ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.

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457 OCTOBER TERM, 2006
Syllabus
ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORP. et al. v.
UNITED STATES et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 05–1272. Argued December 5, 2006—Decided March 27, 2007
While employed as an engineer at a nuclear weapons plant run by peti
tioner Rockwell under a Government contract, respondent Stone pre
dicted that Rockwell’s system for creating solid “pondcrete” blocks from
toxic pond sludge and cement would not work because of problems in
piping the sludge. However, Rockwell successfully made such blocks
and discovered “insolid” ones only after Stone was laid off in 1986. In
1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act, which pro
hibits submitting false or fraudulent payment claims to the United
States, 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a); permits remedial civil actions to be brought
by the Attorney General, § 3730(a), or by private individuals in the Gov
ernment’s name, § 3730(b)(1); but eliminates federal-court jurisdiction
over actions “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions . . . , unless the action is brought by the Attorney General
or the person bringing the action is an original source of the informa
tion,” § 3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” “has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based and has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action . . . based on the information.” § 3730(e)(4)(B). In 1996, the
Government intervened, and, with Stone, filed an amended complaint,
which did not allege that Stone’s predicted piping-system defect caused
the insolid blocks. Nor was such defect mentioned in a statement of
claims included in the final pretrial order, which instead alleged that the
pondcrete failed because a new foreman used an insufficient cement-to
sludge ratio. The jury found for respondents with respect to claims
covering the pondcrete allegations, but found for Rockwell with respect
to all other claims. The District Court denied Rockwell’s postverdict
motion to dismiss Stone’s claims, finding that Stone was an original
source. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, but remanded for the Dis
trict Court to determine whether Stone had disclosed his information
to the Government before filing the action. The District Court found
Stone’s disclosure inadequate, but the Tenth Circuit disagreed and held
that Stone was an original source.

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458 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Held:
1. Section 3730(e)(4)’s original-source requirement is jurisdictional.
Thus, regardless of whether Rockwell conceded Stone’s original-source
status, this Court must decide whether Stone meets this jurisdictional
requirement. Pp. 467–470.
2. Because Stone does not meet § 3730(e)(4)(B)’s requirement that a
relator have “direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based,” he is not an original source.
Pp. 470–476.
(a) The “information” to which subparagraph (B) speaks is the in
formation on which the relator’s allegations are based rather than the
information on which the publicly disclosed allegations that triggered
the public-disclosure bar are based. The subparagraph standing on its
own suggests that disposition. And those “allegations” are not the
same as the allegations referred to in subparagraph (A), which bars
actions based on the “public disclosure of allegations or transactions”
with an exception for cases brought by “an original source of the infor
mation.” Had Congress wanted to link original-source status to infor
mation underlying public disclosure it would have used the identical
phrase, “allegations or transactions.” Furthermore, it is difficult to un
derstand why Congress would care whether a relator knows about the
information underlying a publicly disclosed allegation when the relator
has direct and independent knowledge of different information support
ing the same allegation. Pp. 470–472.
(b) In determining which “allegations” are relevant, that term is
not limited to “allegations” in the original complaint, but includes
the allegations as amended. The statute speaks of the relator’s “alle
gations” simpliciter. Absent some limitation of § 3730(e)(4)’s re
quirement to the initial complaint, this Court will not infer one. Here,
where the final pretrial order superseded prior pleadings, this Court
looks to the final pretrial order to determine original-source status.
Pp. 473–475.
(c) Judged according to these principles, Stone’s knowledge falls
short. The only false claims found by the jury involved insolid pond
crete discovered after Stone left his employment. Thus, he did not
know that the pondcrete had failed; he predicted it. And his prediction
was a failed one, for Stone believed the piping system was defective
when, in fact, the pondcrete problem would be caused by a foreman’s
actions after Stone had left the plant. Stone’s original-source status
with respect to a separate, spray-irrigation claim did not provide juris
diction over all of his claims. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit juris

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459 Cite as: 549 U. S. 457 (2007)
Syllabus
diction in gross just because a relator is an original source with respect
to some claim. Pp. 475–476.
3. The Government’s intervention in this case did not provide an inde
pendent basis of jurisdiction with respect to Stone. The statute draws
a sharp distinction between actions brought by a private person under
§ 3730(b) and actions brought by the Attorney General under § 3730(b).
An action originally brought by a private person, which the Attorney
General has joined, becomes an action brought by the Attorney General
only after the private person has been ousted. Pp. 476–479.
92 Fed. Appx. 708, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 479.
Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioners.
With her on the briefs were J. Scott Ballenger, Barry J.
Blonien, Christopher J. Koenigs, and Michael B. Carroll.
Maria T. Vullo argued the cause for respondent Stone.
With her on the brief were Evan Norris and Hartley
David Alley.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for respondent
United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor Gen
eral Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy
Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, and Peter
R. Maier.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American
Hospital Association et al. by Jonathan L. Diesenhaus and Catherine E.
Stetson; for BP America Production Co. et al. by Donald B. Ayer, Michael
P. Graham, and Daniel M. McClure; for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America et al. by Herbert L. Fenster, Lawrence S. Ebner,
Mark R. Troy, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; for the National
Defense Industrial Association by Alan A. Pemberton and Sarah L. Wil
son; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Alan I. Horowitz,
Robert K. Huffman, Peter B. Hutt II, Daniel J. Popeo, and Paul D.
Kamenar.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Taxpayers
Against Fraud Education Fund et al. by David C. Frederick, James

