GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL

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474 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 06–1321. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
Petitioner, a 45-year-old postal worker, filed suit claiming that her em
ployer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimina
tion in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a)—which
requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees . . . at least 40
years of age . . . be made free from any discrimination based on age”—
by subjecting her to various forms of retaliation after she filed an ad
ministrative ADEA complaint. The District Court granted respondent
summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that
§ 633a(a)’s prohibition of “discrimination based on age” does not cover
retaliation.
Held: Section 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who
complains of age discrimination. Pp. 479–491.
(a) In so concluding, the Court follows the reasoning of two prior
decisions ruling that retaliation is covered by similar language in other
antidiscrimination statutes. First, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237, the Court held that a retaliation claim could be
brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens . . .
shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop
erty.” While § 1982 does not use the phrase “discrimination based on
race,” that is its plain meaning. See, e. g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Ed., 544 U. S. 167, 177. Second, the Jackson Court, id., at 173–174,
relied on Sullivan in holding that Title IX of the Education Amend
ments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), which prohibits “discrimination” “on
the basis of sex” in educational programs receiving federal aid, reached
retaliation against a public school teacher for complaining about sex dis
crimination in his school’s athletic program. 544 U. S., at 176–177.
The ADEA language at issue (“discrimination based on age”) is not ma
terially different from the language at issue in Jackson and is the func
tional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson,
supra, at 177. And the context in which the statutory language ap
pears is the same in all three cases: remedial provisions aimed at prohib
iting discrimination. Respondent neither asks the Court to overrule
Sullivan or Jackson nor questions those decisions’ reasoning, and the
Government, both in Jackson and in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,

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ante, p. 442, has specifically urged the Court to follow Sullivan’s reason
ing. Pp. 479–482.
(b) The three grounds on which the First Circuit sought to distinguish
Jackson in support of the Circuit’s perception that there is a clear differ
ence between causes of action for discrimination and for retaliation are
not persuasive. Pp. 482–485.
(1) The Circuit places too much reliance on the fact that the ADEA
expressly creates a private right of action, whereas the right of action
under Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, is implied and not ex
press, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677. The asser
tion that this distinction allowed the Jackson Court greater leeway to
adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX improperly conflates the
analytically distinct questions whether a statute confers a private right
of action and whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a
particular form of conduct. Moreover, confusing these questions would
lead to exceedingly strange results. For example, Title IX’s prohibition
of “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” either does or does not reach
retaliation, and the presence or absence of another statutory provision
expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter § 1681(a)’s
scope. Pp. 482–483.
(2) Also unavailing is the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson
on the ground that retaliation claims play a more important role under
Title IX than under the ADEA. This argument ignores the basis for
Jackson, which did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because
such claims are important as a policy matter, but, instead, relied on an
interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544 U. S., at 173, 178. Jack
son’s statement that “teachers . . . are often in the best position to
vindicate [student] rights,” id., at 181, did not address the question
whether the statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation,
but was made in response to the school board’s argument that only a
“victim of the discrimination,” not third parties, should be allowed to
assert a retaliation claim, id., at 179–182. P. 484.
(3) Finally, the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the
ground that Title IX was adopted in response to Sullivan, whereas
there is no evidence in the ADEA’s legislative history that § 633a was
adopted in a similar context, is rejected. Jackson did not identify any
legislative history evidence, but merely observed that because “Con
gress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan,” it was “ ‘realistic
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan]
and . . . expected [Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it].”
544 U. S., at 176. What Jackson said about the relationship between
Sullivan and Title IX’s enactment can also be said about the relation
ship between Sullivan and § 633a’s enactment, since the latter provision

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was enacted just five years after Sullivan was decided and two years
after Title IX was enacted. Pp. 484–485.
(c) Respondent’s other arguments supporting the contention that
§ 633a(a) does not encompass retaliation claims are rejected. Pp. 486–
491.
(1) Respondent places too much reliance on the presence of an
ADEA provision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals
complaining about private-sector age discrimination, § 623(d), and the
absence of a similar provision in § 633a. Because §§ 623 and 633a were
enacted seven years apart rather than simultaneously, see Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 330, and because they are couched in very differ
ent terms—with §§ 623(a)(1)–(3) listing specific forbidden employer prac
tices in contrast to § 633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination”—the
absence of a federal-sector provision similar to § 623(d) does not provide
a sufficient reason to depart from Sullivan and Jackson. Pp. 486–488.
(2) There is even less merit in respondent’s reliance on § 633a(f),
which provides that personnel actions by a federal entity covered by
§ 633a “shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of this chap
ter” other than § 633a and § 631(b), which restricts ADEA coverage to
persons at least 40 years old. Respondent’s contention that recognizing
federal-sector retaliation claims would make § 623(d) applicable to
federal-sector employers in contravention of § 633a(f) is unsound be
cause the Court’s holding today is not based on § 623(d) but on § 633a(a)
itself, “unaffected by other [ADEA] sections,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453
U. S. 156, 168. Pp. 488–489.
(3) Also unavailing is respondent’s argument that the history of
congressional and Executive Branch responses to discrimination in fed
eral employment demonstrates that when Congress enacted § 633a, it
anticipated that the pre-existing reprisal regulations of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) would be extended to cover federal-sector age dis
crimination and be the exclusive avenue for asserting retaliation claims.
This argument is not supported by direct evidence, but rests on unsup
ported speculation, and, in any event, is self-contradictory in that, if
§ 633a(a) does not confer an antiretaliation right, there is no reason to
assume that Congress expected the CSC to issue new regulations pro
hibiting retaliation. Pp. 489–490.
(4) Respondent’s final argument—that sovereign immunity princi
ples require that § 633a(a) be read narrowly as prohibiting substantive
age discrimination but not retaliation—is unpersuasive. The rule of
construction requiring that “[a] waiver of the Federal Government’s sov
ereign immunity . . . be unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and
“strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. Pen˜ a, 518
U. S. 187, 192, is satisfied here by § 633a(c), which unequivocally waives

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sovereign immunity for a claim brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved” by
a § 633a violation. Unlike § 633a(c), § 633a(a) is not a waiver of sover
eign immunity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.”
That the § 633a(c) waiver applies to § 633a(a) claims does not mean that
§ 633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle as § 633a(c). Pp. 490–491.
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Ken
nedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to all but
Part I, post, p. 492. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 506.
Joseph R. Guerra argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Virginia A. Seitz, Ileana M. Ciobanu,
Richard A. Kaplan, and Edelmiro A. Salas.
Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for re
spondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General
Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, An
thony A. Yang, Marleigh D. Dover, and August E. Flentje.*
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question before us is whether a federal employee who
is a victim of retaliation due to the filing of a complaint of age
discrimination may assert a claim under the federal-sector
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA), as added, 88 Stat. 74, and amended, 29 U. S. C.
§ 633a(a). We hold that such a claim is authorized.
I
Petitioner Myrna Go´ mez-Pe´ rez was a window distribution
clerk for the United States Postal Service. In October 2002,
petitioner, then 45 years of age, was working full time at the
Post Office in Dorado, Puerto Rico. She requested a trans
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP by Daniel
B. Kohrman and Melvin R. Radowitz; and for the National Treasury Em
ployees Union by Gregory O’Duden, Elaine D. Kaplan, Barbara A. Atkin,
and Robert H. Shriver III.

