LOGAN v. UNITED STATES

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Syllabus
LOGAN v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit
No. 06–6911. Argued October 30, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
Under federal law, the maximum prison term for a felon convicted of pos
sessing a firearm is ordinarily ten years. See 18 U. S. C. § 924(a)(2). If
the offender’s prior criminal record includes at least three convictions
for “violent felon[ies,]” however, the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA) mandates a minimum term of 15 years. See § 924(e)(1). Con
gress defined the term “violent felony” to include specified crimes “pun
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” § 924(e)(2)(B),
but also provided that a state-law misdemeanor may qualify as a “vio
lent felony” if the offense is punishable by a term of more than two
years, § 921(a)(20)(B). Congress amended § 921(a)(20) in 1986 to exclude
from qualification for enhanced sentencing “[a]ny conviction which has
been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned
or has had civil rights [i. e., rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a
jury] restored.”
Petitioner Logan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and received a 15-year sentence, the mandatory minimum under
ACCA. In imposing this sentence, the court took account of three Wis
consin misdemeanor battery convictions, each of them punishable by a
3-year maximum sentence, and none of them revoking any of Logan’s
civil rights. Logan challenged his sentence on the ground that his
state-court convictions fell within § 921(a)(20)’s “civil rights restored”
exemption from ACCA’s reach. Rights retained, Logan argued, should
be treated the same as rights revoked but later restored. The District
Court disagreed, holding that the exemption applies only to defendants
whose civil rights were both lost and restored, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed.
Held: The exemption contained in § 921(a)(20) does not cover the case of
an offender who retained civil rights at all times, and whose legal status,
postconviction, remained in all respects unaltered by any state dispensa
tion. Pp. 30–37.
(a) The ordinary meaning of the word “restored”—giving back some
thing that has been taken away—does not include retention of some
thing never lost. Moreover, the context in which “restored” appears
in § 921(a)(20) counsels adherence to the word’s ordinary meaning. In
§ 921(a)(20), the words “civil rights restored” appear in the company of

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24 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
“expunged,” “set aside,” and “pardoned.” Each of those terms de
scribes a measure by which the government relieves an offender of some
or all of the consequences of his conviction. In contrast, a defendant
who retains rights is simply left alone. He receives no status-altering
dispensation, no token of forgiveness from the government. Pp. 30–32.
(b) Logan’s dominant argument against a plain-meaning approach is
not persuasive. He relies on the harsh result a literal reading could
yield: Unless retention of rights is treated as legally equivalent to resto
ration of rights, he maintains, less serious offenders will be subject to
ACCA’s enhanced penalties while more serious offenders in the same
State, who have had civil rights restored, may escape heightened pun
ishment. Logan urges that this result is not merely anomalous; it is
absurd, particularly in States where restoration of civil rights occurs
automatically upon release from prison. P. 32.
Logan’s harsh or absurd consequences argument overlooks § 921(a)
(20)’s “unless” clause, under which an offender gains no exemption from
ACCA’s application through an expungement, set-aside, pardon, or res
toration of civil rights if the dispensation “expressly provides that the
[offender] may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Many
States that restore felons’ civil rights (or accord another measure of
forgiveness) nonetheless impose or retain firearms disabilities. Fur
ther, Wisconsin no longer punishes misdemeanors by more than two
years’ imprisonment, and thus no longer has any misdemeanors that
qualify as ACCA predicates. Pp. 32–33.
The resolution Logan proposes, in any event, would correct one poten
tial anomaly while creating others. Under Logan’s proposed construc
tion, all crimes, including first-degree murder, would be treated as
crimes for which “civil rights [have been] restored” in a State that does
not revoke any offender’s civil rights, while less serious crimes com
mitted elsewhere would not. Accepting Logan’s argument would also
undercut § 921(a)(20)(B), which subjects to ACCA state misdemeanor
convictions punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. Be
cause misdemeanors generally entail no revocation of civil rights, read
ing the word “restored” to include “retained” would yield this curiosity:
An offender would fall within ACCA’s reach if his three prior offenses
carried potential prison terms of over two years, but would be released
from ACCA’s grip by virtue of his retention of civil rights. This Court
is disinclined to say that what Congress imposed with one hand (expo
sure to ACCA) it withdrew with the other (exemption from ACCA).
Even assuming that when Congress revised § 921(a)(20) in 1986, it la
bored under the misapprehension that all misdemeanants and felons at
least temporarily forfeit civil rights, and indulging the further assump
tion that courts may repair such a congressional oversight or mistake,

