UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO. et al.

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CASES ADJUDGED
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AT
OCTOBER TERM, 2007
UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING
CO. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit
No. 07–308. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 15, 2008
The Internal Revenue Code requires a taxpayer seeking a refund of taxes
unlawfully assessed to file an administrative claim with the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) before filing suit against the Government, see
26 U. S. C. § 7422(a). Such claim must be filed within three years of the
filing of a tax return or two years of the tax’s payment, whichever is
later, see § 6511(a). In contrast, the Tucker Act allows claims to be
brought against the Government within six years of the challenged con
duct. Respondent coal companies paid taxes on coal exports under a
portion of the Code later invalidated under the Export Clause of the
Constitution. They filed timely administrative claims and recovered re
funds of their 1997–1999 taxes, but sought a refund of their 1994–1996
taxes in the Court of Federal Claims without complying with the Code’s
refund procedures. Nevertheless, the court allowed them to proceed
directly under the Export Clause and the Tucker Act. Affirming in
relevant part, the Federal Circuit ruled that the companies could pursue
their Export Clause claim despite their failure to file timely administra
tive refund claims.
Held: The plain language of 26 U. S. C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511 requires a tax
payer seeking a refund for a tax assessed in violation of the Export
Clause, just as for any other unlawfully assessed tax, to file a timely
1

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2 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Syllabus
administrative refund claim before bringing suit against the Govern
ment. Pp. 7–15.
(a) Because the companies did not file a refund claim with the IRS
for the 1994–1996 taxes, they may, under § 7422(a), bring “[n]o suit” in
“any court” to recover “any internal revenue tax” or “any sum” alleged
to have been wrongfully collected “in any manner.” Moreover, § 6511’s
time limits for filing administrative refund claims—set forth in an “un
usually emphatic form,” United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350—
apply to “any tax imposed by [Title 26],” § 6511(a) (emphasis added).
Contrary to the companies’ claim that these statutes are ambiguous, the
provisions clearly state that taxpayers must comply with the Code’s
refund scheme before bringing suit, including the filing of a timely ad
ministrative claim. Indeed, this question was all but decided in United
States v. A. S. Kreider Co., 313 U. S. 443, where the Court held that the
limitations period in the Revenue Act then in effect, not the Tucker
Act’s longer period, applied to tax refund actions. As was the case
there, the current Code’s refund scheme would have “no meaning what
ever,” id., at 448, if taxpayers failing to comply with it were nonetheless
allowed to bring suit subject only to the Tucker Act’s longer time bar.
Pp. 7–9.
(b) The companies nonetheless assert that their claims are exempt
from the Code provisions’ broad sweep because the claims derive from
the Export Clause. The principles that a “constitutional claim can be
come time-barred just as any other claim can,” Block v. North Dakota
ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 292, and that
Congress has the authority to require administrative exhaustion before
allowing a suit against the Government, even for a constitutional viola
tion, see, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1018, are
fully applicable to unconstitutional taxation claims. The companies’ at
tempt to distinguish Export Clause claims on the ground that the Clause
is not simply a limitation on taxing authority but a prohibition carving
particular economic activity out of Congress’s power is without sub
stance and totally manipulable. There is no basis for treating taxes
collected in violation of that Clause differently from taxes challenged on
other grounds. Because the companies acknowledge that their claims
are subject to the Tucker Act’s time bar, the question is not whether
their refund claim can be limited, but rather which limitation applies.
Their argument that, despite explicit and expansive statutory language,
the Code’s refund scheme does not apply to their case as a matter of
statutory interpretation is unavailing. They claim that Congress could
not have intended it to apply a “constitutionally dubious” refund scheme

