JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

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130 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 06–1164. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided January 8, 2008
In a Court of Federal Claims action, petitioner argued that various federal
activities on land for which it held a mining lease amounted to an uncon
stitutional taking of its leasehold rights. The Government initially as
serted that the claims were untimely under the court of claims statute
of limitations, but later effectively conceded that issue and won on the
merits. Although the Government did not raise timeliness on appeal,
the Federal Circuit addressed the issue sua sponte, finding the action
untimely.
Held: The court of claims statute of limitations requires sua sponte con
sideration of a lawsuit’s timeliness, despite the Government’s waiver of
the issue. Pp. 133–139.
(a) This Court has long interpreted the statute as setting out a more
absolute, “jurisdictional” limitations period. For example, in 1883, the
Court concluded with regard to the current statute’s predecessor that
“it [was] the duty of the court to raise the [timeliness] question whether
it [was] done by plea or not.” Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123,
125–126. See also Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, and Soriano v.
United States, 352 U. S. 270. That the statute’s language has changed
slightly since 1883 makes no difference here, for there has been no ex
pression of congressional intent to change the underlying substantive
law. Pp. 133–136.
(b) Thus, petitioner can succeed only by convincing the Court that it
has overturned, or should overturn, its earlier precedent. Pp. 136–139.
(1) The Court did not do so in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, where it applied equitable tolling to a limitations
statute governing employment discrimination claims against the Gov
ernment. While the Irwin Court noted the similarity of that statute
to the court of claims statute, the civil rights statute is unlike the pres
ent statute in the key respect that the Court had not previously pro
vided a definitive interpretation. Moreover, the Irwin Court men
tioned Soriano, which reflects the particular interpretive history of the
court of claims statute, but said nothing about overturning it or any
other case in that line. Finally, just as an equitable tolling presumption

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Syllabus
could be rebutted by statutory language demonstrating Congress’ con
trary intent, it should be rebutted by a definitive earlier interpretation
finding a similar congressional intent. Language in Franconia Associ
ates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145, describing the court of claims
statute as “unexceptional” and citing Irwin for the proposition “that
limitations principles should generally apply to the Government in the
same way that they apply to private parties” refers only to the statute’s
claims-accrual rule and adds little or nothing to petitioner’s contention
that Irwin overruled earlier cases. Pp. 136–138.
(2) Stare decisis principles require rejection of petitioner’s argu
ment that the Court should overturn Kendall, Finn, Soriano, and re
lated cases. Any anomaly such old cases and Irwin together create is
not critical, but simply reflects a different judicial assumption about the
comparative weight Congress would likely have attached to competing
national interests. Moreover, the earlier cases do not produce “un
workable” law, see, e. g., United States v. International Business Ma
chines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856. Stare decisis in respect to statutory
interpretation also has “special force.” Congress, which “remains free
to alter what [the Court has] done,” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164, 172–173, has long acquiesced in the interpretation given
here. Finally, even if the Government cannot show detrimental reli
ance on the earlier cases, reexamination of well-settled precedent could
nevertheless prove harmful. Overturning a decision on the belief that
it is no longer “right” would inevitably reflect a willingness to re
consider others, and such willingness could itself threaten to substitute
disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability.
Pp. 138–139.
457 F. 3d 1345, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ste
vens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post,
p. 140. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 144.
Jeffrey K. Haynes argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Keith C. Jablonski and Gregory C.
Sisk.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General

