NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK v. CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA

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189 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK
v. CHATHAM COUNTY, GEORGIA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit
No. 04–1618. Argued March 1, 2006—Decided April 25, 2006
Petitioner insurance company filed this admiralty suit against respondent
County seeking damages resulting from a collision between a malfunc
tioning County drawbridge and a boat insured by petitioner. Granting
the County summary judgment, the District Court recognized that
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit does not extend to counties,
but relied on Circuit precedent to conclude that sovereign immunity
extends to counties and municipalities that, as here, exercise power dele
gated from the State. The Eleventh Circuit, which was bound by that
same precedent, affirmed. It acknowledged that the County did not
assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense, which would fail be
cause, under other Circuit precedent, the County did not qualify as an
“arm of the State.” The Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that
common law has carved out a “residual immunity” that protects political
subdivisions such as the County from suit.
Held: An entity that does not qualify as an “arm of the State” for Elev
enth Amendment purposes cannot assert sovereign immunity as a de
fense to an admiralty suit. Pp. 193–197.
(a) Immunity from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and
which they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Conven
tion or certain constitutional Amendments.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S.
706, 713. Thus, the phrase “ ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity’ . . . is
convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms
of the Eleventh Amendment.” Ibid. Because preratification sover
eignty is the source of immunity from suit, only States and arms of
the State possess immunity from suits authorized by federal law. See,
e. g., id., at 740. Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not extend
to counties, see, e. g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401, and n. 19, even when they “exer
cise a ‘slice of state power,’ ” id., at 401. The County argues unconvinc
ingly that this Court has recognized a distinct “residual” immunity that
permits adoption of a broader test than it applies in the Eleventh
Amendment context to determine whether an entity is acting as an arm

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190 NORTHERN INS. CO. OF N. Y. v. CHATHAM COUNTY
Syllabus
of the State entitled to immunity. The Court has referenced only the
States’ “ ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’ ” that survived the Con
stitution. See, e. g., Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina
Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 751. Because the County may claim
immunity neither based upon its identity as a county nor under an ex
pansive arm-of-the-State test, it is subject to suit unless it was acting
as an arm of the State, as delineated by this Court’s precedents, in
operating the drawbridge. E. g., Alden, supra, at 756. The County
conceded below that it was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immu
nity, and both the County and the Eleventh Circuit appear to have un
derstood this concession to be based on the County’s failure to qualify
as an “arm of the State” under this Court’s precedent. Moreover, cer
tiorari was granted in this case premised on the conclusion that the
County is not an arm of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,
and this Court presumes that to be the case. The County’s concession
and this Court’s presumption are dispositive. Pp. 193–195.
(b) The County’s alternative argument that the Court should recog
nize a distinct sovereign immunity against in personam admiralty suits
that bars cases arising from a county’s exercise of core state functions
with regard to navigable waters is rejected. Such recognition cannot
be reconciled with the Court’s precedents, which applied the general
principle that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against a city to
an admiralty suit as early as Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552,
570. The Court disagrees with the County’s contention that Workman
does not govern the instant case under Ex parte New York, 256 U. S.
490, 498, where, in extending sovereign immunity beyond cases “in law
or equity” to admiralty cases, the Court concluded that Workman in
volved only substantive admiralty law, not the power of the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over a particular defendant. But Workman did
so precisely because the Court there held that admiralty courts have
jurisdiction over municipal corporations. See 179 U. S., at 565. The
Workman Court accordingly distinguished between the question before
it—whether admiralty courts may, notwithstanding state law, “redress
a wrong committed by one over whom such courts have adequate juris
diction,” id., at 566, such as a municipal corporation—and the question
not before it, but before the Court in Ex parte New York—whether
admiralty courts may “give redress in a case where jurisdiction over
the person or property cannot be exerted,” 179 U. S., at 566. In the
former circumstance, the court should apply general admiralty princi
ples, while in the latter the court lacks the power to do so. See id., at
570; Ex parte New York, supra, at 499–500, 502–503. Because here, as
in Workman and in contrast to Ex parte New York, the defendant was
an entity generally within the District Court’s jurisdiction, Ex parte