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460 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733, eliminates
federal-court jurisdiction over actions under § 3730 of the Act
that are based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions “unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.” § 3730(e)(4)(A). We decide
whether respondent James Stone was an original source.
I
The mixture of concrete and pond sludge that is the sub
ject of this case has taken nearly two decades to seep, so
to speak, into this Court. Given the long history and the
complexity of this litigation, it is well to describe the facts
in some detail.
A
From 1975 through 1989, petitioner Rockwell Interna
tional Corp. was under a management and operating contract
with the Department of Energy (DOE) to run the Rocky
Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado. The most signifi
cant portion of Rockwell’s compensation came in the form of
a semiannual “ ‘award fee,’ ” the amount of which depended
on DOE’s evaluation of Rockwell’s performance in a number
of areas, including environmental, safety, and health con
cerns. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
92 Fed. Appx. 708, 714 (CA10 2004).
From November 1980 through March 1986, James Stone
worked as an engineer at the Rocky Flats plant. In the
early 1980’s, Rockwell explored the possibility of disposing
of the toxic pond sludge that accumulated in solar evapora-
W. Moorman, and Marissa M. Tirona; and for Patricia Haight et al. by
Jeremy L. Friedman.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Comstock Resources, Inc., by Wil
liam Scott Hastings and John Robert Beatty; and for Senator Charles E.
Grassley by John E. Clark.

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tion ponds at the facility, by mixing it with cement. The
idea was to pour the mixture into large rectangular boxes,
where it would solidify into “pondcrete” blocks that could be
stored onsite or transported to other sites for disposal.
Stone reviewed a proposed manufacturing process for
pondcrete in 1982. He concluded that the proposal “would
not work,” App. 175, and communicated that conclusion to
Rockwell management in a written “Engineering Order.”
As Stone would later explain, he believed “the suggested
process would result in an unstable mixture that would later
deteriorate and cause unwanted release of toxic wastes to
the environment.” Ibid. He believed this because he
“foresaw that the piping system” that extracted sludge from
the solar ponds “would not properly remove the sludge and
would lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge/waste and
cement such that the ‘pond crete’ blocks would rapidly dis
integrate thus creating additional contamination problems.”
Id., at 290.
Notwithstanding Stone’s prediction, Rockwell proceeded
with its pondcrete project and successfully manufactured
“concrete hard” pondcrete during the period of Stone’s em
ployment at Rocky Flats. It was only after Stone was laid
off in March 1986 that what the parties have called “insolid”
pondcrete blocks were discovered. According to respond
ents, Rockwell knew by October 1986 that a substantial num
ber of pondcrete blocks were insolid, but DOE did not be
come aware of the problem until May 1988, when several
pondcrete blocks began to leak, leading to the discovery of
thousands of other insolid blocks. The media reported these
discoveries, 3 Appellants’ App. in No. 99–1351 etc. (CA10),
pp. 889–38 to 889–39, and attributed the malfunction to
Rockwell’s reduction of the ratio of concrete to sludge in
the mixture.
In June 1987, more than a year after he had left Rockwell’s
employ, Stone went to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) with allegations of environmental crimes at Rocky

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Flats during the time of his employment. According to the
court below, Stone alleged that
“contrary to public knowledge, Rocky Flats accepted
hazardous and nuclear waste from other DOE facilities;
that Rockwell employees were ‘forbidden from discuss
ing any controversies in front of a DOE employee’; that
although Rocky Flats’ fluid bed incinerators failed test
ing in 1981, the pilot incinerator remained on line and
was used to incinerate wastes daily since 1981, including
plutonium wastes which were then sent out for burial;
that Rockwell distilled and fractionated various oils and
solvents although the wastes were geared for incin
eration; that Stone believed that the ground water was
contaminated from previous waste burial and land ap
plication, and that hazardous waste lagoons tended to
overflow during and after ‘a good rain,’ causing hazard
ous wastes to be discharged without first being treated.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a.
Stone provided the FBI with 2,300 pages of documents, bur
ied among which was his 1982 engineering report predicting
that the pondcrete-system design would not work. Stone
did not discuss his pondcrete allegations with the FBI in
their conversations.1
Based in part on information allegedly learned from Stone,
the Government obtained a search warrant for Rocky Flats,
and on June 6, 1989, 75 FBI and Environmental Protection
Agency agents raided the facility. The affidavit in support
of the warrant included allegations (1) that pondcrete blocks
were insolid “due to an inadequate waste-concrete mixture,”
App. 429, (2) that Rockwell obtained award fees based on its
alleged “ ‘excellent’ ” management of Rocky Flats, id., at 98,
and (3) that Rockwell made false statements and concealed
material facts in violation of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2811, as amended, 42
1 Stone claimed the contrary, but the District Court found that he had
failed to establish that fact.