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Syllabus
this Court is not equipped to say what statutory alteration, if any, Con
gress would have made had its attention trained on offenders who re
tained civil rights; nor can the Court recast § 921(a)(20) in Congress’
stead. Pp. 33–35.
Section 922(g)(9)—which was adopted ten years after § 921(a)(20) was
given its current shape and which outlaws possession of a firearm by
anyone “convicted . . . of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”—
cautions against any assumption that Congress did not mean to deny
the § 921(a)(20) exemption to offenders who retained their civil rights.
Tailored to § 922(g)(9), Congress adopted a definitional provision,
§ 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), corresponding to § 921(a)(20), which specifies expunge
ment, set-aside, pardon, or restoration of rights as dispensations that
can cancel lingering effects of a conviction. That provision also demon
strates that the words “civil rights restored” do not cover a person
whose civil rights were never taken away. It provides for restoration
of civil rights as a qualifying dispensation only “if the law of the applica
ble jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights” in the first place.
Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) also rebuts Logan’s absurdity argument. Stat
utory terms may be interpreted against their literal meaning where the
words could not conceivably have been intended to apply to the case at
hand. See, e. g., Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504,
511. In § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), however, Congress explicitly distinguished
between “restored” and “retained,” thereby making it more than con
ceivable that the Legislature, albeit an earlier one, meant to do the same
in § 921(a)(20). Pp. 35–37.
453 F. 3d 804, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Richard A. Coad argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Brian T. Fahl and Jeffrey T. Green.
Daryl Joseffer argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, As
sistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, and Joel M. Gershowitz.*
*Stephen P. Halbrook filed a brief for the National Rifle Association of
America, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Elliot H. Scherker, Julissa Rodriguez, Peter Goldberger, Mary Price,
and Barbara E. Bergman filed a brief for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as amici curiae.

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26 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner James D. Logan pleaded guilty in a United
States District Court to being a felon in possession of a fire
arm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). Logan’s record as
a recidivist, which included three relevant state convictions,
led the District Court to impose a 15-year prison term, the
minimum sentence mandated by the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). For
ACCA sentence-enhancement purposes, a prior conviction
may be disregarded if the conviction “has been expunged, or
set aside,” or the offender “has been pardoned or has had
civil rights restored.” § 921(a)(20) (2000 ed.). None of Lo
gan’s prior convictions have been expunged or set aside.
Nor has he been pardoned for any past crime. And, bearing
importantly on the instant petition, the three state-court
convictions that triggered Logan’s ACCA-enhanced sentence
occasioned no loss of civil rights.
Challenging his enhanced sentence, Logan presents this
question: Does the “civil rights restored” exemption con
tained in § 921(a)(20) encompass, and therefore remove from
ACCA’s reach, state-court convictions that at no time de
prived the offender of civil rights? We hold that the
§ 921(a)(20) exemption provision does not cover the case of
an offender who retained civil rights at all times, and whose
legal status, postconviction, remained in all respects unal
tered by any state dispensation.
Section 921(a)(20) sets out postconviction events—
expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil
rights—that extend to an offender a measure of forgiveness,
relieving him from some or all of the consequences of his
conviction. Congress might have broadened the § 921(a)(20)
exemption provision to cover convictions attended by no loss
of civil rights. The national lawmakers, however, did not do
so. Section 921(a)(20)’s failure to exempt convictions that do
not revoke civil rights produces anomalies. But so does the
extension of the § 921(a)(20) exemption that Logan advances.

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Opinion of the Court
We are not equipped to say what statutory alteration, if
any, Congress would have made had its attention trained
on offenders who retained civil rights; nor can we recast
§ 921(a)(20) in Congress’ stead.
I
Federal law generally prohibits the possession of a firearm
by a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprison
ment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1).
Ordinarily, the maximum felon-in-possession sentence is ten
years. See § 924(a)(2). If the offender’s prior criminal rec
ord includes at least three convictions for “violent felon[ies]”
or “serious drug offense[s],” however, the maximum sentence
increases to life, and ACCA mandates a minimum term of 15
years. § 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
Congress defined the term “violent felony” to include spec
ified crimes “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceed
ing one year.” § 924(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). An offense classi
fied by a State as a misdemeanor, however, may qualify as a
“violent felony” for ACCA-enhancement purposes (or as a
predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g))
only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in
prison. § 921(a)(20)(B).
In Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103
(1983), we held that a State’s expungement of a conviction
did not nullify the conviction for purposes of the firearms
disabilities Congress placed in §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). In so
ruling, we noted that our decision would ensure greater uni
formity in federal sentences. See id., at 119–120. Provi
sions for expungement “var[ied] widely from State to State,”
we observed, id., at 120, and yielded “nothing less than a
national patchwork,” id., at 122.
In the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (FOPA), 100 Stat.
449, Congress amended § 921(a)(20) in response to Dicker
son’s holding that, for purposes of federal firearms disabili
ties, state law did not determine the present impact of a