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3 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Syllabus
to taxes assessed in violation of the Export Clause, but the statutory
language emphatically covers the facts of this case. In any event, there
is no constitutional problem. Congress’s detailed scheme is designed
“to advise the appropriate officials of the demands or claims intended to
be asserted, so as to insure an orderly administration of the revenue,”
United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 283 U. S. 269, 272, to provide
that refund claims are made promptly, and to allow the IRS to avoid
unnecessary litigation by correcting conceded errors. Even when a
tax’s constitutionality is challenged, taxing authorities have an “exceed
ingly strong interest in financial stability,” McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation,
496 U. S. 18, 37, that they may pursue through provisions of the sort at
issue. There is no reason why invoking the Export Clause would de
prive Congress of the power to protect this interest. The companies’
claim that the Code procedures are excessively burdensome is belied by
their own invocation of those procedures for taxes paid within the
Code’s limitations period, which resulted in full refunds with interest.
Pp. 9–12.
(c) The companies’ fallback argument—that even if the refund scheme
applies to Export Clause cases generally, it does not apply when taxes
are unconstitutional on their face—is rejected. Enochs v. Williams
Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U. S. 1, distinguished. Pp. 12–14.
473 F. 3d 1373, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
William M. Jay argued the cause for the United States.
With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Clement, Act
ing Assistant Attorney General Morrison, Deputy Solicitor
General Hungar, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen
eral Rothenberg, Kenneth L. Greene, and Steven W. Parks.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for respondents.
With her on the brief were Thomas C. Goldstein, Steven H.
Becker, Paul A. Horowitz, and Suzanne I. Offerman.*
*Anthony T. Caso, Karen R. Harned, and Elizabeth Milito filed a brief
for the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Clifton S. Elgarten filed a brief for Alliance Coal, LLC, as amicus
curiae.

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4 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that taxpayers seek
ing a refund of taxes unlawfully assessed must comply with
tax refund procedures set forth in the Code. Under those
procedures, a taxpayer must file an administrative claim
with the Internal Revenue Service before filing suit against
the Government. Such a claim must be filed within three
years of the filing of a return or two years of payment of the
tax, whichever is later. The Tucker Act, in contrast, is more
forgiving, allowing claims to be brought against the United
States within six years of the challenged conduct. The
question in this case is whether a taxpayer suing for a refund
of taxes collected in violation of the Export Clause of the
Constitution may proceed under the Tucker Act, when his
suit does not meet the time limits for refund actions in the
Internal Revenue Code. The answer is no.
I
A taxpayer seeking a refund of taxes erroneously or un
lawfully assessed or collected may bring an action against
the Government either in United States district court or
in the United States Court of Federal Claims. 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(a)(1); EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 550
U. S. 429, 431, and n. 2 (2007). The Internal Revenue Code
specifies that before doing so, the taxpayer must comply with
the tax refund scheme established in the Code. United
States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 609–610 (1990). That scheme
provides that a claim for a refund must be filed with the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) before suit can be brought,
and establishes strict timeframes for filing such a claim.
In particular, 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a) specifies:
“No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any
court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax al
leged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been col

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5 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
lected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected,
until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the [IRS].”
The Code further establishes a time limit for filing such a
refund claim with the IRS: To receive a “refund of an over
payment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which
tax the taxpayer is required to file a return,” a refund claim
must be filed no later than “3 years from the time the return
was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, which
ever of such periods expires the later.” § 6511(a). And
§ 6511(b)(1) mandates that “[n]o credit or refund shall be al
lowed or made” if a claim is not filed within the time limits
set forth in § 6511(a). “Read together, the import of these
sections is clear: unless a claim for refund of a tax has been
filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for
refund . . . may not be maintained in any court.” Dalm,
supra, at 602.
In 1978, Congress levied a tax “on coal from mines located
in the United States sold by the producer,” 26 U. S. C.
§ 4121(a)(1), and specifically applied this tax to coal exports,
see § 4221(a) (1994 ed.) (excepting from the general ban on
taxing exports those taxes imposed under, inter alia, § 4121).
In 1998, a group of companies challenged the tax in the Dis
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, contending
that it violated the Export Clause of the Constitution. That
Clause provides that “No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Ar
ticles exported from any State.” Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The
District Court agreed and held the tax unconstitutional.
Ranger Fuel Corp. v. United States, 33 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469
(1998). The Government did not appeal, and the IRS acqui
esced in the District Court’s holding. See IRS Notice 2000–
28, 2000–1 Cum. Bull. 1116, 1116–1117 (IRS Notice).
The respondents here, three coal companies, had all paid
taxes on coal exports under § 4121(a) “[s]ince as early as
1978.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a. After § 4121(a) was held

