MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., et al. v. MICHI- GAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.

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440 OCTOBER TERM, 2004
Syllabus
MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., et al. v. MICHI-
GAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION et al.
certiorari to the court of appeals of michigan
No. 03–1234. Argued April 26, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005
Federal law requires most interstate truckers to obtain a permit (Federal
Permit) that reflects compliance with certain federal requirements.
The 1965 version of the law authorized States to require proof that a
truck operator had such a permit. By 1991, 39 States demanded such
proof, requiring a $10 per truck registration fee (State Registration)
and giving each trucker a stamp to affix to a multistate “bingo card”
carried in the vehicle. Finding this scheme inefficient and burdensome,
Congress created the current Single State Registration System (SSRS),
which allows a trucking company to fill out one set of forms in one State
(base State), thereby registering its Federal Permit in every partici
pating State through which its trucks travel. 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c).
The base State can demand proof of the Federal Permit, proof of insur
ance, the name of an agent to receive service of process, and a fee equal
to the sum of the individual state fees. §§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). The
SSRS prohibits a State from imposing any additional “State registration
requirement.” § 14504(b). Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 478.2(2) im
poses an annual $100 fee on each Michigan license-plated truck oper
ating entirely in interstate commerce. Petitioner interstate trucking
companies subject to § 478.2(2) sought to have it invalidated, but
the Michigan Court of Claims refused. The State Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that, because the fee is imposed for the administration
of the State’s Motor Carrier Act and for enforcement of state safety
regulations, it is not a “registration requirement” pre-empted by
§ 14504(b).
Held: Section 14504 does not pre-empt Michigan’s $100 fee. Pp. 446–453.
(a) Reference to text, historical context, and purpose disclose that the
words “State registration requirement” in § 14504(b)’s second sentence
apply only to those state requirements concerning SSRS registration.
Statutory language makes clear that the federal provision reaches no
further. The subsection’s first sentence uses the words “State regis
tration” to refer only to state systems seeking evidence that a trucker
has complied with the specific SSRS obligations enumerated in
§§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). No language in the second sentence suggests
that the same words should be given a different, broader meaning there.
Nor does any language elsewhere in the statute suggest that “State

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Syllabus
registration requirement” refers to any kind of State Registration
whatsoever that might affect interstate carriers, or to those state re
quirements imposed by reason of a motor carrier’s operation in inter
state commerce. The implementing regulations also do not support a
broader meaning. Historical context confirms this reading. Congress
enacted § 14504 to simplify the “bingo card” system, which placed no
constraints on any state filings or fees other than those concerning Fed
eral Permit and insurance requirements. In creating the SSRS, Con
gress gave no indication that the pre-emptive scope of the new scheme
would be any broader than that of the old. Finally, nothing in the
statute’s basic purposes or objectives—improving the “bingo card” sys
tem’s efficiency and simplifying a uniform scheme for providing States
with certain vital information—either requires a broader reading of the
statutory term or impliedly pre-empts non-SSRS-related state rules.
Pp. 446–451.
(b) Section 478.2(2)’s requirements do not concern the SSRS’s subject
matter. First, the Michigan statute makes no reference to evidence of
a Federal Permit, an insurance requirement, or an agent for receiving
service of process. Nor do any state rules related to the fee appear to
require the filing of information on these matters. In addition, because
Michigan imposed its separate fee before the SSRS existed and before
it began to participate in the “bingo card” system, the fee does not
represent an effort to circumvent the limitations imposed in connection
with federal laws governing State Registration of Federal Permits. Fi
nally, petitioners have failed to show that Michigan rules do not allow a
Michigan-plated interstate truck choosing Michigan as its base State to
comply with the SSRS requirements even if it does not comply with
§ 478.2(2). The fact that Michigan appears to forgive the State’s $10
SSRS fee for trucks that comply with § 478.2(2) can be seen as an effort
to provide a modest, administratively efficient recompense to those
motor carriers that choose Michigan as their base State, but such a sub
sidiary connection cannot transform the State’s fee into a requirement
concerning the SSRS statute’s subject matter. Pp. 451–453.
255 Mich. App. 589, 662 N. W. 2d 784, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined,
post, p. 456.
James H. Hanson argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the brief were Andrew K. Light and Lynne D. Lidke.

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442 MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. v. MICHIGAN PUB.
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Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant
Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneed
ler, Mark B. Stern, Sushma Soni, Jeffrey A. Rosen, Paul
M. Geier, and Dale C. Andrews.
Henry J. Boynton, Assistant Solicitor General of Michigan,
argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief
were Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey,
Solicitor General, and David A. Voges, Michael A. Nicker
son, Glenn R. White, and Emmanuel B. Odunlami, Assist
ant Attorneys General.
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns pre-emption. A Michigan law imposes
“an annual fee of $100.00” upon each Michigan license-plated
truck that is “operating entirely in interstate commerce.”
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 478.2(2) (West 2002) (hereinafter
MCL). A federal statute states that “a State registration
requirement . . . is an unreasonable burden” upon inter
state commerce when it imposes so high a fee. 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504(b) (emphasis added); see also § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).
Does this federal statutory provision pre-empt the Michigan
law? We conclude that the Michigan fee requirement is not
the kind of “State registration requirement” to which the
federal statute refers. And for that reason, the statute does
not pre-empt it.
I
A
Federal law has long required most motor carriers doing
interstate business to obtain a permit—which we shall call a
Federal Permit—that reflects compliance with certain fed
eral requirements. See 49 U. S. C. § 13901 et seq.; 49 CFR
§ 365.101 et seq. (2004). In 1965, Congress authorized States
to require proof that the operator of an interstate truck had
secured a Federal Permit. 49 U. S. C. § 302(b)(2) (1976 ed.);

