DODD v. UNITED STATES

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353 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
DODD v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 04–5286. Argued March 22, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255, claiming that his conviction for knowingly and intentionally en
gaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U. S. C.
§§ 841 and 846, should be set aside because it was contrary to Richard
son v. United States, 526 U. S. 813, 815, which held that a jury must
agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific viola
tions that together constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The
District Court held that, because Richardson had been decided more
than one year before Dodd filed his motion, the motion was untimely
under § 2255, ¶ 6(3), which provides that § 2255’s 1-year limitation period
begins to run on “the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recog
nized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.” On appeal, Dodd argued that ¶ 6(3)’s limitation
period began to run on April 19, 2002, the date the Eleventh Circuit
recognized Richardson’s retroactive application to cases on collateral
review. The Eleventh Circuit held that the period began to run on
June 1, 1999, the date that this Court initially decided Richardson.
Held:
1. The 1-year limitation period under ¶ 6(3) begins to run on the date
on which this Court “initially recognized” the right asserted in an appli
cant’s motion, not the date on which that right was made retroactive.
The text of ¶ 6(3) unequivocally identifies one, and only one, date from
which the limitation period is measured: “the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” This Court
presumes that a legislature says what it means and means what it says
in a statute. Dodd’s reliance on ¶ 6(3)’s second clause to identify the
operative date is misplaced. That clause merely limits the subsection’s
applicability to cases in which applicants assert rights “newly recog
nized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review.” Thus, ¶ 6(3)’s date—“the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court”—does not
apply at all unless the conditions in the second clause are satisfied.
This result may make it difficult for applicants filing second or succes

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354 DODD v. UNITED STATES
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sive § 2255 motions to obtain relief, since this Court rarely announces a
new rule of constitutional law and makes it retroactive within a year,
but the Court is not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has
enacted. Pp. 356–360.
2. Because Dodd’s § 2255 motion was filed more than a year after this
Court decided Richardson, his motion was untimely. P. 360.
365 F. 3d 1273, affirmed.
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined
as to Part II, except for n. 4, post, p. 360. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 371.
Janice L. Bergmann argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clem
ent, Assistant Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben.*
Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2255 establishes a “1-year period of limi
tation” within which a federal prisoner may file a motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under that section.
That period runs from “the latest” of a number of events,
which are enumerated in subparagraphs (1) through (4) of ¶ 6
of that section. This case involves subparagraph (3), which
provides that the limitation period begins to run on “the
date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” We must decide whether the
date from which the limitation period begins to run under
¶ 6(3) is the date on which this Court “initially recog
*Jeffrey T. Green, David M. Porter, Carol A. Brook, Henry J. Bemp
orad, and Frances H. Pratt filed a brief for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

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nized” the right asserted in an applicant’s § 2255 motion, or
whether, instead, it is the date on which the right is “made
retroactiv[e].”
I
Petitioner Michael Donald Dodd was indicted on June 25,
1993, for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continu
ing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 and
846, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute marijuana
in violation of § 841(a)(1), conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1), and 16 counts
of using and possessing a passport obtained by false state
ment in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1546(a). He was convicted
of all counts except the cocaine charge, and was sentenced
to 360 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of super
vised release. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir
cuit affirmed on May 7, 1997. 111 F. 3d 867 (per curiam).
Because Dodd did not file a petition for certiorari, his convic
tion became final on August 6, 1997. See Clay v. United
States, 537 U. S. 522, 525 (2003).
On April 4, 2001, more than three years after his convic
tion became final, Dodd filed a pro se motion under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2255 seeking to set aside his conviction for knowingly and
intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise,
based on our decision in Richardson v. United States, 526
U. S. 813 (1999). Richardson held that a jury must agree
unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific
violations that together constitute the continuing criminal
enterprise. Id., at 815. Dodd argued, among other things,
that he was entitled to relief because his jury had not
been instructed that they had to agree unanimously on each
predicate violation. App. 9. The District Court dismissed
Dodd’s § 2255 motion as time barred. Id., at 11–15. Be
cause Richardson had been decided more than one year be
fore Dodd filed his motion, the court held that the motion
was untimely; it also rejected Dodd’s request for equitable
tolling. App. 13–15.

