REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

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550 OCTOBER TERM, 2007
Syllabus
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward
Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with
animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, peti
tioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport
“funds from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside the
United States . . . knowing that the . . . funds . . . represent the proceeds
of . . . unlawful activity and . . . that such transportation . . . is designed
. . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the owner
ship, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money, in violation of the
federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirm
ing, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text
petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove that he at
tempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his
extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detection during transportation
showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location,
source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant
attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it
be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during
transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires
proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its effect—was to
conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’ nature, loca
tion, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 556–568.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” require
ment. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds
appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money laundering,” this
Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s common
meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept.
of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212. Here, Congress used broad
language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition
to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Con
gress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise
the funds’ location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find per
suasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse a money laundering requirement
into the listed attributes. Only the attribute “nature” is coextensive

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with the funds’ illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Con
gress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is
likewise skeptical of petitioner’s argument that violating the statute’s
elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear
more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that
concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the
effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law en
forcement’s ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court dis
agrees with petitioner’s argument that § 1956(a)(2) must be aimed at
something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds be
cause that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling stat
ute, 31 U. S. C. § 5332. Even if § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appearance of
legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target dis
tinct conduct, in that § 5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant
who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement . . . ,
knowingly conceals more than $10,000 . . . and transports [it] from . . .
the United States to a place outside” the country. Pp. 557–561.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during trans
portation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining
whether he knew that “such transportation,” § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was de
signed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally ob
tained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of
the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transporta
tion “from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside the United
States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the
Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the
funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or disguise
their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “control.” The
Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transpor
tation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts
have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on
§ 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “design,” which the
dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i. e., the transportation’s in
tended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is de
signed . . . to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute, and when an act is
“designed to” do something, the most natural reading is that it has that
something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to
refer not to the transportation’s purpose but to the manner in which it
was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with
the alternate meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. It is
implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had,
it could have expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that
such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more com

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plex formulation “knowing that such transportation . . . is designed . . .
to conceal or disguise.” § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely
that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law con
cepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant
“structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning
of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture
individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked
any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to
turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals
who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by
law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in
plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal
hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds’
detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abun
dant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to trans
port it, the Government’s own expert testified that the transportation’s
purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation.
Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation’s secretive aspects
were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its
purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive efforts to conceal the funds en
route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to
prove that the transportation was “designed in whole or in part to con
ceal or disguise the [funds’] nature, . . . location, . . . source, . . . owner
ship, or . . . control,” petitioner’s conviction cannot stand. Pp. 561–568.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J.,
joined, post, p. 568.
Jerry V. Beard argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs were Richard Alan Anderson, Kevin Joel Page,
Jonathan D. Hacker, Walter Dellinger, and Mark S. Davies.
Lisa H. Schertler argued the cause for the United States.
With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, As
sistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General
Dreeben, and Joel M. Gershowitz.*
*Craig D. Singer and Jeffrey T. Green filed a brief for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging
reversal.

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the provision of the federal money laun
dering statute that prohibits international transportation of
the proceeds of unlawful activity. Petitioner argues that his
conviction cannot stand because, while the evidence demon
strates that he took steps to hide illicit funds en route to
Mexico, it does not show that the cross-border transport of
those funds was designed to create the appearance of legiti
mate wealth. Although we agree with the Government that
the statute does not require proof that the defendant at
tempted to “legitimize” tainted funds, we agree with peti
tioner that the Government must demonstrate that the de
fendant did more than merely hide the money during its
transport. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit.
I
On July 14, 2004, petitioner Humberto Fidel Regalado
Cuellar was stopped in southern Texas for driving errati
cally. Driving south toward the Mexican border, about 114
miles away, petitioner had just passed the town of Eldorado.
In response to the officer’s questions, petitioner, who spoke
no English, handed the officer a stack of papers. Included
were bus tickets showing travel from a Texas border town
to San Antonio on July 13 and, in the other direction, from
San Antonio to Big Spring, Texas, on July 14. A Spanish
speaking officer, Trooper Danny Nun˜ ez, was called to the
scene and began questioning petitioner. Trooper Nun˜ ez
soon became suspicious because petitioner was avoiding eye
contact and seemed very nervous. Petitioner claimed to be
on a 3-day business trip, but he had no luggage or extra
clothing with him, and he gave conflicting accounts of his
itinerary. When Trooper Nun˜ ez asked petitioner about a
bulge in his shirt pocket, petitioner produced a wad of cash
that smelled of marijuana.
Petitioner consented to a search of the Volkswagen Beetle
that he was driving. While the officers were searching the