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see generally Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan, 537 U. S. 36,
39 (2002). By 1991, 39 States demanded such proof by re
quiring some form of what we shall call State Registration
(of the Federal Permit). Those States typically would re
quire truckers to file with a state agency evidence that each
interstate truck was covered by a Federal Permit. They
would require the trucker to pay a State Registration fee of
up to $10 per truck. And they would issue a State Registra
tion stamp that the trucker would affix to a multistate “bingo
card” carried within the vehicle. See 49 CFR §§ 1023.32,
1023.33 (1990); Yellow Transp., 537 U. S., at 39.
In 1991, Congress focused upon the fact that the “bingo
card” system required a trucking company to obtain a sepa
rate stamp from each State through which an interstate
truck traveled. It found this scheme inefficient and burden
some. See id., at 39–40. And it enacted a statute setting
forth a new system, the Single State Registration System
(SSRS), which remains in effect today. Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504. The SSRS allows a trucking company to fill out one
set of forms in one State (the base State), and by doing so
to register its Federal Permit in every participating State
through which its trucks will travel. § 14504(c); 49 CFR
§ 367.4(b) (2004).
The SSRS statute says that the base State can demand:
(1) proof of the trucking company’s possession of a Fed
eral Permit, (2) proof of insurance, (3) the name of an
agent designated to receive “service of process,” and (4) a
total fee (charged for the filing of the proof of insurance)
equal to the sum of the individual state fees. 49 U. S. C.
§§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv); 49 CFR §§ 367.4(c)(1)–(4) (2004).
Each individual state fee, it adds, cannot exceed the amount
the State charged under the “bingo card” system, and in no
event can it exceed $10 per truck. 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c)
(2)(B)(iv)(III). After a truck owner registers, base state of
ficials provide the owner with a receipt to be kept in the cab

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of each registered truck. 49 CFR §§ 367.5(a), (b), (e) (2004).
The base State distributes to each participating State its
share of the total registration fee. § 367.6(a).
The SSRS statute specifies that a State may not impose
any additional “registration requirement.” It states spe
cifically, in the statutory sentence at issue here, that when a
State Registration requirement imposes further obligations,
“the part in excess is an unreasonable burden.” 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504(b). It adds that a State may not require “decals,
stamps, cab cards, or any other means of registering . . .
specific vehicles.” § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iii). And it provides
that the “charging or collection of any fee under this section
that is not in accordance with the fee system established [in
this provision] shall be deemed to be a burden on interstate
commerce.” § 14504(c)(2)(C). At the same time, the statute
makes clear that a State that complies with the SSRS system
need not fear Commerce Clause attack, for it says that a
state requirement that an interstate truck “must register
with the State” is “not an unreasonable burden on transpor
tation,” provided that “the State registration is completed”
in accordance with the SSRS statute. § 14504(b).
B
The state law at issue here, § 478.2(2) of the Michigan
Motor Carrier Act, reads as follows:
“A motor carrier licensed in this state shall pay an an
nual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated by the
motor carrier which is registered in this state [i. e.,
which has a Michigan license plate] and operating en
tirely in interstate commerce.”
Related state rules and regulations require a carrier paying
the $100 fee to identify each interstate truck by make, type,
year, serial number, and unit number. See Equipment List
Form P–344–T, App. to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Disposition in No. 95–15628–CM etc.

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(Mich. Ct. Cl.) (hereinafter Equipment List Form P–344–T).
They also make clear that, upon payment of the fee, the car
rier will receive a decal that must be affixed to the truck.
App. 24 (Affidavit of Pub. Serv. Comm’n. official Thomas R.
Lonergan). And they provide that a carrier who pays this
fee need not pay the $10 SSRS registration fee if the carrier
chooses Michigan as its SSRS base State. See, e. g., id.,
at 67, n.; Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 603–604, n. 6, 662 N. W. 2d 784,
790–792, n. 6 (2003); Reply Brief for Petitioners 14–15, n. 8.
C
Petitioners are interstate trucking companies with trucks
that bear Michigan license plates and operate entirely in in
terstate commerce. Hence they are subject to Michigan’s
$100 fee. MCL § 478.2(2) (West 2002). They asked a Michi
gan court to invalidate § 478.2(2) as pre-empted by the fed
eral SSRS statute. 255 Mich. App., at 592, 662 N. W. 2d,
at 789–790. The Michigan Court of Claims rejected their
claim. Id., at 593–594, 662 N. W. 2d, at 789–790. And the
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Id., at 604, 662 N. W.
2d, at 795.
The Court of Appeals wrote that the $100 fee is a “regula
tory fee”—a “fee imposed for the administration” of the
State’s Motor Carrier Act and for enforcement of Michigan
“safety regulations.” Ibid. As such, it falls outside the
scope of the term “registration requirement” as used in the
federal SSRS statute, 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). 255 Mich. App.,
at 604, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795. The federal statute, according
to the Michigan court, consequently does not pre-empt it.
Ibid.
Petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Su
preme Court; leave was denied. Westlake Transp., Inc. v.
Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 469 Mich. 976, 673 N. W. 2d
752 (2003). We granted their petition for certiorari and con
solidated the case with American Trucking Assns., Inc. v.

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Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, ante, p. 429, a case in which
interstate truckers sought review of a separate Michigan fee.
We now affirm the Michigan court’s judgment in this case,
though for other reasons.
II
A
The first legal question before us concerns the meaning of
the federal statutory words “State registration require
ment.” They appear in a subsection that reads in relevant
part as follows:
“The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, pro
viding [interstate transportation] in that State, must
register with the State is not an unreasonable burden
on transportation . . . when the State registration is
completed under standards of the Secretary [of Trans
portation] under subsection (c). When a State registra
tion requirement imposes obligations in excess of the
standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an un
reasonable burden.” 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) (emphasis
added).
What is the scope of the italicized words?
Petitioners ask us to give these words a broad interpreta
tion, sweeping within their ambit every state requirement
involving some form of individualized registration that af
fects an interstate motor carrier. Brief for Petitioners 15
(federal statute’s limits apply “to all interstate motor carri
ers compelled to register their operations with any State
regulatory commission under any State law” (emphasis in
original)). The United States argues for a somewhat nar
rower interpretation, submitting that the words apply to
“state registration requirements that are imposed on inter
state carriers by reason of their operation in interstate com
merce.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19–20
(emphasis in original). In our view, however, the language,
read in context, is yet more narrow.

