YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA

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867 OCTOBER TERM, 2005
Syllabus
YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA
on petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme
court of appeals of west virginia
No. 05–6997. Decided June 19, 2006
Petitioner Youngblood was convicted of sexual assault and related charges
based, inter alia, on the testimony of three young women that he and
his friend held them captive and statements by one of the women that
he sexually assaulted her. Youngblood later moved to set aside the
verdict, claiming that a state trooper had suppressed an exculpatory
note written by two of the women, which squarely contradicted the
State’s account of the incidents and directly supported Youngblood’s
consensual-sex defense. He argued that the suppression violated the
State’s federal constitutional obligation to disclose evidence favorable to
the defense and referred to cases citing and applying Brady v. Mary
land, 373 U. S. 83. The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial, say
ing that the note provided only impeachment, not exculpatory, evidence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed without examin
ing the specific constitutional claims associated with the alleged sup
pression of favorable evidence.
Held: The case is remanded for the views of the full State Supreme Court
on the Brady issue that Youngblood clearly presented. A Brady viola
tion occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially
favorable to the accused. See 373 U. S., at 87. Brady extends to im
peachment evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 676, and
Brady suppression occurs even when the evidence not turned over is
“known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor,” Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 438. Reversal is required upon a “showing that
the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case
in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id.,
at 435. Youngblood clearly presented a federal constitutional Brady
claim to the State Supreme Court. If this Court is to reach the merits
of the case, it would be better to have the benefit of that court’s views
on the Brady issue.
Certiorari granted; 217 W. Va. 535, 618 S. E. 2d 544, vacated and
remanded.

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868 YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA
Per Curiam
Per Curiam.
In April 2001, the State of West Virginia indicted peti
tioner Denver A. Youngblood, Jr., on charges including ab
duction of three young women, Katara, Kimberly, and
Wendy, and two instances of sexual assault upon Katara.
The cases went to trial in 2003 in the Circuit Court of Mor
gan County, where a jury convicted Youngblood of two
counts of sexual assault, two counts of brandishing a firearm,
and one count of indecent exposure. The conviction rested
principally on the testimony of the three women that they
were held captive by Youngblood and a friend of his, state
ments by Katara that she was forced at gunpoint to perform
oral sex on Youngblood, and evidence consistent with a claim
by Katara about disposal of certain physical evidence of their
sexual encounter. Youngblood was sentenced to a combined
term of 26 to 60 years’ imprisonment, with 25 to 60 of those
years directly attributable to the sexual-assault convictions.
Several months after being sentenced, Youngblood moved
to set aside the verdict. He claimed that an investigator
working on his case had uncovered new and exculpatory
evidence, in the form of a graphically explicit note that
both squarely contradicted the State’s account of the inci
dents and directly supported Youngblood’s consensual-sex
defense. The note, apparently written by Kimberly and
Wendy, taunted Youngblood and his friend for having been
“played” for fools, warned them that the girls had vandalized
the house where Youngblood brought them, and mockingly
thanked Youngblood for performing oral sex on Katara.
The note was said to have been shown to a state trooper
investigating the sexual-assault allegations against Young
blood; the trooper allegedly read the note but declined to
take possession of it, and told the person who produced it to
destroy it. Youngblood argued that the suppression of this
evidence violated the State’s federal constitutional obligation
to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, and in support

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869 Cite as: 547 U. S. 867 (2006)
Per Curiam
of his argument he referred to cases citing and applying
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963).
The trial court denied Youngblood a new trial, saying that
the note provided only impeachment, but not exculpatory,
evidence. The trial court did not discuss Brady or its scope,
but expressed the view that the investigating trooper had
attached no importance to the note, and because he had
failed to give it to the prosecutor the State could not now be
faulted for failing to share it with Youngblood’s counsel.
See App. C to Pet. for Cert. (Tr. 22–23 (Sept. 25, 2003)).
A bare majority of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court, but without examining the specific consti
tutional claims associated with the alleged suppression of fa
vorable evidence. 217 W. Va. 535, 548, 618 S. E. 2d 544, 557
(2005) (per curiam). Justice Davis, dissenting in an opinion
that Justice Starcher joined, unambiguously characterized
the trooper’s instruction to discard the new evidence as a
Brady violation. 217 W. Va., at 550–552, 618 S. E. 2d, at
559–561. The dissenters concluded that the note indicating
that Youngblood engaged in consensual sex with Katara had
been suppressed and was material, id., at 550, n. 6, 618 S. E.
2d, at 559, n. 6 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435,
437–438 (1995)), both because it was at odds with the testi
mony provided by the State’s three chief witnesses (Katara,
Kimberly, and Wendy) and also because it was entirely con
sistent with Youngblood’s defense at trial that his sexual en
counters with Katara were consensual, 217 W. Va., at 551–
552, 618 S. E. 2d, at 560–561. Youngblood then filed this
petition for a writ of certiorari.
A Brady violation occurs when the government fails to
disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused. See
373 U. S., at 87. This Court has held that the Brady duty
extends to impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evi
dence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 676 (1985), and
Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn