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vehicle, Trooper Nun˜ ez observed petitioner standing on the
side of the road making the sign of the cross, which he inter
preted to mean that petitioner knew he was in trouble. A
drug detection dog alerted on the cash from petitioner’s shirt
pocket and on the rear area of the car. Further scrutiny
uncovered a secret compartment under the rear floorboard,
and inside the compartment the officers found approximately
$81,000 in cash. The money was bundled in plastic bags and
duct tape, and animal hair was spread in the rear of the vehi
cle. Petitioner claimed that he had previously transported
goats in the vehicle, but Trooper Nun˜ ez doubted that goats
could fit in such a small space and suspected that the hair had
been spread in an attempt to mask the smell of marijuana.
There were signs that the compartment had been recently
created and that someone had attempted to cover up the
bodywork: The Beetle’s carpeting appeared newer than the
rest of the interior, and the exterior of the vehicle appeared
to have been purposely splashed with mud to cover up tool
marks, fresh paint, or other work. In the backseat, officers
found a fast-food restaurant receipt dated the same day from
a city farther north than petitioner claimed to have traveled.
After a check of petitioner’s last border crossing also proved
inconsistent with his story, petitioner was arrested and inter
rogated. He continued to tell conflicting stories about his
travels. At one point, before he knew that the officers had
found the cash, he remarked to Trooper Nun˜ ez that he had
to have the car in Mexico by midnight or else his family
would be “floating down the river.” App. 50.
Petitioner was charged with attempting to transport the
proceeds of unlawful activity across the border, knowing that
the transportation was designed “to conceal or disguise the
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the con
trol” of the money. 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). After a
2-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty. The District
Court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment of acquittal

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based on insufficient evidence and sentenced petitioner to 78
months in prison, followed by three years of supervised
release.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed
and rendered a judgment of acquittal. 441 F. 3d 329 (2006).
Judge Smith’s majority opinion held that, although the evi
dence showed that petitioner concealed the money for the
purpose of transporting it, the statute requires that the pur
pose of the transportation itself must be to conceal or dis
guise the unlawful proceeds. Id., at 333–334. Analogizing
from cases interpreting another provision of the money laun
dering statute, the court held that the transportation must
be undertaken in an attempt to create the appearance of
legitimate wealth.1 See id., at 334. Although the evidence
showed intent to avoid detection while driving the funds to
1 Several Courts of Appeals have considered this requirement as rele
vant, or even necessary, in the context of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),
which prohibits, inter alia, engaging in financial transactions “involv[ing]
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . knowing that the transaction
is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of some
specified unlawful activity.” See United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467
F. 3d 1, 13 (CA1 2006); United States v. Esterman, 324 F. 3d 565, 572–573
(CA7 2003); United States v. Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001);
United States v. McGahee, 257 F. 3d 520, 527–528 (CA6 2001); United
States v. Dobbs, 63 F. 3d 391, 397 (CA5 1995); United States v. Dimeck, 24
F. 3d 1239, 1247 (CA10 1994).
In construing the provision under which petitioner was convicted, four
Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have implicitly or explicitly
rejected the requirement. See United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F. 3d
1311, 1322 (CA11 2007) (upholding convictions for conspiracy to commit
transportation money laundering without addressing the requirement);
United States v. Ness, 466 F. 3d 79, 81–82 (CA2 2006) (rejecting the re
quirement and upholding a conviction for conspiracy to violate the trans
portation provision where defendant’s conduct was elaborate and highly
secretive); United States v. Carr, 25 F. 3d 1194, 1206–1207 (CA3 1994)
(upholding a conviction under the transportation provision without dis
cussing the requirement).