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Reference to text, historical context, and purpose discloses
that the words “State registration requirement” do not apply
to every State Registration requirement that happens to
cover interstate carriers, nor to every such requirement spe
cifically focused on a trucking operation’s interstate charac
ter. Rather, they apply only to those state requirements
that concern SSRS registration—that is, registration with a
State of evidence that a carrier possesses a Federal Permit,
registration of proof of insurance, or registration of the name
of an agent “for service of process.” § 14504(c)(2)(A)(iv).
Thus, the federal provision pre-empts only those state re
quirements that (1) concern the subject matter of the SSRS
and (2) are “in excess” of the requirements that the SSRS
imposes in respect to that subject matter. See § 14504(b).
To begin with, statutory language makes clear that the
federal provision reaches no further. Section 14504(b)’s first
sentence says that a state “requirement” that an interstate
motor carrier must “register with the State is not an unrea
sonable burden . . . when the State registration is completed
under standards of the Secretary under subsection (c).”
Ibid. It is clear from the text as a whole that “State regis
tration” cannot cover all registration requirements, but only
some. Cf. post, at 464–465 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The
first sentence’s reference to the “standards of the Secretary”
(as well as the focus of the entire statute) tells us which.
Those “standards,” set forth in subsection (c)—which is titled
“Single State Registration System”—exclusively relate to
State Registration of “evidence of ” a Federal Permit, “proof
of ” insurance, and the “name of a local agent for service of
process,” and state fees “for the filing of proof of insurance.”
§§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv); § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv). And the rest of
the statute similarly deals exclusively with SSRS matters.
See § 14504(a) (“standards” mean “the specification of forms
and procedures required” to prove that a motor carrier is
in compliance with federal requirements). Thus, the words
“State registration” in the pre-emption provision’s first sen

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tence refer only to state systems that seek evidence that a
trucker has complied with specific, federally enumerated,
SSRS obligations. Cf. 49 U. S. C. § 13908(d) (§ 14504’s fees
relate specifically to state efforts to obtain proof of insurance
under the SSRS); §§ 13908(b)(2)–(3) (indicating that § 14504
refers to state requirements having this purpose).
How could the same words in the second sentence refer to
something totally different? We have found no language
here or elsewhere in the statute (which we reproduce in the
Appendix, infra) suggesting that the term “State registra
tion requirement” in sentence two refers to all State Regis
tration requirements “imposed on interstate carriers by rea
son of their operation in interstate commerce.” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 20 (emphasis in original).
Indeed, to read the words “by reason of . . . ” into § 14504,
a linguistic stretch, would be wholly inconsistent with the
statute’s basic purposes, because it would leave a State free
to implement a regulation in excess of specific SSRS limita
tions as long as it did not single out interstate carriers (say,
a neutral rule that all truckers must pay $50, or $500, per
truck for proof of insurance, or must designate multiple
agents for service of process). See post, at 463 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
To avoid this severely incongruous result, the dissent
(which adopts the Government’s view) must resort to inter
pretive acrobatics. After first reading subsection (b) to say
that a neutral base state requirement, despite being “in ex
cess” of SSRS standards, is not an “unreasonable burden on”
commerce, it then reads subsection (c) to say that such a
requirement, because it is “in excess” of SSRS standards, is
nonetheless prohibited by the statute (in effect, an unreason
able burden on commerce). Post, at 466–468. Aside from
imposing significant complexities on the statute where other
wise none would exist, this reading stretches subsection (c)’s
function beyond that which its structure and language will
allow.

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Similarly, we see no language elsewhere in the statute sug
gesting that the term “State registration requirement” re
fers to any kind of State Registration whatsoever that might
affect interstate carriers. And even the Government con
cedes that certain registration obligations—those in “tra
ditional areas of state regulation”—are beyond the pre
emptive reach of the statute. Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 19. Finally, the implementing regulations
do not support these broader constructions. See 49 CFR
§ 367.1 et seq. (2004).
Our reading of the text finds confirmation in historical con
text. Congress enacted § 14504 to simplify the old “bingo
card” system. See Yellow Transp., 537 U. S., at 39–40.
Under the “bingo card” scheme, each State could independ
ently demand the same separate filings (evidence of a Fed
eral Permit, proof of insurance, and a service-of-process
agent) as well as separate fees. 49 U. S. C. § 302(b)(2) (1976
ed.); § 11506 (1988 ed.); 49 CFR §§ 1023.11, 1023.21, 1023.32,
1023.51 (1990). Federal law governing that scheme placed
no express constraints on any state filings or fees other than
those concerning Federal Permit and insurance require
ments. Indeed, federal regulations specified that the fed
eral “bingo card” statute did not “affect” the “collection or
[the] method of collection of taxes or fees by a State” from
interstate truckers “for the operation of vehicles within” its
“borders.” § 1023.104. And they further provided that the
statute did not “affect” state requirements “as to the exter
nal identification of vehicles to indicate the payment of a
State tax or fee imposed for revenue purposes or for any
other purpose” not governed by the “bingo card” system.
§ 1023.42.
When Congress created the new SSRS, it did not indicate
(in the text, structure, or divinable purpose of the new provi
sion) that the pre-emptive scope of the new scheme would
be any broader than that of the old. See ISTEA, 105 Stat.
1914. The relevant differences between the SSRS and the

