JONES v. FLOWERS et al.

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JONES v. FLOWERS et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of arkansas
No. 04–1477. Argued January 17, 2006—Decided April 26, 2006
Petitioner Jones continued to pay the mortgage on his Arkansas home
after separating from his wife and moving elsewhere in the same city.
Once the mortgage was paid off, the property taxes—which had been
paid by the mortgage company—went unpaid, and the property was
certified as delinquent. Respondent Commissioner of State Lands
mailed Jones a certified letter at the property’s address, stating that
unless he redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale in
two years. Nobody was home to sign for the letter and nobody re
trieved it from the post office within 15 days, so it was returned to the
Commissioner, marked “unclaimed.” Two years later, the Commis
sioner published a notice of public sale in a local newspaper. No bids
were submitted, so the State negotiated a private sale to respondent
Flowers. Before selling the house, the Commissioner mailed another
certified letter to Jones, which was also returned unclaimed. Flowers
purchased the house and had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to
the property. It was served on Jones’ daughter, who notified him of
the sale. He filed a state-court suit against respondents, alleging that
the Commissioner’s failure to provide adequate notice resulted in the
taking of his property without due process. Granting respondents
summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Arkansas’ tax sale
statute, which sets out the notice procedure used here, complied with
due process. The State Supreme Court affirmed.
Held:
1. When mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, a State
must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to
the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do
so. Pp. 226–234.
(a) This Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it was
reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent, see,
e. g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314,
but has never addressed whether due process requires further efforts
when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its notice
attempt has failed. Most Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts
addressing this question have decided that the government must do
more in such a case, and many state statutes require more than mailed
notice in the first instance. Pp. 226–228.

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(b) The means a State employs to provide notice “must be such as
one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315. The adequacy of a par
ticular form of notice is assessed by balancing the State’s interest
against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the Four
teenth Amendment.” Id., at 314. Here, the evaluation concerns the
adequacy of notice prior to the State’s extinguishing a property owner’s
interest in a home. It is unlikely that a person who actually desired to
inform an owner about an impending tax sale of a house would do noth
ing when a certified letter addressed to the owner is returned un
claimed. The sender would ordinarily attempt to resend the letter, if
that is practical, especially given that it concerns the important and
irreversible prospect of losing a house. The State may have made a
reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, but it had good reason to
suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was no better off than
if no notice had been sent. The government must consider unique infor
mation about an intended recipient regardless of whether a statutory
scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case.
See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 40 (per curiam), and Covey v.
Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146–147. It does not matter that the
State in each of those cases was aware of the information before it calcu
lated the best way to send notice. Knowledge that notice was ineffec
tive was one of the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case” taken
into account, Mullane, supra, at 314–315, and it should similarly be
taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice here. The Com
missioner and Solicitor General correctly note that the constitutionality
of a particular notice procedure is assessed ex ante, not post hoc. But
if a feature of the State’s procedure is that it promptly provides ad
ditional information to the government about the effectiveness of
attempted notice, the ex ante principle is not contravened by consider
ing what the government does with that information. None of the
Commissioner’s additional contentions—that notice was sent to an
address that Jones provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated,
that a property owner who fails to receive a property tax bill and pay
taxes is on inquiry notice that his property is subject to governmental
taking, and that Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands
he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy—relieves
the State of its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice.
Pp. 229–234.
2. Because additional reasonable steps were available to the State,
given the circumstances here, the Commissioner’s effort to provide no
tice to Jones was insufficient to satisfy due process. What is reasonable

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222 JONES v. FLOWERS
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in response to new information depends on what that information re
veals. The certified letter’s return “unclaimed” meant either that Jones
was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve the letter
or that he no longer resided there. One reasonable step addressed to
the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by
regular mail, which requires no signature. Certified mail makes actual
notice more likely only if someone is there to sign for the letter or tell
the mail carrier that the address is incorrect. Regular mail can be left
until the person returns home, and might increase the chances of actual
notice. Other reasonable followup measures would have been to post
notice on the front door or address otherwise undeliverable mail to “oc
cupant.” Either approach would increase the likelihood that any occu
pants would alert the owner, if only because an ownership change could
affect their own occupancy. Contrary to Jones’ claim, the Commis
sioner was not required to search the local phone book and other govern
ment records. Such an open-ended search imposes burdens on the
State significantly greater than the several relatively easy options out
lined here. The Commissioner’s complaint about the burden of even
these additional steps is belied by Arkansas’ requirement that notice to
homestead owners be accomplished by personal service if certified mail
is returned and by the fact that the State transfers the cost of notice to
the taxpayer or tax sale purchaser. The Solicitor General’s additional
arguments—that posted notice could be removed by children or vandals,
and that the followup requirement will encourage States to favor modes
of delivery that will not generate additional information—are rejected.
This Court will not prescribe the form of service that Arkansas should
adopt. Arkansas can determine how best to proceed, and the States
have taken a variety of approaches. Pp. 234–238.
359 Ark. 443, 198 S. W. 3d 520, reversed and remanded.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissent
ing opinion, in which Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined, post, p. 239.
Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Michael T. Kirkpatrick argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs was Brian Wolfman.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents.
With him on the brief for respondent Commissioner of State
Lands was Virginia A. Seitz. A. J. Kelly filed a brief for
respondent Flowers.