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6 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
unconstitutional as applied to coal exports, the companies
filed timely administrative claims in accordance with the re
fund scheme outlined above, seeking a refund of coal taxes
they had paid in 1997, 1998, and 1999. The IRS refunded
those taxes, with interest.
The companies also filed suit in the Court of Federal
Claims seeking a refund of $1,065,936 in taxes paid between
1994 and 1996. They did not file any claim for those taxes
with the IRS; any such claim would of course have been de
nied, given the limits set forth in § 6511. See IRS Notice,
at 1117 (“Claims [for a refund of taxes paid under § 4121]
must be filed within the period prescribed by § 6511”). Not
withstanding the failure of the companies to file timely ad
ministrative refund claims, the Court of Federal Claims
allowed the companies to pursue their suit directly under the
Export Clause. Jurisdiction rested on the Tucker Act, 28
U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1), and the companies limited their claim to
taxes paid within that statute’s 6-year limitations period,
§ 2501 (2000 ed. and Supp. V).
In allowing the companies to proceed outside the confines
of the Internal Revenue Code refund procedures, the court
relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205 F. 3d
1369 (2000). Andalex Resources, Inc. v. United States, 54
Fed. Cl. 563, 564 (2002). The Court of Federal Claims did
not, however, allow the companies to recover interest on the
taxes paid under 28 U. S. C. § 2411. That provision requires
the Government to pay interest “for any overpayment in re
spect of any internal-revenue tax,” but the court held that
the statute applied only to refund claims brought under
the Code, not to claims brought directly under the Export
Clause. 54 Fed. Cl., at 566.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part. It first refused to revisit its holding in Cyprus Amax,
and therefore upheld the ruling that the companies could
pursue their claim under the Export Clause, despite having

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7 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
failed to file timely administrative refund claims. 473 F. 3d
1373, 1374–1375 (CA Fed. 2007). The Court of Appeals re
versed the Court of Federal Claims interest holding, how
ever, finding that the Government was required to pay the
companies interest on the 1994–1996 amounts under § 2411.
Id., at 1376.
We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1061 (2007), and now
reverse.
II
A
The outcome here is clear given the language of the perti
nent statutory provisions. Title 26 U. S. C. § 7422(a) states
that “[n]o suit . . . shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any pen
alty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund . . . has been
duly filed with” the IRS. (Emphasis added.) Here the
companies did not file a refund claim with the IRS for the
1994–1996 taxes, and therefore may bring “[n]o suit” in “any
court” to recover “any internal revenue tax” or “any sum”
alleged to have been wrongfully collected “in any manner.”
Five “any’s” in one sentence and it begins to seem that Con
gress meant the statute to have expansive reach.
Moreover, the time limits for filing administrative refund
claims in § 6511—set forth in an “unusually emphatic form,”
United States v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 350 (1997)—apply
to “any tax imposed by this title,” 26 U. S. C. § 6511(a) (em
phasis added). The statute further provides that “[n]o
credit or refund shall be allowed or made after the expiration
of the period of limitation prescribed in subsection (a) . . .
unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the taxpayer
within such period.” § 6511(b)(1). Again, this language on
its face plainly covers the companies’ claim for a “refund” of

