PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS et al. v. CITY OF NEW YORK

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Syllabus
PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS et al. v. CITY OF NEW YORK
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 06–134. Argued April 24, 2007—Decided June 14, 2007
Under New York law, real property owned by a foreign government is
exempt from taxation when used exclusively for diplomatic offices or
quarters for ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary to the United Na
tions. For years, respondent (City) has levied property taxes against
petitioner foreign governments for that portion of their diplomatic office
buildings used to house lower level employees and their families. Peti
tioners have refused to pay the taxes. By operation of state law, the
unpaid taxes converted into tax liens held by the City against the prop
erties. The City filed a state-court suit seeking declaratory judgments
to establish the liens’ validity, but petitioners removed the cases to fed
eral court, where they argued that they were immune under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which is “the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court,” Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 439. The Dis
trict Court disagreed, relying on an FSIA exception withdrawing a for
eign state’s immunity from jurisdiction where “rights in immovable
property situated in the United States are in issue.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 1605(a)(4). The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the “immovable
property” exception applied, and thus the District Court had jurisdic
tion over the City’s suits.
Held: The FSIA does not immunize a foreign government from a lawsuit
to declare the validity of tax liens on property held by the sovereign for
the purpose of housing its employees. Pp. 197–202.
(a) Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively immune from
suit unless a specific exception applies. In determining the immovable
property exception’s scope, the Court begins, as always, with the stat
ute’s text. Contrary to petitioners’ position, § 1605(a)(4) does not ex
pressly limit itself to cases in which the specific right at issue is title,
ownership, or possession, or specifically exclude cases in which a lien’s
validity is at issue. Rather, it focuses more broadly on “rights in” prop
erty. At the time of the FSIA’s adoption, “lien” was defined as a
“charge or security or incumbrance upon property,” Black’s Law Dic

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Syllabus
tionary 1072, and “incumbrance” was defined as “[a]ny right to, or inter
est in, land which may subsist in another to the diminution of its value,”
id., at 908. New York law defines “tax lien” in accordance with these
general definitions. A lien’s practical effects bear out the definitions of
liens as interests in property. Because a lien on real property runs
with the land and is enforceable against subsequent purchasers, a tax
lien inhibits a quintessential property ownership right—the right to
convey. It is thus plain that a suit to establish a tax lien’s validity
implicates “rights in immovable property.” Pp. 197–199.
(b) This Court’s reading is supported by two of the FSIA’s related
purposes. First, Congress intended the FSIA to adopt the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, which recognizes immunity “with regard
to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not . . . private
acts (jure gestionis).” Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U. S. 682, 711. Property ownership is not an inherently sov
ereign function. The FSIA was also meant to codify the real property
exception recognized by international practice at the time of its enact
ment. That practice supports the City’s view that petitioners are not
immune, as does the contemporaneous restatement of foreign rela
tions law. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, on which
both parties rely, does not unambiguously support either party, and, in
any event, does nothing to deter this Court from its interpretation.
Pp. 199–202.
446 F. 3d 365, affirmed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ste
vens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post,
p. 202.
John J. P. Howley argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Robert A. Kandel, Steven S. Rosen
thal, and David O. Bickart.
Sri Srinivasan argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solici
tor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler,
Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas Hallward-
Driemeier, Douglas N. Letter, and Sharon Swingle.