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fer to the Post Office in Moca, Puerto Rico, in order to be
closer to her mother, who was ill. The transfer was ap
proved, and in November 2002, petitioner began working at
the Moca Post Office in a part-time position. Later that
month, petitioner requested a transfer back to her old job
at the Dorado Post Office, but her supervisor converted the
Dorado position to part-time, filled it with another employee,
and denied petitioner’s application.
After first filing an unsuccessful union grievance seeking
a transfer back to her old job, petitioner filed a Postal Serv
ice equal employment opportunity age discrimination com
plaint. According to petitioner, she was then subjected to
various forms of retaliation. Specifically, petitioner alleges
that her supervisor called her into meetings during which
groundless complaints were leveled at her, that her name
was written on anti-sexual-harassment posters, that she was
falsely accused of sexual harassment, that her co-workers
told her to “ ‘go back’ ” to where she “ ‘belong[ed],’ ” and that
her work hours were drastically reduced. 476 F. 3d 54, 56
(CA1 2007).
Petitioner responded by filing this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, claim
ing, among other things, that respondent had violated the
federal-sector provision of the ADEA, 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a),
by retaliating against her for filing her equal employment
opportunity age discrimination complaint. Respondent
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the United
States has not waived sovereign immunity for ADEA retali
ation claims and that the ADEA federal-sector provision
does not reach retaliation. The District Court granted sum
mary judgment in favor of respondent on the basis of sover
eign immunity.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that the Postal Reorganization Act, 39
U. S. C. § 401(1), unequivocally waived the Postal Service’s
sovereign immunity, see 476 F. 3d, at 54, 57, but the court

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affirmed the decision of the District Court on the alternative
ground that the federal-sector provision’s prohibition of “dis
crimination based on age,” § 633a(a), does not cover retalia
tion, id., at 60, creating a split among the Courts of Appeals.
Cf. Forman v. Small, 271 F. 3d 285, 296 (CADC 2001)
(ADEA federal-sector provision covers retaliation). We
granted certiorari. 551 U. S. 1188 (2007).
II
The federal-sector provision of the ADEA provides that
“[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age.” § 633a(a).
The key question in this case is whether the statutory phrase
“discrimination based on age” includes retaliation based on
the filing of an age discrimination complaint. We hold that
it does.
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our prior
decisions interpreting similar language in other antidiscrimi
nation statutes. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U. S. 229 (1969), we considered whether a claim of retali
ation could be brought under Rev. Stat. § 1978, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States
shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con
vey real and personal property.” While § 1982 does not use
the phrase “discrimination based on race,” that is its plain
meaning. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509, 561 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing § 1982 as “banning public
or private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of prop
erty”); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968).
In Sullivan, a white man (Sullivan) held membership
shares in a nonstock corporation that operated a park and
playground for residents of the area in which he owned a
home. Under the bylaws of the corporation, a member who
leased a home in the area could assign a membership share

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in the corporation. But when Sullivan rented his house and
attempted to assign a membership share to an African-
American (Freeman), the corporation disallowed the assign
ment because of Freeman’s race and subsequently expelled
Sullivan from the corporation for protesting that decision.
Sullivan sued the corporation, and we held that his claim
that he had been expelled “for the advocacy of Freeman’s
cause” was cognizable under § 1982. 396 U. S., at 237. A
contrary holding, we reasoned, would have allowed Sullivan
to be “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minori
ties” and would have given “impetus to the perpetuation of
racial restrictions on property.” Ibid.
More recently, in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544
U. S. 167 (2005), we relied on Sullivan in interpreting Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq. Jackson, a public school
teacher, sued his school board under Title IX, “alleging that
the Board retaliated against him because he had complained
about sex discrimination in the high school’s athletic pro
gram.” 544 U. S., at 171. Title IX provides in relevant
part that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any educa
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assist
ance.” § 1681(a) (emphasis added). Holding that this provi
sion prohibits retaliation, we wrote:
“Retaliation against a person because that person has
complained of sex discrimination is another form of in
tentional sex discrimination . . . . Retaliation is, by
definition, an intentional act. It is a form of ‘discrimi
nation’ because the complainant is being subjected to
differential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is dis
crimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an inten
tional response to the nature of the complaint: an allega
tion of sex discrimination. We conclude that when a
funding recipient retaliates against a person because he
complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes inten

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tional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation
of Title IX.” Id., at 173–174 (citations omitted).
This interpretation, we found, flowed naturally from Sulli
van: “Retaliation for Jackson’s advocacy of the rights of the
girls’ basketball team in this case is ‘discrimination’ ‘on the
basis of sex,’ just as retaliation for advocacy on behalf of a
black lessee in Sullivan was discrimination on the basis of
race.” 544 U. S., at 176–177.
Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we in
terpret the ADEA federal-sector provision’s prohibition of
“discrimination based on age” as likewise proscribing retalia
tion. The statutory language at issue here (“discrimination
based on age”) is not materially different from the language
at issue in Jackson (“ ‘discrimination’ ” “ ‘on the basis of
sex’ ”) and is the functional equivalent of the language at
issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177 (describing Sul
livan as involving “discrimination on the basis of race”).
And the context in which the statutory language appears is
the same in all three cases; that is, all three cases involve
remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination.
The Jackson dissent strenuously argued that a claim of
retaliation is conceptually different from a claim of discrimi
nation, see 544 U. S., at 184–185 (opinion of Thomas, J.), but
that view did not prevail.1 And respondent in this case does
not ask us to overrule Sullivan or Jackson. Nor does re
1 Suggesting that we have retreated from the reasoning of Sullivan and
Jackson, The Chief Justice, citing Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White,
548 U. S. 53, 63–65 (2006), states that “we have since explained that anti
discrimination and antiretaliation provisions are indeed conceptually dis
tinct, and serve distinct purposes.” Post, at 495 (dissenting opinion).
But as the Court explains today in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante,
at 456, “[i]n Burlington . . . we used the status/conduct distinction to help
explain why Congress might have wanted its explicit Title VII antiretalia
tion provision to sweep more broadly (i. e., to include conduct outside the
workplace) than its substantive Title VII (status-based) antidiscrimination
provision. Burlington did not suggest that Congress must separate the
two in all events.”