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Dodd appealed, arguing that the limitation period in
§ 2255, ¶ 6(3), did not begin to run until April 19, 2002, when
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held in Ross
v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677 (per curiam), that the right
recognized in Richardson applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. The Eleventh Circuit held that the limita
tion period began to run on “the date the Supreme Court
initially recognizes the right”—the date Richardson was
decided—and accordingly affirmed the dismissal of Dodd’s
motion as time barred. 365 F. 3d 1273, 1283 (2004).
We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. 999 (2004), to resolve a
conflict in the Courts of Appeals over when the limitation
period in ¶ 6(3) begins to run. Compare, e. g., 365 F. 3d, at
1283 (case below) (period runs from date of Supreme Court
decision initially recognizing right asserted); and United
States v. Lopez, 248 F. 3d 427, 432–433 (CA5 2001) (same),
with Pryor v. United States, 278 F. 3d 612, 616 (CA6 2002)
(period does not begin to run until right has been held retro
actively applicable to cases on collateral review); and United
States v. Valdez, 195 F. 3d 544, 547–548 (CA9 1999) (same).
II
Section 2255, ¶ 6, provides:
“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion
under this section. The limitation period shall run from
the latest of—
“(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction be
comes final;
“(2) the date on which the impediment to making a
motion created by governmental action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is re
moved, if the movant was prevented from making a mo
tion by such governmental action;
“(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been

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newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made ret
roactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
“(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim
or claims presented could have been discovered through
the exercise of due diligence.”
In most cases, the operative date from which the limitation
period is measured will be the one identified in ¶ 6(1): “the
date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.”
Ibid.; see also Clay, supra, at 524. But later filings are per
mitted where subparagraphs (2)–(4) apply. This case in
volves ¶ 6(3), which gives § 2255 applicants one year from
“the date on which the right asserted was initially recog
nized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review.” Dodd contends
that under subparagraph (3), the limitation period runs from
the date on which the right asserted was made retroactively
applicable. The United States, on the other hand, argues
that it runs from the date on which this Court initially recog
nized the right asserted.
We believe that the text of ¶ 6(3) settles this dispute. It
unequivocally identifies one, and only one, date from which
the 1-year limitation period is measured: “the date on which
the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court.” We “must presume that [the] legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249,
253–254 (1992). What Congress has said in ¶ 6(3) is clear:
An applicant has one year from the date on which the right
he asserts was initially recognized by this Court.
Dodd urges us to adopt a different interpretation. He
contends that the second clause in ¶ 6(3) affects the appli
cable date under that provision. He reads ¶ 6(3) as contain
ing “three distinct prerequisites” that “must be satisfied be
fore the limitation period begins.” Brief for Petitioner 8.
Those three prerequisites are: (1) the right asserted by the

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applicant “was initially recognized” by this Court; (2) this
Court “newly recognized” the right; and (3) a court must
have “made” the right “retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.” Id., at 13–14 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit did not hold the right recognized in Richardson v.
United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999), retroactively applicable
until April 19, 2002, when it decided Ross, 289 F. 3d 677,
Dodd contends that he had until April 19, 2003—one year
from the date when all three prerequisites were satisfied—
to file his § 2255 motion.
Dodd’s interpretation does not square with the only natu
ral reading of the text. Paragraph 6(3) identifies one date
and one date only as the date from which the 1-year limita
tion period runs: “the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” Dodd’s reli
ance on the second clause to identify the operative date is
misplaced. That clause—“if that right has been newly rec
ognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively appli
cable to cases on collateral review”—imposes a condition on
the applicability of this subsection. See Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 1124 (1993) (the definition of
“if ” is “in the event that” or “on condition that”). It there
fore limits ¶ 6(3)’s application to cases in which applicants
are seeking to assert rights “newly recognized by the Su
preme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review.” § 2255, ¶ 6(3). That means that ¶ 6(3)’s
date—“the date on which the right asserted was initially rec
ognized by the Supreme Court”—does not apply at all if the
conditions in the second clause—the right “has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review”—have not been sat
isfied. As long as the conditions in the second clause are
satisfied so that ¶ 6(3) applies in the first place, that clause
has no impact whatsoever on the date from which the 1-year
limitation period in ¶ 6(3) begins to run. Thus, if this Court
decides a case recognizing a new right, a federal prisoner