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Opinion of the Court
prior conviction. The amended provision excludes from
qualification as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year” (or a misdemeanor under state law
punishable by more than two years in prison):
“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside
or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored . . . unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the
person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive fire
arms.” 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20).1
While § 921(a)(20) does not define the term “civil rights,”
courts have held, and petitioner agrees, that the civil rights
relevant under the above-quoted provision are the rights
to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury. See Brief for
Petitioner 13, n. 10; cf. Caron v. United States, 524 U. S. 308,
316 (1998).
II
On May 31, 2005, police officers responded to a domestic
disturbance complaint made by Logan’s girlfriend, Asenath
Wilson. App. 9, 12. Wilson told the officers, among other
things, that she had seen Logan with a gun and that he usu
ally kept it in the car. Id., at 9. Logan, who was with Wil
1 FOPA, 100 Stat. 449, included a “safety valve” provision under which
persons subject to federal firearms disabilities, including persons whose
civil rights have not been restored, may apply to the Attorney General for
relief from the disabilities. See 18 U. S. C. § 925(c) (2000 ed., Supp. V).
The relief provision has been rendered inoperative, however, for Congress
has repeatedly barred the Attorney General from using appropriated
funds “to investigate or act upon [relief] applications.” United States v.
Bean, 537 U. S. 71, 74–75 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
bar on funding was renewed every year from 1992 through 2006. See id.,
at 75, n. 3 (1992 through 2002); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003, 117 Stat. 433; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 118 Stat. 53;
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 118 Stat. 2859; Science, State, Jus
tice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, 119
Stat. 2290.

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son when the police arrived, consented to a search of his car.
Id., at 11. In a hidden compartment behind the glove box,
the officers found a 9-millimeter handgun. Id., at 9–10, 12.
Logan pleaded guilty to the federal offense of possession
of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Id.,
at 12. (In 1991, he had been convicted in an Illinois court of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Id., at 9–10,
12.) The United States District Court for the Western Dis
trict of Wisconsin sentenced Logan to imprisonment for 15
years, the mandatory minimum under ACCA. In imposing
that enhanced sentence, the District Court took account of
Logan’s three Wisconsin misdemeanor battery convictions,
each punishable by a maximum sentence of three years’ im
prisonment. Id., at 16–18.2
Both in the District Court and on appeal, Logan argued
that his Wisconsin misdemeanor convictions did not qualify
as ACCA predicate offenses because they caused no loss of
his civil rights. Rights retained, he urged, are functionally
equivalent to rights revoked but later restored. If the ex
emption contained in § 921(a)(20) covered the three state
court misdemeanor convictions, Logan’s maximum sentence,
in lieu of the 15-year mandatory minimum under ACCA,
would have been ten years, see § 924(a)(2), and the United
2 Under Wisconsin law, misdemeanor battery is ordinarily punishable by
a maximum term of nine months. See Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1) (2005);
§ 939.51(3). Logan was exposed to a three-year maximum term for each
offense, however, because he was convicted as a “repeater” or “habitual”
criminal. See App. 16–17; Wis. Stat. § 939.62 (1999–2000).
Postdating Logan’s battery convictions, Wisconsin prospectively re
duced the maximum term for “repeater” misdemeanors to two years. See
2001 Wis. Act 109, § 562 (Jan. 2002 special session) (amending Wis. Stat.
§ 939.62). Misdemeanors committed in Wisconsin after this reduction no
longer qualify as “violent felonies” under 18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(20).
Logan has never argued that his Wisconsin convictions should not count
as ACCA predicates because they were punishable by more than two
years’ imprisonment solely because of his status as a recidivist offender.
We express no opinion on this matter. Cf. United States v. Rodriquez,
464 F. 3d 1072 (CA9 2006), cert. granted, 551 U. S. 1191 (2007).