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Opinion of the Court
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae in support of respondents. With him on
the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assist
ant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General
Hungar, Michael Jay Singer, and Susan Maxson Lyons.
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid
taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the government to provide the owner “notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to determine
whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner and
returned undelivered, the government must take additional
reasonable steps to provide notice before taking the own
er’s property.
I
In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717
North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in
the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. Jones
then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and his wife
continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. Jones
paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the mortgage
company paid Jones’ property taxes. After Jones paid off
his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes went unpaid, and
the property was certified as delinquent.
In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commissioner
of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify Jones of
his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property, by
mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North Bryan Street
address. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26–37–301 (1997). The
packet of information stated that unless Jones redeemed the
property, it would be subject to public sale two years later
on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody was home to sign for

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the letter, and nobody appeared at the post office to retrieve
the letter within the next 15 days. The post office returned
the unopened packet to the Commissioner marked “ ‘un
claimed.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 3.
Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public
sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in
the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted,
which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of the
property. See § 26–37–202(b). Several months later, re
spondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. The
Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones at the
North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify him that
his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not pay his
taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also returned
to the Commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3.
Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated in
the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for
$21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day pe
riod for postsale redemption passed, see § 26–37–202(e),
Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the
property. The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who
contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11
(Exh. B).
Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the
Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commission
er’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones’
right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property with
out due process. The Commissioner and Flowers moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the two unclaimed
letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally
adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Flowers. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 12a–13a. It concluded that the Arkansas
tax sale statute, which set forth the notice procedure fol

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lowed by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due
process requirements.
Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 443, 198 S. W. 3d 520
(2004). The court noted our precedent stating that due
process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held that at
tempting to provide notice by certified mail satisfied due
process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark., at 453–454,
198 S. W. 3d, at 526–527.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. 1165 (2005), to resolve a
conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts con
cerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the gov
ernment to take additional reasonable steps to notify a prop
erty owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered.
Compare, e. g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d 231, 236
(CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the County was
required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to ascertain
Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N. Y.
2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e reject the view
that the enforcing officer’s obligation is always satisfied by
sending the notice to the address listed in the tax roll, even
where the notice is returned as undeliverable”), with Smith
v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429,
617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000) (per curiam) (“The fact that one
of the mailings was returned by the post office as undelivera
ble does not impose on the state the obligation to undertake
an investigation to see if a new address . . . could be located”).
We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned
unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps
to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before
selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the
circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps
were available to the State. We therefore reverse the judg
ment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.

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II
A
Due process does not require that a property owner re
ceive actual notice before the government may take his prop
erty. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have stated
that due process requires the government to provide “notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane,
339 U. S., at 314. The Commissioner argues that once the
State provided notice reasonably calculated to apprise Jones
of the impending tax sale by mailing him a certified letter,
due process was satisfied. The Arkansas statutory scheme
is reasonably calculated to provide notice, the Commissioner
continues, because it provides for notice by certified mail to
an address that the property owner is responsible for keep
ing up to date. See Ark. Code Ann. § 26–35–705 (1997).
The Commissioner notes this Court’s ample precedent con
doning notice by mail, see, e. g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169;
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485
U. S. 478, 490 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,
462 U. S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane, supra, at 318–319, and
adds that the Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional re
quirements by requiring the Commissioner to use certified
mail. Brief for Respondent Commissioner 14–15.
It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitution
ally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach the
intended recipient when sent. See, e. g., Dusenbery, supra,
at 168–169; Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. In each of these
cases, the government attempted to provide notice and heard
nothing back indicating that anything had gone awry, and we
stated that “[t]he reasonableness and hence the constitu
tional validity of [the] chosen method may be defended on
the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected.” Id., at 315; see also Dusenbery, supra, at

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170. But we have never addressed whether due process en
tails further responsibility when the government becomes
aware prior to the taking that its attempt at notice has
failed. That is a new wrinkle, and we have explained that
the “notice required will vary with circumstances and condi
tions.” Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115
(1956). The question presented is whether such knowledge
on the government’s part is a “circumstance and condition”
that varies the “notice required.”
The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have
addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most have
decided that when the government learns its attempt at no
tice has failed, due process requires the government to do
something more before real property may be sold in a tax
sale.1 See, e. g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F. 3d 569, 576 (CA4
2005); Akey, supra, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed Hope,
Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003); Kennedy,
supra, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, at 611; Malone v. Robinson,
614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992) (per curiam); St. George
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326
Md. 90, 103, 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit
Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P. 2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); Rosenberg v.
Smidt, 727 P. 2d 778, 780–783 (Alaska 1986); Giacobbi v. Hall,
1 Most Courts of Appeals have also concluded that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government to take
further reasonable steps in the property forfeiture context. See, e. g.,
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 911 (CA9 2003); Foehl v. United
States, 238 F. 3d 474, 480 (CA3 2001); Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d
1334, 1337–1338 (CADC 1998); Torres v. $36,256.80 U. S. Currency, 25 F. 3d
1154, 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F. 3d 657,
660 (CA5 1996); United States v. Rodgers, 108 F. 3d 1247, 1252–1253 (CA10
1997); see also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F. 3d 287, 291 (CA7 2000) (declining to
adopt a per se rule that only examines notice at the time it is sent, but
also declining to impose an affirmative duty to seek out claimants in every
case where notice is returned undelivered). But see Madewell v. Downs,
68 F. 3d 1030, 1047 (CA8 1995); Sarit v. United States Drug Enforcement
Admin., 987 F. 2d 10, 14–15 (CA1 1993).