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8 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
“tax[es] imposed by” Title 26, specifically 26 U. S. C. § 4121.
The companies argue that these statutory provisions are am
biguous, Brief for Respondents 43–45, but we cannot imagine
what language could more clearly state that taxpayers seek
ing refunds of unlawfully assessed taxes must comply with
the Code’s refund scheme before bringing suit, including the
requirement to file a timely administrative claim.
Indeed, we all but decided the question presented over six
decades ago in United States v. A. S. Kreider Co., 313 U. S.
443 (1941). Section 1113(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, like
the refund claim provision in § 7422(a) of the current Code,
prescribed that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained
in any court for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or col
lected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected with
out authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive
or in any manner wrongfully collected until a claim for re
fund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue,” and established a time limit for bringing
suit once the claim-filing requirement had been met. 44
Stat. 116. Like the companies here, A. S. Kreider had failed
to file a tax refund action within that limitations period.
See 313 U. S., at 446. And, like the companies here, A. S.
Kreider argued that it was instead subject only to the longer
6-year statute of limitations under the Tucker Act. Id.,
at 447.
We rejected the claim, holding that the Tucker Act limita
tions period “was intended merely to place an outside limit
on the period within which all suits might be initiated” under
that Act, and that “Congress left it open to provide less liber
ally for particular actions which, because of special consider
ations, required different treatment.” Ibid. We held that
the limitations period in § 1113(a) was “precisely that type of
provision,” finding that Congress created a shorter statute
of limitations for tax claims because “suits against the
United States for the recovery of taxes impeded effective

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9 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
administration of the revenue laws.” Ibid. If such suits
were allowed to be brought subject only to the 6-year limita
tions period in the Tucker Act, we explained, § 1113(a) would
have “no meaning whatever.” Id., at 448. So too here.
The refund scheme in the current Code would have “no
meaning whatever” if taxpayers failing to comply with it
were nonetheless allowed to bring suit subject only to the
Tucker Act’s longer time bar.
B
The companies gamely argue for a different result here
because the coal tax at issue was assessed in violation of the
Export Clause of the Constitution. They spend much of
their brief arguing that the Export Clause itself creates a
cause of action against the Government, which can be
brought directly under the Tucker Act. See Brief for Re
spondents 8–25. We need not decide this question here,
because it does not matter. If the companies’ claims are
subject to the Code provisions, those claims are barred what
ever the source of the cause of action. We therefore turn to
the companies’ assertion that their claims are somehow ex
empt from the broad sweep of the Code provisions.
The companies do not argue for such an exemption simply
because their claims are based on a constitutional violation.
As they acknowledge, id., at 34, a “constitutional claim can
become time-barred just as any other claim can,” Block v.
North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461
U. S. 273, 292 (1983). Further, Congress has the authority
to require administrative exhaustion before allowing a suit
against the Government, even for a constitutional violation.
See, e. g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1018
(1984); Christian v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 414 U. S.
614, 622 (1974); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v.
Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 766–767 (1947).
These principles are fully applicable to claims of unconsti
tutional taxation, a point highlighted by what we have said

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10 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
in other cases about the Anti-Injunction Act. That statute
commands that (absent certain exceptions) “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax shall be maintained in any court.” 26 U. S. C. § 7421(a).
The “decisions of this Court make it unmistakably clear that
the constitutional nature of a taxpayer’s claim . . . is of no
consequence” to whether the prohibition against tax injunc
tions applies. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416
U. S. 752, 759 (1974). This is so even though the Anti-
Injunction Act’s prohibitions impose upon the wronged tax
payer requirements at least as onerous as those mandated
by the refund scheme—the taxpayer must succumb to an un
constitutional tax, and seek recourse only after it has been
unlawfully exacted. We see no reason why compliance with
straightforward administrative requirements and reasonable
time limits to seek a refund once a tax has been paid should
lead to a different result.
The companies assert that Export Clause claims in partic
ular must be treated differently from constitutional claims in
general. This is so, they argue, because the Clause is not
simply a limitation on the taxing authority but a prohibition
that “carves one particular economic activity completely out
of Congress’s power.” Brief for Respondents 11. That dis
tinction is without substance and totally manipulable: If the
pertinent authority is regarded as the power to tax exports,
the Clause is indeed a complete prohibition on congressional
power. But if the pertinent authority is instead viewed as
the “Power To lay and collect Taxes,” U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1, then the Clause is properly regarded as a limitation
on that power. We do not question the importance of the
Export Clause to the success of the enterprise in Philadel
phia in 1787, see Brief for Respondents 11–13, but we see no
basis for treating taxes collected in violation of its terms
differently from taxes challenged on other grounds.
Indeed, the companies more or less give up the game when
they acknowledge that their claims are subject to the Tucker