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195 Cite as: 551 U. S. 193 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
Michael A. Cardozo argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Norman Corenthal, John R.
Low-Beer, and Brad M. Synder.*
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28
U. S. C. § 1602 et seq., governs federal courts’ jurisdiction in
lawsuits against foreign sovereigns. Today, we must decide
whether the FSIA provides immunity to a foreign sovereign
from a lawsuit to declare the validity of tax liens on property
held by the sovereign for the purpose of housing its employ
ees. We hold that the FSIA does not immunize a foreign
sovereign from such a suit.
I
The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations is
located in a 26-floor building in New York City that is owned
by the Government of India. Several floors are used for dip
lomatic offices, but approximately 20 floors contain residen
tial units for diplomatic employees of the mission and their
families. The employees—all of whom are below the rank
of Head of Mission or Ambassador—are Indian citizens who
receive housing from the mission rent free.
Similarly, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of Mongolia is housed in a six-story building in New
York City that is owned by the Mongolian Government.
Like the Permanent Mission of India, certain floors of the
Ministry Building include residences for lower level employ
ees of the Ministry and their families.
Under New York law, real property owned by a foreign
government is exempt from taxation if it is “used exclu
sively” for diplomatic offices or for the quarters of a diplomat
*A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the Interna
tional Municipal Lawyers Association et al. by Charles A. Rothfeld,
Andrew J. Pincus, and Dan Kahan.

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Opinion of the Court
“with the rank of ambassador or minister plenipotentiary”
to the United Nations. N. Y. Real Prop. Tax Law Ann. § 418
(West 2000). But “[i]f a portion only of any lot or building
. . . is used exclusively for the purposes herein described,
then such portion only shall be exempt and the remainder
shall be subject to taxation . . . .” Ibid.
For several years, the city of New York (City) has levied
property taxes against petitioners for the portions of their
buildings used to house lower level employees. Petitioners,
however, refused to pay the taxes. By operation of New
York law, the unpaid taxes eventually converted into tax
liens held by the City against the two properties. As of
February 1, 2003, the Indian Mission owed about $16.4 mil
lion in unpaid property taxes and interest, and the Mongolian
Ministry owed about $2.1 million.
On April 2, 2003, the City filed complaints in state court
seeking declaratory judgments to establish the validity of
the tax liens.1 Petitioners removed their cases to federal
court, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1441(d), which provides for
removal by a foreign state or its instrumentality. Once
there, petitioners argued that they were immune from the
suits under the FSIA’s general rule of immunity for foreign
governments. § 1604. The District Court disagreed, rely
ing on the FSIA’s “immovable property” exception, which
1 The City concedes that even if a court of competent jurisdiction de
clares the liens valid, petitioners are immune from foreclosure proceed
ings. See Brief for Respondent 40 (noting that there is no FSIA immu
nity exception for enforcement actions). The City claims, however, that
the declarations of validity are necessary for three reasons. First, once a
court has declared property tax liens valid, foreign sovereigns tradition
ally concede and pay. Second, if the foreign sovereign fails to pay in the
face of a valid court judgment, that country’s foreign aid may be reduced
by the United States by 110% of the outstanding debt. See Foreign Oper
ations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006,
§ 543(a), 119 Stat. 2214; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, § 543(a),
118 Stat. 3011. Third, the liens would be enforceable against subsequent
purchasers. 5 Restatement of Property § 540 (1944).

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Opinion of the Court
provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from juris
diction in any case in which “rights in immovable property
situated in the United States are in issue.” § 1605(a)(4).
Reviewing the District Court’s decision under the collat
eral order doctrine, a unanimous panel of the Court of Ap
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 446 F. 3d 365 (2006).
The Court of Appeals held that the text and purpose of the
FSIA’s immovable property exception confirmed that peti
tioners’ personal property tax obligations involved “rights
in immovable property.” It therefore held that the District
Court had jurisdiction to consider the City’s suits. We
granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1177 (2007), and now affirm.
II
“[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdic
tion over a foreign state in federal court.” Argentine Re
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 439
(1989). Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively
immune from suit unless a specific exception applies. § 1604;
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349, 355 (1993). At issue
here is the scope of the exception where “rights in immov
able property situated in the United States are in issue.”
§ 1605(a)(4). Petitioners contend that the language “rights
in immovable property” limits the reach of the exception
to actions contesting ownership or possession. The City
argues that the exception encompasses additional rights in
immovable property, including tax liens. Each party claims
international practice at the time of the FSIA’s adoption sup
ports its view. We agree with the City.
A
We begin, as always, with the text of the statute. Limti
aco v. Camacho, 549 U. S. 483, 488 (2007). The FSIA pro
vides: “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdic
tion of courts of the United States . . . in any case . . . in
which . . . rights in immovable property situated in the