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109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408 (1985); Tracy v. County
of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288, 296, 489 A. 2d
1334, 1338–1339 (1985). But see Smith, 463 Mich., at 429,
617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 23,
576 N. W. 2d 535, 541–542; Elizondo v. Read, 588 N. E. 2d
501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlantic City v. Block C–11, Lot 11, 74
N. J. 34, 39–40, 376 A. 2d 926, 928 (1977). Many States al
ready require in their statutes that the government do more
than simply mail notice to delinquent owners, either at the
outset or as a followup measure if initial mailed notice is
ineffective.2
2 Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the prop
erty as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 3704.7 (West
Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 48–4–45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill. Comp.
Stat., ch. 35, §§ 200/21–75(a), 200/22–10, 200/22–15 (West 2005); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, § 1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann. § 14–
836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 211.78i(3) (West
2005); Minn. Stat. § 281.23, subd. 6 (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15–18–
212(1)(a), (2)(a) (2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 57–28–04(3) (Lexis 2005);
Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S. D. Codified Laws § 10–
25–5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. § 59–2–1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004); Wis. Stat.
§ 75.12(1) (2003–2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39–13–108(e)(v)(B) (1997–2005).
Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at the prop
erty owner’s last known address either at the outset, see Del. Code Ann.,
Tit. 9, §§ 8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann. § 48–4–78(d)
(Supp. 2005); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 246–56 (2003); Md. Tax-Prop. Code
Ann. § 14–836(b)(6) (Lexis 2001); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, § 3118(A), or as a
followup measure when personal service cannot be accomplished or certi
fied mail is returned, see Fla. Stat. § 197.522(2)(a) (2003); Minn. Stat.
§ 281.23, subd. 6; S. C. Code Ann. § 12–51–40(c) (Supp. 2005). And a few
States require a diligent inquiry to find a property owner’s correct address
when mailed notice is returned. See Miss. Code Ann. § 27–43–3 (1973–
2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 361.595(3)(b) (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72,
§ 5860.607a (Purdon 1990); R. I. Gen. Laws § 44–9–25.1 (2005).
See also 26 U. S. C. § 6335(a) (requiring the Internal Revenue Service to
make a reasonable attempt to personally serve notice on a delinquent
taxpayer before relying upon notice by certified mail); 28 U. S. C.
§ 3203(g)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (requiring written notice to tenants of real property
subject to sale under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990);
12 U. S. C. § 3758(2)(A)(iii) (requiring written notice to occupants before

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Opinion of the Court
In Mullane, we stated that “when notice is a person’s
due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assessing the ade
quacy of a particular form of notice requires balancing the
“interest of the State” against “the individual interest
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” id.,
at 314. Our leading cases on notice have evaluated the ade
quacy of notice given to beneficiaries of a common trust fund,
Mullane, supra; a mortgagee, Mennonite, 462 U. S. 791;
owners of seized cash and automobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U. S.
161; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38 (1972) (per curiam);
creditors of an estate, Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S. 478; and
tenants living in public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S.
444 (1982). In this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice
prior to the State extinguishing a property owner’s interest
in a home.
We do not think that a person who actually desired to in
form a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a
house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter sent
to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner
prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers,
handed them to the postman, and then watched as the de
parting postman accidentally dropped the letters down a
storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s
office to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again.
No one “desirous of actually informing” the owners would
simply shrug his shoulders as the letters disappeared and
say “I tried.” Failure to follow up would be unreasonable,
despite the fact that the letters were reasonably calculated
to reach their intended recipients when delivered to the
postman.
foreclosure by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development);
§ 3758(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that notice be posted on the property if occu
pants are unknown).

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By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post
office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is
practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d
1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true when, as
here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an impor
tant and irreversible prospect as the loss of a house. Al
though the State may have made a reasonable calculation of
how to reach Jones, it had good reason to suspect when the
notice was returned that Jones was “no better off than if
the notice had never been sent.” Malone, 614 A. 2d, at 37.
Deciding to take no further action is not what someone “de
sirous of actually informing” Jones would do; such a person
would take further reasonable steps if any were available.
In prior cases, we have required the government to con
sider unique information about an intended recipient regard
less of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated
to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Robinson v. Han
rahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to
a vehicle owner’s home address was inadequate when the
State knew that the property owner was in prison. 409
U. S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141
(1956), we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting,
and publication was inadequate when town officials knew
that the property owner was incompetent and without a
guardian’s protection. Id., at 146–147.
The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the State
was aware of such information before it calculated how best
to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain why due proc
ess would have settled for something less if the government
had learned after notice was sent, but before the taking oc
curred, that the property owner was in prison or was in
competent. Under Robinson and Covey, the government’s
knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was
ineffective triggered an obligation on the government’s part
to take additional steps to effect notice. That knowledge
was one of the “practicalities and peculiarities of the case,”

