has focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners
use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they
seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either
directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or
indirectly through a judicial determination that necessar-
ily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody. Thus,
Preiser found an implied exception to § 1983’s coverage
where the claim seeks—not where it simply “relates to”—
“core” habeas corpus relief, i. e., where a state prisoner re-
quests present or future release. Cf. post, at 92 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Preiser covers challenges that
“relate . . . to” the duration of confinement). Wolff makes
clear that § 1983 remains available for procedural challenges
where success in the action would not necessarily spell im-
mediate or speedier release for the prisoner. Heck speci-
fies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages
where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of
a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence. And
Balisok, like Wolff, demonstrates that habeas remedies do
not displace § 1983 actions where success in the civil rights
suit would not necessarily vitiate the legality of (not pre-
viously invalidated) state confinement. These cases, taken
together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is

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barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief
sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target
of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or
internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
duration.
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude
that respondents’ claims are cognizable under § 1983, i. e.,
they do not fall within the implicit habeas exception.
Dotson and Johnson seek relief that will render invalid the
state procedures used to deny parole eligibility (Dotson) and
parole suitability (Johnson). See Wolff, 418 U. S., at 554–555.
Neither respondent seeks an injunction ordering his immedi-
ate or speedier release into the community. See Preiser, 411
U. S., at 500; Wolff, supra, at 554. And as in Wolff, a favor-
able judgment will not “necessarily imply the invalidity of
[their] conviction[s] or sentence[s].” Heck, supra, at 487.
Success for Dotson does not mean immediate release from
confinement or a shorter stay in prison; it means at most new
eligibility review, which at most will speed consideration of
a new parole application. Success for Johnson means at
most a new parole hearing at which Ohio parole authorities
may, in their discretion, decline to shorten his prison term.
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.03 (Lexis 2003) (describing
the parole authority’s broad discretionary powers); Inmates
of Orient Correctional Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole
Auth., 929 F. 2d 233, 236 (CA6 1991) (same); see also Tr. of
Oral Arg. 18 (petitioners’ counsel conceding that success on
respondents’ claims would not inevitably lead to release).
Because neither prisoner’s claim would necessarily spell
speedier release, neither lies at “the core of habeas corpus.”
Preiser, supra, at 489. Finally, the prisoners’ claims for fu-
ture relief (which, if successful, will not necessarily imply the
invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration) are yet
more distant from that core. See Balisok, supra, at 648.

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Opinion of the Court
The dissent disagrees with our legal analysis and advo-
cates use of a different legal standard in critical part be-
cause, in its view, (1) a habeas challenge to a sentence (a
“core” challenge) does not necessarily produce the prisoner’s
“release” (so our standard “must be . . . wrong”), see post, at
88, 91; and (2) Heck’s standard is irrelevant because Heck
concerned only damages, see post, at 91. As to the first, we
believe that a case challenging a sentence seeks a prisoner’s
“release” in the only pertinent sense: It seeks invalidation (in
whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s
confinement; the fact that the State may seek a new judg-
ment (through a new trial or a new sentencing proceeding) is
beside the point. As to the second, Balisok applied Heck’s
standard and addressed a claim seeking not only damages,
but also a separate declaration that the State’s procedures
were unlawful. See 520 U. S., at 643, 647–648.
III
Ohio makes two additional arguments. First, Ohio points
to language in Heck indicating that a prisoner’s § 1983 dam-
ages action cannot lie where a favorable judgment would
“necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sen-
tence.” 512 U. S., at 487 (emphasis added). Ohio then ar-
gues that its parole proceedings are part of the prisoners’
“sentence[s]”—indeed, an aspect of the “sentence[s]” that the
§ 1983 claims, if successful, will invalidate.
We do not find this argument persuasive. In context,
Heck uses the word “sentence” to refer not to prison proce-
dures, but to substantive determinations as to the length of
confinement. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 751,
n. 1 (2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he incarceration that matters
under Heck is the incarceration ordered by the original judg-
ment of conviction”). Heck uses the word “sentence” inter-
changeably with such other terms as “continuing confine-
ment” and “imprisonment.” 512 U. S., at 483, 486; see also