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United States are in issue.” 28 U. S. C. § 1605(a)(4). Con
trary to petitioners’ position, § 1605(a)(4) does not expressly
limit itself to cases in which the specific right at issue is
title, ownership, or possession. Neither does it specifically
exclude cases in which the validity of a lien is at issue.
Rather, the exception focuses more broadly on “rights in”
property. Accordingly, we must determine whether an ac
tion seeking a declaration of the validity of a tax lien places
“rights in immovable property . . . in issue.”
At the time of the FSIA’s adoption in 1976, a “lien” was
defined as “[a] charge or security or incumbrance upon prop
erty.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1072 (4th ed. 1951). “In
cumbrance,” in turn, was defined as “[a]ny right to, or inter
est in, land which may subsist in another to the diminution
of its value . . . .” Id., at 908; see also id., at 941 (8th ed.
2004) (defining “lien” as a “legal right or interest that a credi
tor has in another’s property”). New York law defines “tax
lien” in accordance with these general definitions. See N. Y.
Real Prop. Tax Law Ann. § 102(21) (West Supp. 2007) (“ ‘Tax
lien’ means an unpaid tax . . . which is an encumbrance of
real property . . . ”). This Court, interpreting the Bank
ruptcy Code, has also recognized that a lienholder has a
property interest, albeit a “nonpossessory” interest.
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 76
(1982).
The practical effects of a lien bear out these definitions of
liens as interests in property. A lien on real property runs
with the land and is enforceable against subsequent purchas
ers. See 5 Restatement of Property § 540 (1944). As such,
“a lien has an immediate adverse effect upon the amount
which [could be] receive[d] on a sale, . . . constitut[ing] a
direct interference with the property . . . .” Republic of
Argentina v. New York, 25 N. Y. 2d 252, 262, 250 N. E. 2d 698,
702 (1969). A tax lien thus inhibits one of the quintessential
rights of property ownership—the right to convey. It is

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therefore plain that a suit to establish the validity of a lien
implicates “rights in immovable property.”
B
Our reading of the text is supported by two well
recognized and related purposes of the FSIA: adoption of the
restrictive view of sovereign immunity and codification of
international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment.
Until the middle of the last century, the United States fol
lowed “the classical or virtually absolute theory of sovereign
immunity,” under which “a sovereign cannot, without his
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sov
ereign.” Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser,
U. S. Dept. of State, to Acting U. S. Attorney General Phillip
B. Perlman (May 19, 1952) (Tate Letter), reprinted in 26
Dept. of State Bull. 984 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U. S. 682, 711, 712
(1976) (Appendix 2 to opinion of the Court). The Tate Let
ter announced the United States’ decision to join the major
ity of other countries by adopting the “restrictive theory”
of sovereign immunity, under which “the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public
acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private
acts (jure gestionis).” Id., at 711. In enacting the FSIA,
Congress intended to codify the restrictive theory’s limita
tion of immunity to sovereign acts. Republic of Argentina
v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 612 (1992); Asociacion
de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F. 2d 1517,
1520 (CADC 1984) (Scalia, J.).
As a threshold matter, property ownership is not an inher
ently sovereign function. See Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 145 (1812) (“A prince, by acquiring
private property in a foreign country, may possibly be con
sidered as subjecting that property to the territorial juris
diction; he may be considered as so far laying down the