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Mullane, supra, at 314–315, that the Court took into account
in determining whether constitutional requirements were
met. It should similarly be taken into account in assessing
the adequacy of notice in this case. The dissent dismisses
the State’s knowledge that its notice was ineffective as
“learned long after the fact,” post, at 246, n. 5 (opinion of
Thomas, J.), but the notice letter was promptly returned to
the State two to three weeks after it was sent, and the Ar
kansas statutory regime precludes the State from taking the
property for two years while the property owner may exer
cise his right to redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. § 26–37–301
(Supp. 2005).
It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor Gen
eral contend, that the failure of notice in a specific case does
not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice; in that
sense, the constitutionality of a particular procedure for no
tice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc. But if a fea
ture of the State’s chosen procedure is that it promptly pro
vides additional information to the government about the
effectiveness of notice, it does not contravene the ex ante
principle to consider what the government does with that
information in assessing the adequacy of the chosen proce
dure. After all, the State knew ex ante that it would
promptly learn whether its effort to effect notice through
certified mail had succeeded. It would not be inconsistent
with the approach the Court has taken in notice cases to ask,
with respect to a procedure under which telephone calls
were placed to owners, what the State did when no one an
swered. Asking what the State does when a notice letter is
returned unclaimed is not substantively different.
The Commissioner has three further arguments for why
reasonable followup measures were not required in this case.
First, notice was sent to an address that Jones provided and
had a legal obligation to keep updated. See Ark. Code Ann.
§ 26–35–705 (1997). Second, “after failing to receive a prop
erty tax bill and pay property taxes, a property holder is on

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232 JONES v. FLOWERS
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inquiry-notice that his property is subject to governmental
taking. ” Brief for Respondent Commissioner 18–19.
Third, Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands
he left his property would alert him if it was in jeopardy.
None of these contentions relieves the State of its constitu
tional obligation to provide adequate notice.
The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to
comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address up
dated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient notice,
and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (“ ‘[A] party’s ability to take steps to
safeguard its own interests does not relieve the State of its
constitutional obligation’ ” (quoting Mennonite, 462 U. S., at
799)). In Robinson, we noted that Illinois law required each
vehicle owner to register his address with the secretary of
state, and that the State’s vehicle forfeiture scheme provided
for notice by mail to the address listed in the secretary’s
records. See 409 U. S., at 38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat.,
ch. 951⁄ 2, § 3–405 (1971), and ch. 38, § 36–1 (1969)). But we
found that the State had not provided constitutionally suffi
cient notice, despite having followed its reasonably calcu
lated scheme, because it knew that Robinson could not be
reached at his address of record. 409 U. S., at 39–40. Al
though Ark. Code Ann. § 26–35–705 provides strong support
for the Commissioner’s argument that mailing a certified let
ter to Jones at 717 North Bryan Street was reasonably calcu
lated to reach him, it does not alter the reasonableness of
the Commissioner’s position that he must do nothing more
when the notice is promptly returned “unclaimed.”
As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the
common knowledge that property may become subject to
government taking when taxes are not paid does not excuse
the government from complying with its constitutional obli
gation of notice before taking private property. We have
previously stated the opposite: An interested party’s “knowl
edge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent

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233 Cite as: 547 U. S. 220 (2006)
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to notice that a tax sale is pending.” Mennonite, supra, at
800. It is at least as widely known that arrestees have the
right to remain silent, and that anything they say may be
used against them, see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S.
428, 443 (2000) (“Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),]
has become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national cul
ture”), but that knowledge does not excuse a police failure
to provide Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a de
linquent taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State
and redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pay his taxes in
a timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice.
Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement from
Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves his prop
erty in the hands of one who will inform him if his interest is
in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this passage, Justice
Jackson writes of “libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel[,]
or entry upon real estate in the name of law”—such “sei
z[ures]” of property, he concluded, “may reasonably be ex
pected to come promptly to the owner’s attention.” Ibid.
An occupant, however, is not charged with acting as the own
er’s agent in all respects, and it is quite a leap from Justice
Jackson’s examples to conclude that it is an obligation of ten
ancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown content ad
dressed to the owner. In fact, the State makes it impossible
for the occupant to learn why the Commissioner is writing
the owner, because an occupant cannot call for a certified
letter without first obtaining the owner’s signature. For all
the occupant knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might
write to certain residents about a variety of matters he finds
important, such as state parks or highway construction; it
would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a
certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner is
in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is no
record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were left
at 717 North Bryan Street.

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234 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
Jones should have been more diligent with respect to his
property, no question. People must pay their taxes, and the
government may hold citizens accountable for tax delin
quency by taking their property. But before forcing a citi
zen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due proc
ess requires the government to provide adequate notice of
the impending taking. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14; Mennonite,
supra, at 799.
B
In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones
had not received notice that he was about to lose his prop
erty, the State did—nothing. For the reasons stated, we
conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable
steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The question
remains whether there were any such available steps.
While “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the form of
service that the [government] should adopt,” Greene, 456
U. S., at 455, n. 9, if there were no reasonable additional steps
the government could have taken upon return of the un
claimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing nothing.
We think there were several reasonable steps the State
could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response
to new information depends upon what the new information
reveals. The return of the certified letter marked “un
claimed” meant either that Jones still lived at 717 North
Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman called
and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or that Jones
no longer resided at that address. One reasonable step pri
marily addressed to the former possibility would be for the
State to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signa
ture was not required. The Commissioner says that use of
certified mail makes actual notice more likely, because re
quiring the recipient’s signature protects against misdeliv
ery. But that is only true, of course, when someone is home
to sign for the letter, or to inform the mail carrier that he
has arrived at the wrong address. Otherwise, “[c]ertified