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seeking to assert that right will have one year from this
Court’s decision within which to file his § 2255 motion. He
may take advantage of the date in the first clause of ¶ 6(3)
only if the conditions in the second clause are met.
We recognize that the statute of limitations in ¶ 6(3) makes
it difficult for applicants filing second or successive § 2255
motions to obtain relief. The limitation period in ¶ 6(3) ap
plies to “all motions” under § 2255, initial motions as well
as second or successive ones. Section 2255, ¶ 8(2), narrowly
restricts an applicant’s ability to file a second or successive
motion. An applicant may file a second or successive motion
only in limited circumstances, such as where he seeks to take
advantage of “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac
tive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable.” § 2255, ¶ 8(2). Dodd points
out that this Court rarely decides that a new rule is retroac
tively applicable within one year of initially recognizing that
right. Thus, because of the interplay between ¶¶ 8(2) and
6(3), an applicant who files a second or successive motion
seeking to take advantage of a new rule of constitutional law
will be time barred except in the rare case in which this
Court announces a new rule of constitutional law and makes
it retroactive within one year.
Although we recognize the potential for harsh results in
some cases, we are not free to rewrite the statute that Con
gress has enacted. “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain,
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition
required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according
to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union
Planters Bank, N. A., 530 U. S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 663,
n. 5 (2001) (“[E]ven if we disagreed with the legislative deci
sion to establish stringent procedural requirements for ret
roactive application of new rules, we do not have license to
question the decision on policy grounds”). The disposition
required by the text here, though strict, is not absurd. It
is for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it

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believes that the interplay of ¶¶ 8(2) and 6(3) of § 2255 unduly
restricts federal prisoners’ ability to file second or succes
sive motions.
Justice Stevens would hold, contrary to the plain text,
that the limitation period in ¶ 6(3) begins to run when the
right asserted is made retroactive, see post, at 369 (dissent
ing opinion), because he assumes that “the most natural
reading of the statutory text would make it possible for the
limitations period to expire before the cause of action ac
crues,” post, at 361. Justice Stevens analogizes this case
to Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson, post, p. 409, see post this page
and 361 (dissenting opinion), but Graham County is distin
guishable. The text of the statute at issue in Graham
County is ambiguous, justifying the Court’s partial reliance
on “the ‘standard rule that the limitations period commences
when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of ac
tion.’ ” See Graham County, post, at 415–418, 419, n. 2.
Here, there is no such ambiguity; ¶ 6(3) clearly specifies the
date on which the limitation period begins to run.
III
Dodd’s § 2255 motion sought to benefit from our holding in
Richardson, supra, which was decided on June 1, 1999.
Thus, he had one year from that date within which to file his
motion. Because he did not file his motion until April 4,
2001, the motion was untimely. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Jus
tice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join as to Part II,
dissenting.
Because the same anomalous factor is present in both this
case and in Graham County Soil & Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, post, p. 409, and is deci
sive in my analysis of both cases, it is appropriate to explain

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my views in a single opinion. In each case the most natural
reading of the statutory text would make it possible for the
limitations period to expire before the cause of action ac
crues. Whether the source of this possible result is merely
the use of careless wording or an incorrect assumption by
Congress concerning the timing of two relevant events, I am
convinced that Congress did not intend to authorize such a
perverse result in either case. Thus, while I agree with
much of the reasoning in the Court’s cogent opinion in Gra
ham County, I write separately because I would agree with
the Court of Appeals’ reading of the text of 31 U. S. C.
§ 3731(b)(1) were it not for this anomaly. In this case, how
ever, because that same factor provides an even stronger
reason for rejecting the interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2255,
¶ 6(3), that the Court endorses, I would reverse the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In Graham County, the relator and the Government argue
(and the Court of Appeals held) that the 6-year limitations
period applicable to a “civil action under section 3730,” 31
U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1), applies to the retaliation action author
ized by § 3730(h). That argument is supported by a literal
reading of the statutory text; for § 3730(h) plainly qualifies as
a “civil action under section 3730.” Moreover, that reading
derives strong support from the interest in having a uniform
federal statute of limitations govern the litigation of federal
causes of action. Cf. Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co.,
541 U. S. 369, 377–383 (2004). Nevertheless, I agree with
the Court that another reading of the text is far more plausi
ble, and with its conclusion that when choosing between two
constructions of a statute of limitations, whenever possible
we should prefer the construction that starts the time limit
running when the cause of action accrues.1
1 Contrary to the Court’s comment in Graham County, post, at 419, n. 2,
I do not suggest that a statute providing that the limitations period
begins to run before the cause of action accrues is necessarily ambig