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U. S. C. § 6928, and 18 U. S. C. § 1001. Newspapers pub
lished these allegations. In March 1992, Rockwell pleaded
guilty to 10 environmental violations, including the knowing
storage of insolid pondcrete blocks in violation of RCRA.
Rockwell agreed to pay $18.5 million in fines.
B
In July 1989, Stone filed a qui tam suit under the False
Claims Act.2 That Act prohibits false or fraudulent claims
for payment to the United States, 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a), and
authorizes civil actions to remedy such fraud to be brought
by the Attorney General, § 3730(a), or by private individuals
in the Government’s name, § 3730(b)(1). The Act provides,
however, that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an ac
tion under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions . . . from the news media, unless
the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.”
§ 3730(e)(4)(A). An “original source” is “an individual who
has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily pro
vided the information to the Government before filing an ac
tion under this section which is based on the information.”
§ 3730(e)(4)(B).
Stone’s complaint alleged that Rockwell was required to
comply with certain federal and state environmental laws
and regulations, including RCRA; that Rockwell committed
numerous violations of these laws and regulations through
out the 1980’s; 3 and that, in order to induce the Government
2 Qui tam is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur,” which means “who pursues this action on our Lord
the King’s behalf as well as his own.”
3 The laws and regulations allegedly violated included DOE Order Nos.
5480.2 (Dec. 13, 1982), 5483.1 as superseded by 5483.1A (June 22, 1983),
and 6430.1 (Dec. 12, 1983) (DOE General Design Criteria Manual); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25–5–501 et seq. (1982) (Hazardous Substances), 25–7–
101 et seq. (1982 and Supp. 1988) (Air Quality Control Program), 25–7–501
et seq. (Supp. 1988) (Asbestos Control), 25–15–101 (1982 and Supp. 1988)

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to make payments or approvals under Rockwell’s contract,
Rockwell knowingly presented false and fraudulent claims to
the Government in violation of the False Claims Act, 31
U. S. C. § 3729(a). As required under the Act, Stone filed his
complaint under seal and simultaneously delivered to the
Government a confidential disclosure statement describing
“substantially all material evidence and information” in his
possession, § 3730(b)(2). The statement identified 26 envi
ronmental and safety issues, only one of which involved
pondcrete. With respect to that issue, Stone explained in
his statement that he had reviewed the design for the pond
crete system and had foreseen that the piping mechanism
would not properly remove the sludge, which in turn would
lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge and cement.
In December 1992, Rockwell moved to dismiss Stone’s ac
tion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the
action was based on publicly disclosed allegations and that
Stone was not an original source. The District Court denied
the motion because, in its view, “Stone had direct and inde
pendent knowledge that Rockwell’s compensation was linked
to its compliance with environmental, health and safety regu
lations and that it allegedly concealed its deficient perform
ance so that it would continue to receive payments.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 61a.
The Government initially declined to intervene in Stone’s
action, but later reversed course, and in November 1996,
the District Court granted the Government’s intervention.
Several weeks later, at the suggestion of the District Court,
(Hazardous Waste Management Act), 25–8–201 (Water Quality Control
Act), 25–11–101 (Radiation Control), 29–22–101 (Hazardous Substance In
cidents), 25–5–503 (1982), 25–8–506, 25–8–608 (1982 and Supp. 1988), 25–
15–308 through 25–15–310, and 29–22–108 (1982); the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U. S. C. § 651 et seq.; the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2011 et seq.; the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, 42 U. S. C. § 5801 et seq.; the Water Pollution Prevention and Con
trol Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401
et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; and regula
tions promulgated under these statutes.

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the Government and Stone filed a joint amended complaint.
As relevant here, the amended complaint alleged that Rock
well violated RCRA by storing leaky pondcrete blocks, but
did not allege that any defect in the piping system (as pre
dicted by Stone) caused insolid pondcrete.4 Respondents
clarified their allegations even further in a statement of
claims which became part of the final pretrial order and
which superseded their earlier pleadings. This said that the
pondcrete’s insolidity was due to “an incorrect cement/sludge
ratio used in pondcrete operations, as well as due to in
adequate process controls and inadequate inspection proce
dures.” App. 470. It continued:
“During the winter of 1986, Rockwell replaced its then
pondcrete foreman, Norman Fryback, with Ron Teel.
Teel increased pondcrete production rates in part by,
among other things, reducing the amount of cement
added to the blocks. Following the May 23, 1988 spill,
Rockwell acknowledged that this reduced cement-to
sludge ratio was a major contributor to the existence
of insufficiently solid pondcrete blocks on the storage
pads.” Id., at 476–477.
The statement of claims again did not mention the piping
problem asserted by Stone years earlier.
Respondents’ False Claims Act claims went to trial in
1999. None of the witnesses Stone had identified during
discovery as having relevant knowledge testified at trial.
And none of the documents Stone provided to the Govern
ment with his confidential disclosure statement was intro
duced in evidence at trial. Nor did respondents allege at
trial that the defect in the piping system predicted by
Stone caused insolid pondcrete. To the contrary, during
4 In addition to the pondcrete allegations, respondents charged Rockwell
with concealing problems with “saltcrete” (a mixture of cement and salt
from liquid waste treatment processes) and “spray irrigation” (a method
of disposing of waste water generated by the sewage treatment plant at
Rocky Flats).