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11 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
Act’s statute of limitations. See id., at 34. The question is
thus not whether the companies’ refund claim under the Ex
port Clause can be limited, but rather which limitation ap
plies. The companies are therefore left to argue that, de
spite the explicit and expansive statutory language described
above, the refund scheme in Title 26 does not apply to their
case as a matter of statutory interpretation. We find this
ambitious argument unavailing.
The companies seek to support it by characterizing the
refund scheme set out in the Code as “pro-government and
revenue-protective,” and therefore “constitutionally dubi
ous” as applied to Export Clause cases. Id., at 28–29.
Given this potential constitutional infirmity, the companies
argue, Congress could not have intended the refund scheme
to apply to taxes assessed in violation of the Export Clause.
See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). We disagree. To begin with, any argument
that Congress did not mean to require those in the compa
nies’ position to comply with the tax refund scheme runs into
a powerful impediment, for “[t]he ‘strong presumption’ that
the plain language of the statute expresses congressional
intent is rebutted only in ‘rare and exceptional circum
stances.’ ” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135 (1991) (quot
ing Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981)). As we
have already explained, the language of the relevant statutes
emphatically covers the facts of this case.
In any event, we see no constitutional problem at all.
Congress has indeed established a detailed refund scheme
that subjects complaining taxpayers to various requirements
before they can bring suit. This scheme is designed “to ad
vise the appropriate officials of the demands or claims in
tended to be asserted, so as to insure an orderly administra
tion of the revenue,” United States v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg.
Co., 283 U. S. 269, 272 (1931), to provide that refund claims
are made promptly, and to allow the IRS to avoid unneces
sary litigation by correcting conceded errors. Even when

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12 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
the constitutionality of a tax is challenged, taxing authorities
do in fact have an “exceedingly strong interest in financial
stability,” McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bever
ages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496
U. S. 18, 37 (1990), an interest they may pursue through pro
visions of the sort at issue here.
We do not see why invocation of the Export Clause would
deprive Congress of the power to protect this “exceedingly
strong interest.” Congress may not impose a tax in viola
tion of the Export Clause (or any other constitutional provi
sion, for that matter). But it is certainly within Congress’s
authority to ensure that allegations of taxes unlawfully as
sessed—whether the asserted illegality is based upon the
Export Clause or any other provision of law—are processed
in an orderly and timely manner, and that costly litigation is
avoided when possible. The companies’ claim that the Code
procedures are themselves excessively burdensome is belied
by the companies’ own invocation of those procedures for
taxes paid within the Code’s limitations period, which re
sulted in full refunds with interest.
C
As a fallback argument, the companies maintain that even
if the refund scheme applies to Export Clause cases gener
ally, it does not “apply to taxes that are, on their face, uncon
stitutional.” Brief for Respondents 39. They rely for this
proposition on Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370
U. S. 1 (1962), a case dealing with the Anti-Injunction Act, 26
U. S. C. § 7421(a). Despite that Act’s broad and mandatory
language, we explained that “if it is clear that under no cir
cumstances could the Government ultimately prevail, . . . the
attempted collection may be enjoined if equity jurisdiction
otherwise exists. In such a situation the exaction is merely
in ‘the guise of a tax.’ ” 370 U. S., at 7 (quoting Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Fla., 284 U. S. 498, 509