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In Graham County that choice is compelled by the interac
tion between two relevant events: the “violation of § 3729”
and the retaliatory act against the whistle-blower. Section
3731(b)(1) provides that a “civil action under section 3730”
must be brought within six years of a “violation of section
3729.” If this section were read to encompass retaliation
claims under § 3730(h), as held by the Court of Appeals, the
statute of limitations would be triggered by the “violation of
section 3729”; that is, the limitations period would begin to
run before the cause of action for retaliation accrues, and
could potentially expire before an actionable retaliation
claim even exists. See Graham County, post, at 421–422;
United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham County Soil &
Water Conservation Dist., 367 F. 3d 245, 260–261 (CA4 2004)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Thus, the potentially prolonged
time period between the two relevant events—the violation
of § 3729 (triggering the limitations period) and the retalia
tion against the whistle-blower (giving rise to an actionable
claim)—could leave the well-intentioned whistle-blower
without any recourse under § 3730(h), the very statute de
signed to provide such protection.
uous. Rather, as Justice Thomas’ scholarly footnote demonstrates, Gra
ham County, post, at 419–421, n. 3, it is so unlikely that a legislature would
actually intend such an anomalous design that I would presume that the
anomaly was the product of a drafting error absent evidence in either
the legislative history or elsewhere in the text that Congress specifically
intended such a result. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543
U. S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The literal text of § 3731(b)(1), which uses an event that is not an ele
ment of the retaliation cause of action to start the limitations period run
ning, produces two anomalies: (1) The statute may never begin to run, and
(2) it may expire before the cause of action accrues. The Court argues
that the first anomaly makes the statute ambiguous and that the second
justifies resort to a default rule to resolve the ambiguity. In my judg
ment, the latter anomaly would provide a sufficient justification for resort
to the default rule whether or not some other feature of the statute would
support an argument that the text was “ambiguous.”

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The Court rightly avoids that harsh and counterintuitive
result by adopting a construction of the statute that would
generally start the running of the limitations period from
the date the cause of action accrues, i. e., when the act or
acts of retaliation occur. As Justice Thomas explains, that
is not only the prevailing rule applied throughout the coun
try to analogous state-law claims, Graham County, post, at
419–421, n. 3; it is also the background norm against which
Congress legislates, Graham County, post, at 418–419. Be
cause Congress surely did not intend to create a cause of
action for retaliation with one hand, and impose with the
other a premature trigger date for the limitations period
with the potential to bar retaliation claims altogether, I
concur in the judgment in Graham County.
II
The same potential for premature expiration of a statute
of limitations is the primary reason why I cannot join the
Court’s anomalous construction of the statute in this case.
The statute we are called upon to interpret provides a 1-year
period of limitation for a habeas petition that has as its basis
a new rule of criminal law or criminal procedure that has
retroactive application. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3), pro
vides that the “limitation period shall run from . . . the date
on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.” There are two possible inter
pretations of when the period should start to run: from the
date that this Court recognizes the new right, or from the
date that both conditions 2 in ¶ 6(3) are met.
2 Section 2255, ¶ 6(3), technically has three requirements: that a right be
“initially recognized,” that it be “newly recognized,” and that it be “made
retroactively applicable.” In practice, however, the first two require
ments are one and the same. Hence, in this opinion I will refer only to
the requirements (1) that a right be newly recognized and (2) that it be
made retroactively applicable.

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If, as I believe Congress thought to be the case, this Court
made a decision concerning a new rule’s retroactive applica
tion at the same time it recognized the new right, the statu
tory scheme would make perfect sense: Petitioners, whether
filing an initial habeas petition or a second or successive pe
tition, would have one year from this Court’s decision to file
a petition for a writ taking advantage of that decision.
Within a relatively short amount of time, those claims would
be adjudicated, and the statute’s goals of finality would be
duly served. In practice, however, this Court does not ordi
narily make retroactivity judgments at the time a new right
is recognized.3 See, e. g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584
(2002) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000),
to determinations of death penalty eligibility); Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348 (2004) (concluding Ring was not
retroactive). Thus, as in Graham County, the statute impli
cates two relevant events: this Court’s recognition of a new
right (which, according to the majority, triggers the limita
tions period) and the declaration that the right can be applied
retroactively (which allows a petitioner to proceed with the
claim). Because a significant amount of time may elapse
during the interval between the triggering event and the
point at which a petitioner may actually be able to file an
action seeking relief under the statute, there is a real risk
that the 1-year limitations period will expire before the cause
of action accrues. In my judgment, the probable explana
tion for statutory text that creates this risk is Congress’ ap
parent assumption that our recognition of the new right and
our decision to apply it retroactively would be made at the
same time. Otherwise it seems nonsensical to assume that
Congress deliberately enacted a statute that recognizes a
cause of action, but wrote the limitations period in a way that
3 The retroactivity issue is not normally argued in the same case that
announces a new rule because the prisoner is only interested in the out
come of his own case. Moreover, in order to minimize the impact of
the new rule at issue, he actually has an incentive to minimize its
consequences.