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closing arguments both Stone’s counsel and the Govern
ment’s counsel repeatedly explained to the jury that the
pondcrete failed because Rockwell’s new foreman used an in
sufficient cement-to-sludge ratio in an effort to increase
pondcrete production.
The verdict form divided the False Claims Act count into
several different claims corresponding to different award-fee
periods. The jury found in favor of respondents for the
three periods covering the pondcrete allegations (April 1,
1987, to September 30, 1988), and found for Rockwell as
to the remaining periods. The jury awarded damages of
$1,390,775.80, which the District Court trebled pursuant to
31 U. S. C. § 3729(a).
Rockwell filed a postverdict motion to dismiss Stone’s
claims under § 3730(e)(4), arguing that the claims were based
on publicly disclosed allegations and that Stone was not an
original source. In response, Stone acknowledged that his
successful claims were based on publicly disclosed allega
tions, but asserted original-source status. The District
Court agreed with Stone. The United States Court of Ap
peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, but re
manded the case for the District Court to determine whether
Stone had disclosed his information to the Government be
fore filing his qui tam action, as § 3730(e)(4)(B) required. On
remand, the District Court found that Stone had produced
the 1982 engineering order to the Government, but that the
order was insufficient to communicate Stone’s allegations.
The District Court also found that Stone had not carried his
burden of proving that he orally informed the FBI about his
allegations before filing suit. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion and held (over
the dissent of Judge Briscoe) that the 1982 engineering order
sufficed to carry Stone’s burden of persuasion. 92 Fed.
Appx. 708. We granted certiorari, 548 U. S. 941 (2006), to
decide whether Stone was an original source.

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II
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides:
“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allega
tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or adminis
trative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person bring
ing the action is an original source of the information.”
(Footnote omitted.)
As discussed above, § 3730(e)(4)(B) defines “original source”
as “an individual who [1] has direct and independent knowl
edge of the information on which the allegations are based
and [2] has voluntarily provided the information to the Gov
ernment before filing an action under this section which is
based on the information.” As this case comes to the Court,
it is conceded that the claims on which Stone prevailed were
based upon publicly disclosed allegations within the meaning
of § 3730(e)(4)(A). The question is whether Stone qualified
under the original-source exception to the public-disclosure
bar.
We begin with the possibility that little analysis is re
quired in this case, for Stone asserts that Rockwell conceded
his original-source status. Rockwell responds that it con
ceded no such thing and that, even had it done so, the con
cession would have been irrelevant because § 3730(e)(4) is
jurisdictional. We agree with the latter proposition. It is
true enough that the word “jurisdiction” does not in every
context connote subject-matter jurisdiction. Noting that
“jurisdiction” is “ ‘a word of many, too many, meanings,’ ” we
concluded in Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U. S. 83 (1998), that establishing the elements of an of
fense was not made a jurisdictional matter merely because

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the statute creating the cause of action was phrased as pro
viding for “jurisdiction” over such suits. Id., at 90 (quoting
United States v. Vanness, 85 F. 3d 661, 663, n. 2 (CADC
1996)). Here, however, the issue is not whether casting the
creation of a cause of action in jurisdictional terms somehow
limits the general grant of jurisdiction under which that
cause of action would normally be brought, but rather
whether a clear and explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction with
draws jurisdiction. It undoubtedly does so. Just last Term
we stated that, “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as juris
dictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed
and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.” Arbaugh v.
Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006) (footnote omitted).
Here the jurisdictional nature of the original-source require
ment is clear ex visceribus verborum. Indeed, we have
already stated that § 3730(e)(4) speaks to “the power of
a particular court” as well as “the substantive rights of
the parties.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel.
Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 951 (1997).
Stone’s contrary position rests entirely on dicta from a
single Court of Appeals decision, see United States ex rel.
Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F. 3d 937, 940–941 (CA7 1996).
Accudyne thought it significant that jurisdiction over False
Claims Act cases is conferred by 28 U. S. C. §§ 1331 and 1345
(the federal-question and United-States-as-plaintiff provi
sions of the Judicial Code) and 31 U. S. C. § 3732(a) (the pro
vision of the False Claims Act establishing federal-court
venue and conferring federal-court jurisdiction over related
state-law claims), rather than § 3730, which is the “section”
referenced in § 3730(e)(4). To eliminate jurisdiction, the
court believed, it is those jurisdiction-conferring sections
that would have to be referenced. We know of nothing
in logic or authority to support this. The jurisdiction
removing provision here does not say “no court shall have