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132 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Dep
uty Solicitor General Kneedler, and Aaron P. Avila.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether a court must raise on
its own the timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of Fed
eral Claims, despite the Government’s waiver of the issue.
We hold that the special statute of limitations governing
the Court of Federal Claims requires that sua sponte
consideration.
I
Petitioner John R. Sand & Gravel Company filed an action
in the Court of Federal Claims in May 2002. The complaint
explained that petitioner held a 50-year mining lease on cer
tain land. And it asserted that various Environmental Pro
tection Agency activities on that land (involving, e. g., the
building and moving of various fences) amounted to an un
constitutional taking of its leasehold rights.
The Government initially asserted that petitioner’s several
claims were all untimely in light of the statute providing that
“[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first ac
crues.” 28 U. S. C. § 2501. Later, however, the Govern
ment effectively conceded that certain claims were timely.
See App. 37a–39a (Government’s pretrial brief). The Gov
ernment subsequently won on the merits. See 62 Fed. Cl.
556, 589 (2004).
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Asso
ciation of Home Builders by Duane J. Desiderio and Thomas J. Ward;
and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Diana M. Kirchheim and James
S. Burling.
Thomas C. Goldstein, Patricia A. Millett, Robert Huffman, and Steven
C. Nadeau filed a brief for the Metamora Group as amicus curiae urging
affirmance.

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Opinion of the Court
Petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 457 F. 3d 1345, 1346
(2006). The Government’s brief said nothing about the stat
ute of limitations, but an amicus brief called the issue to the
court’s attention. See id., at 1352. The court considered
itself obliged to address the limitations issue, and it held that
the action was untimely. Id., at 1353–1360. We subse
quently agreed to consider whether the Court of Appeals
was right to ignore the Government’s waiver and to decide
the timeliness question. 550 U. S. 968 (2007).
II
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect de
fendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. See, e. g.,
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979). Thus,
the law typically treats a limitations defense as an affirma
tive defense that the defendant must raise at the pleadings
stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.
See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a); Day v. McDon
ough, 547 U. S. 198, 202 (2006); Zipes v. Trans World Air
lines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982). Such statutes also typi
cally permit courts to toll the limitations period in light of
special equitable considerations. See, e. g., Rotella v. Wood,
528 U. S. 549, 560–561 (2000); Zipes, supra, at 393; see also
Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450–453
(CA7 1990).
Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much to
protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to
achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating
the administration of claims, see, e. g., United States v.
Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352–353 (1997), limiting the scope
of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity, see, e. g.,
United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 609–610 (1990), or pro
moting judicial efficiency, see, e. g., Bowles v. Russell, 551
U. S. 205, 210–213 (2007). The Court has often read the
time limits of these statutes as more absolute, say, as requir

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134 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
ing a court to decide a timeliness question despite a waiver,
or as forbidding a court to consider whether certain equita
ble considerations warrant extending a limitations period.
See, e. g., id., at 212–213; see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). As convenient shorthand, the
Court has sometimes referred to the time limits in such stat
utes as “jurisdictional.” See, e. g., Bowles, supra, at 210.
This Court has long interpreted the court of claims limita
tions statute as setting forth this second, more absolute, kind
of limitations period.
A
In Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), the Court
applied a predecessor of the current 6-year bar to a claim
that had first accrued in 1865 but that the plaintiff did not
bring until 1872. Id., at 124; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
§ 10, 12 Stat. 767 (Rev. Stat. § 1069). The plaintiff, a former
Confederate States employee, had asked for equitable tolling
on the ground that he had not been able to bring the suit
until Congress, in 1868, lifted a previously imposed legal dis
ability. See 107 U. S., at 124–125. But the Court denied
the request. Id., at 125–126. It did so not because it
thought the equities ran against the plaintiff, but because the
statute (with certain listed exceptions) did not permit tolling.
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, said the statute was
“jurisdiction[al],” that it was not susceptible to judicial “en
graft[ing]” of unlisted disabilities such as “sickness, surprise,
or inevitable accident,” and that “it [was] the duty of the
court to raise the [timeliness] question whether it [was]
done by plea or not.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
Four years later, in Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227
(1887), the Court found untimely a claim that had originally
been filed with a Government agency, but which that agency
had then voluntarily referred by statute to the Court of
Claims. Id., at 229–230 (citing Act of June 25, 1868, § 7, 15
Stat. 76); see also Rev. Stat. §§ 1063–1065. That Govern
ment reference, it might have been argued, amounted to a