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prince, and assuming the character of a private individual”).
In addition, the FSIA was also meant “to codify . . . the
pre-existing real property exception to sovereign immunity
recognized by international practice.” Reclamantes, supra,
at 1521 (Scalia, J.). Therefore, it is useful to note that
international practice at the time of the FSIA’s enactment
also supports the City’s view that these sovereigns are not
immune. The most recent restatement of foreign relations
law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment states that a foreign
sovereign’s immunity does not extend to “an action to ob
tain possession of or establish a property interest in immov
able property located in the territory of the state exercising
jurisdiction.” Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 68(b), p. 205 (1965). As stated
above, because an action seeking the declaration of the valid
ity of a tax lien on property is a suit to establish an interest
in such property, such an action would be allowed under
this rule.
Petitioners respond to this conclusion by citing the second
sentence of Comment d to § 68, which states that the rule
“does not preclude immunity with respect to a claim arising
out of a foreign state’s ownership or possession of immovable
property but not contesting such ownership or the right to
possession.” Id., at 207. According to petitioners, that
sentence limits the exception to cases contesting ownership
or possession. When read in context, however, the comment
supports the City. Petitioners ignore the first sentence of
the comment, which reemphasizes that immunity does not
extend to cases involving the possession of or “interest in”
the property. Ibid. And the illustrations following the
comment make clear that it refers only to claims incidental
to property ownership, such as actions involving an “injury
suffered in a fall” on the property, for which immunity would
apply. Id., at 208. By contrast, for an eminent-domain pro
ceeding, the foreign sovereign could not claim immunity.

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Opinion of the Court
Ibid. Like the eminent-domain proceeding, the City’s law
suits here directly implicate rights in property.
In addition, both parties rely on various international
agreements, primarily the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U. S. T. 3227, T. I. A. S. No. 7502,
to identify pre-FSIA international practice. Petitioners
point to the Vienna Convention’s analogous withholding of
immunity for “a real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving State, un
less [the diplomatic agent] holds it on behalf of the sending
State for the purposes of the mission.” Id., at 3240, Art.
31(1)(a). Petitioners contend that this language indicates
they are entitled to immunity for two reasons. First, peti
tioners argue that “ ‘real action[s]’ ” do not include actions
for performance of obligations “ ‘deriving from ownership or
possession of immovable property.’ ” Brief for Petitioners
28 (quoting E. Denza, Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 238 (2d ed.
1998); emphasis deleted). Second, petitioners assert that
the property here is held “ ‘on behalf of the sending State for
purposes of the Mission.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 28.
But as the City shows, it is far from apparent that the
term “real action”—a term derived from the civil law—is
as limited as petitioners suggest. See Chateau Lafayette
Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook Nat. Bank, 416 F. 2d 301,
304, n. 7 (CA5 1969). Moreover, the exception for property
held “on behalf of the sending State” concerns only the
case—not at issue here—where local law requires an agent
to hold in his own name property used for the purposes of a
mission. 1957 Y. B. Int’l L. Comm’n 94–95 (402d Meeting,
May 22, 1957); see also Deputy Registrar Case, 94 I. L. R.
308, 313 (D. Ct. The Hague 1980). Other tribunals constru
ing Article 31 have also held that it does not extend immu
nity to staff housing. See id., at 312; cf. Intpro Properties
(U. K.) Ltd. v. Sauvel, [1983] 1 Q. B. 1019, 1032–1033.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
In sum, the Vienna Convention does not unambiguously
support either party on the jurisdictional question.2 In any
event, nothing in the Vienna Convention deters us from our
interpretation of the FSIA. Under the language of the
FSIA’s exception for immovable property, petitioners are not
immune from the City’s suits.
III
Because the statutory text and the acknowledged purposes
of the FSIA make it clear that a suit to establish the validity
of a tax lien places “rights in immovable property . . . in
issue,” we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
dissenting.
Diplomatic channels provide the normal method of resolv
ing disputes between local governmental entities and foreign
sovereigns. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116, 146 (1812). Following well-established interna
tional practice, American courts throughout our history have
consistently endorsed the general rule that foreign sover
eigns enjoy immunity from suit in our courts. See Verlin
den B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486
(1983); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 417 (1979). The fact
that the immunity is the product of comity concerns rather
than a want of juridical power, see Verlinden B. V., 461 U. S.,
2 The City offers several other arguments against immunity based on
the Vienna Convention, but those arguments ultimately go to the merits
of the case, i. e., whether petitioners are actually responsible for paying
the taxes. Because the only question before us is one of jurisdiction, and
because the text and historical context of the FSIA demonstrate that peti
tioners are not immune from the City’s suits, we leave these merits-related
arguments to the lower courts.