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jurisdiction under this section,” but rather “no court shall
have jurisdiction over an action under this section.” That
is surely the most natural way to achieve the desired result
of eliminating jurisdiction over a category of False Claims
Act actions—rather than listing all the conceivable provi
sions of the United States Code whose conferral of juris
diction is being eliminated. (In addition to the provisions
cited by the Accudyne court, one might also have to mention
the diversity-jurisdiction provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1332, and
the supplemental-jurisdiction provision, § 1367.) Accudyne
next observed that the public-disclosure bar limits only who
may speak for the United States on a subject and who if
anyone gets a financial reward, not the “categories of dis
putes that may be resolved (a real ‘jurisdictional’ limit).” 97
F. 3d, at 941. But this is a classic begging of the question,
which is precisely whether there has been removed from the
courts’ jurisdiction that category of disputes consisting of
False Claims Act qui tam suits based on publicly disclosed
allegations as to which the relator is not an original source
of the information. Nothing prevents Congress from defin
ing the “category” of excluded suits in any manner it wishes.
See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1500 (no jurisdiction over “any claim
for or in respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any
other court any suit . . . against the United States”). Lastly,
Accudyne asserted that “the Supreme Court had held that
a similar reference to jurisdiction in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101, 104, limits remedies rather than
subject-matter jurisdiction.” 97 F. 3d, at 941 (citing Bur
lington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way Employes,
481 U. S. 429, 444–446 (1987)). But the language of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is in fact not similar. It provides that
“[n]o court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent in
junction in any case involving or growing out of any labor
dispute . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 104 (emphasis added). It is fa

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cially a limitation upon the relief that can be accorded, not a
removal of jurisdiction over “any case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute.” Here, by contrast, the text says
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section.”
Whether the point was conceded or not, therefore, we may,
and indeed must, decide whether Stone met the jurisdic
tional requirement of being an original source.
III
We turn to the first requirement of original-source status,
that the relator have “direct and independent knowledge of
the information on which the allegations are based.” 31
U. S. C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Because we have not previously ad
dressed this provision, several preliminary questions require
our attention.
A
First, does the phrase “information on which the allega
tions are based” refer to the information on which the rela
tor’s allegations are based or the information on which the
publicly disclosed allegations that triggered the public
disclosure bar are based? The parties agree it is the former.
See Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 13; Brief for United States
24, and n. 8; Brief for Respondent Stone 15, 21. But in view
of our conclusion that § 3730(e)(4) is jurisdictional, we must
satisfy ourselves that the parties’ position is correct.
Though the question is hardly free from doubt,5 we agree
that the “information” to which subparagraph (B) speaks is
the information upon which the relators’ allegations are
5 The Courts of Appeals have divided over the question. See United
States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs. Co., 336 F.
3d 346, 353–355 (CA5 2003) (describing the Courts of Appeals’ divergent
approaches). Only by demoting the actual text of § 3730(e)(4) to a foot
note and then paraphrasing the statute in a way that assumes his con
clusion can Justice Stevens assert (without further analysis) that the
statute’s meaning is “plain.” See post, at 479–480 (dissenting opinion).

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based. To begin with, subparagraph (B) standing on its own
suggests that disposition. The relator must have “direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based,” and he must “provid[e] the informa
tion to the Government before filing an action under this
section which is based on the information.” Surely the in
formation one would expect a relator to “provide to the Gov
ernment before filing an action . . . based on the information”
is the information underlying the relator’s claims.
Subparagraph (A) complicates matters. As described
earlier, it bars actions based on the “public disclosure of alle
gations or transactions” and provides an exception for cases
brought by “an original source of the information.” If the
allegations referred to in subparagraph (B)’s phrase requir
ing “direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based” are the same “allegations”
referred to in subparagraph (A), then original-source status
would depend on knowledge of information underlying the
publicly disclosed allegations. The principal textual diffi
culty with that interpretation is that subparagraph (A) does
not speak simply of “allegations,” but of “allegations or
transactions.” Had Congress wanted to link original-source
status to information underlying the public disclosure, it
would surely have used the identical phrase, “allegations or
transactions”; there is no conceivable reason to require direct
and independent knowledge of publicly disclosed allegations
but not of publicly disclosed transactions.
The sense of the matter offers strong additional support
for this interpretation. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) bars actions
based on publicly disclosed allegations whether or not the
information on which those allegations are based has been
made public. It is difficult to understand why Congress
would care whether a relator knows about the information
underlying a publicly disclosed allegation (e. g., what a con
fidential source told a newspaper reporter about insolid
pondcrete) when the relator has direct and independent