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precludes an individual from ever taking advantage of the
cause of action.
We are thus faced with the same decision as in Graham
County: Do we interpret the statute in such a way as to
allow prisoners such as Dodd to take advantage of the full
year Congress provided for such claims, or do we interpret
the statute in such a way that the limitations period will
begin to run before a prisoner may take advantage of ¶ 6(3)?
As an initial matter, the text here certainly permits both
readings, just as it did in Graham County. Paragraph 6(3)
requires that two prerequisites must be met before a habeas
petitioner can take advantage of that date as the starting
point for the statute of limitations. Both requirements are
in the past tense, and both must be satisfied before ¶ 6(3) is
applicable. Furthermore, just as the clause “if that right
has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court” describes
the date indicated in the phrase “the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized,” it is possible to read the
subordinate clause “if that right has been . . . made retroac
tively applicable to cases on collateral review” as amplifying
the description of the date in the provision’s main clause,
rather than adding an additional qualifier. Consequently,
while the majority’s reading of ¶ 6(3)—requiring that the
statute of limitations begin to run when this Court recog
nizes a new rule—may be the more natural reading of the
text, that advocated by petitioner—starting the statute of
limitations when the new rule is held to be retroactive—is
by no means implausible.4
4 I should note an additional point of disagreement with the majority
(and with petitioner). In reaching its result, the Court relies on an as
sumption made by both parties and not challenged in this Court: namely,
that the decision to make a new rule retroactive for purposes of this sec
tion can be made by any lower court. While I recognize that every Cir
cuit to have addressed the issue has made the same assumption, I am
satisfied that the Government’s initial interpretation of this provision is
the correct one. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Tyler
v. Cain, O. T. 2000, No. 00–5961, p. 16, n. 7. Under that interpretation,
the requirement that the “right has been newly recognized by the Su

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Moreover, the potential for claims to be prematurely
barred by the statute of limitations is even greater than in
Graham County. There, the possibility that the 6-year stat
ute of limitations period could run before the cause of action
accrued, while plausible, was not particularly likely, since in
preme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral re
view” is met only if the Supreme Court has made the right retroactive.
Courts that have reached the contrary conclusion have principally relied
on the fact that 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) contains an explicit requirement
that a new rule be “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court.” (Em
phasis added.) See Ashley v. United States, 266 F. 3d 671, 674 (CA7 2001).
Thus, the argument goes, the absence of “by the Supreme Court” after
“made retroactive” must have some meaning. However, in that clause
there is only one verb that the prepositional phrase “by the Supreme
Court” can modify, whereas in the relevant clause of § 2255, ¶ 6(3), there
are two: newly recognized and made retroactive. The more natural read
ing of ¶ 6(3) is that the prepositional phrase “by the Supreme Court” mod
ifies both verbs of the subordinate clause. This reading comports with
Congress’ general direction that this Court, and not the lower courts,
should provide the final answer to questions of interpretation arising
under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA). See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (requiring that a state-court
decision be contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States” (emphasis added)). Additionally,
it avoids difficult questions of which court can make a retroactivity deter
mination, sets a uniform date by which lower courts can make determina
tions as to whether a petition is timely, and means that only those cases
made retroactive by this Court can form the basis for a petition that can
gain the benefit of tolling under § 2255, ¶ 6(3). Finally, it is the only inter
pretation that gives full effect to § 2255, ¶ 8(2), which allows prisoners
who have already completed one round of federal habeas review to seek
additional relief on the basis of such a new rule.
Ultimately, this reading has no direct bearing on the question presented
in this case. While my view that this Court must make the retroactivity
determination informs my belief that Congress had a mistaken under
standing of how ¶ 6(3) would operate in practice, I would conclude that
the 1-year limitations period begins to run when both requirements of
¶ 6(3) are met regardless of which court makes the retroactivity decision.
Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer do not join
this footnote.