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spondent question the reasoning of those decisions. Indeed,
in Jackson, the Government contended that “[t]he text . . .
of Title IX demonstrate[s] that it encompasses protection
against retaliation” since “retaliation against a person be
cause that person has filed a sex discrimination complaint is
a form of intentional sex discrimination.” Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Ed., O. T. 2004, No. 02–1672, p. 8. Similarly, in another case
this Term, the Government has urged us to follow the rea
soning of Sullivan and to hold that a claim of retaliation may
be brought under Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981. In
that case, the Government argues that § 1981’s prohibition of
“ ‘discrimination’ . . . quite naturally includes discrimination
on account of having complained about discrimination.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, O. T. 2007, No. 06–1431, p. 10.
III
The decision of the Court of Appeals, which respondent
defends, perceived a “clear difference between a cause of ac
tion for discrimination and a cause of action for retaliation”
and sought to distinguish Jackson on three grounds. 476
F. 3d, at 58–59. We are not persuaded, however, by any of
these attempted distinctions.
A
The Court of Appeals first relied on the fact that the
ADEA expressly creates a private right of action whereas
Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, does not. See 476
F. 3d, at 58. The Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned
that, because the private right of action under Title IX is
implied and not express, see Cannon v. University of Chi
cago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979), the Jackson Court had greater
leeway to adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX’s
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.

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This reasoning improperly conflates the question whether
a statute confers a private right of action with the ques
tion whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a
particular form of conduct. These questions are analyti
cally distinct, and confusing them would lead to exceedingly
strange results.
For example, under the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, Title
IX’s prohibition of “discrimination” “on the basis of sex,” in
20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), might have a narrower scope and might
not reach retaliation if Title IX contained a provision ex
pressly authorizing an aggrieved private party to bring suit
to remedy a violation of § 1681(a). We do not see how such
a conclusion could be defended. Section 1681(a)’s prohibi
tion of “discrimination” either does or does not reach retalia
tion, and the presence or absence of another statutory provi
sion expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter
§ 1681(a)’s scope. In addition, it would be perverse if the
enactment of a provision explicitly creating a private right
of action—a provision that, if anything, would tend to sug
gest that Congress perceived a need for a strong remedy—
were taken as a justification for narrowing the scope of the
underlying prohibition.
The Court of Appeals’ reasoning also seems to lead to the
strange conclusion that, despite Jackson’s holding that a pri
vate party may assert a retaliation claim under Title IX, the
Federal Government might not be authorized to impose upon
an entity that engages in retaliation the administrative rem
edies, including the termination of funding, that are ex
pressly sanctioned under § 1682. It would be extremely
odd, however, if § 1681(a) had a broader scope when enforced
by a means not expressly sanctioned by statute than it does
when enforced by the means that the statute explicitly pro
vides. For these reasons, we reject the proposition that
Jackson may be distinguished from the present case on the
ground that Title IX’s private right of action is implied.

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B
The Court of Appeals next attempted to distinguish Jack
son on the ground that retaliation claims play a more impor
tant role under Title IX than they do under the ADEA.
The Court of Appeals pointed to our statement in Jackson
that “ ‘teachers and coaches . . . are often in the best position
to vindicate the rights of their students because they are
better able to identify discrimination and bring it to the at
tention of administrators.’ ” 476 F. 3d, at 58 (quoting Jack
son, 544 U. S., at 181). The Court of Appeals suggested that
third parties are not needed to “identify instances of age
discrimination and bring it to the attention of supervisors”
and that, consequently, there is no need to extend § 633a(a)
to reach retaliation. 476 F. 3d, at 58.
This argument ignores the basis for the decision in Jack
son. Jackson did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation
because the Court concluded as a policy matter that such
claims are important. Instead, the holding in Jackson was
based on an interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544
U. S., at 173, 178.
Moreover, the statements in Jackson on which the Court
of Appeals relied did not address the question whether the
statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation.
Instead, those statements addressed the school board’s argu
ment that, even if Title IX was held to permit some retalia
tion claims, only a “victim of the discrimination”—and not
third parties—should be allowed to assert such a claim. Id.,
at 179–182. It was in response to this argument that the
Court noted the particular importance of reports of Title IX
violations by third parties such as teachers and coaches.
Id., at 181.
C
Finally, the Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish
Jackson on the ground that “Title IX was adopted in re

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sponse to the Court’s holding in Sullivan,” whereas “there
is no evidence in the legislative history that the ADEA’s fed
eral sector provisions were adopted in a similar context.”
476 F. 3d, at 58–59. Jackson’s reliance on Sullivan, how
ever, did not stem from “evidence in the legislative history”
of Title IX. Jackson did not identify any such evidence but
merely observed that “Congress enacted Title IX just three
years after Sullivan was decided.” 544 U. S., at 176. Due
to this chronology, the Court concluded, it was “ ‘not only
appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was
thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and that it expected its
enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with
[it].” Ibid. (quoting Cannon, 441 U. S., at 699). See also
544 U. S., at 176 (“Title IX was enacted in 1972, three years
after [Sullivan]”); id., at 179–180 (“Sullivan . . . formed an
important part of the backdrop against which Congress
enacted Title IX”).
What Jackson said about the relationship between Sulli
van and the enactment of Title IX can be said as well about
the relationship between Sullivan and the enactment of the
ADEA’s federal-sector provision, 29 U. S. C. § 633a. Sulli
van was decided in 1969 and § 633a was enacted in 1974—
five years after the decision in Sullivan and two years after
the enactment of Title IX. We see no reason to think that
Congress forgot about Sullivan during the two years that
passed between the enactment of Title IX in 1972 and the
enactment of § 633a in 1974. And if, as Jackson presumed,
Congress had Sullivan in mind when it enacted Title IX in
1972, it is “appropriate” and “realistic” to presume that Con
gress expected its prohibition of “discrimination based on
age” in § 633a(a) “ ‘to be interpreted in conformity with’ ” its
similarly worded prohibition of “discrimination” “on the
basis of sex” in 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), which it had enacted just
two years earlier. 544 U. S., at 176 (quoting Cannon, supra,
at 699).