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waiver by the Government of any limitations-based defense.
Cf. United States v. Lippitt, 100 U. S. 663, 669 (1880) (reserv
ing the question of the time bar’s application in such circum
stances). The Court nonetheless held that the long (over
10-year) delay between the time the claim accrued and the
plaintiff ’s filing of the claim before the agency made the suit
untimely. Finn, 123 U. S., at 232. And as to any argument
of Government waiver or abandonment of the time-bar de
fense, Justice Harlan, again writing for the Court, said that
the ordinary legal principle that “limitation . . . is a defence
[that a defendant] must plead . . . has no application to suits
in the Court of Claims against the United States.” Id., at
232–233 (emphasis added).
Over the years, the Court has reiterated in various con
texts this or similar views about the more absolute nature
of the court of claims limitations statute. See Soriano v.
United States, 352 U. S. 270, 273–274 (1957); United States v.
Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 602 (1897); United States v. New
York, 160 U. S. 598, 616–619 (1896); De Arnaud v. United
States, 151 U. S. 483, 495–496 (1894).
B
The statute’s language has changed slightly since Kendall
was decided in 1883, but we do not see how any changes in
language make a difference here. The only arguably perti
nent linguistic change took place during the 1948 recodifica
tion of Title 28. See § 2501, 62 Stat. 976. Prior to 1948, the
statute said that “[e]very claim . . . cognizable by the Court
of Claims, shall be forever barred” unless filed within six
years of the time it first accrues. Rev. Stat. § 1069 (empha
sis added); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 156, 36 Stat. 1139
(reenacting the statute without any significant changes).
Now, it says that “[e]very claim of which” the Court of Fed
eral Claims “has jurisdiction shall be barred” unless filed
within six years of the time it first accrues. 28 U. S. C.
§ 2501 (emphasis added).

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136 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
This Court does not “presume” that the 1948 revision
“worked a change in the underlying substantive law ‘unless
an intent to make such a change is clearly expressed.’ ”
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 209 (1993) (quot
ing Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353
U. S. 222, 227 (1957); alterations omitted); see also H. R. Rep.
No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1–8 (1947) (hereinafter
Rep. No. 308) (revision sought to codify, not substantively
modify, existing law); Barron, The Judicial Code: 1948 Revi
sion, 8 F. R. D. 439 (1948) (same). We can find no such ex
pression of intent here. The two linguistic forms (“cogniza
ble by”; “has jurisdiction”) mean about the same thing. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 991 (4th ed. 1951) (defining “jurisdic
tion” as “the authority by which courts and judicial officers
take cognizance of and decide cases” (emphasis added)); see
also Black’s Law Dictionary 1038 (3d ed. 1933) (similarly
using the term “cognizance” to define “jurisdiction”). Nor
have we found any suggestion in the Reviser’s Notes or any
where else that Congress intended to change the prior mean
ing. See Rep. No. 308, at A192 (Reviser’s Note); Barron,
supra, at 446 (Reviser’s Notes specify where change was in
tended). Thus, it is not surprising that nearly a decade
after the revision, the Court, citing Kendall, again repeated
that the statute’s limitations period was “jurisdiction[al]”
and not susceptible to equitable tolling. See Soriano,
supra, at 273–274, 277.
III
In consequence, petitioner can succeed only by convincing
us that this Court has overturned, or that it should now
overturn, its earlier precedent.
A
We cannot agree with petitioner that the Court already
has overturned the earlier precedent. It is true, as peti
tioner points out, that in Irwin v. Department of Veterans