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“bingo card” regime were that: (1) one State, rather than
many, would collect the relevant filings; (2) one State, rather
than many, would collect the relevant fees; and (3) these fees,
limited to the same amount as before, would relate to filing of
proof of insurance rather than to filing of the Federal Permit.
Compare 49 U. S. C. § 11506 (1988 ed.) with § 14504 (2000 ed.);
see also § 11506 (1988 ed., Supp. IV). These modifications
merely sought more efficient, not greater, federal regulation.
See Yellow Transp., supra; see also 49 U. S. C. §§ 13908(a),
(d) (authorizing the Secretary to replace the SSRS with a yet
more streamlined system and pre-empting only those State
“insurance filing requirements or fees that are for the same
purposes as filings or fees the Secretary requires under the
new system” (emphasis added)). And while the new regula
tions implementing the SSRS do not explicitly exempt un
related state requirements from the statute’s pre-emptive
reach, neither they nor the rulemaking that produced them
suggest any change to pre-existing practice in this respect.
See 49 CFR § 367.1 et seq. (2004); see also Single State Insur
ance Registration, 9 I. C. C. 2d 610 (1993) (Interstate Com
merce Commission decision announcing new regulations);
Single State Insurance Registration, No. MC–100 (Sub-
No. 6), 1993 WL 17833 (I. C. C., Jan. 13, 1993) (proposing
regulations, providing justifications, and soliciting further
comments).
Finally, we have found nothing in the statute’s basic pur
poses or objectives—improving the efficiency of the “bingo
card” system and simplifying a uniform scheme for providing
States with certain vital information—that either requires
a broader reading of the statutory term, or that impliedly
pre-empts other, non-SSRS-related state rules. Cf. Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 881 (2000) (fed
eral statutes by implication pre-empt state law that stands
“as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution” of
their federal objectives (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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That is, we can find no indication that Congress sought to
use this narrowly focused statute to forbid state fee or regis
tration obligations that have nothing to do with basic SSRS
(or earlier “bingo card”) objectives—say, for example, a State
Registration requirement related to compliance by interstate
carriers with rules governing the introduction of foreign
pests into the jurisdiction, or with a State’s version of the
Amber Alert system, or with size, weight, and safety stand
ards. The Constitution’s Commerce Clause may (or may
not) forbid some such rules. But this statute—which identi
fies and regulates very specific items—says nothing about
them, and there is no reason to believe that Congress wished
to resolve that kind of Commerce Clause issue in this provi
sion. Cf. 49 U. S. C. § 13908 (indicating that the SSRS may
well be only a temporary system and similarly focusing on
limited, federally enumerated requirements without discuss
ing broad pre-emption).
We conclude, as we have said, that the term “State regis
tration requirement,” as used in the second sentence of the
SSRS statute, covers only those State Registration require
ments that concern the subject matter of that statutory pro
vision, namely, the registration of a Federal Permit, proof of
insurance, and the name of an agent for service of process.
See supra, at 446–447. It neither explicitly nor implicitly
reaches unrelated matters.
B
The second legal question involves the Michigan statute
imposing the $100 fee on Michigan-plated trucks operating
entirely in interstate commerce. MCL § 478.2(2) (West
2002). Do the requirements set forth in that statute concern
the SSRS statute’s subject matter? We think that they
do not.
For one thing, the Michigan statute imposing the $100 fee
makes no reference to evidence of a Federal Permit, to any
insurance requirement, or to an agent for receiving service

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of process. Nor, as far as we can tell, do any state rules
related to the $100 fee require the filing of information about
these matters. See Equipment List Form P–344–T (requir
ing information about truck make, type, year, unit number,
and serial number).
For another thing, Michigan law imposed a separate fee on
interstate motor carriers with trucks license plated in Michi
gan before the SSRS existed and before Michigan began to
participate in the “bingo card” system. See App. 24–25;
Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Partial Summary Disposition
in No. 95–15628–CM etc. (Mich. Ct. Cl.), p. 5; Plaintiffs-
Appellants’ Brief on Appeal, in No. 226052 etc. (Mich. Ct.
App.), pp. 5–6; MCL § 478.7(4) (West 2002). Hence such a
fee does not represent an effort somehow to circumvent the
limitations imposed in connection with federal laws govern
ing State Registration of Federal Permits.
Finally, Michigan rules provide that a Michigan-plated in
terstate truck choosing Michigan as its SSRS base State can
apparently comply with Michigan’s SSRS requirements even
if it does not comply with Michigan’s $100 fee requirement.
The owner of that truck can fill out Michigan form RS–1,
thereby providing Michigan with evidence that it has a Fed
eral Permit. App. 65–66. It can also fill out form RS–2, on
which it indicates the total SSRS fees it owes to all partici
pating States whose borders the truck will cross. Id., at 67.
Upon submission of the two forms and payment of the fees,
Michigan apparently will give the owner form RS–3, an
SSRS receipt, a copy of which the owner can place in the
vehicle of the truck, thereby complying with Michigan’s (and
all other participating States’) SSRS-related “State registra
tion requirements.” If that owner fails to pay Michigan’s
$100 fee for that truck, the owner will not receive a state fee
decal. But that owner will have violated only Michigan’s
$100 fee statute here at issue, MCL § 478.2(2) (West 2002).
Petitioners have provided us with nothing that suggests the

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owner will have violated any other provision of Michigan law.
See § 478.7(4). And they have not demonstrated that Michi
gan law in practice holds hostage a truck owner’s SSRS com
pliance until the owner pays § 478.2(2)’s $100 fee.
On the other hand, we recognize that Michigan form RS–2,
the form that lists all SSRS-participating States together
with their SSRS-related fees, places an asterisk next to
Michigan and states that “[v]ehicles base-plated in Michigan
need not” pay any SSRS fee but “are required to have a
$100.00” Michigan decal. App. 67. Michigan thereby for
gives Michigan-plated interstate trucks (which must pay
Michigan $100) payment of the $10 Michigan SSRS fee that
would otherwise be due. And to that extent, there is a con
nection between the $100 fee and the SSRS.
Michigan appears to forgive its $10 SSRS fee, however,
only for the Michigan-plated interstate trucks of a carrier
that has chosen Michigan as its SSRS “base” State. See
Reply Brief for Petitioners 14–15, n. 8. Michigan-plated
trucks operating out of a different SSRS base State, say,
Ohio, must pay the fee, which is remitted back to Michigan.
Thus, the $10 reduction can be seen simply as an effort to
provide modest, administratively efficient (because Michigan
itself is handling both fees) recompense to those motor carri
ers that operate Michigan-plated trucks and choose Michigan
as their SSRS base State. That subsidiary connection can
not transform Michigan’s $100 fee, which exclusively involves
non-SSRS subject matter (and was created for non-SSRS
related reasons), into a requirement that concerns the sub
ject matter of the SSRS statute.
* * *
For these reasons, we conclude that 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b)
does not pre-empt Michigan’s $100 fee. The judgment of the
Michigan Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