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472 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
knowledge of different information supporting the same alle
gation (e. g., that a defective process would inevitably lead to
insolid pondcrete). Not only would that make little sense, it
would raise nettlesome procedural problems, placing courts
in the position of comparing the relator’s information with
the often unknowable information on which the public disclo
sure was based. Where that latter information has not been
disclosed (by reason, for example, of a reporter’s desire to
protect his source), the relator would presumably be out of
court. To bar a relator with direct and independent knowl
edge of information underlying his allegations just because
no one can know what information underlies the similar alle
gations of some other person simply makes no sense.
The contrary conclusion of some lower courts rests on the
following logic: The term “information” in subparagraph (B)
must be read in tandem with the term “information” in sub
paragraph (A), and the term “information” in subparagraph
(A) refers to the information on which the publicly disclosed
allegations are based. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Laird
v. Lockheed Martin Eng. & Science Servs. Co., 336 F. 3d 346,
354 (CA5 2003). The major premise of this reasoning seems
true enough: “information” in (A) and (B) means the same
thing. The minor premise, however—that “information” in
(A) refers to the information underlying the publicly dis
closed allegations or transactions—is highly questionable.
The complete phrase at issue is “unless . . . the person bring
ing the action is an original source of the information.” It
seems to us more likely (in light of the analysis set forth
above) that the information in question is the information
underlying the action referred to a few words earlier, to wit,
the action “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions” referred to at the beginning of the provision.
On this interpretation, “information” in subparagraph (A)
and “information on which the allegations are based” in sub
paragraph (B) are one and the same, viz., information under
lying the allegations of the relator’s action.

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B
Having determined that the phrase “information on which
the allegations are based” refers to the relator’s allegations
and not the publicly disclosed allegations, we confront more
textual ambiguity: Which of the relator’s allegations are
the relevant ones? Stone’s allegations changed during the
course of the litigation, yet he asks that we look only to his
original complaint. Rockwell argues that Stone must sat
isfy the original-source exception through all stages of the
litigation.
In our view, the term “allegations” is not limited to the
allegations of the original complaint. It includes (at a mini
mum) the allegations in the original complaint as amended.
The statute speaks not of the allegations in the “original
complaint” (or even the allegations in the “complaint”), but
of the relator’s “allegations” simpliciter. Absent some limi
tation of § 3730(e)(4)’s requirement to the relator’s initial
complaint, we will not infer one. Such a limitation would
leave the relator free to plead a trivial theory of fraud for
which he had some direct and independent knowledge and
later amend the complaint to include theories copied from
the public domain or from materials in the Government’s pos
session. Even the Government concedes that new allega
tions regarding a fundamentally different fraudulent scheme
require reevaluation of the court’s jurisdiction. See Brief
for United States 40; Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
The rule that subject-matter jurisdiction “depends on the
state of things at the time of the action brought,” Mollan v.
Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539 (1824), does not suggest a dif
ferent interpretation. The state of things and the originally
alleged state of things are not synonymous; demonstration
that the original allegations were false will defeat jurisdic
tion. Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694, 701 (1891); Morris v.
Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 326 (1889). So also will the with
drawal of those allegations, unless they are replaced by oth
ers that establish jurisdiction. Thus, when a plaintiff files a

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474 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
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complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the
complaint, courts look to the amended complaint to deter
mine jurisdiction. See Wellness Community-Nat. v. Well
ness House, 70 F. 3d 46, 49 (CA7 1995); Boelens v. Redman
Homes, Inc., 759 F. 2d 504, 508 (CA5 1985).6
Here, we have not only an amended complaint, but a final
pretrial order that superseded all prior pleadings and “con
troll[ed] the subsequent course of the action,” Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 16(e). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 190, n. 1
(1974) (where a claim was not included in the complaint, but
was included in the pretrial order, “it is irrelevant that the
pleadings were never formally amended” (citing Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 15(b), 16)); Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F. 3d 1207,
1215 (CA10 2002) (“[C]laims, issues, defenses, or theories of
damages not included in the pretrial order are waived even
if they appeared in the complaint and, conversely, the inclu
sion of a claim in the pretrial order is deemed to amend any
previous pleadings which did not include that claim”); Syrie
v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F. 2d 304, 308 (CA5 1984) (“[I]ncorporation
of a [new] claim into the pre-trial order . . . amends the previ
ous pleadings to state [the new] claim”). In these circum
stances, we look to the allegations as amended—here, the
statement of claims in the final pretrial order—to determine
original-source status.
The Government objects that this approach risks driving
a wedge between the Government and relators. It worries
that future relators might decline to “acquiesc[e]” in the Gov
ernment’s tactical decision to narrow the claims in a case if
6 It is true that, when a defendant removes a case to federal court based
on the presence of a federal claim, an amendment eliminating the original
basis for federal jurisdiction generally does not defeat jurisdiction. See
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 346, 357 (1988); St. Paul
Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 293 (1938). But
removal cases raise forum-manipulation concerns that simply do not exist
when it is the plaintiff who chooses a federal forum and then pleads away
jurisdiction through amendment.