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Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), we adopted “a more general rule”
to replace our prior ad hoc approach for determining
whether a Government-related statute of limitations is sub
ject to equitable tolling—namely, “that the same rebuttable
presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against
private defendants should also apply to suits against the
United States.” Id., at 95–96. It is also true that Irwin,
using that presumption, found equitable tolling applicable to
a statute of limitations governing employment discrimina
tion claims against the Government. See id., at 96; see also
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16(c) (1988 ed.). And the Court noted
that this civil rights statute was linguistically similar to the
court of claims statute at issue here. See Irwin, supra, at
94–95.
But these few swallows cannot make petitioner’s summer.
That is because Irwin dealt with a different limitations stat
ute. That statute, while similar to the present statute in
language, is unlike the present statute in the key respect
that the Court had not previously provided a definitive inter
pretation. Moreover, the Court, while mentioning a case
that reflects the particular interpretive history of the court
of claims statute, namely, Soriano, supra, says nothing at all
about overturning that or any other case in that line. See
498 U. S., at 94–95. Courts do not normally overturn a long
line of earlier cases without mentioning the matter. Indeed,
Irwin recognized that it was announcing a general prospec
tive rule, see id., at 95, which does not imply revisiting
past precedents.
Finally, Irwin adopted a “rebuttable presumption” of equi
table tolling. Ibid. (emphasis added). That presumption
seeks to produce a set of statutory interpretations that will
more accurately reflect Congress’ likely meaning in the mine
run of instances where it enacted a Government-related stat
ute of limitations. But the word “rebuttable” means that
the presumption is not conclusive. Specific statutory lan

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138 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
guage, for example, could rebut the presumption by demon
strating Congress’ intent to the contrary. And if so, a defin
itive earlier interpretation of the statute, finding a similar
congressional intent, should offer a similarly sufficient
rebuttal.
Petitioner adds that in Franconia Associates v. United
States, 536 U. S. 129 (2002), we explicitly considered the
court of claims limitations statute, we described the statute
as “unexceptional,” and we cited Irwin for the proposition
“that limitations principles should generally apply to the
Government in the same way that they apply to private par
ties.” 536 U. S., at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
But we did all of this in the context of rejecting an argument
by the Government that the court of claims statute embodies
a special, earlier-than-normal, rule as to when a claim first
accrues. Id., at 144–145. The quoted language thus refers
only to the statute’s claims-accrual rule and adds little or
nothing to petitioner’s contention that Irwin overruled our
earlier cases—a contention that we have just rejected.
B
Petitioner’s argument must therefore come down to an in
vitation now to reject or to overturn Kendall, Finn, Sori
ano, and related cases. In support, petitioner can claim that
Irwin and Franconia represent a turn in the course of the
law and can argue essentially as follows: The law now re
quires courts, when they interpret statutes setting forth lim
itations periods in respect to actions against the Govern
ment, to place greater weight upon the equitable importance
of treating the Government like other litigants and less
weight upon the special governmental interest in protecting
public funds. Cf. Irwin, supra, at 95–96. The older inter
pretations treated these interests differently. Those older
cases have consequently become anomalous. The Govern
ment is unlikely to have relied significantly upon those ear
lier cases. Hence the Court should now overrule them.

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Opinion of the Court
Basic principles of stare decisis, however, require us to re
ject this argument. Any anomaly the old cases and Irwin
together create is not critical; at most, it reflects a different
judicial assumption about the comparative weight Congress
would likely have attached to competing legitimate interests.
Moreover, the earlier cases lead, at worst, to different inter
pretations of different, but similarly worded, statutes; they
do not produce “unworkable” law. See United States v. In
ternational Business Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); California v.
FERC, 495 U. S. 490, 499 (1990). Further, stare decisis in
respect to statutory interpretation has “special force,” for
“Congress remains free to alter what we have done.” Pat
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173
(1989); see also Watson v. United States, ante, at 82–83. Ad
ditionally, Congress has long acquiesced in the interpretation
we have given. See ibid.; Shepard v. United States, 544
U. S. 13, 23 (2005).
Finally, even if the Government cannot show detrimental
reliance on our earlier cases, our reexamination of well
settled precedent could nevertheless prove harmful. Justice
Brandeis once observed that “in most matters it is more im
portant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion). To overturn
a decision settling one such matter simply because we
might believe that decision is no longer “right” would inevi
tably reflect a willingness to reconsider others. And that
willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption,
confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability. We
have not found here any factors that might overcome these
considerations.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