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13 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
(1932)). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U. S. 725,
745–746 (1974) (reaffirming the “under no circumstances”
rule of Williams Packing).
On the force of Williams Packing, the companies argue
that the refund scheme should similarly be read as inapplica
ble to situations in which there are “no circumstances” under
which the tax imposed could be held valid under the Export
Clause. The trouble with this is that § 7422, the primary
statute governing the refund process, is written much more
broadly than § 7421(a), the statute at issue in Williams Pack
ing. Section 7422(a) states that “[n]o suit . . . shall be main
tained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue
tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the” IRS. (Emphasis added.) This language
generally tracks that of the Anti-Injunction Act, which also
applies to suits “restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax.” § 7421(a) (emphasis added). But § 7422(a) goes on
to apply its prohibition against suit absent a proper refund
claim to “any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected.” (Emphasis added.) Even if
we agreed that a facially unconstitutional tax for purposes
of the tax refund scheme is “merely in ‘the guise of a tax,’ ”
Williams Packing, supra, at 7 (quoting Standard Nut Mar
garine, supra, at 509), and therefore not a “tax alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected,”
§ 7422(a), it would nevertheless clearly fall into the broader
category of “any sum . . . in any manner wrongfully col
lected,” ibid.
Moreover, even if we were to accept the companies’ argu
ment that the “under no circumstances” limitation on the
Anti-Injunction Act applies to the refund scheme, they still
would not prevail. We made clear in Williams Packing that
“the question of whether the Government has a chance of
ultimately prevailing is to be determined on the basis of the

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14 UNITED STATES v. CLINTWOOD ELKHORN MINING CO.
Opinion of the Court
information available to it at the time of suit. Only if it is
then apparent that, under the most liberal view of the law
and the facts, the United States cannot establish its claim,
may the suit for an injunction be maintained.” 370 U. S.,
at 7. A tax injunction suit, of course, is brought at the time
the Government attempts to assess a tax on the taxpayer.
Thus, if we applied the Williams Packing “under no cir
cumstances” rule to the refund scheme, we would judge the
Government’s chances of success as of the time the tax was
assessed.
In this case, the companies seek refunds for taxes paid
between 1994 and 1996. At that time, the scope of the Ex
port Clause was sufficiently debatable that we granted cer
tiorari in 1995, see United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 516 U. S. 1021, and again in 1997, see United
States v. United States Shoe Corp., 522 U. S. 944, to clear it
up. What is more, the District Court that struck down the
application of § 4121(a) to coal exports partially relied on
these cases in arriving at its decision, Ranger Fuel Corp., 33
F. Supp. 2d, at 469, and the IRS cited, inter alia, Interna
tional Business Machines, supra, in its acquiescence notice,
see IRS Notice, at 1116. Indeed, we would think that if the
unconstitutionality of the coal export tax were so obvious
that the Government had no chance of prevailing, some
one paying the tax—such as these companies—would have
successfully challenged it earlier than 20 years after its
enactment.
We therefore hold that the plain language of 26 U. S. C.
§§ 7422(a) and 6511 requires a taxpayer seeking a refund for
a tax assessed in violation of the Export Clause, just as for
any other unlawfully assessed tax, to file a timely adminis
trative refund claim before bringing suit against the Govern
ment. Because we find that the Court of Appeals erred in
allowing the companies to bring suit seeking a refund for the
1994–1996 taxes, we do not reach the question whether the

553US1 Unit: $U29 [12-22-09 10:48:16] PAGES PGT: OPIN
15 Cite as: 553 U. S. 1 (2008)
Opinion of the Court
Court of Appeals also erred in awarding the companies inter
est on those amounts under 28 U. S. C. § 2411. The judg
ment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.