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Appendix to opinion of the Court
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Title 49 U. S. C. § 14504 provides:
“Registration of motor carriers by a State
“(a) Definitions.—In this section, the terms ‘stand
ards’ and ‘amendments to standards’ mean the specifica
tion of forms and procedures required by regulations of
the Secretary to prove the lawfulness of transportation
by motor carrier referred to in section 13501.
“(b) General Rule.—The requirement of a State
that a motor carrier, providing transportation subject
to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 and
providing transportation in that State, must register
with the State is not an unreasonable burden on trans
portation referred to in section 13501 when the State
registration is completed under standards of the Secre
tary under subsection (c). When a State registration
requirement imposes obligations in excess of the stand
ards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreason
able burden.
“(c) Single State Registration System.—
“(1) In general.—The Secretary shall maintain
standards for implementing a system under which—
“(A) a motor carrier is required to register annually
with only one State by providing evidence of its Federal
registration under chapter 139;
“(B) the State of registration shall fully comply with
standards prescribed under this section; and
“(C) such single State registration shall be deemed to
satisfy the registration requirements of all other States.
“(2) Specific requirements.—
“(A) Evidence of federal registration; proof
of insurance; payment of fees.—Under the stand
ards of the Secretary implementing the single State reg
istration system described in paragraph (1) of this sub
section, only a State acting in its capacity as registration

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455 Cite as: 545 U. S. 440 (2005)
Appendix to opinion of the Court
State under such single State system may require a
motor carrier registered by the Secretary under this
part—
“(i) to file and maintain evidence of such Federal
registration;
“(ii) to file satisfactory proof of required insurance or
qualification as a self-insurer;
“(iii) to pay directly to such State fee amounts in ac
cordance with the fee system established under subpara
graph (B)(iv) of this paragraph, subject to allocation of
fee revenues among all States in which the carrier oper
ates and which participate in the single State registra
tion system; and
“(iv) to file the name of a local agent for service of
process.
“(B) Receipts; fee system.—The standards of the
Secretary—
“(i) shall require that the registration State issue a
receipt, in a form prescribed under the standards, re
flecting that the carrier has filed proof of insurance as
provided under subparagraph (A)(ii) of this paragraph
and has paid fee amounts in accordance with the fee sys
tem established under clause (iv) of this subparagraph;
“(ii) shall require that copies of the receipt issued
under clause (i) of this subparagraph be kept in each of
the carrier’s commercial motor vehicles;
“(iii) shall not require decals, stamps, cab cards, or
any other means of registering or identifying specific
vehicles operated by the carrier;
“(iv) shall establish a fee system for the filing of proof
of insurance as provided under subparagraph (A)(ii) of
this paragraph that—
“(I) is based on the number of commercial motor vehi
cles the carrier operates in a State and on the number
of States in which the carrier operates;

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
“(II) minimizes the costs of complying with the regis
tration system; and
“(III) results in a fee for each participating State that
is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that
such State collected or charged as of November 15,
1991; and
“(v) shall not authorize the charging or collection of
any fee for filing and maintaining evidence of Fed
eral registration under subparagraph (A)(i) of this
paragraph.
“(C) Prohibited fees.—The charging or collection
of any fee under this section that is not in accordance
with the fee system established under subparagraph
(B)(iv) of this paragraph shall be deemed to be a burden
on interstate commerce.
“(D) Limitation on participation by States.—
Only a State which, as of January 1, 1991, charged or
collected a fee for a vehicle identification stamp or num
ber under part 1023 of title 49, Code of Federal Regula
tions, shall be eligible to participate as a registration
State under this subsection or to receive any fee reve
nue under this subsection.”
Justice Kennedy, with whom The Chief Justice and
Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in my view, erred in hold
ing that Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 478.2(2) (West 2002) (here
inafter MCL) is not a registration requirement. Westlake
Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich.
App. 589, 603–605, 662 N. W. 2d 784, 795 (2003). Our Court,
too, errs by concluding that the term “State registration re
quirement” in 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) includes only those state
registration requirements that “concern the [same] subject
matter” as the Single State Registration System (SSRS) es
tablished by § 14504(c). Ante, at 447, 451. This respectful
dissent explains my reasons for rejecting these two holdings.

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I
Title 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) provides:
“The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, pro
viding [interstate transportation] in that State, must
register with the State is not an unreasonable burden
on transportation . . . when the State registration is
completed under standards of the Secretary [of Trans
portation] under [§ 14504(c)]. When a State registra
tion requirement imposes obligations in excess of the
standards of the Secretary, the part in excess is an un
reasonable burden.”
The dispositive question in the instant case is whether MCL
§ 478.2(2) is a “State registration requirement” within the
meaning of the second sentence of 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b).
The Michigan Court of Appeals said the answer is no because
MCL § 478.2(2) is not a registration requirement at all. The
Court also says the answer is no, but for a different reason.
It concludes that, even though § 478.2(2) is a registration re
quirement, the term “registration requirement” in 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504(b) includes only the subset of registration require
ments that concern the same subject matter as the SSRS.
Neither the Court’s reason, nor the different reason given by
the Michigan Court of Appeals, is persuasive.
A
The Michigan Court of Appeals adopted a categorical rule:
“If the purpose of a fee is to regulate an industry or service,
it can be properly classified as a regulatory fee,” not a regis
tration fee. 255 Mich. App., at 605, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795.
Proceeding to apply the rule so announced, the Court of Ap
peals held that the $100 fee imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) on
Michigan-plated interstate carriers is a regulatory fee rather
than a registration fee because the fee is “imposed for the
administration of the [Michigan Motor Carrier Act], particu
larly covering costs of enforcing safety regulations.” Id., at
604, 662 N. W. 2d, at 795.