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140 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
Statutes of limitations generally fall into two broad cate
gories: affirmative defenses that can be waived and so-called
“jurisdictional” statutes that are not subject to waiver or
equitable tolling. For much of our history, statutes of limi
tations in suits against the Government were customarily
placed in the latter category on the theory that conditions
attached to a waiver of sovereign immunity “must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”
Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 (1957); see also
Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 232–233 (1887); Kendall
v. United States, 107 U. S. 123, 125–126 (1883). But that rule
was ignored—and thus presumably abandoned—in Honda v.
Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967),1 and Bowen v. City of New York,
476 U. S. 467 (1986).2
In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89,
95–96 (1990), we followed the lead of Bowen (and, by exten
sion, Honda), and explicitly replaced the Soriano rule with
a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling rules “appli
cable to suits against private defendants should also apply to
suits against the United States.” 3 We acknowledged that
1 In Honda, we concluded, as to petitioners’ attempts to recover assets
that had been seized upon the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, that it
was “consistent with the overall congressional purpose to apply a tradi
tional equitable tolling principle, aptly suited to the particular facts of this
case and nowhere eschewed by Congress.” 386 U. S., at 501.
2 In Bowen, we permitted equitable tolling of the 60-day requirement
for challenging the denial of disability benefits under the Social Security
Act. We cautioned that “we must be careful not to assume the authority
to narrow the waiver that Congress intended, or construe the waiver un
duly restrictively.” 476 U. S., at 479 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
3 During the Irwin oral arguments, several Members of the Court re
marked on the need to choose between the Soriano line of cases and the
approach taken in cases like Bowen. See Tr. of Oral Arg., O. T. 1990,
No. 89–5867, pp. 25–26 (“Question: ‘[W]hat do you make of our cases which
seem to go really in different directions. The Bowen case, which was

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Stevens, J., dissenting
“our previous cases dealing with the effect of time limits in
suits against the Government [had] not been entirely consist
ent,” 498 U. S., at 94, and we determined that “a continuing
effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis . . .
would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability
without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to
the intent of Congress,” id., at 95. We therefore crafted a
background rule that reflected “a realistic assessment of leg
islative intent,” and also provided “a practically useful prin
ciple of interpretation.” Ibid.
Our decision in Irwin did more than merely “mentio[n]”
Soriano, ante, at 137; rather, we expressly declined to follow
that case. We noted that the limitations language at issue
in Irwin closely resembled the text we had confronted in
Soriano; although we conceded that “[a]n argument [could]
undoubtedly be made” that the statutes were distinguish
able, we were “not persuaded that the difference between
them [was] enough to manifest a different congressional in
tent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling,” 498
U. S., at 95. Having found the two statutes functionally in
distinguishable, we nevertheless declined the Government’s
invitation to follow Soriano, and we did not so much as cite
Kendall or Finn. Instead, we adopted “a more general rule
to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits
against the Government,” 498 U. S., at 95, and we applied
the new presumption in favor of equitable tolling to the case
before us.4 Nothing in the framing of our decision to adopt
unanimous and contains language in it that says statutory time limits are
traditionally subject to equitable tolling, and other cases like maybe
Soriano . . . which point in the other direction[?]’ ”); see also id., at 8
(“Question: ‘ . . . I think we sort of have to choose between Soriano and
Bowen, don’t you think?’ ”).
4 In the years since we decided Irwin, we have applied its rule in a
number of statutory contexts. See, e. g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541
U. S. 401, 420–423 (2004) (applying the rule of Irwin and finding that an
application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U. S. C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(A), should be permitted to be amended out of time). Most