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235 Cite as: 547 U. S. 220 (2006)
Opinion of the Court
mail is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail,”
United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual
§ 503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the use of certified mail might
make actual notice less likely in some cases—the letter can
not be left like regular mail to be examined at the end of the
day, and it can only be retrieved from the post office for a
specified period of time. Following up with regular mail
might also increase the chances of actual notice to Jones if—
as it turned out—he had moved. Even occupants who ig
nored certified mail notice slips addressed to the owner (if
any had been left) might scrawl the owner’s new address on
the notice packet and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or
notify Jones directly.
Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the possi
bility that Jones had moved as well as that he had simply
not retrieved the certified letter, would have been to post
notice on the front door, or to address otherwise undelivera
ble mail to “occupant.” Most States that explicitly outline
additional procedures in their tax sale statutes require just
such steps. See n. 2, supra. Either approach would in
crease the likelihood that the owner would be notified that
he was about to lose his property, given the failure of a letter
deliverable only to the owner in person. That is clear in the
case of an owner who still resided at the premises. It is also
true in the case of an owner who has moved: Occupants who
might disregard a certified mail slip not addressed to them
are less likely to ignore posted notice, and a letter addressed
to them (even as “occupant”) might be opened and read. In
either case, there is a significant chance the occupants will
alert the owner, if only because a change in ownership could
well affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned
of the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by
one of the occupants—his daughter—after she was served
with an unlawful detainer notice.
Jones believes that the Commissioner should have
searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook

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236 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
and other government records such as income tax rolls. We
do not believe the government was required to go this far.
As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’ mail
marked “unclaimed” did not necessarily mean that 717 North
Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it merely informed
the Commissioner that no one appeared to sign for the mail
before the designated date on which it would be returned
to the sender. An open-ended search for a new address—
especially when the State obligates the taxpayer to keep his
address updated with the tax collector, see Ark. Code Ann.
§ 26–35–705 (1997)—imposes burdens on the State signifi
cantly greater than the several relatively easy options out
lined above.
The Commissioner complains about the burden of even
those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Arkan
sas’ current requirement that notice to homestead owners be
accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned,
§ 26–37–301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact that Arkansas trans
fers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or the tax sale pur
chaser, § 26–37–104(a). The Commissioner has offered no
estimate of how many notice letters are returned, and no
facts to support the dissent’s assertion that the Commis
sioner must now physically locate “tens of thousands of prop
erties every year.” Post, at 248. Citing our decision in
Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor General adds that posted
notice could be taken down by children or vandals. But in
Greene, we noted that outside the specific facts of that case,
posting notice on real property is “a singularly appropriate
and effective way of ensuring that a person . . . is actually
apprised of proceedings against him.” 456 U. S., at 452–453.
Successfully providing notice is often the most efficient way
to collect unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5
(more effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient
arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of
Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in Ar
kansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but rather

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than taking relatively easy additional steps to effect notice,
the State undertook the burden and expense of purchasing a
newspaper advertisement, conducting an auction, and then
negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers.
The Solicitor General argues that requiring further effort
when the government learns that notice was not delivered
will cause the government to favor modes of providing notice
that do not generate additional information—for example,
starting (and stopping) with regular mail instead of certified
mail. We find this unlikely, as we have no doubt that the
government repeatedly finds itself being asked to prove that
notice was sent and received. Using certified mail provides
the State with documentation of personal delivery and pro
tection against false claims that notice was never received.
That added security, however, comes at a price—the State
also learns when notice has not been received. We conclude
that, under the circumstances presented, the State cannot
simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and sell
the owner’s property—any more than it could ignore the in
formation that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or that the
owner in Covey was incompetent.
Though the Commissioner argues that followup measures
are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that the
State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones by
publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before the
public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed that
“[c]hance alone” brings a person’s attention to “an advertise
ment in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspa
per,” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315, and that notice by publica
tion is adequate only where “it is not reasonably possible
or practicable to give more adequate warning,” id., at 317.
Following up by publication was not constitutionally ade
quate under the circumstances presented here because, as
we have explained, it was possible and practicable to give
Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax sale.

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238 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles
about constitutionally required notice, principles from which
we have no intention to depart. In particular, we disclaim
any “new rule” that is “contrary to Dusenbery and a signifi
cant departure from Mullane.” Post, at 244. In Dusen
bery, the Government was aware that someone at the prison
had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and we deter
mined that this attempt at notice was adequate, despite the
fact that the State could have made notice more likely by
requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter himself. 534
U. S., at 171. In this case, of course, the notice letter was
returned to the Commissioner, informing him that his at
tempt at notice had failed.
As for Mullane, it directs that “when notice is a person’s
due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it.” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the dissent’s
concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that someone
who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was in danger of
losing his house would do more when the attempted notice
letter was returned unclaimed, and there was more that rea
sonably could be done.
As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the
form of service that the [government] should adopt. ”
Greene, supra, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases finding notice
inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State’s no
tice statute. See, e. g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S., at 490–
491; Robinson, 409 U. S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U. S. 208, 213–214 (1962); Walker, 352 U. S., at
116; Covey, 351 U. S., at 146–147. The State can determine
how to proceed in response to our conclusion that notice was
inadequate here, and the States have taken a variety of
approaches to the present question. See n. 2, supra. It
suffices for present purposes that we are confident that
additional reasonable steps were available for Arkansas to
employ before taking Jones’ property.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
* * *
There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be
less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue
it needs. The same cannot be said for the State’s efforts to
ensure that its citizens receive proper notice before the State
takes action against them. In this case, the State is exert
ing extraordinary power against a property owner—taking
and selling a house he owns. It is not too much to insist
that the State do a bit more to attempt to let him know about
it when the notice letter addressed to him is returned
unclaimed.
The Commissioner’s effort to provide notice to Jones of an
impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to satisfy
due process given the circumstances of this case. The judg
ment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia and Jus
tice Kennedy join, dissenting.
When petitioner failed to pay his property taxes for sev
eral consecutive years, respondent Commissioner of State
Lands in Arkansas, using the record address that petitioner
provided to the State, sent petitioner a letter by certified
mail, noting his tax delinquency and explaining that his prop
erty would be subject to public sale if the delinquent taxes
and penalties were not paid. After petitioner failed to re
spond, the State also published notice of the delinquency and
public sale in an Arkansas newspaper. Soon after respond
ent Linda K. Flowers submitted a purchase offer to the
State, it sent petitioner a second letter by certified mail ex