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
The majority affirms the judgment below, but “for other
reasons.” Ante, at 446. The Court’s reluctance to adopt
the Michigan Court of Appeals’ rationale is understandable.
MCL § 478.2(2) and related state rules and regulations re
quire a motor carrier that wants to operate Michigan-plated
vehicles in interstate commerce in Michigan to fill out a form
providing detailed identifying information for each vehicle
and to pay a $100-per-vehicle fee. In return, the State pro
vides the carrier with decals that it must place on its trucks.
See ante, at 444–445. If this is not a “State registration
requirement” in the general and ordinary sense of the term,
it is hard to conceive of what is.
The Court of Appeals’ holding would allow the State to
convert any registration fee into a regulatory fee simply by
declaring a regulatory purpose or spending some portion of
the money collected on regulation or administration. The
logic of this approach excludes from the coverage of 49
U. S. C. § 14504(b) almost all state requirements, including
those dealing with similar subject matter as the SSRS. The
purpose of SSRS requirements, after all, is to regulate the
interstate motor carrier industry; and the fees collected are
used to administer the system. The Court’s disapproval of
the Michigan Court of Appeals’ reasoning is implicit in the
Court’s decision to affirm on a different ground. Ante, at
446. Yet the Court’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals’
decision, coupled with the Court’s failure to make its appar
ent disagreement with the reasoning explicit, will result in
the Michigan Court of Appeals’ broad rule surviving to work
additional mischief in future cases, a most undesirable result
in this area, where fees and regulatory requirements are so
pervasive.
B
1
Although the Court appears to agree that MCL § 478.2(2)
imposes a state registration requirement on interstate motor
carriers, it holds, nonetheless, that the provision is not pre
empted by 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). This, according to the

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Court, is because the phrase “State registration require
ment” in § 14504(b) refers not to state registration require
ments generally, but only to those state registration require
ments that concern the same subject matter as the SSRS:
registration of a federal permit, proof of insurance, and des
ignation of an agent for service of process. Ante, at 451.
Section 14504(b) simply cannot bear the narrowing construc
tion the Court seeks to impose upon it.
The first sentence of § 14504(b) authorizes States to impose
registration requirements on interstate motor carriers if the
registration “is completed under standards of the Secretary
under [§ 14504(c)],” i. e., under the SSRS. The second sen
tence of § 14504(b) pre-empts “a State registration require
ment” that imposes “obligations in excess” of the SSRS.
There ought to be no question that MCL § 478.2(2) is a state
registration requirement. The Court seems to agree, at
least when the phrase “State registration requirement” is
used in its ordinary and general sense. It should also be
apparent that the obligations imposed by § 478.2(2) are in
excess of those authorized by the standards of the Secretary
under 49 U. S. C. § 14504(c). The plain text of § 14504(b),
then, would appear to pre-empt MCL § 478.2(2), at least
when § 478.2(2) is considered in isolation.
The Court, however, departs from the text of the statute.
Title 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b), by its terms, saves from pre
emption only one class of state registration requirements im
posed on interstate motor carriers: those completed under
standards of the Secretary under § 14504(c), i. e., those that
are authorized under the SSRS. To this subset the Court
adds a second class of state registration requirements saved
from pre-emption: those that concern subject matters not
covered under § 14504(c). The problem, of course, is that the
statute simply does not provide for the exemption the Court
invents. There is no basis in the statutory text or structure
for adding this limitation, and the Court cannot carry its
heavy burden to show why the language Congress used in
§ 14504(b) should not be given its ordinary meaning.

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2
The Court makes only one textual argument for the limita
tion it superimposes on § 14504(b)’s second sentence. The
second sentence, the Court reasons, refers to the same set of
state registration requirements discussed in the first sen
tence. It must follow, the Court says, that because the
first sentence of § 14504(b) refers to SSRS registration,
the phrase “State registration requirement” in the second
sentence refers only to state registration requirements that
concern the same subject matter as the SSRS. Ante, at
447–448.
The Court’s premise is faulty. The two terms in the first
sentence—“requirement of a State that [an interstate motor
carrier] must register” and “registration requirement”—are
not, when taken by themselves, limited to state registration
requirements concerning the same “subject matter” as the
SSRS. These terms, like the term “State registration re
quirement” in the second sentence of § 14504(b), refer gen
erally to any state requirement that an interstate motor
carrier register with the State. No narrower reading is nec
essary to make perfect sense of each of § 14504(b)’s two sen
tences and of how they operate together. The first sentence
of § 14504(b) declares that the subset of state registra
tion requirements consisting of those requirements author
ized under the SSRS—i. e., requirements “completed under
standards of the Secretary under [§ 14504(c)]”—are not pre
empted. The second sentence of § 14504(b) says that all
other state registration requirements for interstate motor
carriers are pre-empted. It is difficult to understand the
Court’s mighty struggle to resist this simple, direct reading
of the statutory language.
The Court also observes that there is no language else
where in the statute or in the implementing regulations sug
gesting that “State registration requirement” in § 14504(b)
refers to all types of state registration requirements imposed
on interstate motor carriers, and the Court asserts that even