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Mexico, it did not show that petitioner intended to create the
appearance of legitimate wealth, and accordingly no rational
trier of fact could have found petitioner guilty. Ibid.
Judge Davis dissented, arguing that concealment during
transportation is sufficient to violate § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Id.,
at 334–336.
The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and affirmed
petitioner’s conviction. 478 F. 3d 282 (2007). The court re
jected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner’s ar
gument that the Government must prove that he attempted
to create the appearance of legitimate wealth. Id., at 290.
But it held that petitioner’s extensive efforts to prevent de
tection of the funds during transportation showed that peti
tioner sought to conceal or disguise the nature, location, and
source, ownership, or control of the funds. Id., at 289–290.
Judge Smith dissented for largely the same reasons set forth
in his opinion for the original panel majority. He empha
sized the distinction between “concealing something to
transport it, and transporting something to conceal it,” and
explained that whether petitioner was doing the latter de
pended on whether his ultimate plan upon reaching his desti
nation was to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership,
or control of the money. Id., at 296–297.
We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 973 (2007).
II
The federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1956,
prohibits specified transfers of money derived from unlawful
activities. Subsection (a)(1) makes it unlawful to engage in
certain financial transactions, while subsection (a)(2) crimi
nalizes certain kinds of transportation. Petitioner was
charged under the transportation provision: The indictment
alleged that he attempted to transport illicit proceeds across
the Mexican border “knowing that such transportation was
designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the na

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ture, location, source, ownership, and control” of the funds.2
App. 10–11 (citing § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)).
A
We first consider the “designed . . . to conceal” element.
Petitioner argues that to satisfy this element, the Govern
ment must prove that the defendant attempted to create the
appearance of legitimate wealth. Petitioner would replace
“designed . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds”
with “designed to create the appearance of legitimate
wealth.” § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). This is consistent with the
plain meaning of “money laundering,” petitioner argues, be
cause that term is commonly understood to mean disguising
2 Subsection (a)(2) reads, in its entirety:
“Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the
United States to or through a place outside the United States or to a place
in the United States from or through a place outside the United States—
“(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity; or
“(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the
transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation, transmis
sion, or transfer is designed in whole or in part—
“(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own
ership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
“(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Fed
eral law,
“shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value
of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transportation, trans
mission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more
than twenty years, or both. For the purpose of the offense described in
subparagraph (B), the defendant’s knowledge may be established by proof
that a law enforcement officer represented the matter specified in subpara
graph (B) as true, and the defendant’s subsequent statements or actions
indicate that the defendant believed such representations to be true.”

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illegally obtained money in order to make it appear legiti
mate. In petitioner’s view, this common understanding of
“money laundering” is implicit in both the transaction and
transportation provisions of the statute because concealing
or disguising any of the listed attributes would necessarily
have the effect of making the funds appear legitimate, and,
conversely, revealing any such attribute would necessarily
reveal the funds as illicit. The Government disagrees, con
tending that making funds appear legitimate is merely one
way to accomplish money laundering, and that revealing a
listed attribute would not necessarily reveal the funds’ illicit
nature. In any event, the Government argues, the statute
should not be cabined to target only classic money launder
ing because Congress intended to reach any conduct that im
pairs the ability of law enforcement to find and recover the
unlawful proceeds.
We agree with petitioner that taking steps to make funds
appear legitimate is the common meaning of the term
“money laundering.” See American Heritage Dictionary
992 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter Am. Hert.) (defining “launder”
as “[t]o disguise the source or nature of (illegal funds, for
example) by channeling through an intermediate agent”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (8th ed. 2004) (hereinafter
Black’s) (defining “money-laundering” to mean “[t]he act of
transferring illegally obtained money through legitimate
people or accounts so that its original source cannot be
traced”). But to the extent they are inconsistent, we must
be guided by the words of the operative statutory provision,
and not by the common meaning of the statute’s title. See
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206,
212 (1998) (declining to use a statute’s title to limit the mean
ing of the text). Here, Congress used broad language that
captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to
concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds,
Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to

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conceal or disguise the location, ownership, or control of the
funds. For example, a defendant who smuggles cash into
Mexico with the intent of hiding it from authorities by bury
ing it in the desert may have engaged in transportation de
signed to conceal the location of those funds, but his conduct
would not necessarily have the effect of making the funds
appear legitimate.
Nor do we find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse
a “classic money laundering” requirement into the listed
attributes. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, revealing
those attributes—nature, location, source, ownership, or con
trol—would not necessarily expose the illegitimacy of the
funds. Digging up the cash buried in the Mexican desert,
for example, would not necessarily reveal that it was derived
from unlawful activity. Indeed, of all the listed attributes,
only “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate
character: Exposing the nature of illicit funds would, by
definition, reveal them as unlawful proceeds. But nature is
only one attribute in the statute; that it may be coextensive
with the creation of the appearance of legitimate wealth does
not mean that Congress intended that requirement to swal
low the other listed attributes.
We likewise are skeptical of petitioner’s argument that vi
olating the elements of the statute would necessarily have
the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than
they did before. It is true that concealing or disguising any
one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the
funds appear more legitimate—largely because concealing or
disguising those attributes might impede law enforcement’s
ability to identify illegitimate funds—but we are not con
vinced that this is necessarily so. It might be possible for a
defendant to conceal or disguise a listed attribute without
also creating the appearance of legitimate wealth. Cf.
United States v. Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001)
(noting that the transaction provision, although designed to