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Opinion of the Court
States Sentencing Guidelines would have indicated a sen
tence range of 37 to 46 months, see Brief for Petitioner 5.
The District Court rejected Logan’s argument, holding that
the § 921(a)(20) exemption provision “applies only to defend
ants whose civil rights were both lost and restored pursuant
to state statutes.” App. in No. 05–CR–088–S–01 (WD
Wis.), p. 11. Accordingly, the court sentenced Logan to im
prisonment for 15 years. Id., at 12.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir
cuit affirmed, concluding that “an offender whose civil rights
have been neither diminished nor returned is not a person
who ‘has had civil rights restored.’ ” 453 F. 3d 804, 805
(2006). Logan’s argument for treating retained rights the
same way as restored rights, the appeals court observed,
“go[es] in the teeth of [§ 921(a)(20)’s] text.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. 1204 (2007), to resolve a
split among the Circuits as to whether § 921(a)(20)’s excep
tion for “civil rights restored” should be interpreted to in
clude civil rights retained at all times. Compare 453 F. 3d,
at 809 (case below) (“civil rights restored” does not include
civil rights never revoked), and McGrath v. United States,
60 F. 3d 1005 (CA2 1995) (same), with United States v. In
delicato, 97 F. 3d 627, 631 (CA1 1996) (“civil rights restored”
includes civil rights never lost).
III
Logan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of § 922(g)(1), and received a mandatory
minimum 15-year sentence because he had at least three
prior convictions for “violent felon[ies].” § 924(e)(1) (2000
ed., Supp. V). He acknowledges his convictions in Wiscon
sin for three battery offenses that facially qualify as violent
felonies under § 921(a)(20)(B) (2000 ed.). See Brief for
Petitioner 4–5. Thus the sole matter in dispute is whether
Logan fits within the exemption from an ACCA-enhanced
sentence for convictions “expunged, or set aside” or offend

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Opinion of the Court
ers who “ha[ve] been pardoned or ha[ve] had civil rights re
stored.” § 921(a)(20). None of Logan’s battery convictions
have been expunged, set aside, or pardoned. See 453 F. 3d,
at 809. Under Wisconsin law, felons lose but can regain
their civil rights and can gain the removal of firearms disabil
ities. See Wis. Stat. § 6.03(1)(b) (Supp. 2006); Wis. Const.,
Art. XIII, § 3(2); Wis. Stat. § 756.02 (2001); § 973.176(1) (2007).
Persons convicted of misdemeanors, however, even if they
are repeat offenders, generally retain their civil rights and
are not subject to firearms disabilities.
With this background in view, we turn to the proper inter
pretation of the § 921(a)(20) exemption from ACCA-enhanced
sentencing for offenders who have had their “civil rights re
stored.” Logan’s misdemeanor convictions, we reiterate,
did not result in any loss of the rights to vote, hold public
office, or serve on juries. Should he nonetheless be ranked
with offenders whose rights were terminated but later re
stored? The ordinary meaning of the word “restored” af
fords Logan no aid. In line with dictionary definitions,3 the
Court of Appeals stated: “The word ‘restore’ means to give
back something that had been taken away.” 453 F. 3d,
at 805. Accord McGrath, 60 F. 3d, at 1007 (“The ‘restora
tion’ of a thing never lost or diminished is a definitional
impossibility.”); cf. Indelicato, 97 F. 3d, at 629 (“Clearly
the ordinary reading of the word ‘restored’ supports the
government.”).
The context in which the word “restored” appears in
§ 921(a)(20) counsels adherence to the word’s ordinary mean
ing. Words in a list are generally known by the company
they keep. E. g., Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 36
3 See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1936 (1993)
(defining “restore” to mean “give back (as something lost or taken away)”);
American Heritage Dictionary 1486 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “restore” to
mean “bring back into existence or use; reestablish”); 13 Oxford English
Dictionary 755 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “restore” to mean “give back, [or]
make return or restitution of (anything previously taken away or lost)”).