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IV
A
In arguing that § 633a(a) does not encompass retaliation
claims, respondent relies principally on the presence of a pro
vision in the ADEA specifically prohibiting retaliation
against individuals who complain about age discrimination in
the private sector, § 623(d), and the absence of a similar pro
vision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals
who complain about age discrimination in federal employ
ment. According to respondent, “the strong presumption is
that [the] omission reflects that Congress acted intentionally
and purposely in including such language in Section 623 of
the Act and excluding it from Section 633a.” Brief for Re
spondent 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[N]egative implications raised by disparate provisions are
strongest” in those instances in which the relevant statutory
provisions were “considered simultaneously when the lan
guage raising the implication was inserted.” Lindh v. Mur
phy, 521 U. S. 320, 330 (1997). Here, the two relevant provi
sions were not considered or enacted together. Section
623(d), which specifically prohibits private-sector retaliation,
was enacted in 1967, see § 4(d), 81 Stat. 603, but the federal
sector provision, § 633a, was not added until 1974, see
§ 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74.2
Respondent’s argument is also undermined by the fact
that the prohibitory language in the ADEA’s federal-sector
provision differs sharply from that in the corresponding
ADEA provision relating to private-sector employment. In
the private-sector provision, Congress set out a specific list
2 The situation here is quite different from that which we faced in Leh
man v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981), where both the private- and
federal-sector provisions of the ADEA already existed and a single piece
of legislation—the 1978 amendments to the ADEA—added a provision
conferring a jury-trial right for private-sector ADEA suits but failed to
include any similar provision for federal-sector suits. See Age Discrimi
nation in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, § 4(a)(2), 92 Stat. 190.

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of forbidden employer practices. See 29 U. S. C. § 623(a).3
The omission from such a list of a specific prohibition of re
taliation might have been interpreted as suggesting that
Congress did not want to reach retaliation, and therefore
Congress had reason to include a specific prohibition of
retaliation, § 623(d), in order to dispel any such inference.
The ADEA federal-sector provision, however, was not
modeled after § 623(d) and is couched in very different terms.
The ADEA federal-sector provision was patterned “directly
after” Title VII’s federal-sector discrimination ban. Leh
man v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 167, n. 15 (1981). Like the
ADEA’s federal-sector provision, Title VII’s federal-sector
provision contains a broad prohibition of “discrimination,”
rather than a list of specific prohibited practices. Compare
§11, 86 Stat. 111, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16(a) (2000
ed., Supp. V) (personnel actions affecting federal employees
“shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”), with 29 U. S. C.
§ 633a(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V) (personnel actions affecting fed
eral employees who are at least 40 years of age “shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age”). And like
the ADEA’s federal-sector provision, Title VII’s federal
sector provision incorporates certain private-sector provi
sions but does not incorporate the provision prohibiting re
3 Section 623 provides in part:
“(a) Employer practices
“It shall be unlawful for an employer—
“(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individu
al’s age;
“(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s age; or
“(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.”

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Opinion of the Court
taliation in the private sector. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16(d)
(incorporating §§ 2000e–5(f) to (k) but not § 2000e–3(a),
which forbids private-sector retaliation).4
When Congress decided not to pattern 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a)
after § 623(a) but instead to enact a broad, general ban on
“discrimination based on age,” Congress was presumably fa
miliar with Sullivan and had reason to expect that this ban
would be interpreted “ ‘in conformity’ ” with that precedent.
Jackson, 544 U. S., at 176. Under the reasoning of Sullivan,
retaliation for complaining about age discrimination is “dis
crimination based on age,” “just as retaliation for advocacy
on behalf of [the] black lessee in Sullivan was discrimination
on the basis of race.” 544 U. S., at 176–177. Thus, because
§§ 623(d) and 633a were enacted separately and are couched
in very different terms, the absence of a federal-sector provi
sion similar to § 623(d) does not provide a sufficient reason to
depart from the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson.5
B
We see even less merit in respondent’s reliance on 29
U. S. C. § 633a(f), which provides that personnel actions by a
4 While the federal-sector provision of Title VII does not incorporate
§ 2000e–3(a), the federal-sector provision of Title VII does incorporate a
remedial provision, § 2000e–5(g)(2)(A), that authorizes relief for a violation
of § 2000e–3(a). Petitioner argues that this remedial provision shows that
Congress meant for the Title VII federal-sector provision’s broad prohibi
tion of “discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national ori
gin” to reach retaliation because otherwise there would be no provision
banning retaliation in the federal sector and thus no way in which relief
for retaliation could be awarded. Brief for Petitioner 20. The Federal
Government, however, has declined to take a position on the question
whether Title VII bans retaliation in federal employment, see Tr. of Oral
Arg. 31, and that issue is not before us in this case.
5 The Government’s theory that the absence of a provision specifically
banning federal-sector retaliation gives rise to the inference that § 633a(a)
does not ban retaliation would lead logically to the strange conclusion that
§ 633a(a) also does not forbid age-discriminatory job notices and advertise
ments because § 633a(a), unlike § 623(e), fails to mention such practices
expressly.

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federal department, agency, or other entity covered by § 633a
“shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provisions of this
chapter” other than §§ 633a and 631(b), the provisions that
restrict the coverage of the ADEA to persons who are at
least 40 years of age. Respondent contends that recognizing
federal-sector retaliation claims would be tantamount to
making § 623(d) applicable to federal-sector employers and
would thus contravene § 633a(f).
This argument is unsound because our holding that the
ADEA prohibits retaliation against federal-sector employees
is not in any way based on § 623(d). Our conclusion, instead,
is based squarely on § 633a(a) itself, “unaffected by other sec
tions” of the ADEA. Lehman, supra, at 168.
C
Respondent next advances a complicated argument con
cerning “[t]he history of congressional and executive branch
responses to the problem of discrimination in federal employ
ment.” Brief for Respondent 27. After Title VII was
made applicable to federal employment in 1972, see Equal
Employment Opportunity Act, § 11, 86 Stat. 111, the Civil
Service Commission issued new regulations that prohibited
discrimination in federal employment based on race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin (but not age), see 5 CFR
§ 713.211 (1973), as well as “reprisal[s]” prompted by com
plaints about such discrimination, § 713.262(a). When Con
gress enacted the ADEA’s federal-sector provisions in 1974,
respondent argues, Congress anticipated that the enactment
of § 633a would prompt the Civil Service Commission to “ex
tend its existing reprisal regulations” to cover age discrimi
nation complaints and that Congress intended for the civil
service process to provide the exclusive avenue for asserting
retaliation claims. Brief for Respondent 27, 33, and n. 7.
Respondent suggests that Congress took this approach be
cause it believed that the civil service regulations “reflect[ed]
a distinct set of public policy concerns in the civil service
sector.” Id., at 27.