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punish those who “attemp[t] to legitimize their proceeds,”
may be satisfied without proof that a particular defendant
did so). Petitioner’s “appearance of legitimate wealth” re
quirement simply has no basis in the operative provision’s
text.
Petitioner argues that the money laundering transporta
tion provision must be aimed at something other than merely
secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct
is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31
U. S. C. § 5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V). We disagree. A com
parison of the statutory language reveals that, even if no
“appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement exists in 18
U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the two statutes nonetheless target
distinct conduct. The bulk cash smuggling provision encom
passes, in relevant part, a defendant who,
“with the intent to evade a currency reporting require
ment under section 5316, knowingly conceals more than
$10,000 in currency or other monetary instruments . . .
and transports or transfers or attempts to transport or
transfer such currency or monetary instruments from a
place within the United States to a place outside of the
United States.” 31 U. S. C. § 5332(a)(1).
To be sure, certain conduct may fall within both statutes.
For example, both provisions may be violated by a defend
ant who intends to evade a relevant reporting requirement.
See ibid. (transportation of funds “with the intent to evade
a currency reporting requirement”); 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)
(B)(ii) (transportation of funds knowing that it is designed
“to avoid a transaction reporting requirement”). But only
the money laundering statute may be violated in the absence
of such intent. See § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (prohibiting trans
portation of illicit funds knowing that the transportation is
designed to conceal or disguise a listed attribute). Simi
larly, although both statutes encompass transportation of
illicit funds, only the bulk cash smuggling statute also pun

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ishes the mere transportation of lawfully derived proceeds.3
Compare 31 U. S. C. § 5332(a) (omitting any requirement
that the funds be unlawfully derived) with 18 U. S. C.
§ 1956(a)(2)(B) (requiring that the defendant “kno[w] that
the monetary instrument or funds involved in the trans
portation . . . represent the proceeds of some form of unlaw
ful activity”).
B
Having concluded that the statute contains no “appearance
of legitimate wealth” requirement, we next consider whether
the evidence that petitioner concealed the money during
transportation is sufficient to sustain his conviction. As
noted, petitioner was convicted under § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i),
which, in relevant part, makes it a crime to attempt to trans
port “funds from a place in the United States to . . . a place
outside the United States . . . knowing that the . . . funds
involved in the transportation . . . represent the proceeds of
some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such trans
portation . . . is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the owner
ship, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful ac
tivity.” Accordingly, the Government was required in this
case to prove that petitioner (1) attempted to transport funds
from the United States to Mexico, (2) knew that these funds
“represent[ed] the proceeds of some form of unlawful activ
ity,” e. g., drug trafficking, and (3) knew that “such transpor
tation” was designed to “conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control” of the
funds.
It is the last of these that is at issue before us, viz.,
whether petitioner knew that “such transportation” was de
signed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the
3 Section 1956(a)(2)(A) also punishes the mere transportation of lawfully
derived proceeds, but it imposes the additional requirement, not found in
31 U. S. C. § 5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V), that the defendant must have “in
ten[ded] to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.”