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Opinion of the Court
New York is inapposite, and Workman compels the conclusion that the
County is unprotected by sovereign immunity. Pp. 195–197.
129 Fed. Appx. 602, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Miguel A. Estrada argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., and Mat
thew D. McGill.
Dan Himmelfarb argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Soli
citor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keis
ler, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, James A. Feldman,
Mark B. Stern, J. Michael Wiggins, John E. Crowley, Rob
ert Bruce, Amy Wright Larson, and Phillip Christopher
Hughey.
R. Jonathan Hart argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were Emily Elizabeth Garrard and David
J. Bederman.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Northern Insurance Company of New York
(Northern) filed suit against respondent Chatham County,
Georgia (County), in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, seeking damages resulting
from an alleged tort committed by employees of the County.
The District Court granted the County’s motion for summary
judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by sover
eign immunity. Relying on Circuit precedent, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We granted cer
tiorari to consider “[w]hether an entity that does not qualify
as an ‘arm of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes
can nonetheless assert sovereign immunity as a defense to
an admiralty suit.” 546 U. S. 959 (2005).
*Thomas S. Biemer filed a brief for the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

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192 NORTHERN INS. CO. OF N. Y. v. CHATHAM COUNTY
Opinion of the Court
I
The County owns, operates, and maintains the Causton
Bluff Bridge, a drawbridge over the Wilmington River. On
October 6, 2002, James Ludwig requested that the bridge be
raised to allow his boat to pass. The bridge malfunctioned,
a portion falling and colliding with Mr. Ludwig’s boat. As
a result of the collision, Mr. Ludwig and his wife incurred
damages in excess of $130,000.
The Ludwigs submitted a claim for those damages to their
insurer, Northern, which paid in accordance with the terms
of their insurance policy. Northern then sought to recover
its costs by filing suit in admiralty against the County in
the District Court. The County sought summary judgment,
arguing that Northern’s claims were barred by sovereign im
munity. The County conceded that Eleventh Amendment
immunity did not extend to counties, but nonetheless con
tended that it was immune under “the universal rule of state
immunity from suit without the state’s consent.” Defend
ant’s Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Case No. CV403–099, App. 33a. The District Court agreed,
relying on Broward County v. Wickman, 195 F. 2d 614 (CA5
1952), to conclude that sovereign immunity extends to coun
ties and municipalities that, as here, “exercis[e] power dele
gated from the State.” Zurich Ins. Co. v. Chatham County,
No. CV403–99, App. 77a.
The Eleventh Circuit, which was bound to follow Wickman
as Circuit precedent, affirmed.1 The Court of Appeals ac
knowledged that the County did not assert an Eleventh
Amendment immunity defense, which would fail because,
under Circuit precedent, the County did not qualify as an
arm of the State. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Chatham County,
No. 04–13308 (Jan. 28, 2005), App. 83a, n. 1, judgt. order re
1 See Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (CA11 1981) (en banc)
(adopting all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to Octo
ber 1, 1981, as binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).

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ported at 129 Fed. Appx. 602. The Court of Appeals none
theless concluded that “common law has carved out a ‘resid
ual immunity,’ which would protect a political subdivision
such as Chatham County from suit. ” App. 83a. We
granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
II
This Court’s cases have recognized that the immunity of
States from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Con
stitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered
by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713 (1999);
see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 55–56
(1996); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313,
322–323 (1934). Consistent with this recognition, which no
party asks us to reexamine today, we have observed that the
phrase “ ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity’ . . . is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.” Alden, 527
U. S., at 713.
A consequence of this Court’s recognition of preratification
sovereignty as the source of immunity from suit is that only
States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits
authorized by federal law. See id., at 740; Mt. Healthy City
Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977). Accordingly,
this Court has repeatedly refused to extend sovereign immu
nity to counties. See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979); id., at
401, n. 19 (gathering cases); Workman v. New York City, 179
U. S. 552, 565 (1900); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S.
529, 530 (1890). See also Jinks v. Richland County, 538
U. S. 456, 466 (2003) (“[M]unicipalities, unlike States, do not
enjoy a constitutionally protected immunity from suit”).
This is true even when, as respondent alleges here, “such

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entities exercise a ‘slice of state power.’ ” Lake Country Es
tates, supra, at 401.
The County argues that this Court’s cases recognize a dis
tinct “residual” immunity that permits adoption of a broader
test than we apply in the Eleventh Amendment context to
determine whether an entity is acting as an arm of the State
and is accordingly entitled to immunity.2 Brief for Respond
ent 28. But this Court’s use of that term does not suggest
the County’s conclusion; instead, this Court has referenced
only the States’ “residuary and inviolable sovereignty” that
survived the Constitution. See The Federalist No. 39, p. 245
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison); Federal Mar i time
Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743,
751 (2002).
Because the County may claim immunity neither based
upon its identity as a county nor under an expansive arm-of
the-State test, the County is subject to suit unless it was
acting as an arm of the State, as delineated by this Court’s
precedents, in operating the drawbridge. Alden, supra, at
756; Lake Country Estates, supra, at 400–401. The County
conceded below that it was not entitled to Eleventh Amend
ment immunity, and both the County and the Court of Ap
peals appear to have understood this concession to be based
on the County’s failure to qualify as an arm of the State
under our precedent. See App. 83a, n. 1 (recognizing that
the County rightly disclaimed an Eleventh Amendment im
munity defense because such a defense would be inconsistent
2 It is unclear whether respondent believes that residual immunity is a
common-law immunity that has been unaltered by federal substantive law,
see Brief for Respondent 18 (“Chatham County’s sovereign immunity de
rives from the common law which pre-dates Eleventh Amendment immu
nity”), or, as the Solicitor General appears to believe, a constitutionally
based immunity that is distinguishable from the one drawn from the con
stitutional structure, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 16 (“What respondent calls resid
ual sovereign immunity . . . is the doctrine of constitutional sovereign
immunity”). In either case, it appears that the residual immunity would
serve to extend sovereign immunity beyond its preratification scope.