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Respondent cites no direct evidence that Congress actu
ally took this approach; 6 respondent’s argument rests on
nothing more than unsupported speculation. And, in any
event, respondent’s argument contradicts itself. If, as re
spondent maintains, “[s]ection 633a(a) does not confer an
anti-retaliation right,” id., at 9, then there is no reason to
assume that Congress expected the Civil Service Commis
sion to respond to the enactment of § 633a(a) by issuing new
regulations prohibiting retaliation. On the contrary, if, as
respondent maintains, Congress had declined to provide an
antiretaliation right, then Congress presumably would have
expected the Civil Service Commission to abide by that pol
icy choice.
D
Respondent’s final argument is that principles of sovereign
immunity “require that Section 633a(a) be read narrowly as
prohibiting substantive age discrimination, but not retalia
tion.” Id., at 44. Respondent contends that the broad
waiver of sovereign immunity in the Postal Reorganization
Act, 39 U. S. C. § 401(1), is beside the point for present pur
poses because, for many federal agencies, the only provision
6 Respondent asks us to infer that § 633a(a) does not proscribe retaliation
because, when Congress made the ADEA applicable to the Federal Gov
ernment, Congress did not simply subject the Federal Government to the
ADEA’s private-employment provisions by amending the definition of
“employer” to include the United States. Respondent contends that a
similar inference may be drawn from the fact that in 1974 Congress added
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) a provision specifically
making it unlawful to retaliate against an employee for attempting to vin
dicate FLSA rights. See § 215(a)(3). These arguments fail to appreciate
the significance of § 633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination based on
age.” Because Congress had good reason to expect that this broad ban
would be interpreted in the same way that Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 392 U. S. 657 (1968) (per curiam), had interpreted the broad
ban on racial discrimination in 42 U. S. C. § 1982, the inference that re
spondent asks us to draw is unfounded.

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that waives sovereign immunity for ADEA claims is con
tained in § 633a, and therefore this waiver provision “must
be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign.” Brief
for Respondent 44 (quoting United States v. Nordic Vil
lage, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 34 (1992); internal quotation marks
omitted).
Respondent is of course correct that “[a] waiver of the Fed
eral Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequivo
cally expressed in statutory text” and “will be strictly con
strued, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.”
Lane v. Pen˜ a, 518 U. S. 187, 192 (1996). But this rule of
construction is satisfied here. Subsection (c) of § 633a un
equivocally waives sovereign immunity for a claim brought
by “[a]ny person aggrieved” to remedy a violation of § 633a.
Unlike § 633a(c), § 633a(a) is not a waiver of sovereign immu
nity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.”
That the waiver in § 633a(c) applies to § 633a(a) claims does
not mean that § 633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle
as § 633a(c). See United States v. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472–473 (2003) (where one statutory pro
vision unequivocally provides for a waiver of sovereign im
munity to enforce a separate statutory provision, that latter
provision “ ‘need not . . . be construed in the manner appro
priate to waivers of sovereign immunity’ ” (quoting United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 218–219 (1983))). But in
any event, even if § 633a(a) must be construed in the same
manner as § 633a(c), we hold, for the reasons previously ex
plained, that § 633a(a) prohibits retaliation with the requi
site clarity.
* * *
For these reasons, we hold that § 633a(a) prohibits retal
iation against a federal employee who complains of age
discrimination. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas join as to all but Part I, dissenting.
The Court today holds that the federal-sector provision of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act encompasses not
only claims of age discrimination—which its language ex
pressly provides—but also claims of retaliation for complain
ing about age discrimination—which its language does not.
Protection against discrimination may include protection
against retaliation for complaining about discrimination, but
that is not always the case. The separate treatment of each
in the private-sector provision of the ADEA makes that
clear. In my view, the statutory language and structure, as
well as the fact that Congress has always protected federal
employees from retaliation through the established civil
service process, confirm that Congress did not intend those
employees to have a separate judicial remedy for retaliation
under the ADEA. I respectfully dissent.
I
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, which at the time applied only to
private employers, with the purpose of “promot[ing] employ
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; . . . [of] prohibit[ing] arbitrary age discrimination in em
ployment; [and of] help[ing] employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.” 29 U. S. C. § 621(b). The 1967 Act imple
mented this purpose in two principal ways. First, the stat
ute made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”
§ 623(a)(1). Second, Congress enacted a specific antiretalia
tion provision, which made it “unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because such individual . . . has opposed
any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such
individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partic

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
ipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or liti
gation under” the ADEA. § 623(d).
In the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 (FLSA
Amendments), § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74, Congress (among other
things) extended the ADEA to most Executive Branch em
ployees by adopting 29 U. S. C. § 633a. Like its private
sector counterpart, this federal-sector provision includes a
ban on discrimination on the basis of age. Unlike its
private-sector counterpart, the federal-sector provision does
not include a separate ban on retaliation. The federal
sector provision specifies only that “[a]ll personnel actions
affecting employees or applicants for employment who are at
least 40 years of age [in various federal agencies] shall be
made free from any discrimination based on age.” § 633a(a).
Despite the absence of an express retaliation provision in
§ 633a(a), the Court finds that the statute encompasses both
discrimination and retaliation claims. To support this prop
osition, the Court principally relies on our decisions in Sulli
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969), and
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005). In
my view, the majority reads these cases for more than they
are worth.
As the majority correctly states, we held in Sullivan that
42 U. S. C. § 1982, which prohibits race discrimination in the
sale or rental of property, also provides a cause of action for
retaliation.1 396 U. S., at 237. More recently, we held in
Jackson that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
86 Stat. 373—which provides in relevant part that “[n]o per
son in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex
1 To the extent there was any disagreement about whether Sullivan was
really a retaliation case, or whether it dealt only with third-party stand
ing, the view put forth by the Court won the day in Jackson v. Bir
mingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005). Compare id., at 176, and n. 1,
with id., at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Whatever the merits of this
disagreement, I accept Jackson’s (and the Court’s) interpretation as a mat
ter of stare decisis. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, at 447.