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870 YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA
Scalia, J., dissenting
over even evidence that is “known only to police investiga
tors and not to the prosecutor,” Kyles, 514 U. S., at 438. See
id., at 437 (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the police”).
“Such evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probabil
ity that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different,’ ” Strick
ler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280 (1999) (quoting Bagley,
supra, at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.)), although a “showing
of materiality does not require demonstration by a prepon
derance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would
have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal,” Kyles,
514 U. S., at 434. The reversal of a conviction is required
upon a “showing that the favorable evidence could reason
ably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id., at 435.
Youngblood clearly presented a federal constitutional
Brady claim to the State Supreme Court, see Brief for Ap
pellant in No. 31765 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va.), pp. 42–47, as he
had to the trial court, see App. C to Pet. for Cert. (Tr. 6,
44–45, 50, 51 (Sept. 25, 2003)); id., at 13, 17 (Sept. 29, 2003).
And, as noted, the dissenting justices discerned the signifi
cance of the issue raised. If this Court is to reach the merits
of this case, it would be better to have the benefit of the
views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
on the Brady issue. We, therefore, grant the petition for
certiorari, vacate the judgment of the State Supreme Court,
and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
dissenting.
In Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163 (1996) (per curiam),
we greatly expanded our “no-fault V & R practice” (GVR)

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Scalia, J., dissenting
beyond its traditional bounds. Id., at 179 (Scalia, J., dis
senting). At the time, I remarked that “[t]he power to ‘re
vise and correct’ for error has become a power to void for
suspicion” of error, id., at 190 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 175 (1803); alterations omitted). And I pre
dicted that “ ‘GVR’d for clarification of –––’ ” would “become
a common form of order, drastically altering the role of this
Court.” 516 U. S., at 185. Today, by vacating the judgment
of a state court simply because “[i]f this Court is to reach
the merits of this case, it would be better to have the benefit
of the views of the full Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia on the Brady issue,” ante, at 870, the Court brings
this prediction to fulfillment.
In Lawrence, I identified three narrow circumstances in
which this Court could, consistent with the traditional under
standing of our appellate jurisdiction (or at least consistent
with entrenched practice), justify vacating a lower court’s
judgment without first identifying error: “(1) where an in
tervening factor has arisen [e. g., new legislation or a recent
judgment of this Court] that has a legal bearing upon the
decision, (2) where, in a context not governed by Michigan
v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), clarification of the opinion
below is needed to assure our jurisdiction, and (3) (in ac
knowledgment of established practice, though not necessar
ily in agreement with its validity) where the respondent or
appellee confesses error in the judgment below.” 516 U. S.,
at 191–192 (dissenting opinion). Needless to say, today’s
novel GVR order falls into none of these categories. There
has been no intervening change in law that might bear upon
the judgment. Our jurisdiction is not in doubt, see ante, at
870; State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 935, 942, n. 5, 253 S. E. 2d
534, 538, n. 5 (1979) (petitioner’s Brady claim was properly
presented in his motion for a new trial). And the State has
confessed no error—not even on the broadest and least sup
portable theory of what constitutes an error justifying vaca
tur. See, e. g., Alvarado v. United States, 497 U. S. 543, 545

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Scalia, J., dissenting
(1990) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (vacating when the Solic
itor General confessed error in the lower court’s “ ‘analysis,’ ”
but not its judgment); Stutson v. United States, 516 U. S.
193 (1996) (per curiam) (vacating when the Solicitor General
confessed error in a position taken before the Court of Ap
peals, on which the court might have relied; discussed in
Lawrence, supra, at 184–185 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); De
partment of Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U. S. 919, 921
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (vacating when “the Govern
ment, having lost below, wishes to try out a new legal posi
tion”). Here, the Court vacates and remands in light of
nothing.
Instead, the Court remarks tersely that it would be “bet
ter” to have “the benefit” of the West Virginia court’s views
on petitioner’s Brady claim, should we eventually decide to
take the case. Ante, at 870. The Court thus purports to
conscript the judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia to write what is essentially an amicus brief
on the merits of an issue they have already decided, in order
to facilitate our possible review of the merits at some later
time. It is not at all clear why it would be so much “better”
to have the full court below address the Brady claim. True,
we often prefer to review reasoned opinions that facilitate
our consideration—though we may review even a summary
disposition. See Lawrence, supra, at 186 (Scalia, J., dis
senting). But the dissenting judges in the case below dis
cussed petitioner’s Brady claim at some length (indeed, at
greater length than appears in many of the decisions we
agree to review), and argued that it was meritorious. See
217 W. Va. 535, 549–552, 618 S. E. 2d 544, 558–561 (2005)
(Davis, J., joined by Starcher, J., dissenting). Since we
sometimes review judgments with no opinion, and often re
view judgments with opinion only on one side of the issue, it
is not clear why we need opinions on both sides here.
To tell the truth, there is only one obvious sense in which
it might be “better” to have the West Virginia court revisit