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the United States concedes that certain registration obliga
tions in traditional areas of state regulation are beyond the
statute’s pre-emptive reach. Ante, at 449. The first claim
is irrelevant and the second is wrong. Section 14504(b) itself
makes clear its pre-emptive scope, and confirmation by other
statutory provisions or administrative regulations is unnec
essary. And, while the United States did say that § 14504(b)
was not “intended to preempt state laws and fees in tradi
tional areas of state regulation,” the reason the United
States believes this is so is because § 14504(b) does not pre
empt general registration requirements that do not apply
specifically to interstate motor carriers. Brief as Amicus
Curiae 19–20.
3
Perhaps sensing the weakness of its textual argument, the
Court turns to statutory history. The Court is correct to
say that, before the enactment of § 14504(b) and the SSRS,
federal law did not pre-empt state filings or fees other than
those concerning federal permit and insurance requirements.
Ante, at 449. Pre-SSRS federal regulations, furthermore,
specified that the federal statute did not affect the power of
States to collect other fees from interstate motor carriers
or to require decals indicating payment of these fees. Ibid.
This is beside the point, however. The extent of pre
emption before enactment of § 14504(b) tells us little about
§ 14504(b)’s pre-emptive effect. Similarly, the fact that pre-
SSRS federal regulations preserved other state registration
requirements is of minimal significance when, as the Court
admits, the new regulations contain no such provisions.
Ante, at 450. If anything, the failure to repromulgate regu
lations saving other state registration fees from pre-emption
suggests that the federal agency charged with implementing
the SSRS did think that § 14504(b) expanded the scope of
federal pre-emption.
The Court’s meaning is therefore obscure when it declares
that Congress “did not indicate (in the text, structure, or

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divinable purpose of the new provision) that the pre-emptive
scope of the new scheme would be any broader than that of
the old.” Ante, at 449. Congress did indicate an expansion
of federal pre-emption in § 14504(b)’s “text” and “struc
ture”—it did so by replacing a narrow pre-emption clause
with a broad pre-emption clause. Congress is not required
to say, “We really mean it.” Cf. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 73 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“I hardly think it ‘scant indication’ of intent to alter [the
meaning of a statute] that Congress amended the text of the
statute” (emphasis in original)).
Perhaps the Court means to suggest that what appears to
be the plain meaning of § 14504(b) is put in doubt by the fact
that the predecessor statute’s pre-emptive scope was much
more limited. Comparison with predecessor statutes, how
ever, is permissible only to resolve statutory ambiguity that
exists independent of the comparison with the predecessor
statute; comparison with predecessor statutes cannot be
used to create ambiguity about the meaning of an otherwise
clear statute. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526,
533–535 (2004); see also Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.,
543 U. S., at 66–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id., at 67
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 73 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
4
The Court’s final reason for imposing its narrowing con
struction on § 14504(b) is that the Court has found “nothing
in the statute’s basic purposes . . . that . . . requires a broader
reading of the statutory term . . . .” Ante, at 450. In the
Court’s view the only purpose of § 14504 is to make minor
improvements in the efficiency of the old bingo card system.
Ante, at 449–450. The Court makes no convincing argu
ment that § 14504(b)’s purpose was so limited. The Court,
furthermore, does not explain why the statute’s basic pur
poses require the Court’s artificially narrow reading of the

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facially broad statutory command. The most the Court is
willing to say is that it “can find no indication,” ante, at 451,
that when Congress said “State registration requirement,”
it meant “State registration requirement.” So it says Con
gress must have meant “State registration requirement con
cerning the same subject matter as the SSRS.” The text of
§ 14504(b), however, does not admit of the qualifications the
Court adds to it. The Court’s argument from statutory pur
pose has no basis.
The Court suggests that if Congress intended § 14504(b)
to have the broad pre-emptive effect required by the text,
Congress would have more clearly indicated that intention.
Ibid. (“[W]e can find no indication that Congress sought” to
pre-empt requirements not related to SSRS subject matter).
It is not entirely clear what sort of additional indication of
congressional purpose the Court is looking for. The text, as
noted above, does provide an indication of Congress’ intent.
Perhaps the Court is troubled by the absence of statements
in the legislative history endorsing § 14504(b)’s expansion of
federal pre-emption. The lack of confirmatory legislative
history, however, is not a legitimate reason for imposing an
artificial narrowing construction on broad but clear statutory
text. “[I]t would be a strange canon of statutory construc
tion that would require Congress to state in committee re
ports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious
on the face of a statute.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980). See also Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 385, n. 2 (1992) (“[L]egislative
history need not confirm the details of changes in the law
effected by statutory language before we will interpret that
language according to its natural meaning”); Chisom v. Roe
mer, 501 U. S. 380, 406 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We
are here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and cer
tainly not the absence of legislative history”).

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II
A
In my submission, the phrase “State registration require
ment” in § 14504(b) cannot be read as limited to state regis
tration requirements that concern one particular subject
matter. It should be noted, however, that this phrase is am
biguous in a different respect. Section 14504(b) might be
read, on the one hand, to exempt interstate motor carriers
from any non-SSRS state registration requirement, includ
ing general requirements that apply to all motor carriers or
to some other set of entities. On the other hand, § 14504(b)
might be read to pre-empt only those non-SSRS registration
requirements that apply specifically to interstate motor car
riers. That is, § 14504(b) might come into play only if being
an interstate motor carrier is a necessary or sufficient condi
tion for imposition of a state registration requirement. The
United States takes the latter view of the statute, Brief as
Amicus Curiae 17–22, and I am of the same opinion.
Though the phrase “State registration requirement” in the
second sentence of § 14504(b) is not qualified, it is clear from
context that this term refers to a “requirement of a State
that a motor carrier, providing [interstate transportation,]
must register with the State,” the more specific term that
appears in § 14509(b)’s first sentence. It is grammatically
possible to read the statutory command as exempting inter
state motor carriers from all registration requirements other
than the SSRS, but that reading would lead to absurd re
sults. It would suggest, for example, that interstate motor
carriers with a principal place of business in Michigan do
not have to register their presence for purposes of state tax
collection. In context, the more natural and sensible read
ing of the phrase “requirement of a State that a motor car
rier, providing [interstate transportation,] must register with
the State” includes only those registration requirements that