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367 Cite as: 545 U. S. 353 (2005)
Stevens, J., dissenting
most cases the retaliatory conduct that would form the basis
of the cause of action under 31 U. S. C. § 3730(h) would prob
ably occur within six years of the violation of § 3729.5 In
this case, owing to the substantially shorter 1-year statute
of limitations period, both requirements of 28 U. S. C. § 2255,
¶ 6(3), will often not be met before the statute of limitations
period has expired if it is triggered by the decision of the
Supreme Court announcing a new rule.
That result is certainly true for Dodd himself. Richard
son v. United States, 526 U. S. 813, was decided on June 1,
1999. Under the majority’s interpretation, the statute of
limitations thus expired on June 1, 2000, one year after we
recognized the new rule. The Eleventh Circuit, however,
did not decide whether Richardson was retroactive until
April 19, 2002.6 See Ross v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677
(CA11 2002) (per curiam). Thus, Dodd would not, under
the majority’s interpretation, have been able to raise his
claim at all, since the statute of limitations expired before he
could have taken advantage of ¶ 6(3)’s 1-year grace period.7
5 As the majority in Graham County noted, however, in almost every
case the statute of limitations would begin to run before the cause of
action actually accrued. See post, at 421.
6 This assumes that the Eleventh Circuit is the relevant “court” to decide
the retroactivity question, an issue the majority fails to address. Even
if a district court, as opposed to the Court of Appeals, could make that
determination for purposes of ¶ 6(3), the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida has not decided the issue in a published opinion.
7 This would be true for prisoners in every Circuit except the Sixth
Circuit, in which a prisoner would have had six months to file his petition.
See Murr v. United States, 200 F. 3d 895 (Jan. 7, 2000). In the five other
Circuits besides the Eleventh to have decided the issue, all held Richard
son v. United States, 526 U. S. 813 (1999), to be retroactive more than one
year after Richardson was decided; in all of those Circuits, prisoners’
claims under Richardson would be time barred before they were able to
file under ¶ 6(3). See Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F. 3d 133
(CA2, Aug. 3, 2001); United States v. Lopez, 248 F. 3d 427 (CA5, Apr. 16,
2001); Lanier v. United States, 220 F. 3d 833 (CA7, June 12, 2000); United