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 20 U. S. C.
§ 1681(a)—encompasses claims of retaliation for complaints
about sex discrimination. 544 U. S., at 173–174.
To the extent the majority takes from these precedents
the principle that broad antidiscrimination provisions may
also encompass an antiretaliation component, I do not dis
agree. That is why I am able to join today’s opinion in
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, at 457 (holding that
a retaliation claim is cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1981).
But it cannot be—contrary to the majority’s apparent view—
that any time Congress proscribes “discrimination based on
X,” it means to proscribe retaliation as well. That is clear
from the private-sector provision of the ADEA, which in
cludes a ban on “discriminat[ion] against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s age,” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1), but
also includes a separate (and presumably not superfluous)
ban on retaliation, § 623(d).
Indeed, we made this precise observation in Jackson itself.
The respondent in that case argued that Title IX’s ban on
discrimination could not include a cause of action for retalia
tion because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, like
the private-sector provision of the ADEA, includes discrete
discrimination and retaliation provisions. See 42 U. S. C.
§§ 2000e–2 (discrimination), 2000e–3 (retaliation). We dis
tinguished Title VII on the ground that “Title IX is a broadly
written general prohibition on discrimination,” while “Title
VII spells out in greater detail the conduct that constitutes
discrimination in violation of that statute.” 544 U. S., at
175. Thus, while we distinguished Title VII from Title IX
in Jackson, we also acknowledged that not every express
ban on discrimination must be read as a ban on retaliation
as well.
What is more, although the majority asserts that Jackson
rejected the view that “a claim of retaliation is conceptually

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
different from a claim of discrimination,” ante, at 481, we
have since explained that antidiscrimination and antiretalia
tion provisions are indeed conceptually distinct, and serve
distinct purposes. In Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White,
548 U. S. 53 (2006), we considered whether the antiretaliation
provision in the Title VII private-sector provision, 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–3(a)—which is materially indistinguishable
from that in the ADEA—applies “only [to] those employer
actions and resulting harms that are related to employment
or the workplace.” 548 U. S., at 61. In answering that
question in the negative, we explained:
“The antidiscrimination provision seeks a workplace
where individuals are not discriminated against because
of their [protected] status. The antiretaliation provi
sion seeks to secure that primary objective by prevent
ing an employer from interfering (through retaliation)
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforce
ment of the Act’s basic guarantees. The substantive
provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based
on who they are, i. e., their status. The antiretaliation
provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on
what they do, i. e., their conduct.” Id., at 63 (citation
omitted).2
While I take from Sullivan and Jackson the proposition
that broad bans on discrimination, standing alone, may be
read to include a retaliation component, the provision at
2 The Court views this discussion of Burlington as “[s]uggesting that
[the Court has] retreated from the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson.”
Ante, at 481, n. 1. Not a bit. The discussion simply points out what
Burlington plainly said: that there is a distinction between discrimination
and retaliation claims. That does not mean Congress cannot address both
in the same provision, as we held it did in Sullivan and Jackson and as
we hold today it did in CBOCS West, Inc., ante, at 457. But it does con
firm that Congress may choose to separate the two, as the private-sector
provision of the ADEA, as well as the portion of Title VII interpreted in
Burlington, makes clear.

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
issue here does not stand alone. And, as Jackson itself
makes clear, see 544 U. S., at 173, 175, “the words of a statute
must be read in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme,” Davis v. Michigan Dept.
of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989). Here the text and
structure of the statute, the broader statutory scheme of
which it is a part, and distinctions between federal- and
private-sector employment convince me that § 633a(a) does
not provide a cause of action for retaliation.
II
We have explained that “[w]here Congress includes partic
ular language in one section of a statute but omits it in an
other section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States, 464 U. S.
16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). If, as the
majority holds, the ban on “discrimination based on age” in
§ 633a(a) encompasses both discrimination and retaliation
claims, it is difficult to understand why Congress would have
felt the need to specify in § 623 separate prohibitions against
both “discriminat[ion]” “because of [an] individual’s age,”
and retaliation.
The majority responds by noting that “ ‘[n]egative implica
tions raised by disparate provisions are strongest’ in those
instances in which the relevant statutory provisions were
‘considered simultaneously when the language raising the
implication was inserted.’ ” Ante, at 486 (quoting Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 330 (1997)). Here, the majority notes
that § 623 was enacted in 1967, while § 633a was not passed
until 1974. Ante, at 486. Fair enough, but while I do not
quarrel with this principle as a general matter, I do not think
it does the work the majority thinks it does. Congress obvi
ously had the private-sector ADEA provision prominently
before it when it enacted § 633a, because the same bill that
included § 633a also amended the private-sector provision.

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See, e. g., § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (amending the definition of
“employer” in 29 U. S. C. § 630(b) to include States and their
political subdivisions). Indeed, it is quite odd to assume, as
the majority does, see ante, at 485, 488, that the Congress
that enacted § 633a was aware of and relied upon our decision
in Sullivan—which interpreted 42 U. S. C. § 1982, a wholly
unrelated provision—but was not attuned to its own work
reflected in the differences between 29 U. S. C. §§ 623 and
633a. Even if the negative implication to be drawn from
those differences may not be at its “strongest” under these
circumstances, it is certainly strong enough.
Moreover, and more to the point, we have relied on the
differences in language between the federal- and private
sector provisions of the ADEA specifically in our interpreta
tion of § 633a. In Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 (1981),
we faced the question whether a person bringing an action
under § 633a(c), alleging a violation of § 633a(a), was entitled
to a trial by jury. In holding that there was no jury-trial
right available against the Federal Government, we relied
on the fact that while the ADEA’s federal-sector provision
did not include a provision for a jury trial, the analogous
grant of a right of action in the private-sector provision,
§ 626(c), “expressly provides for jury trials.” Id., at 162.
We reasoned that “Congress accordingly demonstrated that
it knew how to provide a statutory right to a jury trial when
it wished to do so elsewhere in the very ‘legislation cited.’ . . .
But in [§ 633a(c)] it failed explicitly to do so.” Ibid. (quoting
Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372, 389 (1943)). So too
here. “Congress . . . demonstrated that it knew how to”
provide a retaliation cause of action “when it wished to do
so elsewhere in the very ‘legislation cited,’ ” but “failed ex
plicitly to do so” in § 633a(a).
The majority argues that this inference is weakened by
the fact that, in “the private-sector provision, Congress set
out a specific list of forbidden employer practices,” ante, at
486–487, while § 633a(a) is a “broad, general ban on ‘discrimi

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
nation based on age,’ ” ante, at 488. This point cuts against
the majority. Section 623 drew a distinction between pro
hibited “employer practices” that discriminate based on age,
and retaliation. See §§ 623(a) (discriminatory “[e]mployer
practices”), 623(d) (retaliation). Section 633a(a) phrased the
prohibited discrimination in terms of “personnel actions.”
Just as Congress did not regard retaliation as included
within “employer practices,” but dealt with it separately in
§ 623(d), the counterpart to “employer practices” in § 633a—
discriminatory “personnel actions”—should similarly not be
read to include retaliation.
The argument that some meaning ought to attach to Con
gress’s inclusion of an antiretaliation provision in § 623 but
not in § 633a is further supported by several other factors.
To begin with, Congress expressly made clear that the
ADEA’s private-sector provisions should not apply to their
federal-sector counterpart, by providing that “[a]ny person
nel action . . . referred to in subsection (a) of this section
shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of ”
the ADEA, except for one provision not relevant here.
§ 633a(f). The majority sees no “merit in respondent’s reli
ance on 29 U. S. C. § 633a(f).” Ante, at 488. But again, we
relied on this very provision in Lehman. We explained that
this subsection “clearly emphasize[s] that [§ 633a] was self
contained and unaffected by other sections” of the ADEA,
453 U. S., at 168, a fact that we used to support our holding
that the federal-sector provision does not provide a right to
a jury trial, even though the private-sector provision does.
In short, Congress was aware that there were significant
differences between the private- and federal-sector portions
of the ADEA, and specified that no part of the former should
be understood to have been implicitly imported into the
latter.
Other actions Congress took at the same time that it
enacted § 633a in 1974 further underscore the point that Con
gress deliberately chose to exclude retaliation claims from