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240 JONES v. FLOWERS
Thomas, J., dissenting
plaining that the sale would proceed if the delinquent taxes
and penalties were not paid.
Petitioner argues that the State violated his rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be
cause, in his view, the State failed to take sufficient steps to
contact him before selling his property to Flowers. Peti
tioner contends that once the State became aware that he
had not claimed the certified mail, it was constitutionally ob
ligated to employ additional methods to locate him.
Adopting petitioner’s arguments, the Court holds today
that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed,
the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt
to provide notice to the property owner before selling his
property, if it is practicable to do so.” Ante, at 225. The
Court concludes that it was practicable for Arkansas to
take additional steps here—namely, notice by regular mail,
posting notice on petitioner’s door, and addressing mail to
“ ‘occupant.’ ” Ante, at 235. Because, under this Court’s
precedents, the State’s notice methods clearly satisfy
the requirements of the Due Process Clause, I respectfully
dissent.
I
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” This Court has held that a State must
provide an individual with notice and opportunity to be
heard before the State may deprive him of his property.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S.
306, 313 (1950). Balancing a State’s interest in efficiently
managing its administrative system and an individual’s inter
est in adequate notice, this Court has held that a State must
provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action.” Id., at 313–314. As this Court has explained,
“when notice is a person’s due . . . [t]he means employed must
be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee

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241 Cite as: 547 U. S. 220 (2006)
Thomas, J., dissenting
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id., at 315.
“[H]eroic efforts,” however, are not required. Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002). To the contrary, we
have expressly rejected “[a] construction of the Due Process
Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles
in the way [of the State].” Mullane, supra, at 313–314.
Thus, “none of our cases . . . has required actual notice”;
instead, “we have allowed the Government to defend the
‘reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any
chosen method . . . on the ground that it is in itself reasonably
certain to inform those affected.’ ” Dusenbery, supra, at
169–170 (quoting Mullane, supra, at 315).
The methods of notice employed by Arkansas were reason
ably calculated to inform petitioner of proceedings affecting
his property interest and thus satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause. The State mailed a notice by certi
fied letter to the address provided by petitioner. The certi
fied letter was returned to the State marked “unclaimed”
after three attempts to deliver it. The State then published
a notice of public sale containing redemption information in
the Arkansas Democrat Gazette newspaper. After Flowers
submitted a purchase offer, the State sent yet another certi
fied letter to petitioner at his record address. That letter,
too, was returned to the State marked “unclaimed” after
three delivery attempts.1
Arkansas’ attempts to contact petitioner by certified mail
at his “record address,” without more, satisfy due process.
1 Though the Court posits that “there is no record evidence that notices
of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street,” ante, at
233, the postal carrier was required to leave notice at the address at each
delivery attempt indicating that delivery of certified mail had been
attempted and that the mail could be retrieved at the local post office.
See United States Postal Operations Manual § 813.25 (July 2002), http://
www.nalc.org/depart/cau/pdf/manuals/pom/pomc8.pdf (all Internet materi
als as visited Apr. 21, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file)
(“The carrier must leave a notice of arrival on Form 3849 if the carrier
cannot deliver the certified article for any reason”).

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242 JONES v. FLOWERS
Thomas, J., dissenting
Dusenbery, supra, at 169. See also Mullane, supra, at 318;
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485
U. S. 478, 490 (1988) (“We have repeatedly recognized that
mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that
is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice”); Mennon
ite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 792, 798 (1983)
(holding that “notice mailed to [the affected party’s] last
known available address” is sufficient where a State seeks
to sell “real property on which payments of property taxes
have been delinquent” (emphasis added)). Because the no
tices were sent to the address provided by petitioner himself,
the State had an especially sound basis for determining that
notice would reach him. Moreover, Arkansas exceeded the
constitutional minimum by additionally publishing notice in
a local newspaper.2 See Mullane, supra, at 318. Due proc
ess requires nothing more—and certainly not here, where
petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to report
any change of address to the state taxing authority. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 26–35–705 (1997).
My conclusion that Arkansas’ notice methods satisfy due
process is reinforced by the well-established presumption
that individuals, especially those owning property, act in
their own interest. Recognizing that “ ‘[i]t is the part of
common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a
thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a situa
tion to protect it,’ ” Mullane, supra, at 316 (quoting The
Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (1815)), this Court has concluded
that “[t]he ways of an owner with tangible property are such
that he usually arranges means to learn of any direct attack
upon his possessory or proprietary rights,” Mullane, 339
U. S., at 316. Consistent with this observation, Arkansas
was free to “indulge the assumption” that petitioner had
2 The Court found inadequate the State’s attempt at notice by publica
tion, as if that were the State’s sole method for effectuating notice, see
ante, at 237. But the State plainly used it here as a secondary method
of notice.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
either provided the state taxing authority with a correct and
up-to-date mailing address—as required by state law—“or
that he . . . left some caretaker under a duty to let him know
that [his property was] being jeopardized.” 3 Ibid.
The Court does not conclude that certified mail is inher
ently insufficient as a means of notice, but rather that “the
government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal
procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on the gov
ernment’s part to take additional steps to effect notice.”
Ante, at 230. I disagree.
First, whether a method of notice is reasonably calculated
to notify the interested party is determined ex ante, i. e.,
from the viewpoint of the government agency at the time its
notice is sent. This follows from Mullane, where this Court
rested its analysis on the information the sender had “at
hand” when its notice was sent. 339 U. S., at 318. Relat
edly, we have refused to evaluate the reasonableness of a
particular method of notice by comparing it to alternative
methods that are identified after the fact. See Dusenbery,
534 U. S., at 171–172. Today the Court appears to abandon
both of these practices. Its rejection of Arkansas’ selected
method of notice—a method this Court has repeatedly con
cluded is constitutionally sufficient—is based upon infor
mation that was unavailable when notice was sent. Indeed,
the Court’s proposed notice methods—regular mail, posting,
and addressing mail to “ ‘occupant,’ ” ante, at 234–235—are
entirely the product of post hoc considerations, including
the discovery that members of petitioner’s family continued
to live in the house. Similarly, the Court’s observation that
“[t]he Commissioner[’s] complain[t] about the burden of . . .
additional steps . . . is belied by Arkansas’ current require
ment that notice to homestead owners be accomplished
by personal service if certified mail is returned,” ante, at
3 The issue is not, as the Court maintains, whether the current occupant
is “charged with acting as the owner’s agent.” Ante, at 233. Rather, the
issue is whether petitioner discharged his own duty to guard his interests.