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are triggered specifically by the fact that the entity in ques
tion is an interstate motor carrier.
Because § 14504(b) pre-empts state registration require
ments that single out interstate carriers, but not general
state registration requirements that apply to interstate
carriers only incidentally, my analysis of § 14504(b) does not
necessarily mean the Court’s ultimate conclusion in this case
is incorrect. Respondents contend that MCL § 478.2(2) ap
plies only to trucks with Michigan license plates, and that
§ 478.2(2) should be considered together with § 478.2(1),
which imposes a $100 fee on every truck doing intrastate
business within Michigan. According to respondents, then,
49 U. S. C. § 14504(b) does not come into play because inter
state carriers are not singled out; Michigan imposes the same
$100 fee on all for-hire motor vehicles license plated in Michi
gan. Brief for Respondents 44–45. Petitioners and the
United States take issue with this argument. Reply Brief
for Petitioners 10–14; Brief for United States as Amicus Cu
riae 24–29.
In my view it is not necessary to reach this question. The
Michigan Court of Appeals resolved the case on the incorrect
theory that a fee is not a registration fee if its purpose is to
regulate the industry. Given its erroneous view of the stat
ute, the proper course should be to vacate the Court of
Appeals’ decision and remand for further proceedings. Re
manding the case would allow the Michigan courts to con
sider the competing arguments in light of the correct legal
interpretation of 49 U. S. C. § 14504(b). Respondents would,
at that stage, be able to advance their arguments that MCL
§ 478.2(2) is not pre-empted when it is considered in conjunc
tion with § 478.2(1) or any other aspect of the statutory
scheme that bears on whether Michigan imposes registration
requirements specifically on interstate motor carriers be
yond those authorized under the SSRS.

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B
The Court insists that to read “requirement that a motor
carrier providing [interstate transportation] must register
with the State” as including only those requirements that
apply specifically to interstate motor carriers would be
“wholly inconsistent with the statute’s basic purposes, be
cause it would leave a State free to implement a regulation
in excess of specific SSRS limitations as long as it did not
single out interstate carriers . . . .” Ante, at 448. The
Court is correct that, under my interpretation, 49 U. S. C.
§ 14504(b) would not pre-empt general, neutral requirements,
even if they dealt with subject matter similar to that covered
by the SSRS. The Court is wrong, however, to suggest this
therefore means an SSRS could collect from interstate motor
carriers a $500 fee for proof of insurance or require designa
tion of multiple agents for service of process, as long as the
requirement in question applied evenhandedly to all motor
carriers. The Court errs because it fails to give adequate
consideration to the restrictions imposed by § 14504(c).
Section 14504(c)(2)(A) declares that “only a State acting in
its capacity as [a] registration State under [the SSRS] may
require a motor carrier registered by the Secretary under
[the SSRS]” to file proof of federal registration and proof of
insurance, to collect fees for filing proof of insurance, and
to maintain a local agent for service of process. Section
14504(c)(2)(B) constrains the SSRS registration require
ments and fees the SSRS registration State can impose
on interstate motor carriers. These sections contain an am
biguity similar to that which affects § 14504(b). Context,
however, suggests that the ambiguity should be resolved dif
ferently. The best interpretation of § 14504(c), in my sub
mission, is that no State participating in the SSRS other than
an interstate motor carrier’s designated SSRS registra
tion State may impose requirements of the sort listed in
§ 14504(c)(2)(A) on that carrier, even if the requirement is

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general and applies to all motor carriers. The SSRS regis
tration State, furthermore, may only impose on registered
interstate motor carriers requirements related to those
listed in §§ 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv) if the State conforms to the
restrictions in § 14504(c)(2)(B).
Taken together, the general pre-emption provision in
§ 14504(b) and the specific limitations on SSRS registration
States in § 14504(c) establish a rational regulatory scheme.
Whether or not a State participates in the SSRS, it cannot
impose a registration requirement that singles out interstate
motor carriers unless that requirement is authorized under
the SSRS. States that participate in the SSRS may impose
general, neutral registration requirements that happen to af
fect interstate motor carriers unless those requirements are
inconsistent with the specific mandates of the SSRS related
to proof of insurance, proof of federal permit, fees, and serv
ice of process. Non-SSRS States may impose any general,
neutral registration requirement, even if they require inter
state motor carriers, among others, to file proof of insurance
or maintain a local agent for service of process.
The Court’s interpretation leads to a less sensible scheme.
According to the Court, that statute permits States to im
pose on interstate carriers any number of onerous require
ments so long as these requirements are not explicitly linked
to the subjects covered by the SSRS. The Court’s interpre
tation, furthermore, means that those States which are ex
cluded from the SSRS under § 14504(c)(2)(D) may not apply
general state registration requirements to interstate motor
carriers if the requirements concern proof of insurance or
registration of an agent for service of process. Under the
Court’s interpretation, the statute does not pre-empt state
regulations that single out interstate carriers for special bur
dens well beyond what the SSRS allows, but it does prevent
non-SSRS States from applying a number of modest, even
handed registration requirements to interstate carriers, even

545US1 Unit: $U68 [03-26-08 17:32:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN
468 MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. v. MICHIGAN PUB.
SERV. COMM’N
Kennedy, J., dissenting
though the SSRS is not available to these States. That im
plausible result is not demanded by the statute’s basic
purposes.
* * *
Instead of heeding what Congress actually said, the Court
relies on flawed textual analysis and dubious inferences from
legislative silence to impose the Court’s view of what it
thinks Congress probably wanted to say. In my view, this
is a mistake. Other arguments, not considered by the Michi
gan Court of Appeals or by our Court, might support the
ultimate outcome in this case. These arguments, however,
ought to be addressed on remand.