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illegally obtained funds. In this connection, it is important
to keep in mind that the critical transportation was not the
transportation of the funds within this country on the way to
the border. Instead, the term “such transportation” means
transportation “from a place in the United States to . . . a
place outside the United States”—here, from the United
States to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had
to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to
Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or dis
guise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or
“control.”
Petitioner argues that the evidence is not sufficient to sus
tain his conviction because concealing or disguising a listed
attribute of the funds during transportation cannot satisfy
the “designed . . . to conceal” element. Citing cases that
interpret the identical phrase in the transaction provision to
exclude “mere spending,” 4 petitioner argues that the trans
portation provision must exclude “mere hiding.” Other
wise, petitioner contends, all cross-border transport of illicit
funds would fall under the statute because people regularly
make minimal efforts to conceal money, such as placing it
inside a wallet or other receptacle, in order to secure it dur
ing travel. The Government responds that concealment
during transportation is sufficient to satisfy this element be
cause it is circumstantial evidence that the ultimate purpose
of the transportation—i. e., its “design”—is to conceal or dis
guise a listed attribute of the funds. This standard would
not criminalize all cross-border transport of illicit funds,
the Government argues, because, just as in the transaction
4 See, e. g., Esterman, 324 F. 3d, at 570–572; United States v. Corchado-
Peralta, 318 F. 3d 255, 259 (CA1 2003); McGahee, 257 F. 3d, at 527; United
States v. Herron, 97 F. 3d 234, 237 (CA8 1996); United States v. Majors,
196 F. 3d 1206, 1213 (CA11 1999); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F. 3d
110, 120–121 (CA2 1999); Dobbs, 63 F. 3d, at 398; United States v. Garcia-
Emanuel, 14 F. 3d 1469, 1474 (CA10 1994).

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cases,5 the statute encompasses only substantial efforts at
concealment. As a result, the Government agrees with the
Court of Appeals that a violation of the transportation provi
sion cannot be established solely by evidence that the de
fendant carried money in a wallet or concealed it in some
other conventional or incidental way. See 478 F. 3d, at 291
(characterizing the defendant’s transportation of money in a
box in United States v. Dimeck, 24 F. 3d 1239, 1246 (CA10
1994), as a “minimal attempt at concealment” that is distin
guishable from petitioner’s “effort to hide or conceal” the
funds).
We agree with petitioner that merely hiding funds during
transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if
substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money.
Our conclusion turns on the text of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and par
ticularly on the term “design.” In this context, “design”
means purpose or plan; i. e., the intended aim of the trans
portation. See Am. Hert. 491 (“[t]o formulate a plan for;
devise”; “[t]o create or contrive for a particular purpose or
effect”); Black’s 478 (“[a] plan or scheme”; “[p]urpose or
intention combined with a plan”); see also Brief for United
States 14 (“ ‘to conceive and plan out in the mind’ ” (quoting
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 611 (1993))).
Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is de
signed . . . to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute of the
funds, § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and when an act is “designed to” do
something, the most natural reading is that it has that some
5 See, e. g., Ness, 466 F. 3d, at 81 (concluding that extensive attempts
at secrecy were sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U. S. C.
§ 1956(a)(1), but “express[ing] no view” as to whether transactions involv
ing “less elaborate stratagems or a lesser measure of secrecy” would be
sufficient); United States v. Johnson, 440 F. 3d 1286, 1291 (CA11 2006)
(“Evidence of concealment must be substantial”); Dimeck, 24 F. 3d, at 1247
(“The transportation of the money from Detroit to California in a box,
suitcase, or other container does not convert the mere transportation of
money into money laundering”).

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564 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
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thing as its purpose. The Fifth Circuit employed this mean
ing of design when it referred to the “transportation design
or plan to get the funds out of this country.” See 478 F.
3d, at 289.
But the Fifth Circuit went on to discuss the “design” of
the transportation in a different sense. It described the
packaging of the money, its placement in the hidden compart
ment, and the use of animal hair to mask its scent as “aspects
of the transportation” that “were designed to conceal or dis
guise” the nature and location of the cash. Ibid. (emphasis
added). Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer
not to the purpose of the transportation but to the manner
in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context
was consistent with the alternate meaning of “design” as
structure or arrangement. See Am. Hert. 491, 492 (“[t]o
plan out in systematic, usually graphic form”; “[t]he purpose
ful or inventive arrangement of parts or details”); Black’s 478
(“[t]he pattern or configuration of elements in something,
such as a work of art”). The Government at times also ap
pears to adopt this meaning of “design.” See Brief for
United States 21 (“Congress focused on how the transporta
tion itself was ‘designed’ ”); id., at 43 (arguing that petition
er’s design to move funds without detection is proof of a
design to conceal or disguise the location and nature of the
funds).6 If the statutory term had this meaning, it would
6 This understanding of “design” is also implicit in some of the Govern
ment’s statements that secretive transportation is sufficient to prove a
violation of the statute. See Brief for United States 46 (arguing that the
statute covers any “surreptitiou[s]” movement of funds “to a location
where United States law enforcement authorities are impaired from de
tecting and intercepting them,” apparently regardless of whether such
impairment was the purpose of the plan); id., at 11 (“When a defendant
surreptitiously transports or attempts to transport illegal proceeds across
the border knowing of their illegal character, money laundering is the
appropriate charge”); id., at 13 (“The statute explicitly covers, and was
intended to cover, a wide range of conduct that impairs the ability of
law enforcement to find and recover the proceeds of crime”); Tr. of Oral