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368 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
Even for those prisoners who are incarcerated in a jurisdic
tion in which the new rule is quickly held to be retroactive,
at least part of the 1-year period in which to file a claim
taking advantage of the retroactive rule will run before the
petition raising the claim can be filed.8
Thus, the admonition in Graham County that “Congress
generally drafts statutes of limitations to begin when the
cause of action accrues,” post, at 418, applies with special
force in this case. Paragraph 6(3) both recognizes a basis
for habeas relief by allowing an otherwise barred claim to
go forward if certain conditions are met, and also sets forth
a 1-year statute of limitations for such claims. It would
make no sense for Congress, in the same provision, both to
recognize a potential basis for habeas relief and also to make
it highly probable that the statute of limitations would bar
relief before the claim can be brought. Again, this is not
simply a remote possibility: It is true for Dodd himself, and
in six of the seven Circuits to have addressed whether Rich
ardson is retroactive. See n. 7, supra. It is this absurd
result that convinces me that Congress could not have in-
States v. Montalvo, 331 F. 3d 1052 (CA9, June 9, 2003) (per curiam);
United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F. 3d 1242 (CA10, Dec. 3, 2002); Ross
v. United States, 289 F. 3d 677 (CA11, Apr. 19, 2002) (per curiam). The
Eighth Circuit appears to have assumed the retroactive application of
Richardson, but that too was decided more than a year after Richardson
itself. See United States v. Scott, 218 F. 3d 835 (July 7, 2000). Of course,
if any of the other four Circuits that have not yet decided the issue were
to conclude Richardson was retroactive, the statute of limitations would
have long since expired, and prisoners would be similarly barred from
taking advantage of any such decision.
8 In Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656 (2001), it appeared that a majority of
the Court recognized that the Court could make a new rule retroactive
“through multiple holdings that logically dictate the retroactivity of the
new rule.” Id., at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In such a case, a pris
oner could file a petition under ¶ 6(3) immediately. Since there was much
disagreement over when that would be the case, however, that potential
exception holds small comfort in this case.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
tended that ¶ 6(3) should be read in this manner. Even if
the text is as clear as the majority claims (a proposition I
reject), we should still interpret the text in a manner that
would avoid such an absurd result. See, e. g., Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 429 (1998); Church of Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892).
To avoid this result, I would interpret ¶ 6(3) to begin to
run only when the Supreme Court has initially recognized
the new right and when that right has been held to be ret
roactive. Under this interpretation, the statute of limita
tions would not begin to run until the prisoner was actually
able to file a petition under ¶ 6(3), which is the only interpre
tation Congress could have intended. Although in enacting
AEDPA Congress was clearly concerned with finality, see
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 179 (2001), ¶ 6(3) is an ex
plicit exception to that general preference. Congress surely
intended to allow habeas petitioners to take advantage of the
new rights that this Court deems retroactive. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason to include that section in
the statute. That is why, “[a]bsent other indication, a stat
ute of limitations begins to run at the time the plaintiff has
the right to apply to the court for relief.” Graham County,
post, at 419 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment; internal quota
tion marks omitted).9
9 The approach that the Court takes in Graham County and the ap
proach I would take here has support in our prior case law. In Fleisch
mann Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Forsberg, 270 U. S. 349 (1926),
the Court was faced with the interpretation of the Materialmen’s Act of
1894, as amended, which allowed a private creditor to bring suit against a
party contracting with the United States, provided that the United States
did not itself bring suit “within six months from the completion and final
settlement” of the contract. 33 Stat. 812. Such a creditor had one year
from the completion of the contract and final settlement to bring a suit,
giving him a 6-month window within which to file his claims. If any other
creditors wanted to bring suit, they had to join the action of the original

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370 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
In addition to creating the perverse result that the statute
of limitations will run before a prisoner can file an initial
habeas petition, the Court’s myopic reading of ¶ 6(3) effec
tively nullifies 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), which allows pris
oners to file second or successive applications based on a ret
roactive rule.10 As the majority recognizes in what amounts
to a dramatic understatement, its interpretation of ¶ 6(3)
“makes it difficult for applicants filing second or successive
§ 2255 motions to obtain relief.” Ante, at 359. Because of
the way ¶¶ 6(3) and 8(2) interact, a prisoner can only file a
second or successive petition based on a newly recognized
rule that has been made retroactive if this Court has held
creditor, but under the statute had only one year from “the completion of
the work” in which to do so. Ibid. As the Court in Fleischmann recog
nized, if taken literally this last section would have meant that in a case
in which the “final settlement” of the contract occurred more than six
months after work was completed on the contract—as “frequently” hap
pened—only the initial creditor to file suit would have been able to meet
the requirement of the statute of limitations; any subsequent creditor
would have been barred under the second statute of limitations that did
not reference the final settlement as a start date, but rather only the
completion of work. 270 U. S., at 361. Rather than permit these “unjust
or absurd consequences,” id., at 360, the Court interpreted “within one
year from the completion of the work” to mean “ ‘within one year after
the performance and final settlement of the contract,’ ” id., at 362.
Fleischmann thus presents the identical situation as in Graham County
and Dodd: Because of the unforeseen possibility that two relevant events
might occur far apart in time, the most natural reading of the statute
would cause the statute of limitations to expire before the suit may be
brought. As we did in Fleischmann and in Graham County, we should
construe the statute of limitations in Dodd to avoid this unnatural result.
10 Our cases make clear that when interpreting a particular section of a
statute, we look to the entire statutory scheme rather than simply examin
ing the text at issue. See Koons, 543 U. S., at 60. “A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a
context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissi
ble meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the
rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) (citation omitted and emphasis
added).