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Opinion of the Court
that would eliminate jurisdiction with respect to the relator.
Brief for United States 44. Even if this policy concern were
valid, it would not induce us to determine jurisdiction on the
basis of whether the relator is an original source of informa
tion underlying allegations that he no longer makes.
IV
Judged according to the principles set forth above, Stone’s
knowledge falls short. The only false claims ultimately
found by the jury (and hence the only ones to which our
jurisdictional inquiry is pertinent to the outcome) involved
false statements with respect to environmental, safety, and
health compliance over a 11/2-year period between April 1,
1987, and September 30, 1988. As described by Stone
and the Government in the final pretrial order, the only
pertinent problem with respect to this period of time for
which Stone claimed to have direct and independent knowl
edge was insolid pondcrete. Because Stone was no longer
employed by Rockwell at the time, he did not know that
the pondcrete was insolid; he did not know that pondcrete
storage was even subject to RCRA; he did not know that
Rockwell would fail to remedy the defect; he did not know
that the insolid pondcrete leaked while being stored on
site; and, of course, he did not know that Rockwell made
false statements to the Government regarding pondcrete
storage.
Stone’s prediction that the pondcrete would be insolid be
cause of a flaw in the piping system does not qualify as “di
rect and independent knowledge” of the pondcrete defect.
Of course a qui tam relator’s misunderstanding of why a con
cealed defect occurred would normally be immaterial as long
as he knew the defect actually existed. But here Stone did
not know that the pondcrete failed; he predicted it. Even if
a prediction can qualify as direct and independent knowledge
in some cases (a point we need not address), it assuredly
does not do so when its premise of cause and effect is wrong.

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476 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
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Stone’s prediction was a failed prediction, disproved by
Stone’s own allegations. As Stone acknowledged, Rockwell
was able to produce “concrete hard” pondcrete using the ma
chinery Stone said was defective. According to respond
ents’ allegations in the final pretrial order, the insolidity
problem was caused by a new foreman’s reduction of the
cement-to-sludge ratio in the winter of 1986, long after Stone
had left Rocky Flats.
Stone counters that his original-source status with respect
to his spray-irrigation claim (which related to a time period
different from that for his pondcrete claim, App. 492) pro
vided jurisdiction with respect to all of his claims. We dis
agree. Section 3730(e)(4) does not permit jurisdiction in
gross just because a relator is an original source with respect
to some claim. We, along with every court to have ad
dressed the question, conclude that § 3730(e)(4) does not per
mit such claim smuggling. See United States ex rel. Merena
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 205 F. 3d 97, 102 (CA3 2000);
Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F. 3d 982, 990 (CA8 2003); Wang ex
rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415–1416,
1420 (CA9 1992). As then-Judge Alito explained, “[t]he
plaintiff ’s decision to join all of his or her claims in a single
lawsuit should not rescue claims that would have been
doomed by section (e)(4) if they had been asserted in a sepa
rate action. And likewise, this joinder should not result in
the dismissal of claims that would have otherwise survived.”
SmithKline Beecham, supra, at 102.
Because Stone did not have direct and independent knowl
edge of the information upon which his allegations were
based, we need not decide whether Stone met the second
requirement of original-source status, that he have voluntar
ily provided the information to the Government before filing
his action.
V
Respondents contend that even if Stone failed the
original-source test as to his pondcrete allegations, the Gov

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477 Cite as: 549 U. S. 457 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
ernment’s intervention in his case provided an independent
basis of jurisdiction. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) permits jurisdic
tion over an action based on publicly disclosed allegations
or transactions if the action is “brought by the Attorney
General.” Respondents say that any inquiry into Stone’s
original-source status with respect to amendments to the
complaint was unnecessary because the Government had in
tervened, making this an “action brought by the Attorney
General.” 7 Even assuming that Stone was an original
source of allegations in his initial complaint, we reject re
spondents’ “intervention” argument.
The False Claims Act contemplates two types of actions.
First, under § 3730(a), “[i]f the Attorney General finds that a
person has violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney
General may bring a civil action under this section against
the person.” Second, under § 3730(b), “[a] person may bring
an action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and
for the United States Government.” When a private person
brings an action under § 3730(b), the Government may elect
to “proceed with the action,” § 3730(b)(4)(A), or it may “de
clin[e] to take over the action, in which case the person
bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the ac
tion,” § 3730(b)(4)(B). The statute thus draws a sharp dis
tinction between actions brought by the Attorney General
under § 3730(a) and actions brought by a private person
under § 3730(b). An action brought by a private person does
not become one brought by the Government just because the
Government intervenes and elects to “proceed with the ac
tion.” Section 3730 elsewhere refers to the Government’s
“proceed[ing] with an action brought by a person under
subsection (b)”—which makes crystal clear the distinction
between actions brought by the Government and actions
7 The Government includes a significant caveat: In its view, intervention
does not cure any pre-existing defects in Stone’s initial complaint; it only
cures defects resulting from amendments to the pleadings.

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478 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
brought by a relator where the Government intervenes but
does not oust the relator. § 3730(d).
Does this conclusion cast into doubt the courts’ jurisdic
tion with respect to the Government as well? After all,
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) bars jurisdiction over any action brought
under § 3730, as this one was, unless the action is brought (1)
by the Attorney General or (2) by an original source; and we
have concluded that this is brought by neither. Not even
petitioners have suggested the bizarre result that the Gov
ernment’s judgment must be set aside. It is readily enough
avoided, as common sense suggests it must be, by holding
that an action originally brought by a private person, which
the Attorney General has joined, becomes an action brought
by the Attorney General once the private person has been
determined to lack the jurisdictional prerequisites for suit.
The outcome would be similar to that frequently produced in
diversity-jurisdiction cases, where the “courts of appeals . . .
have the authority to cure a jurisdictional defect by dismiss
ing a dispensable nondiverse party.” Grupo Dataflux v.
Atlas Global Group, L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 573 (2004) (citing
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 837
(1989)); see United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F. 2d 843,
845 (CA3 1979) (“[T]here are instances when an intervenor’s
claim does not rise and fall with the claim of the original
party”); 7C C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1920, p. 491 (2d ed. 1986) (“[A]n intervenor
can proceed to decision after a dismissal of the original ac
tion . . . if there are independent grounds for jurisdiction of
the intervenor’s claim”). What is cured here, by the juris
dictional ruling regarding Stone’s claim, is the characteriza
tion of the action as one brought by an original source. The
elimination of Stone leaves in place an action pursued only
by the Attorney General, that can reasonably be regarded as
being “brought” by him for purposes of § 3730(e)(4)(A).