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apply whenever a person transported illicit funds in a secre
tive manner. Judge Smith supplied an example of this con
struction: A petty thief who hides money in his shoe and
then walks across the border to spend the money in local
bars, see 478 F. 3d, at 301 (dissenting opinion), has engaged
in transportation designed to conceal the location of the
money because he has hidden it in an unlikely place.
We think it implausible, however, that Congress intended
this meaning of “design.” If it had, it could have expressed
its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transpor
tation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex
formulation “knowing that such transportation . . . is de
signed . . . to conceal or disguise.” § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It
seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply
the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than
to focus exclusively on how a defendant “structured” the
transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of “de
sign” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would cap
ture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive
way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid
illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement);
yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move
the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement
but failed to hide them during the transportation.
To be sure, purpose and structure are often related. One
may employ structure to achieve a purpose: For example, the
petty thief may hide money in his shoe to prevent it from
being detected as he crosses the border with the intent to
hide the money in Mexico. See 478 F. 3d, at 301 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). Although transporting money in a conventional
manner may suggest no particular purpose other than simply
Arg. 46. Agent Richard Nuckles, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), appears to have adopted this standard at trial as well. See Tr. 196
(Oct. 12, 2004) (testifying that attempting to move funds across the border
without detection would be illegal, apparently regardless of the reason
for doing so).

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Opinion of the Court
to move it from one place to another, secretively transport
ing it suggests, at least, that the defendant did not want the
money to be detected during transport. In this case, evi
dence of the methods petitioner used to transport the nearly
$81,000 in cash—bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a se
cret compartment covered with animal hair—was plainly
probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds from
being detected while he drove them from the United States
to Mexico. The same secretive aspects of the transportation
also may be circumstantial evidence that the transportation
itself was intended to avoid detection of the funds, because,
for example, they may suggest that the transportation is
only one step in a larger plan to facilitate the cross-border
transport of the funds. Cf. id., at 289 (noting that “conceal
ment of the funds during the U. S. leg of the trip [was] a vital
part of the transportation design or plan to get the funds out
of this country”). But its probative force, in that context, is
weak. “There is a difference between concealing something
to transport it, and transporting something to conceal it,”
id., at 296–297 (Smith, J., dissenting); that is, how one moves
the money is distinct from why one moves the money. Evi
dence of the former, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove
the latter.
This case illustrates why: Even with abundant evidence
that petitioner had concealed the money in order to trans
port it, the Government’s own expert witness—ICE Agent
Richard Nuckles—testified that the purpose of the transpor
tation was to compensate the leaders of the operation.7
Tr. 179 (Oct. 12, 2004), App. 64–65 (“[T]he bulk of [the money]
generally goes back to Mexico, because the smuggler is the
one who originated this entire process. He’s going to get a
7 Concealing or disguising a listed attribute need be only one of the pur
poses of the transportation. See § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a trans
portation plan need be designed “in whole or in part” to conceal or dis
guise). But here, compensating the leaders of the operation was the only
purpose to which Agent Nuckles testified.

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large cut of the profit, and that money has to be moved back
to him in Mexico”). The evidence suggested that the secre
tive aspects of the transportation were employed to facili
tate the transportation, see 478 F. 3d, at 289 (noting that
“concealment of the funds during the U. S. leg of the trip
[was] a vital part of the transportation design or plan”), but
not necessarily that secrecy was the purpose of the transpor
tation. Agent Nuckles testified that the secretive manner
of transportation was consistent with drug smuggling, see
Tr. 179–180, App. 65–66, but the Government failed to intro
duce any evidence that the reason drug smugglers move
money to Mexico is to conceal or disguise a listed attribute
of the funds.
Agent Nuckles also testified that Acuna, the Mexican bor
der town to which petitioner was headed, has a cash economy
and that U. S. currency is widely accepted there. See
Tr. 188–189, App. 69. The Fifth Circuit apparently viewed
this as evidence that petitioner transported the money in
order to conceal or disguise it: “[G]iven Mexico’s largely cash
economy, if [petitioner] had successfully transported the
funds to Mexico without detection, the jury was entitled to
find that the funds would have been better concealed or con
cealable after the transportation than before.” 478 F. 3d, at
292. The statutory text makes clear, however, that a convic
tion under this provision requires proof that the purpose—
not merely effect—of the transportation was to conceal or
disguise a listed attribute. Although the evidence sug
gested that petitioner’s transportation would have had the
effect of concealing the funds, the evidence did not demon
strate that such concealment was the purpose of the trans
portation because, for instance, there was no evidence that
petitioner knew about or intended the effect.8
8 In many cases, a criminal defendant’s knowledge or purpose is not es
tablished by direct evidence but instead is shown circumstantially based
on inferences drawn from evidence of effect. See, e. g., 1 W. LaFave, Sub
stantive Criminal Law § 5.2(a), p. 341 (2d ed. 2003). Specifically, where