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Opinion of the Court
(1990); Beecham v. United States, 511 U. S. 368, 371 (1994).
In § 921(a)(20), the words “civil rights restored” appear
in the company of the words “expunged,” “set aside,” and
“pardoned.” Each term describes a measure by which the
government relieves an offender of some or all of the con
sequences of his conviction. In contrast, a defendant who
retains rights is simply left alone. He receives no status
altering dispensation, no token of forgiveness from the
government.
Opposing a plain-meaning approach to the language Con
gress enacted, Logan relies dominantly on the harsh results
a literal reading could yield: Unless retention of rights is
treated as legally equivalent to restoration of rights, less se
rious offenders will be subject to ACCA’s enhanced penalties
while more serious offenders in the same State, who have
had civil rights restored, may escape heightened punishment.
E. g., Reply Brief 8 (“[I]ndividuals who have committed more
serious crimes than Petitioner may nonetheless have their
rights restored, whereas misdemeanants who never lost their
rights must suffer enhanced sentencing.”). Logan urges
that this result—treating those who never lost their civil
rights more harshly than those who lost, then regained, those
rights—is not merely anomalous; it rises to the level of the
absurd, particularly in States where restoration of civil
rights is automatic and occurs immediately upon release from
prison. See Caron, 524 U. S., at 313 (automatic restoration
of rights qualifies for § 921(a)(20)’s exemption).
Logan’s argument, we note, overlooks § 921(a)(20)’s “un
less” clause. Under that provision, an offender gains no ex
emption from ACCA’s application through an expungement,
set-aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights if the dispen
sation “expressly provides that the [offender] may not ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Many States that
restore felons’ civil rights (or accord another measure of for
giveness) nonetheless impose or retain firearms disabilities.

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See Brief for United States 30 (citing, inter alia, La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:95.1(C) (West Supp. 2007), under which felons’
firearms disabilities are lifted only after ten years and only
if no further felony convictions intervene).4 We further note
that Wisconsin has addressed, and prospectively eliminated,
the anomaly Logan asserts he encountered: Wisconsin no
longer punishes misdemeanors by more than two years of
imprisonment, and thus no longer has any misdemeanors
that qualify as ACCA predicates. See supra, at 29, n. 2.
One can demur to Logan’s argument that a literal reading
of § 921(a)(20) could produce anomalous results, for the reso
lution he proposes—reading into the exemption convictions
under which civil rights are retained—would correct one po
tential anomaly while creating others. See McGrath, 60
F. 3d, at 1009. Under Logan’s proposed construction, the
most dangerous recidivists in a State that does not revoke
any offender’s civil rights could fall within § 921(a)(20)’s ex
emption. For example, Maine does not deprive any offend
ers of their civil rights. See Lodging for National Associa
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
(NACDL Lodging), App. 1, pp. 23–24. As Logan would
have us read § 921(a)(20), all Maine crimes, including first
degree murder, would be treated as crimes for which “civil
rights [have been] restored,” while less serious crimes com
mitted elsewhere would not.
In McGrath, the Second Circuit incisively identified Con
gress’ response to Dickerson, see supra, at 27–28, as the
cause of the multiple anomalies § 921(a)(20) may produce:
4 Courts have divided on the question whether § 921(a)(20)’s “unless”
clause is triggered whenever state law provides for the continuation of
firearm proscriptions, or only when the State provides individual notice to
the offender of the firearms disabilities. Compare, e. g., United States v.
Cassidy, 899 F. 2d 543, 549 (CA6 1990) (courts must look to “the whole of
state law”), with United States v. Gallaher, 275 F. 3d 784, 791, and n. 3
(CA9 2001) (individualized notice is required). We express no opinion on
this issue.

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“[Congress’] decision to have restoration triggered by
events governed by state law insured anomalous results.
The several states have considerably different laws gov
erning pardon, expungement, and forfeiture and restora
tion of civil rights. Furthermore, states have drasti
cally different policies as to when and under what
circumstances such discretionary acts of grace should be
extended. . . . [Anomalies generated by § 921(a)(20)] are
the inevitable consequence of making access to the ex
emption depend on the differing laws and policies of the
several states.” 60 F. 3d, at 1009.
Accord 453 F. 3d, at 807 (“When Congress replaced Dicker
so[n] . . . it ensured that similarly situated people would
be treated differently—for states vary widely in which
if any civil rights a convict loses and whether these
rights are restored.”). See also M. Love, Relief from the
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: A
State-by-State Resource Guide (2006), updated online at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?
PublicationID=486 (as visited Nov. 27, 2007, and in Clerk of
Court’s case file) (surveying state practices).
Were we to accept Logan’s argument, it bears emphasis,
we would undercut § 921(a)(20)(B), which places within
ACCA’s reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable by
more than two years’ imprisonment. Because state-law
misdemeanors generally entail no revocation of civil rights,5
Logan’s proposed reading of the word “restored” to include
“retained” would yield this curiosity: An offender would fall
within ACCA’s reach if his three prior offenses carried po
tential prison terms of over two years, but that same of
5 See NACDL Lodging, App. 1 (compiling state laws); id., at 17–34 (indi
cating that Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, and New
Hampshire revoke no misdemeanant’s civil rights, but provide for punish
ment of certain crimes they classify as misdemeanors by prison terms
exceeding two years).