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244 JONES v. FLOWERS
Thomas, J., dissenting
236, is contrary to Dusenbery’s “conclusion that the Govern
ment ought not be penalized and told to ‘try harder’ . . .
simply because [it] has since upgraded its policies,” 534 U. S.,
at 172.
Second, implicit in our holding that due process does not
require “actual notice,” see id., at 169–170, is that when the
“government becomes aware . . . that its attempt at notice
has failed,” ante, at 227, it is not required to take additional
steps to ensure that notice has been received. Petitioner’s
challenge to Arkansas’ notice methods, and the Court’s ac
ceptance of it, is little more than a thinly veiled attack on
Dusenbery. Under the majority’s logic, each time a doubt
is raised with respect to whether notice has reached an inter
ested party, the State will have to consider additional means
better calculated to achieve notice. Because this rule turns
on speculative, newly acquired information, it has no nat
ural end point, and, in effect, requires the States to achieve
something close to actual notice. The majority’s new rule
is contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from
Mullane.
The only circumstances in which this Court has found no
tice by mail and publication inadequate under the Due Proc
ess Clause involve situations where the state or local govern
ment knew at the outset that its notice efforts were destined
to fail and knew how to rectify the problem prior to sending
notice. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 39 (1972)
(per curiam) (intended recipient known to be in jail); Covey
v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 145 (1956) (intended recipi
ent known to be incompetent and without a guardian).
In Robinson, the State, having arrested petitioner and
having detained him in county jail, immediately instituted
forfeiture proceedings against his automobile and mailed no
tice of those proceedings to his residential address. 409
U. S., at 38. Robinson, who was incarcerated in the county
jail during the entirety of the forfeiture proceedings, did not
receive notice of the proceedings until after he was released

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Thomas, J., dissenting
and the forfeiture order had been entered. Id., at 38–39.
Because the State knew beforehand that Robinson was not
at, and had no access to, the address to which it sent the
notice, this Court held that the State’s efforts were not “ ‘rea
sonably calculated’ ” to notify him of the pending proceed
ings. Id., at 40. Similarly, in Covey, the Court concluded
that the methods of notice used by the town—mailing, post
ing, and publishing—were not reasonably calculated to in
form Covey of proceedings adverse to her property interests
because local officials knew prior to sending notice that she
was “without mental capacity to handle her affairs” and un
able to comprehend the meaning of the notices. 351 U. S.,
at 144, 146.
By contrast, Arkansas did not know at the time it
sent notice to petitioner that its method would fail, and
Arkansas did not know that petitioner no longer lived at the
record address simply because letters were returned “un
claimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3. “[U]nclaimed” does not neces
sarily mean that an address is no longer correct; it may indi
cate that an intended recipient has simply failed or refused
to claim mail. See United States Postal Service, Domestic
Mail Manual (DMM), § 507, Exh. 1.4.1, http://pe.usps.gov/
text/dmm300/507.htm.4 Given that the State had been using
the address provided by petitioner and that petitioner had a
legal duty to maintain a current mailing address with the
state taxing authority, return of the mail as “unclaimed” did
not arm Arkansas with the type of specific knowledge that
the governments had at hand in Robinson and Covey.
Cf. ante, at 234. The State cannot be charged to correct a
problem of petitioner’s own creation and of which it was not
4 The Postal Service uses “Moved, Left No Address” to indicate that
the “[a]ddressee moved and filed no change-of-address order,” and “Not
Deliverable as Addressed—Unable to Forward” to indicate that the mail
is “undeliverable at address given; no change-of-address order on file; for
warding order expired.” DMM § 507, Exh. 1.4.1.