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142 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Stevens, J., dissenting
a “general rule” to govern the availability of equitable tolling
in suits against the Government, ibid., suggested a carveout
for statutes we had already held ineligible for equitable toll
ing, pursuant to the approach that we had previously aban
doned in Honda and Bowen, and definitively rejected in
Irwin.
Indeed, in his separate opinion in Irwin, Justice White
noted that the decision was not only inconsistent with our
prior cases but also that it “directly overrule[d]” Soriano.
498 U. S., at 98 (opinion concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Neither the Court’s opinion nor my separate
opinion disagreed with that characterization of our holding.
The attempt of the Court today, therefore, to cast petition
er’s argument as an entreaty to overrule Soriano, as well as
Kendall and Finn—and its response that “[b]asic principles
of stare decisis . . . require us to reject this argument,” ante,
at 139—has a hollow ring. If the doctrine of stare decisis
supplied a clear answer to the question posed by this case—
or if the Government could plausibly argue that it had relied
on Soriano after our decision in Irwin—I would join the
Court’s judgment, despite its unwisdom.5 But I do not
significantly, in Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145
(2002), we affirmed, in the context of 28 U. S. C. § 2501, the rule that “limi
tations principles should generally apply to the Government ‘in the same
way that’ they apply to private parties” (citing Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95).
Although the Government is correct that the question presented by Fran
conia was when a claim accrued under § 2501, our reliance on Irwin under
mines the majority’s suggestion that Irwin has no bearing on statutes that
have previously been the subject of judicial construction.
5 The majority points out quite rightly, ante, at 139, that the doctrine of
stare decisis has “ ‘special force’ ” in statutory cases. See Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173 (1989). But the doctrine
should not prevent us from acknowledging when we have already over
ruled a prior case, even if we failed to say so explicitly at the time. In
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004), for example, we explained that in
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973), we had
overruled so much of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), as found that
the habeas petitioners’ presence within the territorial reach of the district

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Stevens, J., dissenting
agree with the majority’s reading of our cases. It seems to
me quite plain that Soriano is no longer good law, and if
there is in fact ambiguity in our cases, it ought to be resolved
in favor of clarifying the law, rather than preserving an
anachronism whose doctrinal underpinnings were discarded
years ago.6
With respect to provisions as common as time limitations,
Congress, in enacting statutes, and judges, in applying them,
ought to be able to rely upon a background rule of consider
able clarity. Irwin announced such a rule, and I would
apply that rule to the case before us.7 Because today’s deci
sion threatens to revive the confusion of our pre-Irwin juris
prudence, I respectfully dissent.
court was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Braden held, contrary to Ahrens,
that a prisoner’s presence within the district court’s territorial reach was
not an “inflexible jurisdictional rule,” 410 U. S., at 500. Braden nowhere
stated that it was overruling Ahrens, although Justice Rehnquist began
his dissent by noting: “Today the Court overrules Ahrens v. Clark.” 410
U. S., at 502. Thirty years later we acknowledged in Rasul what was by
then clear: Ahrens was no longer good law. 542 U. S., at 478–479, and n. 9.
Moreover, the logic of the “special force” of stare decisis in the statutory
context is that “Congress remains free to alter what we have done,” Pat
terson, 491 U. S., at 172–173. But the amendment of an obscure statutory
provision is not a high priority for a busy Congress, and we should remain
mindful that enactment of legislation is by no means a cost-free enterprise.
6 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897) (“It
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past”).
7 The majority does gesture toward an application of Irwin, contending
that even if Irwin’s rule is apposite, the presumption of congressional in
tent to allow equitable tolling is rebutted by this Court’s “definitive earlier
interpretation” of § 2501, ante, at 138. But the majority’s application of
the Irwin rule is implausible, since Irwin itself compared the language of
§ 2501 with the limitations language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and found that the comparison did not reveal “a different congres
sional intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling,” 498
U. S., at 95.

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144 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting.
I agree that adhering to Kendall, Finn, and Soriano is
irreconcilable with the reasoning and result in Irwin, and
therefore join Justice Stevens’ dissent. I write sepa
rately to explain why I would regard this case as an appro
priate occasion to revisit those precedents even if we had not
already “directly overrule[d]” them. Cf. Irwin v. Depart
ment of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 98 (1990) (White, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Stare decisis is an important, but not an inflexible, doc
trine in our law. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare de
cisis is not . . . a universal, inexorable command.”). The
policies underlying the doctrine—stability and predictabil
ity—are at their strongest when the Court is asked to change
its mind, though nothing else of significance has changed.
See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 281, 286–287 (1990). As to the matter before
us, our perception of the office of a time limit on suits against
the Government has changed significantly since the decisions
relied upon by the Court. We have recognized that “the
same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable
to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits
against the United States,” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95–96, and
that “limitations principles should generally apply to the
Government in the same way that they apply to private par
ties,” Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129,
145 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 420–422 (2004). It
damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn
precedent at odds with later, more enlightened decisions.
I surely do not suggest that overruling is routinely in
order whenever a majority disagrees with a past decision,
and I acknowledge that “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation,”