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Balisok, supra, at 645, 648 (referring to the invalidity of “the
judgment” or “punishment imposed”). So understood, Heck
is consistent with other cases permitting prisoners to bring
§ 1983 challenges to prison administrative decisions. See,
e. g., Wolff, supra, at 554–555; Muhammad, 540 U. S., at 754;
see also ibid. (rejecting “the mistaken view . . . that Heck
applies categorically to all suits challenging prison discipli-
nary proceedings”). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly per-
mitted prisoners to bring § 1983 actions challenging the con-
ditions of their confinement—conditions that, were Ohio
right, might be considered part of the “sentence.” See, e. g.,
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U. S. 546 (1964) (per curiam); Wilword-
ing v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (per curiam). And
this interpretation of Heck is consistent with Balisok, where
the Court held the prisoner’s suit Heck-barred not because it
sought nullification of the disciplinary procedures but rather
because nullification of the disciplinary procedures would
lead necessarily to restoration of good-time credits and hence
the shortening of the prisoner’s sentence. 520 U. S., at 646.
Second, Ohio says that a decision in favor of respondents
would break faith with principles of federal/state comity by
opening the door to federal court without prior exhaustion
of state-court remedies. Our earlier cases, however, have
already placed the States’ important comity considerations
in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to
vindicate federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded
that prisoners may bring their claims without fully exhaust-
ing state-court remedies so long as their suits, if established,
would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement.
See Part II, supra. Thus, we see no reason for moving the
line these cases draw—particularly since Congress has al-
ready strengthened the requirement that prisoners exhaust
state administrative remedies as a precondition to any § 1983
action. See 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U. S.
516, 524 (2002).

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Scalia, J., concurring
For these reasons, the Sixth Circuit’s judgment is affirmed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, which in my view reads Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U. S. 641 (1997), correctly. And I am in full agreement with
the Court’s holding that “[b]ecause neither prisoner’s claim
would necessarily spell speedier release, neither lies at ‘the
core of habeas corpus’ ” and both may be brought under Rev.
Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Ante, at 82. I write sepa-
rately to note that a contrary holding would require us to
broaden the scope of habeas relief beyond recognition.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), and the cases
that follow it hold that Congress, in enacting § 1983, pre-
served the habeas corpus statute as the sole authorization
for challenges to allegedly unlawful confinement. Id., at
489–490. At the time of § 1983’s adoption, the federal
habeas statute mirrored the common-law writ of habeas cor-
pus, in that it authorized a single form of relief: the pris-
oner’s immediate release from custody. See Act of Feb.
5, 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 386. Congress shortly thereafter
amended the statute, authorizing federal habeas courts to
“dispose of the party as law and justice require,” Rev. Stat.
§ 761. The statute reads virtually the same today, 28
U. S. C. § 2243 (“dispose of the matter as law and justice
require”). We have interpreted this broader remedial lan-
guage to permit relief short of release. For example, when
a habeas petitioner challenges only one of several consecu-
tive sentences, the court may invalidate the challenged sen-
tence even though the prisoner remains in custody to serve
the others. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 67 (1968);
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U. S. 335, 336–337 (1968) (per cu-

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86 WILKINSON v. DOTSON
Scalia, J., concurring
riam). Thus, in Preiser we held the prisoners’ § 1983 action
barred because the relief it sought—restoration of good-time
credits, which would shorten the prisoners’ incarceration and
hasten the date on which they would be transferred to super-
vised release—was available in habeas. See 411 U. S., at
487–488.
It is one thing to say that permissible habeas relief, as
our cases interpret the statute, includes ordering a “quantum
change in the level of custody,” Graham v. Broglin, 922 F. 2d
379, 381 (CA7 1991) (Posner, J.), such as release from incar-
ceration to parole. It is quite another to say that the habeas
statute authorizes federal courts to order relief that neither
terminates custody, accelerates the future date of release
from custody, nor reduces the level of custody. That is what
is sought here: the mandating of a new parole hearing that
may or may not result in release, prescription of the composi-
tion of the hearing panel, and specification of the procedures
to be followed. A holding that this sort of judicial immer-
sion in the administration of discretionary parole lies at the
“core of habeas” would utterly sever the writ from its
common-law roots. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 526,
n. 6 (1979) (treating as open the question whether prison-
conditions claims are cognizable in habeas). The dissent
suggests that because a habeas court may issue a conditional
writ ordering a prisoner released unless the State conducts
a new sentencing proceeding, the court may also issue a con-
ditional writ ordering release absent a new parole proceed-
ing. See post, at 88–91 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). But the
prisoner who shows that his sentencing was unconstitutional
is actually entitled to release, because the judgment pursu-
ant to which he is confined has been invalidated; the condi-
tional writ serves only to “delay the release . . . in order to
provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitu-
tional violation.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U. S. 770, 775
(1987); see In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 259, 262 (1894) (condi-
tional writ for proper resentencing). By contrast, the val-