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246 JONES v. FLOWERS
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aware.5 Even if the State had divined that petitioner was
no longer at the record address, its publication of notice in a
local newspaper would have sufficed because Mullane au
thorizes the use of publication when the record address is
unknown. See 339 U. S., at 316 (“[P]ublication traditionally
has been acceptable as notification supplemental to other ac
tion which in itself may reasonably be expected to convey
a warning”).
II
The Court’s proposed methods, aside from being constitu
tionally unnecessary, are also burdensome, impractical, and
no more likely to effect notice than the methods actually em
ployed by the State.
In Arkansas, approximately 18,000 parcels of delinquent
real estate are certified annually. Tsann Kuen Enterprises
Co. v. Campbell, 355 Ark. 110, 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d 822, 828
(2003). Under the Court’s rule, the State will bear the bur
den of locating thousands of delinquent property owners.
These administrative burdens are not compelled by the Due
Process Clause. See Mullane, supra, at 313–314; Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U. S., at 489–490
(stating that constitutionally sufficient notice “need not be
inefficient or burdensome”). Here, Arkansas has deter
mined that its law requiring property owners to maintain a
current address with the state taxing authority, in conjunc
tion with its authorization to send property notices to the
record address, is an efficient and fair way to administer its
tax collection system. The Court’s decision today forecloses
5 The Court’s “storm drain” hypothetical, ante, at 229, presents the
harder question of when notice is sent—at the precise moment the Com
missioner places the mail in the postal carrier’s hand or the split second
later when he observes the departing carrier drop the mail down the
storm drain. That more difficult question is not before us in this case
because Arkansas learned long after the fact that its attempts had been
unsuccessful.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
such a reasonable system and burdens the State with ineffi
ciencies caused by delinquent taxpayers.
Moreover, the Court’s proposed methods are no more rea
sonably calculated to achieve notice than the methods em
ployed by the State here. Regular mail is hardly foolproof;
indeed, it is arguably less effective than certified mail. Cer
tified mail is tracked, delivery attempts are recorded, actual
delivery is logged, and notices are posted to alert someone
at the residence that certified mail is being held at a local
post office. By creating a record, these features give parties
grounds for defending or challenging notice. By contrast,
regular mail is untraceable; there is no record of either deliv
ery or receipt. Had the State used regular mail, petitioner
would presumably argue that it should have sent notice by
certified mail because it creates a paper trail.6
The Court itself recognizes the deficiencies of its proposed
methods. It acknowledges that “[f]ollowing up with regular
mail might . . . increase the chances of actual notice”; “occu
pants who ignored certified mail notice slips . . . might scrawl
the owner’s new address on the notice packet,” ante, at 235
(emphasis added); and “a letter addressed to [occupant] might
be opened and read,” ibid. (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
the Court justifies its redrafting of Arkansas’ notice statute
6 Interestingly, the Court stops short of saddling the State with the
other steps that petitioner argues a State should take any time the inter
ested party fails to claim letters mailed to his record address, see ante, at
235–236, namely, searching state tax records, the phonebook, the Internet,
department of motor vehicle records, or voting rolls, contacting his em
ployer, or employing debt collectors. Here, the Court reasons that be
cause of the context—the fact that the letter was returned merely “un
claimed” and petitioner had a duty to maintain a current address—the
State is not required to go as far as petitioner urges. Ante, at 236.
Though the methods proposed by petitioner are severely flawed (for in
stance, the commonality of his surname “Jones” calls into question the
fruitfulness of Internet and phonebook searches), there is no principled
basis for the Court’s conclusion that petitioner’s other proposed methods
would “impos[e] burdens on the State significantly greater than the sev
eral relatively easy options outlined [by the Court].” Ibid.

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Thomas, J., dissenting
on the ground that “[its] approach[es] would increase the
likelihood that the owner would be notified that he was about
to lose his property . . . .” Ibid. That, however, is not the
test; indeed, we rejected such reasoning in Dusenbery. See
534 U. S., at 171 (rejecting the argument that “the FBI’s
notice was constitutionally flawed because it was ‘substan
tially less likely to bring home notice’ than a feasible substi
tute” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court’s suggestion that Arkansas post notice is simi
larly unavailing. The State’s records are organized by legal
description, not address, which makes the prospect of physi
cally locating tens of thousands of properties every year, and
posting notice on each, impractical. See Tsann Kuen Enter
prises Co., supra, at 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d, at 828. Also, this
Court has previously concluded that posting is an inherently
unreliable method of notice. See Greene v. Lindsey, 456
U. S. 444, 453–454 (1982).
Similarly, addressing the mail to “ ‘occupant,’ ” see ante, at
235, is no more reasonably calculated to reach petitioner. It
is sheer speculation to assume, as the Court does, that al
though “[o]ccupants . . . might disregard a certified mail
slip . . . , . . . a letter addressed to them (even as ‘occupant’)
might be opened and read.” Ibid. It is at least as likely
that an occupant who receives generically addressed mail
will discard it as junk mail.
III
If “title to property should not depend on [factual] vagar
ies,” Dusenbery, supra, at 171, then certainly it cannot turn
on “wrinkle[s],” ante, at 227, caused by a property owner’s
own failure to be a prudent ward of his interests. The
meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the antics of
tax evaders and scofflaws. Nor is the self-created conun
drum in which petitioner finds himself a legitimate ground
for imposing additional constitutional obligations on the
State. The State’s attempts to notify petitioner by certified

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249 Cite as: 547 U. S. 220 (2006)
Thomas, J., dissenting
mail at the address that he provided and, additionally, by
publishing notice in a local newspaper satisfy due process.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Arkansas
Supreme Court.