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Stevens, J., dissenting
at 486, does not detract from the important role that it per
forms in ordering our affairs.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)
both codified and modified that basic rule. The statute con
firms that sovereigns are generally immune from suit in our
courts, 28 U. S. C. § 1604, but identifies seven specific excep
tions through which courts may accept jurisdiction, § 1605(a).
None of those exceptions pertains, or indeed makes any ref
erence, to actions brought to establish a foreign sovereign’s
tax liabilities. Because this is such an action, I think it is
barred by the general rule codified in the FSIA.
It is true that the FSIA contains an exception for suits
to resolve disputes over “rights in immovable property,”
§ 1605(a)(4), and New York City law provides that unpaid
real estate taxes create a lien that constitutes an interest in
such property, N. Y. C. Admin. Code § 11–301 (Cum. Supp.
2006). It follows that a literal application of the FSIA’s text
provides a basis for applying the exception to this case. See
ante, at 197–199. Given the breadth and vintage of the
background general rule, however, it seems to me highly un
likely that the drafters of the FSIA intended to abrogate
sovereign immunity in suits over property interests whose
primary function is to provide a remedy against delinquent
taxpayers.
Under the Court’s logic, since “a suit to establish the va
lidity of a lien implicates ‘rights in immovable property,’ ”
ante, at 199, whenever state or municipal law recognizes a
lien against a foreign sovereign’s real property, the foreign
government may be haled into federal court to litigate the
validity of that lien. Such a broad exception to sovereign
immunity threatens, as they say, to swallow the rule.
Under the municipal law of New York City, for example, liens
are available against real property, among other things, to
compel landowners to pay for pest control, emergency re
pairs, and sidewalk upkeep. See N. Y. C. Admin. Code
§§ 17–145, 17–147, 17–151(b) (2000); see also M. Mitzner, Liens

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Stevens, J., dissenting
and Encumbrances, in Real Estate Titles 299, 311–314 (J.
Pedowitz ed. 1984). A whole host of routine civil controver
sies, from sidewalk slip-and-falls to landlord-tenant disputes,
could be converted into property liens under local law, and
then used—as the tax lien was in this case—to pierce a for
eign sovereign’s traditional and statutory immunity. In
order to reclaim immunity, foreign governments might argue
in those cases—just as the Governments of India and the
People’s Republic of Mongolia tried to argue here—that
slip-and-fall claims, even once they are transformed into
property liens, do not implicate “rights in immovable prop
erty.” But the burden of answering such complaints and
making such arguments is itself an imposition that foreign
sovereigns should not have to bear.
The force of the arguments of the Solicitor General as ami
cus curiae supporting petitioners buttresses my conviction
that a narrow reading of the statutory exception is more
faithful to congressional intent than a reading that enables a
dispute over taxes to be classified as a dispute over “rights
in immovable property.” It is true that insofar as the FSIA
transferred the responsibility for making immunity decisions
from the State Department to the Judiciary, Verlinden B. V.,
461 U. S., at 487–488, the views of the Executive are not enti
tled to any special deference on this issue. But we have
recognized that well-reasoned opinions of the Executive
Branch about matters within its expertise may have the
“power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
And I am persuaded. At bottom, this case is not about
the validity of the city’s title to immovable property, or even
the validity of its automatic prejudgment lien. Rather, it is
a dispute over a foreign sovereign’s tax liability. If Con
gress had intended the statute to waive sovereign immunity
in tax litigation, I think it would have said so.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.