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87 Cite as: 544 U. S. 74 (2005)
Scalia, J., concurring
idly sentenced prisoner who shows only that the State made
a procedural error in denying discretionary parole has not
established a right to release, and so cannot obtain habeas
relief—conditional or otherwise. Conditional writs enable
habeas courts to give States time to replace an invalid judg-
ment with a valid one, and the consequence when they fail
to do so is always release. Conditional writs are not an all-
purpose weapon with which federal habeas courts can extort
from the respondent custodian forms of relief short of re-
lease, whether a new parole hearing or a new mattress in
the applicant’s cell.
Petitioners counter that we need not be concerned about
this expansion of habeas relief because prisoners will natu-
rally prefer § 1983 to habeas corpus, in light of the burden-
some prerequisites attached to habeas relief by 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254. But those prerequisites, such as exhaustion of state
remedies, reliance on “clearly established Federal law,” and
deference to previous findings of fact, apply only to “a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,”
§§ 2254(b)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1). By contrast, § 2243’s delineation
of the scope of permissible relief applies to all federal habeas
proceedings, whether the petitioner is in federal or state cus-
tody, see § 2241(c). Thus, while § 2254 may shield petitioners
and their fellow state wardens from the impact of the broad-
ened writ they urge us to create, not every warden respond-
ing to a habeas petition can claim the same protection. And
federal prisoners, whose custodians are not acting under
color of state law and hence cannot be sued under § 1983,
have greater incentives to shoehorn their claims into habeas.
Finally, I note that the Court’s opinion focuses correctly
on whether the claims respondents pleaded were claims that
may be pursued in habeas—not on whether respondents can
be successful in obtaining habeas relief on those claims.
See, e. g., ante, at 80–81. Thus, for example, a prisoner who
wishes to challenge the length of his confinement, but who
cannot obtain federal habeas relief because of the statute

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
of limitations or the restrictions on successive petitions,
§§ 2244(a), (b), (d), cannot use the unavailability of federal
habeas relief in his individual case as grounds for proceeding
under § 1983. Cf. Preiser, supra, at 489–490 (“It would
wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent to hold that
[state prisoners] could evade [the exhaustion] requirement by
the simple expedient of putting a different label on their
pleadings”).
With these observations, I join the Court’s opinion.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
In this case, the Court insists that an attack on parole
proceedings brought under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983, may not be dismissed on the grounds that habeas cor-
pus is the exclusive remedy for such claims. The primary
reason offered for the Court’s holding is that an order enti-
tling a prisoner to a new parole proceeding might not result
in his early release. That reason, however, applies with
equal logic and force to a sentencing proceeding. And since
it is elementary that habeas is the appropriate remedy for
challenging a sentence, something must be quite wrong with
the Court’s own first premise.
Everyone knows that when a prisoner succeeds in a habeas
action and obtains a new sentencing hearing, the sentence
may or may not be reduced. The sentence can end up being
just the same, or perhaps longer. The prisoner’s early
release is by no means assured simply because the first sen-
tence was found unlawful. Yet no one would say that an
attack on judicial sentencing proceedings following convic-
tion may be raised through an action under § 1983. The in-
consistency in the Court’s treatment of sentencing proceed-
ings and parole proceedings is thus difficult to justify. It
is, furthermore, in tension with our precedents. For these
reasons, I write this respectful dissent.
Challenges to parole proceedings are cognizable in habeas.
Here respondents challenge parole determinations that not

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
only deny release (or eligibility for consideration for release)
but also guarantee continued confinement until the next
scheduled parole proceeding. See ante, at 76–77 (majority
opinion). If a parole determination is made in a proceeding
flawed by errors of constitutional dimensions, as these re-
spondents now allege, their continued confinement may well
be the result of constitutional violation. Respondents thus
raise a cognizable habeas claim of being “in custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution.” 28 U. S. C. § 2241(c)(3); see also 1
R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 9.1, pp. 431–437, and n. 33 (4th ed. 2001) (noting
that “[t]he range of claims cognizable in federal habeas cor-
pus” includes challenges to “the duration of sentence (includ-
ing on the basis of parole, good time, and other prison- or
administratively, as opposed to court-administered rules)”
and citing numerous cases to that effect). In recognition of
this elementary principle, this Court and the courts of ap-
peals have adjudicated the merits of many parole challenges
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See, e. g., California
Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995);
Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F. 3d 374 (CA3 2003); Nulph
v. Faatz, 27 F. 3d 451 (CA9 1994) (per curiam); Fender v.
Thompson, 883 F. 2d 303 (CA4 1989).
My concerns with the Court’s holding are increased, not
diminished, by the fact that the Court does not seem to
deny that respondents’ claims indeed could be cognizable in
habeas corpus proceedings. Justice Scalia’s concurring
opinion suggests otherwise, because respondents seek a form
of relief (new parole hearings) unavailable in habeas. Ante,
at 86–87. But the common practice of granting a conditional
writ—ordering that a State release the prisoner or else cor-
rect the constitutional error through a new hearing—already
allows a habeas court to compel the type of relief Justice
Scalia supposes to be unavailable. See Hilton v. Braun-
skill, 481 U. S. 770, 775 (1987) (“Federal habeas corpus prac-
tice, as reflected by the decisions of this Court, indicates that