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fender would be released from ACCA’s grip by virtue of his
retention of civil rights. We are disinclined to say that what
Congress imposed with one hand (exposure to ACCA) it
withdrew with the other (exemption from ACCA).
We may assume, arguendo, that when Congress revised
§ 921(a)(20) in 1986, see supra, at 27–28, it labored under the
misapprehension that all offenders—misdemeanants as well
as felons—forfeit civil rights, at least temporarily. Even in
dulging the further assumption that courts may repair such
a congressional oversight or mistake,6 we could hardly divine
the revision the Legislature would favor. Perhaps Congress
would choose to exempt offenders who never lost their civil
rights. See McGrath, 60 F. 3d, at 1009. But it is also plau
sible that Congress would remove the exemption for civil
rights restoration as insufficiently indicative of official for
giveness. Or, Congress might elect to include restorations
of civil rights along with expungements, set-asides, and par
dons only if the restoration was nonautomatic, i. e., granted
on a case-by-case basis. Homing in on the disparities result
ing from diverse state legislation, see supra, at 33–34 and
this page, Congress might even revise § 921(a)(20) to provide,
in accord with Dickerson, that federal rather than state law
defines a conviction for purposes of §§ 922 and 924. See 453
F. 3d, at 806–807.
In all events, a measure adopted ten years af ter
§ 921(a)(20) was given its current shape cautions against any
assumption that Congress did not mean to deny that exemp
tion to offenders who retained their civil rights. In 1996,
Congress enacted § 922(g)(9), which outlaws possession of a
firearm by anyone “who has been convicted . . . of a misde
meanor crime of domestic violence.” See Pub. L. 104–208,
6 But see Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926) (“enlargement
of [a statute] by [a] court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inad
vertence, may be included within its scope . . . transcends the judicial
function”).

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36 LOGAN v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
Tit. VI, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009–371 to 3009–372. Tailored to
§ 922(g)(9), Congress adopted a definitional provision, corre
sponding to § 921(a)(20), which reads:
“A person shall not be considered to have been convicted
of [a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] if the con
viction has been expunged or set aside, or is an offense
for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil
rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction
provides for the loss of civil rights under such an
offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration
of civil rights expressly provides that the person may
not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 18
U. S. C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) tracks § 921(a)(20) in specifying
expungement, set-aside, pardon, or restoration of rights as
dispensations that can cancel lingering effects of a convic
tion. But the emphasized parenthetical qualification shows
that the words “civil rights restored” do not cover a person
whose civil rights were never taken away. See 453 F. 3d,
at 808. Section 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) casts considerable doubt on
Logan’s hypothesis that, had Congress adverted to the issue
when it drafted § 921(a)(20), it would have placed in the same
category persons who regained civil rights and persons who
retained civil rights.
Congress’ enactment of § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) is also relevant
to Logan’s absurdity argument. See supra, at 32. Statu
tory terms, we have held, may be interpreted against their
literal meaning where the words “could not conceivably have
been intended to apply” to the case at hand. Cabell v. Mark
ham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2) (L. Hand, J.), aff ’d, 326
U. S. 404 (1945); see Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,
490 U. S. 504, 511 (1989) (Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)
“can’t mean what it says” (internal quotation marks omit
ted)). In this case, it can hardly be maintained that Con
gress could not have meant what it said. Congress explic

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37 Cite as: 552 U. S. 23 (2007)
Opinion of the Court
itly distinguished between “restored” and “retained” in
§ 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). It is more than “conceivable” that the
Legislature, albeit an earlier one, see supra, at 27–28, meant
to do the same in § 921(a)(20).
In sum, Congress framed § 921(a)(20) to serve two purposes.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 28–29. It sought to qualify as ACCA
predicate offenses violent crimes that a State classifies as mis
demeanors yet punishes by a substantial term of imprison
ment, i. e., more than two years. See § 921(a)(20)(B). Con
gress also sought to defer to a State’s dispensation relieving
an offender from disabling effects of a conviction. See supra,
at 27–28. Had Congress included a retention-of-rights ex
emption, however, the very misdemeanors it meant to cover
would escape ACCA’s reach. See supra, at 34–35. Logan
complains of an anomalous result. Yet the solution he pro
poses would also produce anomalies. See supra, at 33.
Having no warrant to stray from § 921(a)(20)’s text, we hold
that the words “civil rights restored” do not cover the case of
an offender who lost no civil rights.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Ap
peals for the Seventh Circuit is
Affirmed.