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479 Cite as: 549 U. S. 457 (2007)
Stevens, J., dissenting
* * *
We hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to enter
judgment in favor of Stone. We reverse the Tenth Circuit’s
judgment to the contrary.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or deci
sion of this case.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
Any private citizen may bring an action to enforce the
False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733, unless the infor
mation on which his allegations are based is already in the
public domain. Even if the information is publicly available,
however, the citizen may still sue if he was an “original
source” of that information. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (“No court shall
have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions . . .
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the
person bringing the action is an original source of the infor
mation”). Because I believe the Court has misinterpreted
these provisions to require that an “original source” in a qui
tam action have knowledge of the actual facts underlying the
allegations on which he may ultimately prevail, I respect
fully dissent.
In my view, a plain reading of the statute’s provisions—
specifically, §§ 3730(e)(4)(A) and (B)—makes clear that it is
the information underlying the publicly disclosed allegations,
not the information underlying the allegations in the rela
tor’s complaint (original or amended), of which the relator
must be an original source.1 Moreover, the statute’s use of
1 Section 3730(e)(4)(A) states:
“No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil,

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480 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
the article “an,” rather than “the,” in describing the original
source indicates that the relator need not be the sole source
of the information.
By contrast, the majority’s approach suggests that the re
lator must have knowledge of actual facts supporting the
theory ultimately proved at trial—in other words, knowledge
of the information underlying the prevailing claims. See
ante, at 475 (limiting the relevant jurisdictional inquiry to
those “false claims ultimately found by the jury”). I dis
agree. Such a view is not supported by the statute, which
requires only that the relator have “direct and independent
knowledge” of the information on which the publicly dis
closed allegations are based and that the relator provide such
information to the Government in a timely manner. As I
read the statute, the jurisdictional inquiry focuses on the
facts in the public domain at the time the action is com
menced. If the process of discovery leads to amended theo
ries of recovery, amendments to the original complaint would
not affect jurisdiction that was proper at the time of the
original filing.2
or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Govern
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an original source of the information.”
(Footnote omitted.)
Section 3730(e)(4)(B) then states:
“For purposes of this paragraph, ‘original source’ means an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which is based
on the information.”
2 The majority’s approach requires courts to reevaluate jurisdiction over
a qui tam action brought by an original source every time the complaint
is amended. Such an approach, the Government has argued, will inter
fere with its ability to tailor the claims advanced as it sees appropriate.
By contrast, under the approach I would adopt, the jurisdictional inquiry
relates only to whether the relator was an original source of the informa

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481 Cite as: 549 U. S. 457 (2007)
Stevens, J., dissenting
In this case, as the Court points out, the fact that Rockwell
was storing thousands of insolid pondcrete blocks at the
Rocky Flats facility had been publicly disclosed by the news
media before Stone filed this lawsuit. Ante, at 461, 462–463.
In my view, the record establishes that Stone was an original
source of the allegations publicly disclosed by the media in
June 1989, even though he thought that the deterioration of
the pondcrete blocks would be caused by poor engineering
rather than a poor formula for the mixture. The search
warrant that was executed on June 6, 1989, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit that was released to
the news media on June 9, 1989, were both based, in part, on
interviews with Stone and on information Stone had pro
vided to the Government, including the 1982 Engineering
Order.
With respect to earlier media coverage of the pondcrete
leakage discovery in May 1988, however, Stone’s status as an
original source is less obvious. Stone first went to the FBI
with allegations of Rockwell’s environmental violations in
March 1986. App. 180. He subsequently met with several
FBI agents over the course of several years. Id., at 180–
182. During those meetings he provided the FBI with thou
sands of pages of documents, including the Engineering
Order, in which he predicted that the pondcrete system de
sign would not work. On the basis of that record, it seems
likely that Stone (1) had “direct and independent knowledge
of the information on which the [publicly disclosed] allega
tions [we]re based” and (2) voluntarily provided such infor
mation to the Government before filing suit. It is, however,
his burden to establish that he did so. Because there has
been no finding as to whether Stone was an original source
tion underlying the public disclosures, which can easily be determined
when an action is filed and need not be revisited during later stages of
the litigation.

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482 ROCKWELL INT’L CORP. v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
as to those public disclosures, I would vacate and remand for
a determination whether Stone was in fact an original source
of the allegations publicly disclosed by the media in 1988
and 1989.