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371 Cite as: 545 U. S. 353 (2005)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
the rule to be retroactive within one year of recognizing it.
Unfortunately for such prisoners, however, this Court has
never done so since Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), was
decided.11 Because of the need for percolation, and the time
it takes for cases to come to this Court from the courts below,
it seems unlikely (to say the least) that we would ever do so.
Therefore, the majority’s interpretation of ¶ 6(3) effectively
nullifies ¶ 8(2). It is, of course, a basic canon of statutory
construction that we will not interpret a congressional stat
ute in such a manner as to effectively nullify an entire sec
tion. See, e. g., Duncan, 533 U. S., at 174 (“[A] statute ought,
upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be pre
vented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It is a strange principle that requires strict adherence to the
text of one provision while allowing another to have virtu
ally no real world application. It would seem far wiser to
give both sections the meaning that Congress obviously
intended.
Accordingly, while I concur in the judgment in Graham
County, I respectfully dissent in Dodd.
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
Essentially for reasons stated by Justice Stevens,
I conclude that 28 U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3), is most sensibly read
to start the time clock on the date a right is “made retroac
tively applicable to cases on collateral review.” I therefore
join, in principal part, Part II of Justice Stevens’ dissent
ing opinion.*
11 Again, it is possible that a combination of our decisions has effectively
done this, see n. 8, supra, but we have never actually recognized an in
stance in which that has occurred.
*Petitioner and the Government assume, for the purpose at hand, that
a controlling decision whether a right operates retroactively may be made
by a court of appeals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5–7, 20, 24, 41; Brief for Peti
tioner 13–14, and n. 2, 25, and n. 5, 26–28; Brief for United States 17–18,
and n. 5, 23. We have no cause in this case to question that assump

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372 DODD v. UNITED STATES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
The Court’s interpretation—that the limitation period be
gins on “the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by [this] Court,” 28 U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3)—pre
sents “a real risk that the 1-year limitation period will expire
before [a § 2255 petitioner’s] cause of action accrues,” ante,
at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By contrast, as Justice
Breyer explains in his dissenting opinion in Graham
County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex
rel. Wilson, post, at 427–428, a determination that the False
Claims Act’s six-year statute of limitations, see 31 U. S. C.
§ 3731(b)(1), governs civil suits for retaliation under the Act,
see § 3730(h), ordinarily would work no claim deprivation.
See ante, at 366–367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (In Graham
County, “the possibility that the 6-year statute of limitations
period could run before the cause of action accrued, while
plausible, was not particularly likely, since in most cases the
retaliatory conduct that would form the basis of the cause
of action under 31 U. S. C. § 3730(h) would probably occur
within six years of the violation of § 3729. [In cases like
Dodd, on the other hand,] owing to the substantially shorter
1-year statute of limitations period, both requirements of 28
U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3), will often not be met before the statute
of limitations period has expired if it is triggered by the deci
sion of the Supreme Court announcing a new rule.” (foot
note omitted)).
Nearly 20 years have passed since Congress amended 31
U. S. C. § 3731(b)(1) to provide that “[a] civil action under sec
tion 3730 may not be brought . . . more than 6 years after
the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed.”
See Graham County, post, at 412–413. Yet petitioner Gra
ham County District has been unable to cite a single instance
in which a suit has been time barred because the alleged
tion. I therefore do not subscribe to Justice Stevens’ statements that
only this Court has the prerogative to make the retroactivity determina
tion. See ante, at 365–366, n. 4. I would await full adversarial presenta
tion before expressing an opinion on that issue.

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Ginsburg, J., dissenting
retaliation proscribed by § 3730(h) fell outside the period
triggered by submission of a false claim in violation of § 3729.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 04–169, pp. 4–6; Brief for Re
spondent in No. 04–169, pp. 4, 15–16; Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae in No. 04–169, pp. 27–28; see also Graham
County, post, at 427 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Dodd’s
case illustrates, however, on the Court’s reading, it is “highly
probable” that the 28 U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3), limitation “would
bar relief before the claim can be brought.” Ante, at 368–
369 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would not, as
Justice Stevens does, bracket the instant case with Gra
ham County.
True, the limitation period in Graham County, like the
§ 2255, ¶ 6(3), limitation, is triggered by an event that may
precede the accrual date of a claim. But the resemblance
ends there. The generous six-year span in 31 U. S. C.
§ 3731(b)(1), in practical effect, will give the plaintiff leeway
to commence suit she likely will not have under the typically
shorter state limitation. See Graham County, post, at 427
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The opposite effect would attend
28 U. S. C. § 2255, ¶ 6(3). The one-year limitation specified
there, if triggered by the date on which this Court “initially
recognized” the right asserted, bars Dodd and will bar most
“new rule” petitioners from presenting their claims. It ex
alts form over reality to equate the two statutes and cases
for time-bar purposes.