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Scalia, J., dissenting
the Brady issue: If the majority suspects that the court
below erred, there is a chance that the GVR-in-light-of
nothing will induce it to change its mind on remand, sparing
us the trouble of correcting the suspected error. It is note
worthy that, to justify its GVR order, the Court does not
invoke even the flabby standard adopted in Lawrence,
namely, whether there is “a reasonable probability that the
decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court
would reject if given the opportunity for further consider
ation,” 516 U. S., at 167. That is because (there being no
relevant intervening event to create such a probability) the
only possibility that the West Virginia court will alter its
considered judgment is created by this Court’s GVR order
itself. A case such as this, which meets none of the usual,
outcome-neutral criteria for granting certiorari set forth in
this Court’s Rules 10(a)–(c), could attract our notice only if
we suspected that the judgment appealed from was in error.
Those whose judgments we review have sometimes viewed
even our legitimate, intervening-event GVR orders as polite
directives that they reverse themselves. See, e. g., Sharpe
v. United States, 712 F. 2d 65, 67 (CA4 1983) (Russell, J.,
dissenting) (“Once again, I think the majority has mistaken
gentleness in instruction for indefiniteness in command.
The Supreme Court was seeking to be gentle with us but
there is, I submit, no mistaking what they expected us to
do”). How much more is that suspicion justified when the
GVR order rests on nothing more than our statement that it
would be “better” for the lower court to reconsider its deci
sion (much as a mob enforcer might suggest that it would be
“better” to make protection payments).
Even when we suspect error, we may have many reasons
not to grant certiorari outright in a case such as this—an
overcrowded docket, a reluctance to correct “the misapplica
tion of a properly stated rule of law,” this Court’s Rule 10,
or (in this particular case) even a neo-Victorian desire to
keep the lurid phrases of the “graphically explicit note,”

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874 YOUNGBLOOD v. WEST VIRGINIA
Scalia, J., dissenting
ante, at 868, out of the U. S. Reports. But none of these
reasons justifies “a tutelary remand, as to a schoolboy made
to do his homework again.” Lawrence, 516 U. S., at 185–186
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In “the nature of the appellate sys
tem created by the Constitution and laws of the United
States,” id., at 178, state courts and lower federal courts are
constitutionally distinct tribunals, independently authorized
to decide issues of federal law. They are not, as we treat
them today, “the creatures and agents of this body,” id., at
178–179. If we suspect that a lower court has erred and
wish to correct its error, we should grant certiorari and de
cide the issue ourselves in accordance with the traditional
exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.
It is particularly ironic that the Court inaugurates its
“GVR-in-light-of-nothing” practice by vacating the judg
ment of a state court. Our no-fault GVR practice had its
origins “in situations calling forth the special deference owed
to state law and state courts in our system of federalism.”
Id., at 179. We first used it to allow the state court to decide
the effect of an intervening change in state law. Ibid. (citing
Missouri ex rel. Wabash R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 273
U. S. 126 (1927)). Likewise, our other legitimate category
of no-fault GVR—to ensure our own jurisdiction—“origi
nate[d] in the special needs of federalism.” Lawrence, 516
U. S., at 181. In vacating the judgment of a state court for
no better reason than our own convenience, we not only fail
to observe, but positively flout the “special deference owed
to . . . state courts,” id., at 179. Like the Ouroboros swal
lowing its tail, our GVR practice has ingested its own origi
nal justification.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison that
“[i]t is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that
it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted . . . .” 1 Cranch, at 175. At best, today’s unprec
edented decision rests on a finding that the state court’s
“opinion, though arguably correct, [is] incomplete and un

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Kennedy, J., dissenting
workmanlike,” Lawrence, 516 U. S., at 189 (Scalia, J., dis
senting)—which all Members of the Court in Lawrence
agreed was an illegitimate basis for a GVR, see id., at 173
(per curiam). At worst, it is an implied threat to the lower
court, not backed by a judgment of our own, that it had “bet
ter” reconsider its holding.
I suppose it would be available to the West Virginia Su
preme Court of Appeals, on remand, simply to reaffirm its
judgment without further elaboration. Or it could instead
enter into a full discussion of the Brady issue, producing
either a reaffirmance or a revision of its judgment. The lat
ter course will of course encourage and stimulate our new
“GVR-in-light-of-nothing” jurisprudence. Verb. sap.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
The Court’s order to grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) in
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163 (1996) (per curiam), had
my assent. In that case there was a new administrative in
terpretation that the Court of Appeals did not have an op
portunity to consider. Id., at 174. The Court today ex
tends the GVR procedure well beyond Lawrence and the
traditional practice of issuing a GVR order in light of some
new development. See id., at 166–167. Since the issuance
of a GVR order simply for further explanation is, as Justice
Scalia explains, see ante, p. 870 (dissenting opinion), both
improper and contrary to our precedents, I respectfully
dissent.

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Reporter’s Note
The next page is purposely numbered 1001. The numbers between 875
and 1001 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.