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a court has broad discretion in conditioning a judgment
granting habeas relief ”).
Because habeas is available for parole challenges like re-
spondents’, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), thus
requires a holding that it also provides the exclusive vehicle
for them. In Preiser, the Court held that challenges to “the
very fact or duration of [a prisoner’s] confinement,” as op-
posed to “the conditions of . . . prison life,” must be brought
in habeas, not under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 411 U. S., at 499–
500. The language of § 1983, to be sure, is capacious enough
to include a challenge to the fact or duration of confinement;
Preiser, nonetheless, established that because habeas is the
most specific applicable remedy it should be the exclusive
means for raising the challenge. Id., at 489. Respondents’
challenges to adverse parole system determinations relate
not at all to conditions of confinement but rather to the fact
and duration of confinement. See Butterfield v. Bail, 120
F. 3d 1023, 1024 (CA9 1997) (“[A] challenge to the proce-
dures used in the denial of parole necessarily implicates the
validity of the denial of parole and, therefore, the prison-
er’s continuing confinement”). Straightforward application
of Preiser and the cases after it would yield the conclusion
that these claims must be brought in habeas.
The majority’s contrary holding, permitting parole deter-
mination challenges to go forward under § 1983, is not based
on any argument that these claims should be characterized
as challenges to conditions of confinement rather than to its
fact or duration. That argument is unavailable to the Court.
The majority must say instead that respondents’ claims do
not fall into the “ ‘core of habeas.’ ” Ante, at 82. For this,
it gives two reasons.
The first is that success on the claims will not necessar-
ily entitle respondents to immediate release. Ibid. This,
as noted at the very outset, proves far too much. If the
Court’s line of reasoning is sound, it would remove from the

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“core of habeas” any challenge to an unconstitutional sen-
tencing procedure.
The second reason, that success on the claims does not
necessarily imply the invalidity of respondents’ convictions
or sentences, ibid., is both misplaced and irrelevant. It is
misplaced, because it takes out of context the test employed
in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), and in Edwards
v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997). In both those cases there
was a temptation to seek only relief unavailable in habeas,
such as damages (and declaratory relief serving as a predi-
cate to damages), and thus to do an end run around Preiser.
Heck, supra, at 481; Balisok, supra, at 643–644; see also
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749 (2004) (per curiam) (rec-
ognizing that damages are unavailable in habeas). Today’s
case does not present that problem. The fact that respond-
ents’ claims do not impugn the validity of their convictions or
sentences is also irrelevant. True, respondents’ contentions
have nothing to do with their original state-court convictions
or sentencing determinations. Stating this fact, however,
gets the Court no closer to resolving whether parole deter-
minations themselves are subject to direct challenge only in
habeas. That is why we have held that administrative deci-
sions denying good-time credits are subject to attack only
in habeas. Preiser, supra, at 477, 500; Balisok, supra, at
643–644.
The Court makes it a point to cite a sentence fragment
from Close, observing that “ ‘the incarceration that matters
under Heck is the incarceration ordered by the original judg-
ment of conviction,’ ” ante, at 83 (quoting 540 U. S., at 751,
n. 1). That statement, however, is inapplicable even on its
own terms, because it addresses the Heck problem, not this
one. Furthermore, even apart from Heck’s inapplicability to
this case, the full sentence from which the majority takes
the quotation makes clear that the Court in Close was con-
trasting confinement per se with “special disciplinary con-

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finement for infraction of prison rules,” 540 U. S., at 751, n. 1.
That simply is not at issue here. In sum, neither of the
majority’s stated principles can justify its deviation from the
holding Preiser demands.
Today’s ruling blurs the Preiser formulation. It is appar-
ent that respondents’ challenges relate not at all to condi-
tions of confinement but solely to its duration. Notwith-
standing Preiser’s direction that challenges to the fact or
duration of confinement should be restricted to habeas, the
Court’s decision will allow numerous § 1983 challenges to
state parole system determinations that do relate solely to
the duration of the prisoners’ confinement.
It is unsurprising, then, that 18 States have filed an ami-
cus brief joining with Ohio in urging the opposite result, see
Brief for Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae. Today’s decision
allows state prisoners raising parole challenges to circum-
vent the state courts. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)
(providing that a person in custody pursuant to a state-court
judgment must in general exhaust all “remedies available in
the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief)
with 42 U. S. C. § 1997e(a) (requiring only that a prisoner ex-
haust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 ac-
tion to challenge “prison conditions”). Parole systems no
doubt have variations from State to State. It is within the
special province and expertise of the state courts to address
challenges to their own state parole determinations in the
first instance, particularly because many challenges raise
state procedural questions. Today the Court, over the ob-
jection of many States, deprives the federal courts of the
invaluable assistance and frontline expertise found in the
state courts.
For the reasons given above, I would reverse.