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
the ADEA’s federal-sector provision. The Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1974, as the Act’s name suggests,
dealt for the most part not with the ADEA, but with the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, extending that statute’s
protections to federal employees. See FLSA Amendments,
§ 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 58. In doing so, Congress explicitly sub
jected federal employers to the FLSA’s express antiretal
iation provision, 29 U. S. C. § 215(a)(3). Congress did not
similarly subject the Federal Government to the express
antiretaliation provision in the ADEA, strongly suggesting
that this was a conscious choice.
The majority responds that this “inference . . . is un
founded” because “Congress had good reason to expect that
this broad ban would be interpreted in the same way that
Sullivan . . . had interpreted the broad ban on racial discrim
ination in 42 U. S. C. § 1982.” Ante, at 490, n. 6. Anything
is possible, but again, it seems far more likely that Congress
had its eye on the private-sector provision of the ADEA in
crafting the federal one, rather than on one of our precedents
on a different statute. See supra, at 496–497.
But whatever the merits of this argument, it does not
rebut the import of other probative provisions of the FLSA
Amendments. In particular, Congress specifically chose in
the FLSA Amendments to treat States and the Federal
Government differently with respect to the ADEA itself.
It subjected the former to the ADEA’s private-sector
provision, see FLSA Amendments, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74—
including the express prohibition against retaliation in
§ 623(d)—while creating § 633a as a stand-alone prohibition
against discrimination in federal employment, without an
antiretaliation provision, see § 28(b)(2), ibid. This decision
evinces a deliberate legislative choice not to extend those
portions of the ADEA’s private-sector provisions that are
not expressly included in § 633a, as of course Congress
specified in § 633a(f).

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Roberts, C. J., dissenting
Given all this, it seems safe to say that the text and struc
ture of the statute strongly support the proposition that
Congress did not intend to include a cause of action for retal
iation against federal employees in § 633a(a).
III
But why would Congress allow retaliation suits against
private-sector and state employers, but not against the Fed
eral Government? The answer is that such retaliation was
dealt with not through a judicial remedy, but rather the
way retaliation in the federal workplace was typically
addressed—through the established civil service system,
with its comprehensive protection for Government workers.
Congress was quite familiar with that detailed administra
tive system—one that already existed for most federal em
ployees, but not for private ones. This approach, unlike the
Court’s, is consistent with the fact that Congress has recog
nized that regulation of the civil service is a complex issue,
requiring “careful attention to conflicting policy considera
tions” and “balancing governmental efficiency and the rights
of employees,” Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 388, 389 (1983).
The resulting system often requires remedies different from
those found to be appropriate for the private sector (or even
for the States).
A
Before Title VII was extended to federal employees in
1972, discrimination in federal employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was prohibited
by executive order. See Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed.
Reg. 12985 (1969). Civil service regulations implemented
this policy by authorizing Executive Branch employees to
bring administrative complaints for allegedly discriminatory
acts, including “personnel action[s],” 5 CFR §§ 713.211,
713.214(a)(1)(i) (1972). These regulations further provided
that such complainants, their representatives, and witnesses
“shall be free from restraint, interference, coercion, discrimi

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nation, or reprisal” for their involvement in the complaint
process. §§ 713.214(b) (complainants and representatives),
713.218(e) (witnesses).
The Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated a de
tailed scheme through which federal employees could vin
dicate these rights, including the express antiretaliation
protections. More serious personnel actions, known as
“adverse actions,” could be challenged before the employing
agency and appealed to the CSC, see §§ 713.219(a) and (b),
752.203, 771.202, 771.208, 771.222, while less serious person
nel actions and “any [other] matter of concern or dissatis
faction” could be challenged under alternative procedures
that were also appealable to the CSC, see §§ 713.217(b),
713.218, 713.219(a) and (c), 713.231(a), 771.302(a). Retal
iation was proscribed in all events. See, e. g., §§ 713.219(a)
and (c) (incorporating Part 771 antiretaliation provisions to
complaint procedures except certain appeals to the CSC);
§§ 771.105(a)(1) and (b)(1), 771.211(e) (antiretaliation provi
sions for CSC appeals).
In 1972, Congress applied Title VII to the federal sector,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEO Act), § 11,
86 Stat. 111, mandating that “[a]ll personnel actions” with
respect to federal employees “shall be made free from any
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–16(a). Congress empowered
the CSC “to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section through appropriate remedies,” and to “issue such
rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems neces
sary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under
this section.” § 2000e–16(b).
Under this grant of authority, as well as its prior authority
under statute and executive order, the CSC revised its regu
lations both “to implement the [EEO Act] and to strengthen
the system of complaint processing.” 37 Fed. Reg. 22717
(1972) (Part 713 Subpart B). As with its prior system of
administrative enforcement, the CSC distinguished between

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“complaints of discrimination on grounds of race, color, reli
gion, sex, or national origin,” 5 CFR § 713.211 (1973), on the
one hand, and charges by a “complainant, his representative,
or a witness who alleges restraint, interference, coercion,
discrimination, or reprisal in connection with the presenta
tion of a complaint,” § 713.262(a), on the other. The regula
tions imposed upon employing agencies the obligation of
“timely investigation and resolution of complaints including
complaints of coercion and reprisal,” 37 Fed. Reg. 22717; see
also 5 CFR § 713.220, and made clear the procedures for proc
essing retaliation claims, §§ 713.261, 713.262. The regula
tions further mandated that the CSC “require the [employ
ing] agency to take whatever action is appropriate” with
respect to allegations of retaliation if the agency itself has
“not completed an appropriate inquiry,” § 713.262(b)(1).
Thus, leading up to the enactment of 29 U. S. C. § 633a in
1974, the CSC’s comprehensive regulatory scheme set forth
a broadly applicable remedy for retaliation against federal
employees for filing complaints or otherwise participating in
the EEO process. And when Congress empowered the CSC
in 1974 to “enforce the provisions of [§ 633a(a)] through ap
propriate remedies,” and to “issue such rules, regulations,
orders, and instructions as it deems necessary and appro
priate to carry out its responsibilities” under that statute,
§ 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 75, the assumption that Congress expected
the CSC to create an administrative antiretaliation remedy,
just as it had for complaints of discrimination under Title
VII, is compelling. And sure enough, the CSC did just that
promptly after § 633a was enacted. See 39 Fed. Reg. 24351
(1974); 5 CFR § 713.511 (1975).
Given this history of addressing retaliation through ad
ministrative means, combined with the complicated nature
(relative to the private sector) of federal personnel practices,
it is therefore by no means anomalous that Congress would
have dealt with the “primary objective” of combating age
discrimination through a judicial remedy, Burlington, 548