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568 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
Alito, J., concurring
In sum, we conclude that the evidence introduced by the
Government was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s
transportation was “designed in whole or in part . . . to con
ceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the own
ership, or the control of the proceeds.” § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
III
The provision of the money laundering statute under
which petitioner was convicted requires proof that the trans
portation was “designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or
disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control” of the funds. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Although
this element does not require proof that the defendant at
tempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, nei
ther can it be satisfied solely by evidence that a defendant
concealed the funds during their transport. In this case, the
only evidence introduced to prove this element showed that
petitioner engaged in extensive efforts to conceal the funds
en route to Mexico, and thus his conviction cannot stand.
We reverse the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice and Jus
tice Kennedy join, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court but write briefly to summa
rize my understanding of the deficiency in the Govern
ment’s proof.
the consequences of an action are commonly known, a trier of fact will
often infer that the person taking the action knew what the consequences
would be and acted with the purpose of bringing them about. Although,
as noted above, the Government introduced some evidence regarding the
effect of transporting illegally obtained money to Mexico, the Government
has not pointed to any evidence in the record from which it could be in
ferred beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner knew that taking the
funds to Mexico would have had one of the relevant effects.

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Alito, J., concurring
As the Court notes, ante, at 561–562, the Government was
required in this case to prove that petitioner knew that the
plan to transport the funds across the Mexican border was
designed at least in part to “conceal or disguise the nature,
the location, the source, the ownership, or the control” of the
funds. 18 U. S. C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
Transporting the funds across the border would have had
the effect of achieving this objective if, once the funds made
it into Mexico, it would have been harder for law enforce
ment authorities in this country (1) to ascertain that the
funds were drug proceeds (“nature”), (2) to find the funds
(“location”), (3) to determine where they came from
(“source”), (4) to ascertain who owned them (“ownership”),
or (5) to find out who controlled them (“control”). But as
the Court notes, ante, at 566, the prosecution had to prove,
not simply that the transportation of the funds from the
United States to Mexico would have had one of these effects,
ibid., but that petitioner knew that achieving one of these
effects was a design (i. e., purpose) of the transportation.
As the Court also notes, ante, at 567–568, n. 8, a criminal
defendant’s intent is often inferred. Here, proof of petition
er’s knowledge and of the intent of the person or persons
who “designed” the transportation would have been suffi
cient if the prosecution had introduced evidence showing, not
only that taking “dirty” money across the border has one or
more of the effects noted above, but that it is commonly
known in the relevant circles (that is, among those who de
sign and carry out “such transportation,” § 1956(a)(2)(B))
that taking “dirty” money to Mexico has one of the effects
noted above. Such evidence would permit a trier of fact to
infer (1) that the person or persons who “designed” the plan
to have the funds taken to Mexico intended to achieve the
effect in question and (2) that a person like petitioner (that
is, a person who is recruited to transport the funds) knew
that this was the design.

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Alito, J., concurring
Of course, if the prosecution had introduced such evidence,
the defense could have countered with any available proof
showing (1) that in fact the achievement of these effects was
not a design of the transportation or (2) that petitioner in
fact did not know that achieving one of these effects was a
purpose of the plan. It would have then been up to the trier
of fact to decide whether the statutory elements had been
adequately proved.
At petitioner’s trial, as the Court notes, ante, at 567, the
Government introduced some evidence regarding the effect
of transporting illegally obtained money to Mexico, but the
Government has not pointed to any evidence in the record
from which it could be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt
that a person like petitioner knew that taking the funds to
Mexico would have had one of the relevant effects. For this
reason, I agree with the Court that petitioner’s conviction
cannot be sustained.