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145 Cite as: 552 U. S. 130 (2008)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (1989).
But concerns we have previously found sufficiently weighty
to justify revisiting a statutory precedent counsel strongly in
favor of doing so here. First, overruling Kendall v. United
States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), Finn v. United States, 123 U. S.
227 (1887), and Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270 (1957),
would, as the Court concedes, see ante, at 138–139, “achieve
a uniform interpretation of similar statutory language,” Ro
driguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490
U. S. 477, 484 (1989). Second, we have recognized the pro
priety of revisiting a decision when “intervening develop
ment of the law” has “removed or weakened [its] conceptual
underpinnings.” Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173. Irwin and
Franconia—not to mention our recent efforts to apply the
term “jurisdictional” with greater precision, see, e. g.,
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006)—have
left no tenable basis for Kendall and its progeny.
Third, it is altogether appropriate to overrule a precedent
that has become “a positive detriment to coherence and con
sistency in the law.” Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173. The in
consistency between the Kendall line and Irwin is a source
of both theoretical incoherence and practical confusion. For
example, 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a) contains a time limit materially
identical to the one in § 2501. Courts of Appeals have di
vided on the question whether § 2401(a)’s limit is “jurisdic
tional.” Compare Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamil
ton, 453 F. 3d 1331, 1334 (CA11 2006) (per curiam), with
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F. 3d 765, 770
(CA9 1997). See also Harris v. Federal Aviation Admin.,
353 F. 3d 1006, 1013, n. 7 (CADC 2004) (recognizing that
Irwin may have undermined Circuit precedent holding that
§ 2401(a) is “jurisdictional”). Today’s decision hardly assists
lower courts endeavoring to answer this question. While
holding that the language in § 2501 is “jurisdictional,” the
Court also implies that Irwin governs the interpretation of

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146 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
all statutes we have not yet construed—including, presum
ably, the identically worded § 2401. See ante, at 137–138.
Moreover, as the Court implicitly concedes, see ante, at
139, the strongest reason to adhere to precedent provides no
support for the Kendall-Finn-Soriano line. “Stare decisis
has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere,
and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance on a
previous decision, for in this instance overruling the decision
would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an
extensive legislative response.” Hilton v. South Carolina
Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991). The
Government, however, makes no claim that either private
citizens or Congress have relied upon the “jurisdictional”
status of § 2501. There are thus strong reasons to aban
don—and notably slim reasons to adhere to—the anachronis
tic interpretation of § 2501 adopted in Kendall.
Several times, in recent Terms, the Court has discarded
statutory decisions rendered infirm by what a majority con
sidered to be better informed opinion. See, e. g., Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877,
907 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911)); Bowles v. Russell,
551 U. S. 205, 214 (2007) (overruling Thompson v. INS, 375
U. S. 384 (1964) (per curiam), and Harris Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per cu
riam)); Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,
547 U. S. 28, 42–43 (2006) (overruling, inter alia, Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942)); Hohn v.
United States, 524 U. S. 236, 253 (1998) (overruling House v.
Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945) (per curiam)). In light of these
overrulings, the Court’s decision to adhere to Kendall, Finn,
and Soriano—while offering nothing to justify their reason
ing or results—is, to say the least, perplexing. After to
day’s decision, one will need a crystal ball to predict when
this Court will reject, and when it will cling to, its prior
decisions interpreting legislative texts.

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147 Cite as: 552 U. S. 130 (2008)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
I would reverse the judgment rendered by the Federal
Circuit majority. In accord with dissenting Judge Newman,
I would hold that the Court of Appeals had no warrant to
declare the petitioner’s action time barred.