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U. S., at 63, but left it to expert administrators used to deal
ing with personnel matters in the federal work force to “se
cure that primary objective by preventing an employer from
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts
to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guaran
tees,” ibid.
B
The majority discounts the above argument as “unsup
ported speculation.” Ante, at 490. It seems to me that the
fact that the Executive Branch had always treated discrimi
nation and retaliation as distinct, and that it enacted admin
istrative remedies for retaliation almost immediately after
the passage of the Title VII and ADEA federal-sector provi
sions, provide plenty of support. But even if the majority
is right, the view that Congress intended to treat retaliation
for age discrimination complaints as a problem to be dealt
with primarily through administrative procedures, rather
than through the judicial process in the first instance, is con
firmed by Congress’s passage of the Civil Service Reform
Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 Stat. 1111.
The CSRA, as amended, has a detailed comprehensive
antiretaliation provision, which generally makes it unlawful
for Executive Branch employers to
“take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take,
any personnel action against any employee or applicant
for employment because of . . . (A) the exercise of any
appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any
law, rule, or regulation [or] (B) testifying for or other
wise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of
any right referred to in subparagraph (A).” 5 U. S. C.
§ 2302(b)(9).3
3 Neither 29 U. S. C. § 633a nor the CSRA cover employees of Congress
or of the Executive Office of the President and Executive Residence of the
White House. See § 633a(a); 5 U. S. C. § 2302(a)(2)(B). But Congress has
expressly extended the protections of the ADEA to such employees, 2
U. S. C. § 1311(a)(2) (Congress); 3 U. S. C. § 411(a)(2) (White House), and

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This antiretaliation provision, which plainly applies to re
taliation for exercising rights under the civil rights statutes,
including the ADEA, is supported by a host of administra
tive remedies. If the alleged retaliation results in adverse
actions such as removal, suspension for more than 14 days,
or reduction in pay, see § 7512, an appeal can be taken di
rectly to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),
§§ 7513(d), 7701, with judicial review in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, § 7703(b)(1). Re
taliation claims based on less serious allegations are first in
vestigated by the Office of Special Counsel. If the Office
finds that there are reasonable grounds supporting the retal
iation charge, it must report its determination to, and may
seek corrective action from, the MSPB. §§ 1214(a)(1)(A),
(b)(2)(B), (C), and 1214(c). Again, judicial review in the Fed
eral Circuit is available. § 7703(b)(1). In all events, upon
a finding that retaliation has in fact occurred, the MSPB
has the authority to order corrective action, §§ 1214(b)(4),
7701(b)(2), to order attorney’s fees on appeal, § 7701(g), and
to discipline federal employees responsible for retaliatory
acts, § 1215.4
To be sure, the CSRA was enacted after § 633a. Never
theless, we have explained, in the same context of federal
employee remedies, that the “classic judicial task of reconcil
ing many laws enacted over time, and getting them to ‘make
sense’ in combination, necessarily assumes that the implica
tions of a statute may be altered by the implications of a
later statute.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453
(1988). That is precisely the situation here.
provided them with an express retaliation remedy, 2 U. S. C. § 1317; 3
U. S. C. § 417(a).
4 The Postal Service—Go´ mez-Pe´ rez’s employer—operates under its own
personnel system. But the Postal Service’s Employee and Labor Rela
tions Manual (ELM) prohibits “any action, event, or course of conduct that
. . . subjects any person to reprisal for prior involvement in EEO activity.”
ELM § 665.23, pp. 681–682 (June 2007).

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Indeed, this is particularly true with respect to Congress’s
regulation of federal employment. We have explained that
the CSRA is an “integrated scheme of administrative and
judicial review, designed to balance the legitimate interests
of the various categories of federal employees with the needs
of sound and efficient administration.” Id., at 445. Perhaps
the CSRA’s “civil service remedies [are] not as effective as
an individual damages remedy” that can be obtained in fed
eral court, Bush, 462 U. S., at 372, or perhaps a quicker and
more familiar administrative remedy is more effective as a
practical matter. That is not the issue. Cf. id., at 388 (the
question whether a judicial remedy against a federal em
ployer for a First Amendment violation should be implied
“obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that exist
ing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plain
tiff ”). The CSRA establishes an “elaborate, comprehensive
scheme that encompasses substantive provisions forbidding
arbitrary action by supervisors and procedures—administra
tive and judicial—by which improper action may be re
dressed.” Id., at 385. Retaliation as a general matter was
already addressed for federal employees. I would not read
into § 633a a judicial remedy for retaliation when Congress—
which has “developed considerable familiarity with balancing
governmental efficiency and the rights of employees,” id., at
389—chose to provide a detailed administrative one.
* * *
The question whether a ban against “discrimination based
on” a protected status such as age can also be read to encom
pass a ban on retaliation can be answered only after careful
scrutiny of the particular provision in question. In this
case, an analysis of the statutory language of § 633a and the
broader scheme of which it is a part confirms that Congress
did not intend implicitly to create a judicial remedy for retal
iation against federal employees, when it did so expressly
for private-sector employees. Congress was not sloppy in

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Thomas, J., dissenting
creating this distinction; it did so for good reason: because
the federal workplace is governed by comprehensive regula
tion, of which Congress was well aware, while the private
sector is not.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.
I join all but Part I of The Chief Justice’s dissent.
I write separately to reiterate my view that Jackson v. Bir
mingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 (2005), incorrectly con
flated the concepts of retaliation and discrimination. The
text of the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimina
tion in Employment Act of 1967 is clear: It prohibits only
“discrimination based on age.” 29 U. S. C. § 633a(a). If re
taliation is not “discrimination on the basis of sex,” Jackson,
supra, at 185 (Thomas, J., dissenting), or “discrimination
based on race,” CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, at
459 (Thomas, J., dissenting), it is certainly not “discrimina
tion based on age.” Because § 633a(a) provides no basis for
implying a private right of action for retaliation claims, and
its context only reaffirms its plain meaning, see ante, at
496–500 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), I would affirm the judg
ment below.