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with the court’s holding in Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises,
Inc., 339 F. 3d 1309 (CA11 2003), that the Broward County
Port Authority was not an arm of the State); Brief of Appel
lee Chatham County in No. 04–13308DD (CA11), p. 13 (distin
guishing Vierling in part because it dealt with the question
of Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Brief for Re
spondent 8 (implicitly conceding that respondent is not an
arm of the State under our Eleventh Amendment jurispru
dence). Moreover, the question on which we granted certio
rari is premised on the conclusion that the County is not
“an ‘arm of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes,”
546 U. S. 959 (2005), and we presume that to be the case.
Accordingly, the County’s concession and the presumption
underlying the question on which we granted review are
dispositive.
As an alternative ground for affirmance, the County asks
the Court to recognize a distinct sovereign immunity against
in personam admiralty suits that bars cases arising from a
county’s exercise of core state functions with regard to navi
gable waters. Recognition of a distinct immunity in admi
ralty cases cannot be reconciled with our precedents. Im
munity in admiralty, like other sovereign immunity, is simply
an application of “the fundamental rule” that “the entire ju
dicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace
authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a State without consent given.” Ex parte New
York, 256 U. S. 490, 497–500 (1921). Accordingly, this Court
has resolved sovereign immunity questions in admiralty by
relying upon principles set out in this Court’s sovereign im
munity cases, rather than by examining the history or juris
prudence specific to suits in admiralty. See Federal Mari
time Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, supra, at
754–769 (an admiralty suit relying heavily on Alden, supra
(plaintiff raised a Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 claim),
and Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, supra (plaintiff al
leged violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act)). In

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deed, the Court applied the general principle that sovereign
immunity does not bar a suit against a city to an admiralty
suit as early as Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552,
which held that such immunity “afforded no reason for deny
ing redress in a court of admiralty for the wrong which . . .
[had] been committed” by the city of New York, id., at 570.
The County nonetheless contends—and the Eleventh Cir
cuit, in reliance upon the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Wick
man, held—that the reach of Workman is limited, and that
this Court’s decision in Ex parte New York, supra, demon
strates that Workman does not govern the instant case.
See Wickman, 195 F. 2d, at 615. We disagree. Ex parte
New York extended sovereign immunity beyond cases “in
law or equity” to cases in admiralty. As the County points
out, Ex parte New York concluded that Workman involved
only the substantive law of admiralty, and not the power of
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a particular defend
ant. Ex parte New York, supra, at 498. But Workman
dealt only with the substantive law of admiralty precisely
because the Workman Court held that admiralty courts have
jurisdiction over municipal corporations. See 179 U. S., at
565 (“[A]s a general rule, municipal corporations, like individ
uals, may be sued; in other words . . . they are amenable to
judicial process for the purpose of compelling performance
of their obligations”). The Workman Court accordingly dis
tinguished between the question before it—whether courts
of admiralty may, notwithstanding state law, “redress a
wrong committed by one over whom such courts have ade
quate jurisdiction,” id., at 566, such as a municipal corpora
tion—and the question not before it, but before the Court in
Ex parte New York—whether courts of admiralty may “give
redress in a case where jurisdiction over the person or prop
erty cannot be exerted,” 179 U. S., at 566. In the former
circumstance, the court should apply general admiralty prin
ciples, while in the latter the court lacks the power to do
so. See id., at 570; Ex parte New York, supra, at 499–500,

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502–503. Because here, as in Workman and in contrast to
Ex parte New York, the defendant was an entity generally
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Ex parte New
York is inapposite, and Workman compels the conclusion that
the County is unprotected by sovereign immunity.
* * *
Because the County has failed to demonstrate that it was
acting as an arm of the State when it operated the Causton
Bluff Bridge, the County is not entitled to immunity from
Northern’s suit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.